



Exploring Misinformation and Disinformation Towards 2024 Election: Patterns and Policy Recommendations

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A B S T R A C T

Ahead of the 2024 election, social media offers ease of production and access to its information. On the other hand, it also encourages the spread of misinformation and disinformation and has the potential to influence democracy in Indonesia. This research aims to investigate misinformation and disinformation on social media and provide policy recommendations. The researchers analyzed mis/disinformation content from the turnbackhoax.id site from 18 July - 26 September 2023 by using qualitative content analysis methods to identify patterns of spreading misinformation and disinformation content on social media. This research identified the dominance of hoax and clickbait content types and personal and social content topics. There are similar patterns of mis/disinformation on every social media; its content is the result of digital reproduction from social media, online media, and microstock sites. The researchers provide content moderation policy recommendations using the reeve model of the regulatory pyramid, which consists of regulatory laws, standards, and co-regulation through independent institutions.



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INTRODUCTION

The digital transformation causes changes in the dynamics of political communication with the spread of misinformation and disinformation on social media. Social media plays roles in participatory democracy, influencing people's political participation (Fuchs, 2021). Thus, some content containing disinformation and misinformation before the 2024 election can potentially harm the digital democracy by increasing the number of abstentions (Muda et al., 2023). Moreover, generation Z and millennials have dominated the upcoming election with changes in the way information is consumed from text-based digital platforms to visual-based digital platforms and private messaging applications (Anderson & Jiang, 2018; Aoyama et al., 2011; Dennis et al., 2017). Unfortunately, the Indonesian government does not yet have regulations tackling misinformation and disinformation on social media while respecting people's freedom of opinion. Therefore, this research aims to map patterns of misinformation and disinformation ahead of the 2024 election on social media and then provide recommendations for content moderation policies in Indonesia.

According to (Aïmeur et al., 2023), false information has not yet had an agreed definition. Misinformation and disinformation fall into intent-based false information, where information is intentionally shared to mislead, while misinformation is without intent to mislead. In Indonesia, buzzers, known as social bots, have dominated political disinformation (Ong et al., 2022). Meanwhile, misinformation occurs more organically on a human-based basis, and

its spread is five times higher than disinformation (Aïmeur et al., 2023).

The ease of accessing news and information in text, audio, and audiovisual form on social media also supports the spread of false information (Prianto et al., 2021). As the 2024 election approaches, there has been an increase in the production of false information. The Indonesian Anti-Defamation Society (Mafindo) recorded that the number of hoaxes in the first quarter of 2022 was 534 cases, while in the first quarter of 2023, there was an increase of about 664 cases. The political content dominated the hoaxes in the first quarter through videos on YouTube, Facebook, and TikTok (Athifah, 2023).

This false information in the form of videos is a form of digital art. Digital reproduction is a part that accompanies social media and the production of false information. Previously, Benjamin (2018) introduced mechanical reproduction, which refers to duplicating a work of art using a machine so that the aura of the work of art fades to what Caygill (2020) called 'from magic to politics.' Meanwhile, digital reproduction refers to online, computer, and smartphone duplication (Hardiman, 2020). According to Hardiman (2020), digital and mechanical reproduction blur the line between authenticity and inauthenticity of a work.

According to the Director of the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem), Khoirunnisa Nur Agustyati, the disinformation trend began to occur in the 2014 elections, in the 2017 regional elections, and in the 2019 simultaneous elections (Perludem, 2023). She also stated the shift in disinformation, from public opinion with their political choices in the 2014 elections to attacking election organizers, in this case, the KPU and



Bawaslu in the 2019 elections (Perludem, 2023). In the 2019 Election, the government handled this false information in four ways: media literacy education, law enforcement, account blocking carried out by the National Police Cyber Crime team and Kominfo, and fact-checking (Susilo & Kodir, 2016).

A survey by Mujani and Kuipers (2020) during the 2019 presidential campaign showed that younger, better-educated, and wealthier voters were more likely to believe misinformation. This false information also risks people's unusual behavior patterns in responding to any content about the election. The existence of inaccurate content makes them anxious and afraid to respond to this content. This results in doubts about their decision-making during elections (Barua et al., 2020).

To overcome the problem of misinformation and disinformation, a human and technology-based approach is needed. So far, dealing with fake news through Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms such as automatic detection is considered ineffective and raises questions. Humans have emotions and beliefs (trust) that influence sharing behavior on social media (Horner et al., 2021). Meanwhile, relying on human-based techniques such as fact-checking is also considered less effective in preventing the rapid spread of content. This method also takes quite a lot of time and costs (Aimeur et al., 2023). Therefore, to be more effective in tackling misinformation and disinformation, significantly ahead of the 2024 election, the Indonesian government must have a policy regarding technology and human-based content moderation so that it not only produces technological solutions such as automatic

detection but also understands the fundamental perspective of human behavior.

Research on misinformation and disinformation by Aimeur et al. (2023) mapped the types of fake news in clickbait, hoaxes, rumors, innuendo, propaganda, framing, conspiracy, and others. Meanwhile, research by Rosinska (2021) found that the types of disinformation in Poland in the political and social-economic context consisted of gossip/rumors, extreme, pseudo-scientific, worldview, historical, and commercial. Also, Pathak (2021) tried to classify disinformation in the 2016 US election and the 2020 COVID pandemic, most of which stated that disinformation has the characteristics of propaganda, especially from mainstream news, making it more difficult to detect.

To date, policy research regarding misinformation and disinformation regulations in almost all countries still focuses on discussions about how these regulations can accommodate or even conflict with the right to freedom of expression, which is protected by the constitution of each country (Goldenziel & Cheema, 2019) Based on previous research (Saurwein & Spencer-Smith, 2020), European countries were fighting misinformation and disinformation through pressure on online platforms and recommending transparency. Meanwhile, research by Ahn et al. (2022) focuses on platform governance that focuses on Facebook regarding the adaptation of political and legal content in the United States, Germany, and South Korea. However, no country has created specific laws targeting misinformation and disinformation regulations (Tan, 2022).

In the United States (US), the spread of divisive political content disinformation is considered free speech

protected by the First Amendment of the United States (Hundley, 2018). For defamation, the United States provides the Communication Decency Act (CDA) and the First Amendment (Pozen, 2018). The downside is that CDA frees online platforms from the responsibility of content creators (Bhagwat, 2021) and creates obstacles to legal regulations regarding fake news from online platforms (Goldman, 2021). In another country, Singapore's Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA), a criminal mechanism to combat online lies, has limitations in scope, speed, and ability to remove relevant false information from online access (Yihan, 2018). POFMA, Twitter, and Facebook can be included in the 'intermediary internet services' category and are aimed at people who spread fake news directly or through social media (Tan, 2018). If users do not comply with POFMA, they will be given sanctions by terminating access to online locations through their platform and being subject to fines (Tan, 2022).

In response to mis/disinformation, Australia, in 2021, created the Digital Industry Group Inc. (DiGi) and the Australian Code of Practice on Disinformation and Misinformation (Croft & Dawson, 2022) in response to digital platforms by developing voluntary codes of conduct to address concerns around disinformation and content credibility (Australian Government, 2022). In 2022, the Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) legislation was introduced to set industry standards for online platforms and improve access to information on effective measures to tackle disinformation (Australian Government, 2022).

Another response from Europe is to enforce more self-regulation by

following the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation (EU Code of Practice) (European Commission, 2018), which requires online platforms to comply with self-regulatory standards to counter disinformation (Dando & Jack, 2019). In contrast to other European countries, Germany has a Network Enforcement Law (NetzDG), which requires social network providers to report processes against unlawful online content and build a system against fake content (Fagan, 2020). They also began to oblige online platforms with authorities for criminal prosecution and reporting unlawful content to the Federal Criminal Police Office (Schmon & Pedersen, 2022).

The existence of content moderation regulations in Indonesia in the form of the ITE Law can potentially violate the right to freedom of expression. Research by Helm and Nasu (2021) proves that the criminal sanctions approach is the most effective of the three regulatory approaches to content moderation—information correction, removal or blocking of content, and criminal sanctions. However, this approach risks being misused by authoritarian government regimes to suppress dissent and violate human rights. In Indonesia, the content moderation sanctions in Article 45A paragraph (1) of the ITE Law only prioritize 'consumer losses' in 'electronic transactions.' Thus, the primary control of content moderation is only from an economic perspective that prioritizes corporate profit interests (Rachmawaty, 2022). Therefore, Indonesia must create a regulatory model that effectively tackles mis/disinformation while respecting people's freedom of opinion.

Therefore, referring to these problems, there is an urgency to map misinformation and disinformation ahead

of the 2024 elections in Indonesia before the registration period for presidential candidates. This mis/disinformation is related to threats to information democracy, as access to public information is a citizen's right. There is a role in spreading deliberate, biased, and systemic mis/disinformation in democracy, thereby weakening social cohesion and inhibiting public deliberation and thus influencing political practice (Monsees, 2023). Mapping misinformation will help identify patterns and processes of mis/disinformation as efforts that can unfairly tarnish a particular candidate's reputation and can influence voters. From this mapping, an appropriate content moderation policy model can be formulated to ensure that information democracy is maintained.

METHODOLOGY

The researchers mapped the types and topics of election-related mis/disinformation content on social media. They used a qualitative content analysis method, with the research object focused on mis/disinformation content on social media, namely Google (Youtube), Meta (Facebook), ByteDance (TikTok), and X Corp (X/Twitter). They collected data by grouping content from the turnbackhoax.id website from 18 July - 26 September 2023 with keywords 'anies,' 'prabowo,' 'ganjar,' and 'election.' In processing and grouping data, they mapped content based on instruments from the mis/disinformation framework on social media, which resulted from researchers' processing. The framework is based on elements of types and sources of spread by Aïmeur et al. (2023), as well as risks from Barua et al. (2020).

Table 1. Mis/disinformation Framework

Social Media Patterns	Mis/Disinformation Types	Content Topics	Original Sources
- Facebook	- Clickbait	- Personal	- Online Media
- Instagram	- Hoax	- Social	- Social Media
- Youtube	- Rumor	- Law	- Microstock Site
- Tiktok	- Satire	- Environment	
- X (Twitter)	- Propaganda	- History	
	- Framing		
	- Conspiracy beliefs		
	- Others		

(Author's Processed Results)

Based on data collected from the turnbackhoax.id website, there was 119 mis/disinformation content ahead of the 2024 election from YouTube, Facebook, TikTok, and X/Twitter. YouTube is the social media with the most mis/disinformation content, with 77 content. Then Facebook is the second most social media, with 40 mis/disinformation content. Meanwhile, TikTok found four mis/disinformation content, and X/Twitter only had one mis/disinformation content.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Patterns of Electoral Mis/Disinformation on Social Media

Ahead of the 2024 Election, mis/disinformation political content on social media is dominated by hoaxes and clickbait compared to other types of mis/disinformation such as rumors, satire, propaganda, framing, and conspiracy beliefs. The emergence of clickbait

content ahead of the election is related to what is called the 'attention economy' which refers to the competition between content creators to attract public attention and the monetization process in the context of a saturated information market (Blom & Hansen, 2015; RUBIN, 2021). The dominance of clickbait content ahead of the election was often found on video-based social media, such as YouTube and Facebook.



Figure 1. Clickbait on Anies Baswedan (Screenshot of Turnbackhoax)

The Suara Rakyat YouTube account uploaded the clickbait content in image one on July 14, 2023, titled “GEMPAR HARI INI ! MEGAWATI RESMI TANDATANGANI PUAN JADI CAWAPRES ANIES 2024.(TODAY'S SHOCK! MEGAWATI OFFICIALLY SIGNED PUAN AS ANIES' VICE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE FOR 2024).” The title of the clickbait video uses a provocative word in the title, namely “Gempar”, followed by an exclamation mark (!). Moreover, the title on the video thumbnail also uses a provocative sentence, namely “INI BARU MANTAB” followed by an exclamation mark (!). Several other clickbait videos (figures 4 & 7) also use the same title characteristics, starting with a provocative word or sentence, written in capital letters, and ending with an exclamation mark (!). The title of clickbait content is deliberately exaggerated, provocative, and bombastic

to attract the audience's attention. Some words that are often used as titles for clickbait political videos include “gempar (shocking)”, “mengejutkan (surprising)”, “terkejut (shocked)”, “memalukan (embarrassing)”, “breaking news”, “terbaru (latest)”, “geger (noisy)”, “panik total (totally panic)”, and so on.

Unlike content titles in general, which begin with a subject or noun, clickbait content titles always begin with a verb or adjective, only then followed by the intended subject. In political clickbait content before the 2024 election, the names of party leaders and their parties, even the president's name, are included in the title after verbs or adjectives to attract the audience's attention. Additionally, several clickbait videos also 'play up' issues between opposing parties and presidential candidates to attract more attention. For example, the clickbait video captured in Figure 1 above attempts to narrate the issue that Megawati (General Chair of PDIP) supports Anies Baswedan through the nomination of her daughter, Puan Maharani, as Anies' vice presidential candidate in the 2024 presidential election. PDIP already has its chosen presidential candidate, Ganjar Pranowo, so PDIP cannot support Anies Baswedan.

Clickbait content can also be considered deceptive political “advertising,” aiming to obtain many clicks through the audience's first impression. However, the content does not match the title after clicking, so the audience will feel cheated (Santoso & Kurhade, 2021). The way clickbait content works ahead of the 2024 election takes advantage of the curiosity of supporters of each presidential candidate (Bacapres) and supporters of certain political parties. Clickbait content also exploits the audience's insatiable appetite

to indulge their curiosity. When clicking on clickbait content, the audience will feel a gap between what they want to know and what they get (to know) from the content (Anand et al., 2017). Political clickbait videos before the 2024 election were made to take advantage of audience clicks. They did not aim to satisfy the audience with the information they got.

In this way, political accounts on social media can increase their income by gaining the number of clicks and viewers. However, many audiences are still easily influenced by provocative titles in clickbait content. Sadly, the more clickbait political content created before the 2024 election, the more viewer traffic per video will increase.

The dominance of hoax-type content is the second largest after clickbait content, ahead of the 2024 Election. Hoaxes are publications that look like facts but contain lies or slander, and do not have a specifically identifiable pattern (Rasywir & Kunci, 2015). Hoax content before the 2024 election was created to damage the presidential candidate's self-image by spreading false information and slander. If clickbait content is often found in video-based content, this differs from hoax content with a broader scope. Video-based content and hoaxes can also be found in content with images or photos and text only. Hoax content in the form of photos or videos is usually accompanied by manipulated narratives (figures 5, 6, and 8). This narrative contains false information, fake news, and even slander.

Unlike clickbait content, which is characterized by bombastic titles and content that does not match the title, the characteristics of hoax content are manipulated narratives. There are three characteristics of hoax content. First, the narrative does not match the context when the original image or video was

uploaded. The context means the date, moment, or atmosphere according to the original video or image. Second, the narrative contains the hoax creator's opinion based on personal interpretation of the original image or video. Third, some content has narrative claims that do not match the images or videos.

If you look at the title, the hoax content has provocative sentences that can attract the audience's attention, just like clickbait content. Some hoax content even uses titles with a combination of letters and numbers, such as “gempar!pelaku yang ingin h4bisi anies dit4ngk4p? pelaku akui dib4y4r dan diperint4h h4bisi ny4w4 anies”, “MEMALUK4N !! DETIK-DETIK GANJ4R DIBANJIRI TERIAKAN “ANIES PRE5IDEN” SAAT BLUSUK4N || TERKINI”, “Geger Malam Ini Demokrasi Siap P3-Ra-Ng, AHY Tak Terima Di Hi4-Nati, Langsung Ge-Ru-Duk Rumah Anies”, and so on. A piece of content can include clickbait content as well as hoaxes.

The pattern of false information found on social media can be seen from the titles or photos used by the content (Hidayat & Syech Alaydrus, 2019). Using convincing titles and photos, using provocative words, or using capital letters with exclamation marks (!) can cause people to believe the information being disseminated readily.

[NARASI]: "GEMPAR!! PELAKU UT4M4 PENJEGALAN ANIES MENYERAHKAN DIRI AKUI DIPERINT4H IST4N4 UTK H4BISI ANIES!"

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Figure 2. Titles on fake YouTube content (Screenshot of Turnbackhoax.id)

Figure 2 is one of the titles of fake YouTube content on the turnbackhoax.id website. All the words in the title are capital letters and use exclamation marks (!) to convince people who watch the

content. At the beginning of the content title, you also use the word 'GEMPAR' to liven up the sentence in the content title.

The topic of fake content/information on social media is dominated by content with personal and social topics that touch on religion, politics/parties, etc. Personal content tends to discuss personal information about the three prospective candidates, such as family life, lifestyle, hobbies, etc. Content that raises personal topics from prospective candidates directly attacks them personally and creates content that causes uproar on social media (Suryo & Aji, 2020).

Meanwhile, fake content that raises social topics is related to supporting activities, party networks, social consolidation, congresses, and other social activities by prospective candidates. This content is created to manipulate information about the social agenda or political agenda of prospective candidates. The existence of this content makes it easy for people to incite hatred, build political polarization, intimidate, and provoke (Monggilo et al., 2023).



Figure 3. Facebook Rumor Content about Prabowo (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)

Figure 3 is an example of rumor content spread via Facebook.

The topic is Prabowo's content about Prabowo selling Indonesia's forest wealth to China. This content was uploaded to the Bhinneka Tunggal Ika account in the Indonesia Berdalam Facebook group. The post stated that foreign investors from China took over a paper company, PT Kertas Nusantara, which Prabowo owned. However, this claim is not valid.

Then Figure 4 is a video from YouTube with hoax content about Ganjar. The video uploaded to the Lintas Opinion account entitled "Mengenaskan Akibat fitnah Anies Allah telah turunkan azab terhadap Ganjar selama di Mekkah (Tragic consequences of Anies' slander: Allah has sent down punishment on Ganjar while in Mecca)" received 93 likes with 3000 viewers on YouTube. However, the video does not contain information according to the content title. The narration in the video explains Musni Umar's criticism of people who called Anies Baswedan a liar regarding King Salman's invitation to perform the Hajj. The hoax video uploaded by Lintas Opinion is included in a personal topic about Ganjar.



Figure 4. Youtube Clickbait content about Ganjar (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)



Figure 5. Tiktok Hoax Content about Ganjar (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)

Figure 5, with a 46-second video on the TikTok account arifin.1230, is an example of hoax content with a personal topic. The video has a narrative “WAH PAK GANJAR MINUM APA TUH!?! minuman beralkohol di bilang es teh dikira rakyat bodoh mau dibawa kmn negara ini (WOW, MR. GANJAR, WHAT IS THAT YOU ARE DRINKING!?! Alcoholic drinks are called iced tea, people think they are stupid, and they want to take them to this country).”The video shows Ganjar drinking a bottled drink that is thought to be an alcoholic drink. However, the fact is that Ganjar was drinking Panser Iced Tea. The content uploaded by arifin.1230 received 183 likes with 210 comments.

Next, figure 6 is an uploaded image from Yuri's Facebook account. The picture uploaded by Yuri shows Anies doing activities at a temple. The caption on the picture is “ANIS BAS EDAN LAGI SEMBAHYANG MEMEGANG HIO DI KELENTENG (ANIS BAS IS CRAZY WHILE PRAYING HOLDING HIO IN THE TEMPLE)”. This post was uploaded on September

13. The caption of this hoax post is also confirmed by the text on the picture, namely “KETIKA ANIS DI BAPTIS MENJADI YOHANES, & KETIKA ANIS SEMBAHYANG DI WIHARA, BINGUNG..YG MN AGAMA ANIS, DEMI JABATAN RELA JUAL AKIDAH KEMANA? (WHEN ANIS WAS BAPTIZED INTO JOHN & WHEN ANIS WAS PRAYING AT THE MONASTERY, HE WAS CONFUSED..THE ONE WHO IS RELIGIOUS, ANIS, IS WILLING TO SELL HIS FAITH EVERYWHERE FOR A POSITION).”

Meanwhile, from the picture, Anies, when he was Governor of DKI Jakarta, was visiting the Dharma Jaya Toasebio Vihara as an appreciation because the Vihara management had been helping to make vaccination a success in Jakarta. This content is hoax content with social topics related to religion.



Figure 6. Facebook Hoax Content about Anies (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)

Apart from social topics related to religion, Figure 7 shows a YouTube video containing misleading information to put presidential candidates down. The video uploaded by Political Secrets

claims a narrative stating that Ganjar admitted to bribing the Corruption Eradication Committee (KPK) to thwart Anies on Jokowi's orders. With a thumbnail image showing Ganjar prostrating himself in front of Anies. The thumbnail in the video is doctored, and no credible information is found about Ganjar admitting that he bribed the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to thwart Anies.



Figure 7. Youtube Clickbait Content about Ganjar (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)



Figure 8. Tiktok Hoax Content about Anies (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)

Furthermore, TikTok hoax content claims a crowd of Anies supporters in Kalimantan (figure 8). This video is included in content with social topics related to supporting activities. The video uploaded is on the TikTok account of rizal.arif77 with a video duration of 1 minute 41 minutes. The video with the caption “luar biasa pendukung pak anis di kalimantan. semoga sukses buat pak anis.#anis#relawananisfor2024 (extraordinary supporters of Mr. Anies in Kalimantan. Good luck to Mr. Anies. #anis #relawananisfor2024” received 95 likes with 11 comments. However, after tracing the video, it was a video from the Yamaha Rx-King Indonesia (YRKI) Facebook account.



Figure 9. Hoax Twitter content about Anies (Screenshot Turnbackhoax.id)

Finally, an example of hoax content with social topics is on Twitter (figure 9). The video uploaded by the account @kakang_juaw has the caption “Acara Jalan Sehat pk Haji @aniesbaswedan di Jabar dikawal pasukan Kodam Siliwangi dan Marinir. SDH MULAI SI IJAZAH PALSU TDK BERWIBAWA DI MATA TNI YG AKTIF MENDUKUNG

SALAH SATU CAPRES, BRAVO SILIWANGI,,ayo TNI POLRI gunakan akal sehat (The Healthy Walk event for Haji @aniesbaswedan in West Java was escorted by the Siliwangi Military Command and Marines. THE MAN WITH FAKE DIPLOMA HAS ALREADY BEGUN TO HAVE NO AUTHORITY IN THE EYES OF THE TNI WHO ACTIVELY SUPPORTS ONE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, BRAVO SILIWANGI,,come on TNI POLRI use common sense)” got 10,600 viewers. This is misleading because the video is a twisted recycled video that was checked and clarified last May. The video contains unrelated video clips, including a video of the 2020 National Navy Preparedness Troop Event.

Mis/disinformation content is often found on YouTube because YouTube's policies are more permissive than other social media. YouTube created the phenomenon of clickbait videos as an alternative to increasing profiles with attributes assessed by algorithms. Hence, the importance of clicks, views, and channel subscriptions on YouTube to increase the visibility and reach of posted content (Lemos, Bitencourt, & dos Santos, 2021).

Election Mis/disinformation Content as A Part of Digital Reproduction

From the data collected by the researchers, there are similar patterns of mis/disinformation on each social media, namely that the source of original content information is the result of digital reproduction from social media, online media, and microstock sites. There is no authenticity in digital reproductions; mis/disinformation images or videos uploaded come from social media and

microstock sites, while video narratives are taken from online news channels. Digital reproduction in mis/disinformation ahead of the 2024 Election takes the form of image manipulation or digital imaging, compilation of video clips, and manipulation of narratives from online media.

The screenshot in Figure 10 shows the results of digital image manipulation, a technique for creating digital art by combining several photos or images into one image with the help of editing software to provoke people's sentiments (Thakur & Rohilla, 2020). Figure 10 shows one type of image manipulation, namely image forgery with fake content in several parts of the image, intending to deceive facts that occurred in the past (Thakur & Rohilla, 2020). In the picture showing Anies touching the stomach of a beautiful woman with a personal topic, the woman's photo comes from iStock, a paid microstock site, replacing the head of the man hugging her with a photo of Anies Baswedan. Likewise, the content of Jokowi holding a frame is from Instagram @ekosulistyo8 with an original photo of the frame containing his self-portrait.



Figure 10. Image Manipulation (Screenshot Turnbackhoax)

The Jokowi photo was not reproduced just once; a photo from the same source was used to launch a hoax against Ganjar and Anies. The characteristic of digital reproduction means that works, in this case, photography, are not protected from political use because anyone can access content from the @ekosulistyo8 account, which is not private (Hardiman, 2020). Anyone can then reproduce and distribute it for political use following the interests of the users, both those who reproduce and those who distribute it.

In video content, digital reproduction of mis/disinformation is a combination of three forms: compiling existing videos from other social media, narratives taken from online media, and thumbnails resulting from image manipulation. One example is in Figure 11, entitled “Pantas Saja Prabowo Ganjar K3takut4n Deb4t Dengan Anies Gagasan Anies Tak Main² Soal Kampus Kedepan (No wonder Prabowo Ganjar is afraid of debating with Anies. Anies' idea is not kidding about the future of campuses)”. This hoax content with a social topic takes a video clip showing the chairman of BEM UI, Melki Sedek Huang, from METRO TV with a video title “BEM UI Protes Biaya Kuliah Mahal (BEM UI Protests on Expensive Tuition Fees)”. Meanwhile, the voiceover in the video is a reproduction of an article from cnnindonesia.com with a title “BEM UI Undang Anies, Ganjar, Prabowo Debat di Kampus: Jika Punya Nyali (BEM UI Invites Anies, Ganjar, Prabowo to Debate on Campus: If You Have the Guts)” by re-reading the contents of the article. Digital reproduction of articles also changes its form from writing to sound. Apart from that, the video thumbnail is also the result of image manipulation, with the original photo of Ganjar, who was giving a speech at Pancasila University, changing to Anies

with the addition of Ganjar's figure beside him.



Figure 11. Compiling existing videos, narratives manipulation, and image manipulation (Screenshot Turnbackhoax)

According to Hardiman (2020), three essential points regarding the implications of digital reproduction are closely related to mis/disinformation content. First, a work, which is mis/disinformation content, is enjoyed via a telepresence that masses lose their 'constant readiness for risky surprises' and vulnerability (Dreyfus, 2008). The telepresence masses, in this case, social media users who consume mis/disinformation, are present without bodies in their interactivity. Therefore, their vulnerability is not related to the body but to immaterial matters such as political views. Users as a telepresence mass are not ready to accept the surprise of the risks that occur from consuming mis/disinformation content.

Next, the digital reproduction of this misinformation content 'takes place very quickly, in the blink of an eye and can even be seen globally at once' so that the effect is virality, which is immaterial (Hardiman, 2020). This problem is related to one of the social media logics mentioned by van Dijck & Poell (2013), namely popularity. Initially, social media is created to be more egalitarian and democratic, with all users able to

participate. However, the maturity of social media platforms means that popularity influences how content will be noticed (Dijck & Poell, 2013). Meanwhile, this popularity depends on algorithmic and socio-economic components, most of which are quantitative. Social media platforms can even measure popularity in real-time, at the same time and in the same way as trying to influence or manipulate popularity rankings (Dijck & Poell, 2013).

The popularity is related to the popularity of the accounts that are the source of mis/disinformation. Some accounts have a number of followers, subscribers, or members who support the content to gain popularity. These examples can be seen in the four accounts in Figure 12. On Facebook, Ailyn Zoila uploaded a video entitled 'TEKA TEKI CAPRES GANJAR TEMUI TITIK TERANG.. SOSOK KUAT DI NU INI YANG DIPILIH JOKOWI & MEGA (THE PUZZLE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, GANJAR, FINDS A CLEAR ANSWER.. THIS STRONG FIGURE IN NU WAS CHOSEN BY JOKOWI & MEGA)' which is included in clickbait content in the Indonesia Maju group. After the researchers investigated, the account, namely Ailyn Zoila, was a creator of a group founded on July 7 with around 28 thousand members. Meanwhile, on Tiktok, the @ganjarbtp2024 account can no longer be accessed even though it can still be found when searched on a Google browser. The account appears to have more than 400 thousand followers.

On Twitter, @MayaA62580468 often uploads election-related content, one of which she reposted hoax content originating from Tiktok @nusantarauntukkhilafah on September

26, 2023. With almost 5 thousand followers, the video received 15.7K views and 447 likes until it was distributed again via other accounts via retweets, as many as 266. Interestingly, on YouTube accounts, the researchers found that most of the YouTube accounts that had a fantastic number of subscribers posted mis/disinformation content. One is Gajah Mada TV, which has over 600 thousand subscribers. One of the hoax content is entitled 'WOW! PRABOWO, SBY & GATOT NURMANTYO BERSAMA TNI AKN PER4NG BELA RAKYAT USIR INVESTOR CINA DI REMPANG (WOW! PRABOWO, SBY and GATOT NURMANTYO TOGETHER WITH THE TNI WILL FIGHT TO DEFEND THE PEOPLE AND EXPEL CHINESE INVESTORS IN REMPANG)' posted on September 26, 2023, received 83 comments and more than 6 thousand views. Also, there is also an account, namely KURSI POLITIK, with 330 thousand subscribers on YouTube. The account has clickbait content 'on Jokowi's orders; Surya Paloh declares his resignation from supporting Anies' with 139 comments and 31 thousand views.




Figure 12. Several sources of mis/disinformation accounts on Youtube, Facebook, Tiktok, and Twitter (from above)

The final implication speaks to the hyperpoliticization of content with disrupted spatial rules. This disappearance of spatial boundaries also eliminates the boundaries between one platform and another social media platform. For example, YouTube content can easily be distributed and reproduced on other social media platforms. Users can easily access and download images or videos belonging to other users without being tied to place and time. Social media features facilitate downloading content like YouTube and TikTok to download videos and then Facebook and Twitter to download images. If there is no download feature, users can download via free sites available on the internet just by copying the video address.

In this implication, content published without the intention of going viral can become viral beyond the control of the spreader or those who reproduce it. Therefore, the political effect on digital content reproduction is much more significant than mechanical reproduction because in social media, the spatial boundaries, the space between public and private are faded (Hardiman, 2020). It is related to digital intermediation with a plurality of media whose processes are so complex that they question user agency regarding mis/disinformation. Hutchinson (2023) defines digital intermediation as a combination and process with digital media actors, including technology, agency, and automation, that determines the exposure of content to its audience and is related to the complexity of the interconnected processes of content production,

distribution, and consumption. Users lose agency in determining the content on their homepage with less human intervention in invisible recommendation filtering mechanisms. Users must ultimately have insights to control their information space with diverse content, including mis/disinformation content. (Hutchinson, 2023)

Apart from digital intermediation, the reproduction of mis/disinformation content is also related to transmediation, which, according to Elleström (2019), 'refers to the idea of 're' and 'trans'-mediation repeated through other technical media' (p.5). Transmediation is about transferring ideas or narratives across media and creating a new narrative when reproduced. According to Bruhn & (Bruhn & Schirmacher, 2021), transmediation 'reconstructs meaning that was previously mediated by another type of media' (p.115). In the context of mis/disinformation, transmediation can be seen in how online media articles are transmediated into voice overs in mis/disinformation content in the form of videos. Giving it a new title and adding images and captions forms a new idea different from the original article.



Figure 12. Mis/disinformation Process Ahead of The 2024 Elections (Author's Processed Results)

Re-thinking the Systemic Flow of Content Moderation Policies for Election

So far, government content moderation is implemented by unilaterally deleting content without

transparency. Data from the Content Removal Transparency Report released by Google noted that Indonesia removed more than 500,000 URLs and was in first place as the country with the most content removed (Conney & Yudha, 2021). It cannot be separated from the influence of legal regulations that have been used to regulate various content and its distribution on social media, namely Law Number 11 of 2008 concerning Information and Electronic Transactions (UU ITE), PP No. 71 of 2019, as well as Regulation of the Minister of Communication and Information (Permenkominfo) Number 5 of 2020 concerning Private Electronic System Operators (ESO) (Audrine & Setiawan, 2022).

These three rules are also used in the context of election content. Their implementation is under the supervision of the KPU and Bawaslu, in collaboration with the Ministry of Communication and Information and the Cyber Police. However, the implementation of these regulations to date has not been optimal because the regulations made are still too broad and have not explicitly defined what content is prohibited and what the content regulation mechanism is. No particular independent institution is tasked with assessing such content. (Monggilo et al., 2023)

The findings in this research show that mis/disinformation content during the 2024 election is caused by a continuous content reproduction process. The dominant distribution pattern occurs in mis/disinformation content. Meanwhile, this illegal content is dominated by image, narrative, and video manipulation in the form of video remixes, image forgery, and narrative patches that do not match the content of the image or video. This manipulated

content is dangerous because it has layers of meaning and contains layers of context (deep fake).

Even though there has been a lot of mis/disinformation content circulating since the beginning of the election until now, Bawaslu's monitoring system has not run optimally due to its limited access and authority. Bawaslu, through its internet content monitoring task force, only has the authority to monitor content, not take action or impose sanctions. Overlapping authority and legal regulations in dealing with mis/disinformation content during the 2024 election mean that their implementation may not be optimal.

However, on the other hand, the government's frequent actions to delete content show that the current content moderation rules favor the state (state-centric) and lead to abuse of power. Removing excessive content will also harm digital democracy, which the President has often spoken about in his speeches. Digital democracy itself includes freedom of expression and opinion in the digital space.

During the 2024 election, abuse of power occurs not only in the digital space but also in the reality space. Not long ago, President Jokowi stated that the President and other state officials may campaign and stand for certain candidates by referring to the article 299 in Law Number 7 of 2017 (Erika & Ihsanuddin, 2024). On several occasions, we can also see several state officials participating in the campaigns of specific candidate pairs. Moreover, the actions of officials who campaign during the election are used as content on social media and have the opportunity to increase the space for mis/disinformation content during the election. Responding to the polemic, Bawaslu attempted to reprimand and

write to President Jokowi regarding the limits on state officials during the election. Even though they can impose strict sanctions on various violations during elections, both in the real and digital space, Bawaslu very rarely provides strict sanctions. It only gives continuous warnings and gives the impression of neglecting them.

To overcome mis/disinformation content, Prochazka in Jiang et al. (2023) argues that the problem of fake news cannot be resolved only with an internet-based approach, so it requires the role of a human resources. The complex problems that arise from these two directions (internet and human) encourage the importance of a systemic approach through content moderation policies as a basis for their implementation by the government and platforms for democracy in the digital space in the 2024 elections. Therefore, this research invites us to rethink the flow of content moderation in Indonesia, one of which is through a pyramid arrangement of the reeve model of the regulatory pyramid which consists of regulatory laws, standards, co-regulation through independent institutions, self-regulation by platforms and voluntary compliance by society through mature digital understanding (Marsden et al., 2020).

Regulatory laws lead to calls for a revision of the ITE Law so that it is not state-centric, referring to this current research findings that the government tends to regulate Indonesian internet activities, by limiting and blocking. The revision could be applied by creating standards created through a bottom-up process, not top-down: in this case, it can be based on democratic values in Indonesia as stated in articles 27-34 of the 1945 Constitution, and the fourth

principle of Pancasila containing "democracy, led by wisdom in deliberation/representation." Then the content prohibition should be redefined in detail as well as transparency. Meanwhile, the core of the problem of solving human-based moderation is the implementation of co-regulation, which protects users' fundamental rights in the online world, and co-regulation with social media platforms. For internet-based moderation through a self-regulation platform with an application of machine learning and AI (compiled by programming experts) can be a solution for bot detection, and content narratives that can be adjusted through Indonesian regulatory laws (if they already exist). Then self-image manipulation platform regulations can also develop a taxonomy of image manipulation detection methods and a general framework for copy-move forgery detection CMFD methods (Thakur & Rohilla, 2020).

The latter is undoubtedly the most crucial element in the implementation of digital democracy, especially in the context of the 2024 elections, namely the involvement of the public, who are also social media users and content distributors or even producers. In this case, they are able to take advantage of the role of mainstream media and public spaces as information space providers. Therefore, systematically all elements of information dissemination spaces can run conductively and encourage elections that uphold democratic rights.

CONCLUSION

Competition to attract public attention in a saturated information market produces mis/disinformation content dominated by clickbait and hoax types on social media. Including most personal

and social topics, this content has the same pattern of mis/disinformation ahead of the 2024 Election on every social media, with the source of content information being the result of digital reproduction from social media, online media, and microstock sites. This digital reproduction content leads to a problem that Hardiman (2020) calls hyper politicization content. A user is unaware that its impact is in the form of risky immaterial shocks. This impact is accompanied by a spread that is beyond human control. This is because, from production and distribution to consumption, it involves non-human automation and algorithmic components. From this problem, a combination of human and AI-based policy approaches is needed.

This research invites rethinking of existing content moderation regulations in Indonesia. Current regulations are still state-centric, allowing political elites to have high control, which can impact democracy by imposing restrictions and blocking. In reality, new forms of campaigns using social media and advertising tools raise problems that existing policies cannot yet be overcome. Therefore, we recommend a policy based on the regulatory pyramid model, which consists of regulatory laws, standards, co-regulation through independent institutions, platform self-regulation, and community voluntary compliance (Marsden et al., 2020). This model underlines the importance of the bottom-up process in making regulations by including democratic values. Apart from that, we also highlight the importance of combining human-based with internet-based moderation, namely implementing machine learning and AI, as well as developing a taxonomy of image manipulation detection methods and a

general framework for Copy-Move Forgery Detection (CMFD) methods (Thakur & Rohilla, 2020).

This research only explores mis/disinformation that occurred before the registration period for presidential candidates. Therefore, we suggest conducting further research after the election period, starting with the assumption that content topics will be more diverse. We also assume that there is a change in the pattern of mis/disinformation to be more personal than social, as is the case in the current research. Thus, there is an urgency of balance in the content moderation regulations. Evaluation of policies related to content moderation in Indonesia could become further research. The results can be used to balance regulations between the state, market, and civil society.

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