



## Majelis Selawat as a Political Communication Medium in Indonesia

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### A B S T R A C T

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This study attempts to analyze the propaganda delivered by the *Habib* in *PKB Bersholawat* initiated by PKB's *Majelis Pesona*. After the reformation, *Majelis Selawat* in Indonesia was utilized for various interests, including for conveying political messages. One of them was *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB) through the *Majelis Pesona*. *Majelis Selawat* in Indonesia became an effective medium for gathering large masses. Religion and politics touch the emotional and personal side of the congregation. *Majelis Selawat* are popular among *Nahdliyin* and Indonesian Muslims in general. *PKB Bersholawat* contains messages of da'wah and politics. PKB utilizes the *Majelis Selawat* as a medium of political communication to bring in the masses. PKB utilizes religious figures such as *Habibs*, *Kiai*, and *Gus* to achieve specific goals. With a qualitative approach and Jacques Ellul's propaganda theory, this study concludes that PKB utilizes the *Majelis Selawat* to convey political messages. The *Majelis Selawat* were chosen because they can bring in large numbers of Muslim masses and reflect PKB's identity as a party born



from the aspirations of *Nahdlatul Ulama* members, with the jargon of the *rahmatan lil alamin* party. The propaganda used by PKB in *PKB Bersholawat* is a bandwagon, transfer, and glittering generalities, in the form of support for Muhaimin Iskandar to become president, which is conveyed through prayers read by a *Habib*.

## INTRODUCTION

Since the reformation, the *Majelis Selawat* has become a common phenomenon in Indonesia (Rijal, S., 2020b). In some places, selawat is a spiritual actualization and a place for the commodification of religion, which contains capital commodities (Anggrisia, 2020). In addition to being initiated by religious leaders such as *Ustadz* or a *Habib*, *Majelis Selawat* is usually held in a prominent place, either in an open space or indoors, with a large stage supported by a magnificent sound system and lighting. In addition, the assembly is usually attended by *Habib*, religious figures, and local community leaders. The chanting of *selawat* is supported by a *hadrah* team that accompanies it with traditional *rebana* musical instruments. There are also lectures/*tausiyah* delivered by religious figures at the event, which are attended by thousands of worshipers from various backgrounds and levels of society. *Majelis Selawat* is an expression of popular piety of Indonesian Muslims rooted in the tradition of Sufism (Zamhari & Howell, 2012).

Several scholars have observed the emergence of these *Majelis Selawat*. Rijal noted that *Habib* confirmed their authority through *Majelis Selawat* that received a positive response and enthusiasm from the wider community. The attraction of *Habib* was mainly due to their charisma, which came from Arab ethnicity and was related to the Prophet Muhammad (Rijal, 2018). This gave the impression that *Habib's* preaching was more authentic and authoritative than other traditional preaching. *Habib*, with their *Majelis Selawat*, had a vast influence because they succeeded in packaging their preaching well, including through new media (Rijal, 2020b).

The label “descendant of the Prophet Muhammad” is called the religious capital for a *Habib* (Rosyid, 2021; Woodward dkk., 2012). This capital enabled their preaching to develop so quickly and massively. This Hadrami diaspora preaching is a new form of urban spirituality in specific contexts. In its development, their preaching is not limited and can be accessed by all segments of society—both urban and overseas—but also influences various political dynamics in Indonesia (Assegaf, 2023), (Mawardi & Permana, 2022).

The characteristics of Hadrami preachers in Indonesia are not singular. This is reflected, for example, in the preaching of Habib Syech and Habib Rizieq. Their preaching is seen as influential Hadrami preaching in Indonesia with prominent differences. Habib Syech’s preaching focuses on calling for love for Allah, the Prophet Muhammad, and his family and compassion for humanity. Meanwhile, Habib Rizieq and the FPI chose their path with firm preaching. Both movements aim to build a more Islamic Indonesia based on the same set of theological assumptions but differ fundamentally about how this should be achieved and what an Islamic Indonesia should be like. Habib Syech emphasizes piety and peace. Habib Rizieq seeks to build an Islamic society determined by behavioral norms and punishment for deviations (Woodward dkk., 2012).

In addition, Wicaksono’s research shows that the charisma of the figure who leads *Majelis Selawat* plays an important role. He gave the example of the Habib Syech’s *Majelis Selawat*, which is very popular, especially in Java. Wicaksono said that the charisma owned or attached to a figure is based on his prominent characteristics, such as heredity, physical characteristics, and physical abilities, such as a melodious voice or the ability to motivate his congregation. The obedience formed from the charisma of a religious figure can hegemonize his followers consciously and without coercion. The prayer culture that has grown strong among the NU community is another supporting aspect in creating the sustainability of Habib Syech’s charisma (Wicaksono, 2018).

On the other hand, Aryani said that *Majelis Selawat* differs from *Majelis Zikir* that was once popular in Indonesia. *Majelis Selawat* presents a joyful, happy nuance and enjoys religion, while the *Majelis Zikir* tends to be sad, melancholy, and gloomy with tears. Aryani researched the *Majelis Selawat* Habib Syech, Habib Luthfi, and Maiyah Cak Nun. He found the phenomenon of healthy-mindedness in these forums. The congregation who attended the *Majelis Selawat* claimed to

feel happiness and optimism in religion (Aryani, 2017). One of *Majelis Zikir* that was once popular in Indonesia was the *Majelis Azzikra* (Bakti, 2006). *Majelis Azzikra* is a *Majelis Zikir* with Muhammad Arifin Ilham as the central figure. In this assembly, the gathered congregation chanted *zikir*, read holy verses of the Al-Quran, and listened to sermons. The da'wah of the *Majelis Azzikra* was aimed at forming *khaira umah* (the best people) (Bakti, 2000).

*Majelis Selawat* developed along with the development of da'wah in Indonesia, which has grown rapidly over time (Bakti, 2011). Zamhari and Mustofa see the *Majelis Selawat* as a religious forum that responds to religious radicalism, especially among young people. Both studied the *Majelis Selawat Ahbabul Mustafa* led by Habib Syech in Solo. Habib Syech, as a Hadrami preacher, used Javanese symbols in his preaching. Habib Syech carried out preaching through a cultural approach like the *Walisongo* did by using Javanese idioms to get closer to the objects of preaching, most of whom were in Java. This strategy made his preaching take root in the local community (Zamhari & Mustofa, 2020).

*Majelis Selawat* in Indonesia shows a unique expression of religiosity. One can be seen from the attributes worn by the congregation when attending the assembly, ranging from t-shirts and jackets to flags. Rijal calls this the collective identity of the congregation, which shows their attachment to the assembly (Rijal, 2020a). Other researchers call it religious identity (Baidawi dkk., 2024). Such attributes are important, especially for young people seeking spirituality in the *Majelis Selawat*. The excitement shown thanks to the attributes in *Majelis Selawat* also adds to the attraction that attracts many people to attend, in addition to seeking blessings, which is the main factor for the congregation to come to the *Majelis Selawat*.

Meanwhile, Ken Miichi's research found that prayer assemblies in Indonesia are also used for political interests. One of them was when the anti-Ahok movement strengthened in Jakarta in 2016. Conservative Islamic groups are considered to have used the *zikir* and prayer assembly, which attracted many people for political interests and packaged it as a peaceful action. This condition shows that urban Sufism is developing and adapting to the changing political environment and establishing temporary strategic alliances with Islamic groups for specific purposes (Miichi, 2019).

*Majelis Selawat* as a medium for political communication can also be traced to Firtiana's research. He highlighted the political communication of Gus

Ipul (Saifullah Yusuf) and the role of Habib Syech in the 2018 East Java Pilkada (I. Fitriana, 2019). Syekher Mania, Habib Syech's fans, whose numbers are huge, are an attraction and are used by politicians in the general election. Habib Syech, who has a strong influence, appears as an opinion leader whose voice is heard in the East Java Pilkada. Meanwhile, Gus Ipul shows his closeness to Habib Syech on the *Majelis Selawat* stage to gain the masses' sympathy.

The use of the *Majelis Selawat* and *Majelis Zikir* for political interests is also carried out by political parties in Indonesia, especially Islamic political parties. One of Indonesia's parties holding a *Majelis Selawat* is the *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB). PKB is one of the parties that target Muslim voters, more specifically, the *Nahdliyin* (Romli, 2006). PKB was born after the 1998 reformation and has gone through various dynamics within their party. Although identical to *Nahdlatul Ulama*, Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organization, it does not necessarily make PKB the dominant party in Indonesia (Ekawati, 2016). In the 2024 election, PKB won 16,115,655 or 10.62 percent of the vote and was in fourth place under PDIP, Golkar, and Gerindra (Wienanto, 2024). In the 2024 presidential election, Muhaimin Iskandar, the general chairman of PKB, ran as a vice presidential candidate with Anies Baswedan and won 40,971,906 votes or 24.95 percent (Maharso, 2024).

There are several studies discussing *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB). These studies mainly focus on PKB's political communication strategy in winning the general election, such as that written by Kadomi regarding the role of *Kiai* in PKB's vote acquisition (Kadomi, 2022) or Dhakiri and Djafar who questioned PKB's political structure (Dhakhiri & Djafar, 2015). There is also research on PKB's internal conflict (Kamarudin, 2013) and an analysis of PKB's defeat in regional head elections (Dewanti dkk., 2022).

Research on PKB adds to the wealth of research on Islamic parties in Indonesia (Nurhasim, 2016). A frequently asked question regarding Islamic parties is why Islamic parties in Indonesia find it difficult to win elections even though Islam is the majority religion in Indonesia (Riyanto, 2020). Research on Islamic parties has attracted the attention of several scholars. Among them, Islamic parties tend to be pragmatic, only seeking votes and not showing a strong party ideology (Herdiansah, Ganjar, 2017). However, according to Mikail, Islamic parties in Indonesia still have a promising future. He said that one of the keys to a party's victory, including an Islamic party, is their ability to absorb the people's



aspirations and be free from corruption (Mikail, 2015). This view aligns with Fanani's opinion, which argues that Islamic parties can rise if they can be actively involved in the struggle for public policy issues and build a strong base at the local level (Fanani, 2014).

On the other hand, Yumitro said that Indonesian history shows that Islam is often only used as a political tool for the elite. Moreover, the involvement of Islamic parties in Indonesian politics has so far been considered incapable of solving various real problems that occur in society (poverty, unemployment, corruption) (Yumitro, 2014). Islamic parties are required to present themselves as parties that provide solutions. Islamic parties are not only able to discourse but must be able to provide breakthroughs and utilize their potential strengths.

As an Islamic party, PKB uses various methods and media to gain votes. They use conventional methods, for example, by installing outdoor banners featuring the figure of the PKB general chairman, Muhaimin Iskandar, at several points. The branding displayed is Gus Muhaimin 2024. PKB also utilizes social media. PKB also creates several activities to gather large masses, including the Gus Muhaimin Festival and *PKB Bersholawat* (S. N. Fitriana, 2022).

*PKB Bersholawat* is interesting because it combines religious activities (*selawat*) with politics. One *PKB Bersholawat* activity occurred at the Gelanggang Remaja Jakarta Timur (GRJT) on October 7, 2022. Several *Habib, Kiai*, several ministers, members of the DPR, and PKB politicians attended the event. *PKB Bersholawat* was held to commemorate the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad (T. D. PKB, 2022).

*PKB Bersholawat* in Jakarta is a series of activities of the *Majelis Selawat* in other cities, such as *Pati Bersholawat, Kebumen Bersholawat, Jateng Bersholawat*, which were also initiated by PKB, especially by the *Majelis Pesona* (Lovers of the Prophet's Sholawat). *PKB Bersholawat* is not limited to religious activities per se but is a vehicle for PKB's political communication.

From various studies that have been conducted, this study tries to further examine the relationship between *selawat* and politics, which in practice occurs in *PKB Bersholawat*. *PKB Bersholawat* is one of the public campaign stages that has not been widely highlighted by researchers focusing on dissecting political communication practices rooted in classical rhetoric. Therefore, the role of communicators in activities that combine religious and political activities becomes very dominant in conveying political messages (Kaid, 2018).

## **METHOD**

This research is a descriptive qualitative research. Qualitative research views social reality as holistic, dynamic, complex, and meaningful (Sugiyono, 2016). This type of research is content analysis. The content of the recording of the *Majelis Pesona* PKB activities was analyzed using Jacques Ellul's propaganda theory. This was done to analyze the political messages conveyed by PKB, primarily through the *Majelis Selawat*. The object of the research was the PKB Bersholawat activity at the East Jakarta Youth Arena on October 7, 2022.

This research refers to the propaganda theory put forward by Jacques Ellul. He calls propaganda a communication used by organized groups to create active or passive participation that is united psychologically through psychological manipulation and combined in one organization. Ellul then divides propaganda into two categories: political and sociological. Political propaganda involves the efforts of the government, parties, or influential groups to achieve strategic and tactical goals. This propaganda, for example, is in the form of short-term appeals (Ellul, 1973).

Propaganda, according to Ellul, is also divided into vertical and horizontal propaganda. Vertical propaganda is one-to-many communication, which relies on mass media to deliver messages. At the same time, horizontal propaganda circulates among group members, not from leaders to groups. Horizontal propaganda relies on interpersonal communication and organizational communication rather than mass communication. Political parties generally rely on horizontal propaganda, such as in party cadre training, mass meetings, and so on (Ellul, 1973).

Dann Nimmo calls political propaganda a mechanism of social control in which social order is produced by people who continuously strengthen political loyalty, religious beliefs, social views, habits, rules, and the same basic way of life. Propaganda is used to mobilize public support, spread ideology, raise awareness, create close relationships between each other, build loyalty, and maintain obedience (Nimmo, 2011). Propaganda, in general, has the primary goal of influencing public opinion, manipulating emotions, and rallying support or rejection (Kunandar, 2017).

The elements that will be studied in this research are aspects of the

propaganda deliverer or communicator (status of the communicator, credibility of the communicator, attractiveness of the communicator), aspects of the propaganda message (message content, message structure), and aspects of the propaganda media (Ellul, 1973). This study is a comprehensive study of the propaganda carried out by the PKB.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study focuses on the *PKB Bersholawat* activity held in Jakarta on October 7, 2022. Habib Sholeh bin Bagir Al Attas, Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf, Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman Alhabsyi Kwitang, Habib Jindan bin Novel bin Jindan, Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas, KH Manarul Hidayah attended the event. The ranks of the *Habibs* who were present were popular *Habibs*, at least in the Jakarta area and its surroundings. Also present were the administrators of the PKB DPP, including Jazilul Fawaid, Ida Fauziyah, M. Hasanuddin Wahid, Bambang Susanto, and several members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) FPKB, namely Faisol Riza, Tommy Kurniawan, Siti Mukaromah. At the *PKB Bersholawat* activity, Muhaimin Iskandar was introduced as a presidential candidate. At the event, Habib Jindan symbolically put a green turban around Muhaimin Iskandar shortly before Habib Jindan delivered a sermon about the Prophet's birthday. The host invited the audience to shout cheers of support for Muhaimin Iskandar and PKB and pray for him. In the middle of the event, Muhaimin Iskandar delivered a speech, Habib Jindan bin Novel bin Jindan delivered a sermon, and several *Habibs* read prayers (D. PKB, 2022).

There are several interesting elements to observe in the event entitled *PKB Bersholawat*. The first element is the status of the communicator. In principle, the higher the status of a communicator, the more they are heard and the more influence they have (Nimmo, 2011). In the context of PKB, the position of *Habib*, who prayed for PKB's victory and for Muhaimin Iskandar to become president, is important to observe. The title of *Habib* is not merely a religious figure but is also considered someone connected as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (Najamudin & Abdullah, 2022).

The second element examined is the credibility of the communicator. Audiences tend to consider propagandists credible if they are perceived to have authority, competence, and expertise and are trustworthy. The assumption is



that the more credible a propagandist is, the more effective his persuasion will be in the short term (Nimmo, 2011). The *Habib* in the *PKB Bersholawat* event is a credible figure in religious matters. He has authority in the religious field so that he is trusted by the audience, who are indeed Muslim, at a commemoration of the Prophet's Birthday held by a Muslim-based party.

This research examines Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf and Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas, two habibs who convey political messages in the *PKB Bersholawat* activity. Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf is the leader of the Majelis Ta'lim Nalwa (Nailul Author lil Ilmi wa Da'wah) in Jakarta. Habib Muhammad is a popular *Habib* and is often invited to *Majelis Selawat* in the Jakarta area and its surroundings. His Instagram account @official\_habibmuhammadassegaf now has more than 10 thousand followers. In addition, Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas is the founder and caretaker of the *Nurul Fata dzikir wa ta'lim ma'had*. Although his followers on social media Instagram account @alhabibhasan are not that many (2,277 as of February 7, 2025), on that account, he shows his closeness to several figures such as Habib Lutfi bin Yahya, Habib Rizieq Shihab, Anies Baswedan, and Habib Syech.

In addition, the communicator's attractiveness is the third point examined in PKB propaganda. Status and credibility are indeed important in propaganda work, but the attractiveness of a propagandist is no less important. The more attractive a propagandist is, the greater the chance of persuasion (Nimmo, 2011). PKB chose Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf and Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas because the two habibs have attractiveness with good and convincing rhetorical skills, not only their status as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad.

The attractiveness of a propagandist explains why, in the general election in Indonesia, many use influencers to get votes. Influencers are considered attractive for politicians to gain votes even though they do not fully understand the politician's political agenda. Influencers, especially those with many followers on social media, appear in online and offline political campaigns.

In addition, the content of the PKB propaganda message at the *PKB Bersholawat* event is interesting to examine further, primarily related to the content delivered by Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf and Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas. Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf was initially asked to read a prayer at the *PKB Bersholawat* activity. However, before reading the prayer, he delivered a kind of

sermon. His sermon generally revolved around the virtues of reciting *Selawat*, including *Selawat* as the key to success, and people who read *Selawat* will have their sins forgiven. However, in the middle of his sermon, Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf said, “*We are grateful for this activity held by PKB. We must be grateful, and we must support it. We must invite our children and wives to join the Salawat assemblies held by PKB. We are grateful, and we must support it. Not only worldly affairs but afterlife matters will be saved thanks to salawat to the Prophet.*”

Not only that, but Habib Hasan bin Abdul Qodir Al Attas also delivered a message in a prayer containing support for PKB. “*O Allah, with the charisma of Selawat, win the PKB party, O Allah. Give a leader from PKB, O Allah. Gus Muhaimin becomes president, O Allah. Leader for the people, O Allah. PKB wins. Gus Muhaimin is president. PKB wins.*” Therefore, by referring to the propaganda techniques initiated by The Institute of Propaganda Analysis with name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, and bandwagon (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009), this study tries to analyze the message structure in *PKB Berselawat* activities. Technically, the messages conveyed use the following propaganda techniques:

No.	Message	Propaganda Techniques
1.	We are grateful for the activities held by PKB. We must be grateful, and we must support. We must invite our children and wives to participate in the prayer assemblies PKB holds. We are grateful, and we must support it.	Bandwagon
2.	World affairs and the affairs of the afterlife will be saved thanks to prayers from the Prophet.	Glittering Generalities
3.	O Allah, with your blessings, win the PKB party, O Allah. Give a leader from PKB, O Allah. Leader for the people, O Allah.	Transfer
4.	Gus Muhaimin becomes president, O Allah. PKB wins. Gus Muhaimin, president. PKB Wins.	Transfer

In the first message, Habib Muhammad bin Ali Assegaf invited people to support PKB because the party had held a prayer assembly event. Propaganda

with the bandwagon technique appeared in the message, namely an attempt to exaggerate the success achieved by a person, institution, or organization. The choice of the words “gratitude”, “thank you” and “support” showed how good PKB was in holding a *Majelis Selawat* and gathering Muslims with *habibs* in order to commemorate the Prophet’s birthday. The statement of support was delivered by a *Habib*, thus adding value to the message when delivered in the Muslim community.


In addition, the second message was related to the first message regarding support for PKB, which was also associated with prayer. Prayer is said to be able to be a means of salvation for those who continue to recite it. The message also confirmed the importance of *Habibs* and prayer assemblies in an Islamic party. In addition, it also gave the impression that the Muslims who attended the event were not merely attending a party event but also a religious event that brought blessings and provided salvation in this world and the hereafter. The propaganda technique in the message is glittering generalities, which is associating something with one good thing to make the audience accept and agree with it without checking it first.

In the following message the third message contains support for the PKB, which is packaged with a prayer for the PKB to win and for a leader candidate (president) to emerge. The propaganda transfer technique is used in delivering the political message. There is a sentence “*with the charisma of the prayer, win the PKB*” in the recited prayer. Prayer, considered great and noble by Muslims, is used to convey messages in the form of prayers for the party’s victory. The transfer process is also seen in the mention of the name of God (Allah) in prayer. God is a symbol of something great and powerful.

In addition, the fourth message is not very different from the third message, which is also a prayer. This prayer in this section explicitly mentions the name Gus Muhaimin (Muhaimin Iskandar). The context behind it is that Muhaimin Iskandar appeared as one of the presidential candidates then. Ultimately, he became a vice presidential candidate paired with Anies Baswedan. Awareness of the importance of remembering Muhaimin Iskandar as a presidential candidate was echoed through the prayer assembly through the figure of a *Habib*.

The final part of the PKB propaganda review is about the propaganda media used by the party. *PKB Bersholawat* is a party activity held offline at Gelanggang Remaja Jakarta Timur (GRJT). *PKB Bersholawat* is also broadcast live through the DPP PKB YouTube Channel, and other social media such as Instagram, Twitter,

and Facebook are used to publish short versions of the activity documentation. The method used by PKB is in line with Nimmo's opinion that the characteristic of modern propaganda is utilizing all available communication channels (Nimmo, 2011). In addition, social media is one of the most important forms of political propaganda in contemporary political communication (Heryanto & Rumaru, 2013).



As an Islamic party, PKB's political media is directed to target Muslim voters. Therefore, religious activities that can attract large masses are chosen to strengthen PKB's position further. This strategy is not only to maintain their constituents but also as an effort to consolidate ahead of the 2024 political year so that activities such as *PKB Bersholawat* can be easily found. On the one hand, the prayer assembly is a religious activity (preaching), but when held by a political party and attended by politicians, political elements are inevitably mixed. This activity is commonplace for political parties and affiliated organizations or institutions (Asroni dkk., 2013). In the context of this research, *PKB Bersholawat* is under the auspices of the *Assembly of Lovers of the Prophet's Prayer (Pesona)*, which is an affiliated organization.

Thus, *PKB Bersholawat* is a combination of religious and political expressions of traditionalist Muslim groups that are packaged according to the audience's

pleasure. Several decades ago, political parties campaigned by gathering the masses through music performances, *dangdut*, and *campursari*, which were quite popular with the public and attracted many people. On such occasions, politicians insert their interests into attracting the sympathy of the masses who attend. Moreover, in some places, holding sholawat with a large crowd experienced commodification as a lifestyle because it was done so often (Alwy, 2024).

Therefore, observing the PKB propaganda in the *PKB Bersholawat* activity, it can be concluded that the *Habibs* who came to the event acted as propagandists. *Habibs* are considered religious figures who have charisma and authority. The messages conveyed, in general, are in the form of an invitation to support PKB and Muhaimin Iskandar (PKB general chairman) as presidential candidates. Their media range from activities with large masses in open areas to broadcast through the party's social media.

## CONCLUSION

The prayer assembly is one of the PKB's political communication channels that is still quite important by bringing up the *PKB Bersholawat*. The activity is under the auspices of the *Assembly of Lovers of the Prophet's Prayer (Pesona)* which is part of the PKB. *Majelis Selawat* was chosen because it can bring together many people and reflect the identity of the PKB as a party born from the aspirations of the *Nahdlatul Ulama* community. *Majelis Selawat* was held in several cities by presenting *Habibs*, *Kiai*, *Gus*, and party administrators. The position of *Habibs*, *Kiai*, and *Gus* are seen as religious figures and as opinion leaders and reinforcers of the PKB's position as an Islamic party, with the jargon of the *rahmatan lil alamin* party.

The *PKB Bersholawat* contains not only religious messages or preaching messages but also political messages. The propaganda used by the PKB in the *PKB Bersholawat* is in the form of the bandwagon, transfer, glittering generalities, and support for Muhaimin Iskandar to become president, which is conveyed through prayers read by a *Habib*.

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