

LANGO ACTIVISM (LEGAL AID NGOS) ON THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY IN POST-AUTHORITARIAN INDONESIA: EXAMINING TWO DECADES OF STRUGGLE

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the dynamics and challenges of the movement of a Legal Aid NGO (LANGO) in Indonesia in advocating for the rights of the weak, poor, and marginalized to gain access to justice during two decades of reform. Through historical, sociological, and political insights, this paper reveals the discursive narrative of neoliberal governmentality for the last twenty years. This study uses a qualitative method, with data collection techniques of observation, documentation, and in-depth interviews with three informants from Legal Aid NGO. Using the Foucaultian analytical framework, this study finds that neoliberal governance has shaped LANGO as a managerial subject that implicitly and obediently promotes the discourse and practice of neoliberal rationality. But on the other hand, LANGO becomes an administrative subject resistant to neoliberal rationality by performing several maneuvers and tactics: promotion, contextual adaptation, avoidance/avoidance, and rejection. This contradiction and ambivalence become a severe challenge for LANGO in realizing equal access to justice for the marginalized and vulnerable in Indonesia.

Keywords: NGOs; Legal aid advocacy; Civil society; Post-authoritarian Indonesia

Abstrak

Paper ini akan menganalisis secara kritis dinamika dan tantangan gerakan dari sebuah Legal Aid NGO (LANGO) di Indonesia dalam mengadvokasi hak-hak kaum lemah, miskin, dan terpinggirkan untuk mendapatkan akses keadilan selama dua dekade reformasi. Melalui tilikan historis, sosiologis, dan politis, paper ini akan mengungkap narasi diskursif governmentality neoliberal yang berlangsung selama dua puluh tahun terakhir. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data berupa observasi, dokumentasi, dan wawancara mendalam terhadap tiga informan dari Legal Aid NGO. Dengan menggunakan kerangka analisis Foucaultian, studi ini menemukan bahwa pemerintahan neoliberal telah membentuk LANGO sebagai subjek manajerial yang secara implisit dan patuh mempromosikan wacana dan praktik rasionalitas neoliberal. Namun di sisi lain, LANGO menjadi subjek manajerial yang resisten terhadap rasionalitas neoliberal dengan melakukan sejumlah manuver dan taktik: promosi, adaptasi kontekstual, penghindaran, dan penolakan. Kontradiksi dan ambivalensi ini merupakan tantangan serius bagi LANGO dalam mewujudkan kesetaraan akses keadilan bagi kaum marginal dan rentan di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: NGO; Bantuan advokasi hukum; Civil society; Post-authoritarian Indonesia

A. INTRODUCTION

In the past two decades after the collapse of the New Order regime, which was marked by the fall of Suharto from the presidency under the pressure of the reform (pro-democracy) movement on May 21, 1998 (Kasenda 2013; Suparno 2012; Tobing 2013), the political map of Indonesian Governmental Organizations (NGOs) has undergone dramatic changes. In the Indonesian context, the use of the term “NGOs” is often used interchangeably with several other terms such as LSM (Non-Governmental Organization), LPSM (Institutional Non-Governmental Organization Development), NGOs (Non-Government Organizations), Civil Society Organizations (CSO), Ormas (Community Organizations), etc. In this paper, the term “NGOs” is used to emphasise that the process of internationalisation of the civil society movement in “*global governance*” has made these organisations relatively more identical and generic.

This paper refers to the definition of NGOs from Lester M. Salamon and Helmut K. Anheier, as “organizations in developing countries with five main characteristics of formal, *private/non-government, non-profit distributing, self-governing*, and voluntary volunteering” (Salamon and Anheier, 1992). However, to explain the context of the current writing, it refers to a more specific definition of NGOs, namely: “communal organisations that are formal (professionalized), independent, and whose main objective is to promote common goals at the national level and internationally” (Martens 2002:282).

Changes in the political map of the post-authoritarian Indonesian NGO movement are characterised by the following three symptoms: **First**, in their first decade of reform, national and local NGOs grew, developed, and mushroomed in various parts of Indonesia. In the late 1990s, there were about 10,000 NGOs operating in Indonesia, both at the national, provincial, and

regional levels and at the district and city level, whose number was steadily increasing (Hikam 1999:6). Entering the second millennium, SMERU estimates that there were about 20,000 NGOs working on development and empowerment issues, community, advocacy, and litigation (SMERU 2000; Suharko 2003, 2005). A decade later, in April 2010, the Ministry of Home Affairs (Depdagri) revealed that there were more than 100,000 NGOs with membership in Indonesia (both non-membership NGOs and membership-based NGOs). Only about 10 percent of them were officially registered into the Ministry of Home Affairs (Suharko 2011:463).

Second, in the last decade, many national and local NGOs had no programs to run any longer due to a “financing drought”. Apart from the dwindling amount of money from donors, it has also been caused by more stringent, selective, and competitive mechanisms to gain necessary funding from donors. For example, the survey data obtained in 2009 involving 551 NGOs—most of them on the Java Island—show that around 90 percent of NGOs managed funds of less than IDR 500 million, and 75 percent of NGOs managed much less than IDR 200 million (Davis 2015; Hoelman 2021). In such a situation, many underwent a “near-death state”, *collapsed*, and even closed. Based on STATT records, up to 2012, 2,293 NGOs were active in Indonesia (STATT 2012).

Third, the pattern of activism and the work among these surviving national and local NGOs have become more formalized, administrative, hierarchical, and stratified. In terms of their internal administrations, activists or NGO workers were increasingly formulated and shaped as “managerial subjects”, whose administrative practises were geared to record a collection of validated evidence, ranging from programmeme planning, *input, process, output, outcome, and* measurable impacts meticulously administered for transparency and accountability. Instead of

recruiting *volunteers*, NGOs will prioritise experts who are professionals with special competencies. At the external level, instead of staying and living together in and with the society (*live in*) to organise “organic” grassroots communities, activists or NGO workers are now accustomed, moved, trained, and shaped to prioritise time and activities in front of the PCs and behind the office desk to fulfil administrative demands for mandatory reports required by government, country donors, INGOs, and corporations. In short, the actuality of post-authoritarian Indonesian NGOs has experienced a shift from *grassroots activism* to *managerialism* (Aagaard and Trykker 2020; Appe 2016; Chang 2002; Eagleton-Pierce and Knafo 2020; Georgeou and Engel 2011).

The term “*grassroots activism*” refers to the spirit and excitement of NGO social action in *bottom-up*, participatory, and inclusive manners in organising a group of disadvantaged citizens so as to collectively and independently pursue the betterment of social, cultural, and economic conditions in their families, communities, and societies (Anheier and List 2005:17; Cornwall and Coelho 2007:12; Mohanty and Tandon 2010; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997). While the notion of “*managerialism*”, as it refers to Merriam-Webster Dictionary, is a “philosophy or practise of running the affairs of a group that is organised (as a national entity) with planning and direction from managers professional” (Clarke and Newman 1997; Denhardt 1993; Drake and Simper 2004; Eagleton-Pierce and Knafo 2020; Edwards 1998; Harvey 1989; Hood 2001; Klikauer 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Locke and Spender 2011; Pollitt 1993; Terry 1998). This managerialism justifies the application of managerial techniques in all areas of society on the basis of superior ideology, expert training, and exclusive possession of the managerial knowledge necessary to run companies and society efficiently” (Klikauer 2013a:2).

The effects of such managerialism frame NGOs as hybrid organizations (HO) *as a result* of “genetic cross-recombination” between “*public-private-civil society*” sectors (Anheier and Krlev 2014:1395; Lewis 2010). NGOs have to face “a system” that is increasingly complex and pluralistic, involving various institutions and actors from the public, private, and voluntary sectors” (MacKinnon 2000:294). To a certain extent, NGOs also experienced a significant shift, from “confrontation” to “negotiation” practises, from “grassroots activists” to “professional workers”, “experts”, etc. Arundhati Roy called the phenomenon of the "professionalization" of NGO activism "*the NGO-ization of resistance*" (Roy 2014). According to her, NGOs have become “referees, interpreters, and facilitators” that sustains relationships “between the government and the public, between the empire and its people” (Roy 2005:311–12).

The power shift of Indonesian NGOs from “grassroots activism” to “managerialism”, to borrow Michel Foucault's (1991) term, is a representation of the diverse effects of different “*governmentality*” or “*governmental rationality*”. According to Foucault, “*governmentality*” refers to a way of thinking about government as “the right way to organise things” to achieve not one dogmatic end but “a whole series of certain finalities” achieved through “various forms of tactics” (Foucault 1991:95). In other words, the politics of NGOs in post-authoritarian Indonesia has experienced, to borrow the words of Aihwa Ong (2006), “the infiltration of market-controlled truths and calculations into the political domain”. Based on such neoliberal rationality, the whole of public life is determined by the actions of many regimes, while the way of governing free individuals is to encourage self-management in accordance with market principles, such as discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness (Ong 2006:4).

In line with Ong, Trent H. Hamann (2009) simply sharpens "*neoliberal governmentality*" as the creation of strategic social conditions that encourage and necessitate the production of "*homo economicus*", a special form of historical subjectivity, as an "atom" of self-interest that is autonomous and free. And those aspects of subjectivity production are intensified through everyday economic, political, and cultural life" (Hamann 2009:37). In short, neoliberal governance has situated NGOs into investing various *skills* and *expertise* as tools or machines for economic growth and social control at the same time (Miller 2014:20). This is where the complicity of NGOs as subject of neoliberal governance is important to comprehend. As indicated in Foucault's conception of power, changes in knowledge configurations have led to the reorganisation of reality as described by that knowledge. Reconfiguration of the political, economic, social, and cultural order in post-authoritarian Indonesia is basically a formation of all movements involving *multiple regimes* of neoliberal governance. It is through this mechanism that the social constellation in post-authoritarian Indonesia has undergone dramatic changes, in which creative production and reproduction are expected to take shape in forms of power relations, in all arenas of *democratic governance* that are constantly unstable, volatile, and contingent.

Based on the critical perspective of poststructuralism, this article is set to describe discursive formation and LANGO power relations with civil society, the state, donors, and the private sector in the era of the rise of neoliberal government in post-Indonesian authoritarianism. Through historical archaeological and genealogical insight into the production of knowledge and power from the "*welfare state to neoliberal state*" or "*government*" towards *governance* and/or "*governmentality*" (Bevir 2010, 2011; Gjaltema, Biesbroek, and Termeer 2020; May 2013), which operates through a *regime of truth* governmentality neoliberalism in Indonesia, this

paper will explain the normalisation and discipline of the “*regime of truth*” (Foucault 1980: 242) to describe the managerialism of LANGO and its forms of strategy and *counter-conduct* tactics against normalising forces.

LANGO was born in the early 1980s as part of (joined with) a national umbrella institution that had been established a decade earlier. LANGO was founded by several advocates and lawyers who have a commitment to enforcing the law, during which many violations of the law and abuses of power were committed by state officials. LANGO won the trust of the community, as is visible from the number of case complaints, ranging from criminal, civil, political, labor, and so on. LANGO introduces necessary help for structural law, namely assistance that is not solely based on instruments of positivistic articles of law but by making various breakthroughs in defence in order to fight for justice for the people who are oppressed and incapable in the field of law and economically. In ideas, the foundation of the establishment, vision, mission, and history of the institution, which is almost half a century old, affirm that LANGO's primary interest base objective is free legal aid to the poor, the lawless, and the oppressed.

The vision that LANGO wants to achieve is to determine the direction of trans-political, gender-just economic, social, cultural, and political transformation based on the people's movement, as well as guaranteeing and protecting the people in fulfilling their economic, social, and cultural rights and basic human freedoms. To achieve the vision and put itself on the side of the grassroots community, LANGO provides legal advocacy services to the people by providing:

First, legal consultation services are provided to every community group in the LANGO work area. *Second*, every justice seeker who wants to register for free legal consultation and assistance must show a Card to Prosperity (Kartu Menuju

Sejahtera/KMS) or Certificate of Disability from the local RT/RW. *Third*, justice seekers who are not free, pay the registration administration fee of Rp. 100,000.00 (one hundred thousand Rupiah), and consultation will apply for two months. And *fourth*, in the case process, justice seekers or clients are required to be available at all times to respond to calls from LANGO.

Based on the relatively limited level of financial resources, the literacy level of the law, which is still relatively low, and the need to deal with procedures and the legal apparatus, which is still considered "scary", the trust of the citizens is fixed entirely on *Pro Bono* legal aid agencies such as LANGO. Two decades of LANGO focus on human rights, women's issues, and human rights civil society to express, political matters to vote and be elected, economic issues, cultural issues, and anti-corruption advocacy. As the discourse develops on neoliberal governance, LANGO faces serious challenges regarding the process of neoliberalism in all aspects of social life. The liberal economy invaded the political arena and public services. The impact is that there is a narrowing public area. It is at this point that LANGO pays attention to advocating for space and strengthening the public in Indonesia.

Starting from the explanation of the discursive formation of governmentality and neoliberalism in the above-mentioned LANGO activism, this paper further proposes two main questions: First, how has the power of neoliberal government in post-authoritarian Indonesia shaped LANGO as a managerial subject? Second, how does LANGO counteract the normalisation of managerialism that reduces the activism of social movements? The two questions will guide further tracking of: *first*, LANGO's discursive formation as subject to "managerial governance" and *second*, LANGO's resistance to power normalisation and discipline of "managerial governance" of NGO activism in Indonesia for two decades.

B. METHODOLOGY

This paper used the Foucauldian *Critical Discourse Analysis* method to outline the entire substance of the discussion. Marianne Jorgensen and Louise J. Phillips provide an overview of this analytical discourse approach as described in the following brief points: (1). no language reflects a reflection on a pre-existing reality; (2). structured language in patterns or discourses—there is not only one system of general meaning as in Saussurian structuralism but a series of systems or discourses, where the meaning changes from one discourse to another; (3). these discursive patterns are nurtured and transformed into discursive practises; (4). the maintenance and transformation of these patterns must therefore be explored through analysis of the specific contexts in which language is in the language of practice or action (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:12).

Foucault's work is divided into "archaeo-logical" and genealogical stages. Although the two often overlap with each other. Foucault's discourses form part of his archeology, where the rules determine whether statements are accepted as meaningful and true in a certain historical period (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002:13). With the genealogical method, Foucault developed the theory of power and knowledge. Power does not belong to particular agents, such as individuals, or countries, or groups with particular interests; rather, power spreads across social practises that vary. Power should be understood as productive, not oppressive. Power comes from discourse, knowledge, the body, and subjectivity.

The *Critical Discourse Analysis* method was used to analyse primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through a series of *in-depth interviews* with three (3) resource persons from the LANGO Governing Body. To guarantee the confidentiality of the sources and the organization, three codes, i.e., L-1, L-2, and L-3,

were used. The secondary data were obtained from library sources such as books, journal articles, seminar papers, magazine articles, opinions, or newspaper reviews daily, NGO internal documents in the form of archives, research reports, *annual reports*, minutes of meetings, seminars, websites of relevant Indonesian and international NGOs, and products of legislation and regulation.

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Two Decades of Reform in the Maelstrom of Neoliberal Governmentality

You do not need to add any special indentation when typing the body text under the sub-section heading. The body text here is typed just like any other body text. In Suharko's notes (2003), the rapid growth of Indonesian NGOs in number and their expanded roles after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime are closely related to the agenda of international donor agencies—especially multilateral donors like the IMF, World Bank, and UNDP and US bilateral donors like, USAID—which demand “*governance reform*” as a condition for aid or loans to the Government of Indonesia in overcoming the economic crisis in the middle of the year 1997. The IMF signed a *Letter of Intent (LOI)* with the New Order government in October 1997. It contained a series of economic reforms—deregulation, free markets, and privatisation—combined with improved financial system governance and law in Indonesia in exchange for an emergency loan. In line with the IMF's agenda, the World Bank sets policy strategies in three main areas: (1) strengthening net social security for the poor; (2) stabilising the economy, and; (3) strengthening institutions for sustainable growth by emphasising “*governance reform*” as a prerequisite for loans (Suharko 2003:225).

Suharko contends that the loan operations from the IMF and the World Bank orchestrated all the major segments: government,

civil society, NGOs, academia, media, the private sector, and international donors, so that they could work together to address various *governance reforms* and public issues in Indonesia. Through the *Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)*, for example, the World Bank sought to conduct public consultations and cooperate with NGOs and other Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to respond to reports on the progress of corruption cases in World Bank-funded development projects (Suharko 2003:225–26). A case in point is the funding support from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), that at the beginning In 2000, the government initiated the programme “*the Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia*” which sought to promote *governance reform* in six key areas, namely: justice sector, civil service, electoral system and management, legislative, civil society and the media sectors, the corporate sectors, and two cross-cutting issues, namely decentralisation and anti-corruption (Suharko 2003:226).

Critically reviewing the role of UNDP and USAID in *democratic governance* in Indonesia, Suharko notes that both of them played an important role in the execution of the 1999 general election (completed in November 1998) (UNDP 1999). UNDP and the Government of Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) declaring international technical assistance for the 1999 elections to be channelled through UNDP with a total of \$90 million, of which \$30 million was managed directly by USAID. In addition, during the period 2000-2003, UNDP provided assistance to the DPR and DPRD, and a number of NGOs (Suharko 2003:226).

On the other hand, through the *Democracy and Governance (DG) programme*, USAID directed support for sustainability and deepening the transition toward democracy. Its strategic objectives are: (1) strengthening the government's capacity to design and

implement key reforms; and (2) strengthening the abilities of civil society to engage the government through analysis, advocacy, and monitoring. Capacity building for civil society was needed so that NGOs and CSOs could play the following four important roles, namely: (1) as independent analysts on key reforms issues; (2) as supporters of effective reforms; (3) as partners in constructive and collaborative government addressing key reform issues; and (4) as independent supervisors of the government (Suharko 2003:226–27).

In such a historical setting, it could be imagined how the positions of NGOs and countries were situated in the wave of “*democratic governance*” supported by international donor funds on a large scale. Through this huge disbursement of funds, on the one hand, international donors have exercised disciplinary and normalising powers on the government to fulfil its obligations in accordance with the requirements of the Letter of Intent (LOI) and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which have been signed, for the realisation of democratic governance among all stakeholders (government, private sector, and civil society). On the other hand, international donors also exercised disciplinary and normalising powers over NGOs to carry out their role in strengthening civil society participation, both in the process of planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating various government policies and programmes.

In other words, international donors are forming governments to act as *duty bearers* for public services while at the same time forming NGOs to act as *pressure groups* for the sake of improving the quality of public services. The pressure on the government was carried out through various approaches and strategies ranging from conducting discussions, studies, capacity building, publication and dissemination in public media, *public hearings*, public consultation, and advocacy related to specific

public issues and policies. Within the time span of five years after the reform, Suharko (2003) identified at least five prominent issues that were involved in NGO advocacy work, namely: (1) enhancing transition democratic politics; (2) strengthening civil rights; (3) improving human rights; (4) monitoring and eradicating corruption; and (5) advocating for accountability in government, business sectors, and donors related to environmental damage (Suharko 2003).

A long series of NGO advocacy projects on these various issues, starting from assisting grassroots communities to advocating for policy changes through the preparation of legal and regulatory products, has started the constitutionalization of public issues during the two decades of *democratic governance*. The results of such constitutionalization were interpretable as "an effort to form and discipline the state" by NGOs as "*organized pressure groups*", namely networks of well-organized pressure groups seeking policy changes in government in accordance with *democratic governance* norms and values normalised by the international donor network.

The majority of the hundreds of constitutionalized products of public issues as a result of the *democratic governance* transformation have been ratified for approximately the first ten years of the post-reform era (1998-2008). Hence, this decade can be labelled as "the period of formation and discipline of the neoliberal-democratic state by the organisation of civil society organisations (NGOs) driven by international donors". Three legal products markedly visible from this era were extensively mobilised by a network of NGOs with financial support from major international donors. They are Law No. 28/1999 about the Implementation of a State Free of Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism; Law No. 31/1999 about the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption; and Law No. 24/2007 about Disaster Management.

Meanwhile, the second post-reform decade (2008-2018) has become a turning point for the establishment and discipline by the state, which led to recentralization power. The need for recentralization of power is an inseparable part of *the grand design* of the national development vision as stated in Law No. 17/2007 on the National Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025. For the sake of the largely redefined goal, the recentralization of power has become an unavoidable consequence for the government of Indonesia so as to play a dynamic, effective, and efficient role in the free market. Power recentralization can be achieved through these two steps: (1) liberalising the market by embracing private corporations to make massive investments and (2) clearing the market of parties who will destabilise the operation of the free market. The issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 32/2011 on the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Economic Development Indonesia 2011-2025 and Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organizations (Ormas) has served a powerful recipe for breaking the “*bottleneck*” of “growth economy” as the leader of development in a third-world country like Indonesia.

Therefore, the second post-reform decade can be referred to as “the period of state formation and discipline of civil society organizations, NGOs, and the nationalisation or naturalisation of international donors operating in Indonesia”. Enacting disciplinary power over civil society organizations—which also encompass civil society organizations, NGOs, INGOs, and international donors—has been a representation of the enforcement of Law No. 17/2013 on Societal Organizations in the era of the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY).

In this second decade, the process of institutionalising democracy in the organs of the country is getting stronger and stronger. In an effort to pursue one's passion as a country that competes in the international market, the government is

increasingly aggressive in adopting regulations that are market-friendly. *Public-Private Partnership*, or Government and Business Entity Cooperation (PPP) is stipulated as a regulation fundamental to the creation of increasingly competitive public institutions, that are increasingly held accountable and professional. In order to secure and protect market interests, the state is increasingly tightening control over civil society organizations (NGOs).

In such a political constellation, NGOs are squeezed by four problems, as follows: 1). The private (corporate) sector is increasingly invasive; 2). State control is getting tighter; 3). Access to funds from donors is increasingly limited; and 4). The stronger the demands on NGOs to be more competitive, accountable, and professional. Instead of intensively doing *counter-discourse* to the almost non-existent government power and the balance of power of the opposition groups, the majority of NGOs tend to vote to secure the "coffers" for the survivability of the organization. In the framing paradigm of "*democratic governance*", labelled as "partnership", activists or NGO workers are increasingly being absorbed into managerial-administrative discourse and practice. NGOs are increasingly being sucked into the vortex of rituals and programmeme work cycles by *Result-Based Management (RBM)* tools, *Logical Framework Analysis (LFA)*, and *Theory of Change (ToC)*. To ensure that all *stakeholders* contribute directly or indirectly to the achievement of programmeme objectives, NGOs are required to be loyal and diligent in undergoing a "sacred cycle" called: Planning, Implementation, Monitoring, to Evaluation (Andersen, Packer, and Ratcliffe 2008; Crack 2019:623; Golini, Landoni, and Kalchschmidt 2018; Hulme 2010; Lainjo 2019; Mayne 2007; Örtengren 2016; Shutt 2016).

This change in the social constellation of NGOs is the fruit of intensive formation and the extensive multiplicity of the ongoing neoliberal regime of government for at least the last twenty years.

The social reorganisation of global capitalism works through a multi-layered and complex discourse of power and knowledge, starting from *good governance* reform, democratic governance, disaster governance, and manoeuvring back the state discipline of civil society (organizations), positioning NGOs as a form of “*Hybrid Organization*” (HO) which are increasingly being ambushed by attacks of “blood sluggishness”, “*fatigue*”, and “*malaise*”, so that they are reluctant to persist on *the front* and on the social movement scene.

2. Models Two Decades of LANGO Managerial Subject Formation

a. LANGO and the Context of Two Decades of Democratization

First decade (2000-2010). In the current wave of democratisation for two decades, LANGO has intensively carried out democratisation programmemes in particular enforcement of human rights, civil and political rights, ECOSOC (economy social-cultural) rights, and struggle for access to justice and equality for women and citizens who are less fortunate (vulnerable). LANGO advocates for various complaints from the public, especially those related to land, corruption cases, and policy advocacy. LANGO is also involved in advocating freedom of access to public information, facilitating association and gathering, and disseminating advocacy for strengthening democratisation and participation in accessing justice.

From 2006-2010, a catastrophic event occurred in this area, which ultimately kept LANGO busy with the programmeme due to the emergency response handling. However, after entering the post-disaster recovery period, LANGO returns to its core business. Its mission is to carry out advocacy and litigation work for underprivileged residents. In this regard, LANGO is very restrictive and consistent in determining programmes so as not to be distorted by the “disaster relief business” programme. Following

the occurrence of several cases of disaster assistance by the village head, LANGO did advocacy with residents affected by village head corruption.

The Second Decade (2010-2020). This decade was a winning one for LANGO. LANGO, together with the Umbrella Institution, formulated and proposed the ratification of the Law on Legal Aid for Underprivileged Communities to guarantee constitutional rights for the citizens seeking justice and equality before the law. The ratification of this law was LANGO's big victory in efforts to strengthen the democratisation process in the era of reform. However, LANGO did not use the law as a basis for a programme to get support from the government. In other words, LANGO did not take advantage of this success to reap the benefits of his own institution.

The law was widely used by various law firms throughout Indonesia to conduct legal advocacy for underprivileged citizens. LANGO, with its ethical principle of advocacy work, must be distanced from the government, political parties, and the private sector. This shows that LANGO has independence in carrying out work in the public interest.

In 2010-2020, LANGO conducted a long series of litigation advocacy for residents who were the victims of eviction due to the rampant development of good infrastructure for both private and public use in the region. Some of the cases handled by LANGO were the case of the South Coast iron sand mining, the dispute over the residents' land, which was claimed by the Indonesian Armed Forces, the construction of apartments, hotels and malls to facilitate amenities for tourists, the construction of international airports, construction of highways, mining andesite rock for the construction of large dams to supply water needs to meet the airport standards, and legal assistance for victims of violence by

the authorities security during demonstrations and victims of arrests without proper legal procedures (criminalization).

Under the leadership of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), there have been significant changes. One of the things that undermined the spirit of reform was the passing of revised Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC). The plan to revise the CEC Law has emerged since the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). While Jokowi shows a different attitude before and after the 2019 presidential election, which went smoothly on September 17 2019. In this context, LANGO paid great attention when carrying out critical movements on the revision of the CEC Law.

In the course of advocacy throughout the end of the second post-authoritarianism period, LANGO divides some cases into handling into seven sectors. The first was about the Land and Environment issue group. The second dealt with unfair trial issues. The third was related to religious minority groups and trust. The fourth was concerned with vulnerable groups, such as women and children, and in some cases, sexual harassment victims. The fifth dealt with urban communities. The sixth was related to freedom of expression, assembly, and unions. The last dealt with legal reform issues.

b. LANGO Organizational Management

This section will explain the task of organising programmes litigation advocacy carried out by LANGO with the network of organisational movements of the civil society, such as environmental NGOs, paralegal activists, ombudsman institutions, academics, student organizations, labour organizations, religious organizations, alliances of independent journalists, and various urban (city) community groups that are concerned with the problem of the victims affected by the development.

LANGO relies on the power of solidarity and networks of community movements in civil society rather than relying solely on donors. The most striking character of LANGO is its institutions which are proactive and open to all forms of voluntarism within the alliance. Student organisation groups are militant or active supporters who participate in a number of community organising activities. LANGO becomes the place of internship for prospective advocates before they carry out their profession as professional advocates. In this case, LANGO provides a very wide space for the regeneration of activists who will later be involved in litigation advocacy work.

From the funding aspect, LANGO faces big financial constraints because foreign donors providing operational funding assistance shift their focus and put more emphasis on government programmes.

"From the aspect of funding, there are several sources of funding that have supported our advocacy work. Maybe for almost 80% of it, we use donors. The rest we rely on consulting. The consultation might be some kind of social-enterprise yes. So, we take advantage of our profession as an advocate to buy legal services for people who can afford them. Where people who can afford it donate to us as much as Rp. 100,000 for 2 months of consultation. But it's just a consultation, it doesn't arrive in further stages. Because the energy for that we leave to structural. So, the consultation... I just realized that it was a fund the raising is LANGO (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

To overcome these financial constraints, LANGO created efforts in the form of social enterprise, through the sale of merchandise in the form of t-shirts. Though it does not generate large amounts of funding, this line of work is still carried out as a form of business independence.

"Around 2017, we tried to open a social enterprise, but with other sectors. If the consultation was based on my capacity as a legal

person, in 2017 we opened an independent business selling t-shirts. On the one hand, it is an economic benefit for the benefits we get. On the other hand, it has become a campaign movement. The designs are also problems- social problems. It's not big, because the market segmentation is limited. We're still running until now" (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

Another effort is to open donation channels, both from the community area, and from the predecessors who were involved in the management of LANGO. In running the programme and implementing LANGO funding, also implement financial governance as required by the accountability system.

This accountability is the responsibility of public institutions or institutions that use public funds economically, efficiently, and effectively, without wastage, leakage of funds, or corruption. To avoid double incomes between monthly salary and honorarium from the project, comrades in the organisation have a common consensus to donate the honorarium of the project to the institution. A consensus is a form of joint commitment that allows institutions to maintain their sustainability.

"This is the account. I got 6 million (rupiah). As long as it's from the honorarium, I would take some of it as a donation. So, it's accountable. For me, bro. Do donors know such agreements? As far as I know from friends from donor agencies, such practises, yes, they are like that" (L1 Interview, January 13, 2021).

In fact, the LANGO experience's greatest challenge is the pursuit of achievement in the program. What's more complicated is the report. This has become self-criticism. It has been a long time since work has been preoccupied with administrative matters.

"However, it is administratively accountable because it is a non-formal practise that was awakened. In context, the report will report the name of the recipient, the donor, for example, A will enter the database, the name of A will only be A will donate it is the policy of each institution. Yes, in LANGO, everyone who receives money from a donor must return it later, when the money will be managed and manifested in various aspects, a including monthly salary. From an

accountable point of view, the report is not a problem” (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

Regarding achievements as programme implementers, LANGO is also based on its logical framework work. This instrument is often used as a tool for analysis, presentation, and management that can assist in the planning process to analyse existing situations, build a logical hierarchy of goals to be achieved, identify the potential risks faced in achieving the goals and results, develop ways to monitor and evaluate goals (outputs) and results (outcomes), present a summary of the activities of an activity, and assist monitoring efforts during project implementation.

“Yes, this includes planning, execution, and then stages of accountability. There are two kinds of responsibilities. In the form of the narrative report must contextualise the outputs and outcomes of ... The programme includes the finances. Well, indeed between the problems of too detailed administration of the donor itself or other factors. When it comes to residents, it is impossible for residents to be absent one by one. That's what we have to answer. Negotiating between our model conditions in the field, the LANGO dynamically by generating reports” (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

In this case, the donor can accept what is done by LANGO. It means dynamic style work can be negotiated with donors. So from the side, LANGO, as the program implementer has the ability to negotiate practises in the field.

"Yes, as long as it (donor interests) can be negotiated, it can be justified" (L3 interview, January 13, 2021).

The problem that NGOs often experience is serving the administrative needs of donors, whose implications could lead to a “swelling” of financial administration. However, in the context of LANGO, it does not occur. No matter how many programmes are carried out, the number of implementers will not increase.

c. LANGO Involvement

This section describes the formation of LANGO in the democratization arena. How LANGO implements its work programmes reflects the complexity of the power relations that surround it, both in the external context (external) and the internal institutional context. This section emphasises the strong character of LANGO with a non-engagement pattern. In a sense, LANGO takes its distance from government and has a strong bargaining position when dealing with the strengths of government and private organisations that become adversaries.

Independence is a principle that LANGO adheres to when dealing with power. LANGO 's non-engagement approach is indicated in their various tactical choices in mapping out who is friend and who is foe. Judging from the aspects of the profession, grassroots activism, programme implementers, and institutional management, LANGO's track record shows that it is a legal aid organisation (OBH) based on the people's movement (non-donor driven). The non-engagement feature of LANGO is represented by the following indicators:

First, it is unnegotiable for the government and the private sector. For LANGO, it does not even matter if the legal aid funds through the APBN are withdrawn. Funds in the amount of 50 million per case until completion, which are given by the state as stated in Law no. 16 of 2011 concerning Legal Aid, are only one of the possible funding sources undertaken by LANGO.

"So during the Omnibus Law action yesterday, I was asked by the office person, LANGO does not accompany the actions of the Omnibus Law. There are suspicions. Perhaps access to funds will be withdrawn. LANGO actually assumes a position for against the government. So it's actually a legal aid fund too it's not a mainstream fund for us. Cause we'll think of another way, there are many other ways to survive. If that's the case, that's fine too. Since at first we saw this as a tactical one, it didn't become a strategic aid fund that law.

Because of the story earlier, lest there be any indications that same" (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

The nominal amount of access to legal aid is very small for the poor community. Meanwhile, the number of poor people who need legal assistance is very high. The comparison of the number of advocates with the poor is also not comparable. Observing that, it appears that LANGO never negotiated about funding from the government, as mandated by Law no. 16 of 2011, or from donors. All programmes and activities are put at the same value by LANGO.

Second, selectively choose donors. LANGO never follows market logic as well as donor logic. Although nearly 80 to 90 percent of funding is from donors, independence and selectivity are prioritized.

"... indeed 90%/ mostly depends on donors. maybe almost 80% of it we use donors.... and we never follow donor logic. If you talk about it from a legal point of view, that's the way it is" (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

LANGO is firmly trying to reduce dependence on donors. LANGO is even starting to dream of reversing the portion from initially 70% independent donors to 30% independent donors. One of the steps is to build social enterprise embryos and form long consultations long. The goal is for LANGO to become an independent institution, and that is serious reading for LANGO.

Third, be persistent and proactive in regenerating activists. For LANGO, regeneration is not only aimed at replacing old members and adding new ones but also at spreading the values of legal aid, structural justice and human rights. This practise is carried out by LANGO as an art to govern form. So far, LANGO has proven to be very disciplined in regenerating its cadre. Training in legal aid, public attorney recruitment, and internal training are always held regularly.

"Because if we want to regenerate our students, we play there" (L2 interview, 13 January 2021).

"Legal aid training is actually a cadre system that exists" in LANGO. Only then is it important to look at regeneration. So then legal aid training was revived" (L1 Interview, 13 January 2021).

LANGO always adjusts its regeneration to be able to answer various things, including increasingly formidable advocacy challenges. The organisational system is able to adapt and is compatible with the various challenges that exist. Sustainability must also be maintained.

Observing that there is a cadre level that is taken by LANGO. First regeneration starts from the Education and Training system. Second, those who graduated from

Education will occupy the second level, namely, volunteering. Even at the volunteer level, there are three levels: beginner, intermediate, and major volunteers. Each level is required to have outputs that must be achieved with equal responsibilities. A minimum degree is needed to know about law, human rights, and democracy. This position tends to have followers. Intermediate volunteers are gradually involved in advocacy. In Intermediate level, students must be able to read social problems. Meanwhile, at the main level, the position is classified as semi-staff. These three levels are voluntary. Third, after that, they become staff, who, in the context of "company", are still apprentices. The maximum cadre was carried out for 2 years.

Fourth, relying on the power of solidarity and voluntarism from networks and the civil society movement alliance. Law-based community organising continues to be tested by mobilisation and solidarity between human rights issues. LANGO continues to play an active role in forming and consolidating progressive organisations and alliances, even creating new organisation if needed. The point is that the source of political power is related to resources, people, and capabilities that must be improved.

Regarding material as a source of political power, currently LANGO has developed its ability to obtain funds directly from the community through the civil society solidarity fund. Even though that wasn't enough, because LANGO wants at least 70% of its funding sources to come from the community and not from countries or donor agencies. Of course, it will be more significant if the source of funds is 100% from society.

Fifth, the performance of LANGO shows the strength of professionalism with expertise as a lawyer (advocate). Values and understanding are strengthened by having professional technical ability. LANGO educates its activists to master procedural law techniques (criminal, civil, state administration, military, constitutional court, etc.), advocacy strategies, case analysis, and international human rights advocacy. In this case, LANGO also made a breakthrough by breaking the formal order to make it easier for society to achieve justice. Public speaking, research, writing, and skills in foreign languages are also important parts of LANGO's capacity.

"There are many legal recognitions. Those programmes that increase the number advocate" (L3 interview, January 13, 2021).

From the three things mentioned above, it is clear that LANGO has more than just the desire to become a reliable lawyer or activist. Identity LANGO is a grassroots lawyer who takes a firm position against injustice. LANGO is demanded not only to be reliable in court, but also to be a mover in society and a thinker for change.

Sixth, institutionally, LANGO is independent. It means LANGO cannot be dictated by donors, though. LANGO proposes more work programmes that have been independently prepared for later submission to donors. If the proposal is not accepted, it doesn't matter. Although there is a possibility of adjustment, it

does not conflict with the values that LANGO has been working on so far.

“From the start, the LANGO staff were the ones working on the program. As much as possible maybe then don't let the donor programme interfere with work LANGO. Several times we made a work programme. The Raperda (draft local regulation), sir. Yes, that work programme is what we offer to donors. If you want, please if you don't want it, that's fine (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

Seventh, LANGO has the courage to be independent like that, because it is institutionally supported by an umbrella organization.

d. LANGO Involvement

This section will emphasise the important points of the previous sub-chapter presentation. An important point that needs to be emphasized here is the LANGO's consistency in maintaining independence with a non-engagement pattern.

The following are the stages of LANGO discourse. *First*, the professional stage. Professional organisations that represent how to know about the expertise involved. In this case, LANGO's expert advocates have a knowledge base on advocacy assistance law, disseminate a series of advocacy for public education, increase citizen awareness, and serve as an internship place for prospective advocates before they carry out their profession as professional advocates.

“...but I'll just use the term apprenticeship, okay, because at LANGO Later there will be two differences, internships and volunteers. I'm just saying if in the context or office it is called an apprenticeship, if in LANGO is called a volunteer. Those three areas are the service staff for assistance law, and culminates as a director” (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

That knowledge base is the power of LANGO, so "the will to enforce" which means the will to uphold justice and equality as its knowledge base. However, LANGO doesn't only contain people with

a legal education background. All educational backgrounds are welcome, as long as they have an interest in social issues.

"Basically, law school is average, only at LANGO did I try to expand, not only accepted law but also disciplines each other. Because a few years ago we had a volunteer from the Department of Mathematics. As long as he has an interest and interest in social issues" (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

The discussion about the involvement of people outside the legal person seems to be a separate conversation in the LANGO trip. There was a time when it wasn't only the law that was involved. In the 1990s, there were a number of science students who became politically active. However, in the next era, law students changed, becoming more volunteers. It happened because LANGO imposed a requirement that training in legal aid be devoted to law students to regenerate young activists.

In 2018, there was discretion regarding those requirements, which then made the perspective of social change not the monopoly of advocates. Faced with these changes, LANGO is not completely smooth. In fact, every time a volunteer registration opens at LANGO, those who register make up the majority of the Law Department. LANGO suspects that this has something to do with community's mindset about LANGO.

"I'm still guessing. Maybe the mindset of the people is still viewing LANGO (as) a legal institution. Moreover, there is (name) the law" (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

Second, the stage of grassroots activism. The establishment of LANGO started with the grassroots activism movement. His side is clear on the poor, marginalised and oppressed, such as the urban poor, women, groups with disabilities, LGBT groups, religious minority groups, workers, farmers, fishermen, and other groups that are oppressed. LANGO relies on the power of solidarity and voluntarism from the civil society movement alliance network.

“One thing we emphasize...not to serve the material, but to serve to value. So, we don't use the term worker. We use servant term. Then volunteers, we used to call them volunteers. In its development, volunteer editorial was changed to APBH (Assistant of Legal Aid Servant). Then our staff referred to as legal aid worker. Those humans then have no orientation Theory” (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

For half a century, LANGO has been with the poor and marginalized. LANGO has assisted those involved in high-level political cases, spoken out against the abuse of power by the state, and continues to promote the rule of law, constitutional democracy, and human rights.

Third, the stage of implementing the program. LANGO as a branch of the Institute Umbrella, is an advocate for victims affected by public and private infrastructure development. The implementation of the LANGO programme has the following stages: (1) Complaints; (2) Investigation studies using the live in method; (3) Legal assistance; (4) Operation litigation; (5) Dissemination of a series of advocacy (for example: seminars, press releases, campaigns on social media) for public education and citizen awareness raising; (6) Cadreization through an internship programme for prospective advocates before they run for office as a professional advocate.

“The art to govern” created by LANGO is structured in such a way that activities are adjusted according to the organization's mandate.

“As a servant, he will functionally work on advocacy activities. Because of the needs of the organization, it needs structure. There is a campaign division, division advocacy. That's the structure. The people who fill the division are all also PBH (Legal Aid Servants). They do functional activities” (L1 interview, January 13, 2021).

LANGO as an independent institution, runs its programmes through direct contact with the grassroots (activists and residents). That matter indicates LANGO as an institution with a non-engagement pattern.

Fourth, the stage of institutional management. This section explains how LANGO becomes an independent organisation that carries out human rights enforcement, civil and political rights, ECOSOC (economy social-cultural) rights, and the struggle for access to justice and equality for women and disadvantaged citizens (susceptible). This is marked by the consistency of LANGO in carrying out a number of prerequisites as a professional advocacy agency. Institutionally, LANGO prioritises professionalism in providing legal services. This is indicated by the completeness of the institutional rules, which include: the Memorandum and Articles of Association (AD-ART), Administration System, Financial System, Human Resources (HR), Recruitment System (this recruitment is in the form of regeneration through an internship programme for prospective advocates before they carry out their profession as professional advocates), HR regeneration, work contracts, and institutional arrangements (Human Resources plotting).

"Legal aid training is actually a cadre system that exists" in LANGO. Only then is it important to look at regeneration. so then legal aid training was revived" (L1 Interview, 13 January 2021).

Ethical guidance (e.g., practising the standards of the advocacy profession in the process of selective assistance in selecting cases and donors), Standard Operational Procedure (militant work: available but not as detailed as RENGO), performance appraisal (e.g., regional minimum wage (UMR) payroll), evaluation (e.g., dismissal and rules related to worker performance), payroll system, and staff capacity building.

"I always emphasise that if you go to LANGO looking for work looking for money, you better not be here. First, the value is not right. Second, financially we don't have to pay. This one is always put to LANGO humans; besides that, there are other values about codes, like the ethic of a LANGO servant" (L1 Interview, 13 January 2021).

In addition, LANGO does not allow the accumulation of capital (e.g.: purchase of assets, employment contracts). There is a term for the personality of a helper law, that deals with principles and values. LANGO people must respect justice, the value of truth, and human rights, and they must fight for the rights of the poor and weak. At the institutional level, there are two types of servants. First, group public lawyers whose terms of service are limited are made in stages, evaluated in terms of each stage, and become the face of LANGO in conducting advocacy. Second, devotees become owners and custodians of each LANGO activity. Diverse designations are pinned on all staff, employees, and supporting systems (head of office, finance department, office keeper, general worker, driver, etc.). Second, welfare and guarantees for all rights are prioritized; work until old age, retire, and get severance pay, as well as the rights guaranteed in the regulations of existing legislation.

Briefly, the table below details the movement of power and position of LANGO in the formation of neoliberal governance for two decades. On the one hand, LANGO is “complicit in” and an obedient managerial subject promoting the discourse and practise of neoliberal rationality. But on the other hand, LANGO becomes a managerial subject who refuses to submit to the neoliberal rationality shown in a number of manoeuvres and tactics: promotion, contextual adaptation, avoidance/evasion, and rejection.

Table 1.

**The Making and Unmaking Managerial Subject: The Motion
Spectrum of the LANGO in the Maelstrom of Managerial
Governmentality**

Period	LEGAL AID NGO (LANGO)			
	Promotion	Contextual Adaptation	Avoidance/ Evasion	Rejection
2000-2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access funds from foreign donors to carry out the organization's vision and mission based on the programme's design from below; • Implement and advocate for democratization programmes ((democratic governance); • Advocating, drafting, and promoting the Law on State Administration Free of Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (No. 28/1999) and the Law on the Eradication of Corruption Crimes (No. 31/1999); • Adopt and implement the Foundation Law (UU No. 16/2001); • Carry out political transformation based on the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adopt and implement Result-Based Management (RBM), Logical Frame Analysis (LFA), Theory of Change (ToC) tools in the implementation of donor programmes; • Initiate and submit proposals to donors that are designed from below (bottom-up approach) based on human rights, civil rights, political rights, economic, social and cultural rights of the assisted communities; • Conducting regeneration programmes and volunteer training through legal aid training for students and selecting volunteers to become permanent staff; • Conducting regeneration programmes and paralegal training through legal aid training for assisted communities; 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take a radical opposition to the government at various levels (Central, Provincial, and District); • Create two financial reports ("double accounting"), one report for donors, one report for internal documents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refuse direct grants from the World Bank, ADB, etc.; • Reject donor programmes that are top-down and do not accommodate programme designs based on community needs and/or the organization's vision and mission; • Refusing engagement with the country; • Reject private and state-owned corporate projects so that there is no conflict of interest with the organization's vision and mission;

Period	LEGAL AID NGO (LANGO)			
	Promotion	Contextual Adaptation	Avoidance/ Evasion	Rejection
	<p>people's movement and gender justice;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Promote and fight for the economic, social, cultural rights of the community; • Strengthen the enforcement and protection of civil and political rights, to support efforts to promote and fight for civil and political rights 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raising donations (administrative fees) from community members who need legal assistance; • Raising donations from senior lawyers who were once permanent staff; • Develop implementation of advocacy programmes involving NGO networks. 		
2010-2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drafting, Implementing and advocating the Legal Aid Law (UU No. 16/2011); • Carry out political transformation based on the people's movement and gender justice; • Promote and fight for the economic, social, cultural rights of the community; • Strengthen the enforcement and protection of civil and political rights, to support efforts to promote and fight for civil and political rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiate and submit proposals to donors that are designed from the bottom up based on human rights, civil rights, political rights, economic, social and cultural rights of the assisted communities; • Conduct volunteer regeneration through legal aid training for students to the appointment of permanent staff; • Conduct paralegal regeneration through legal aid training for assisted communities; • Raising donations from the public and lawyers who were staff of the organization; • Strengthening the pattern of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Take a radical opposition to the government at various levels (Central, Provincial, and District); • Create two financial reports ("double accounting"), one report for donors, one report for internal documents; • For the sake of saving and survivability, LANGO takes financial management tactics (single salary, deducting resource persons' fees for institutional donations, etc.); • Currently pioneering 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Refuse direct grants from the World Bank, ADB, etc. • Rejecting "donor driven programmes" (with a top-down approach), programmes that ignore the participation or needs of beneficiaries, and programmes that conflict with the organization's vision and mission as well; • Refusing engagement with the country; • LANGO works as a critical opposition agency. • Reject private and state-owned

Period	LEGAL AID NGO (LANGO)			
	Promotion	Contextual Adaptation	Avoidance/ Evasion	Rejection
		programme implementation involving networks of NGOs, universities, and the media to deal with increasingly limited resources	public fundraising through a web system or application	corporate projects so that there is no conflict of interest with the vision and mission of the LANGO organization

Source: Table of Research Findings

The table above illustrates the motion spectrum of the LANGO power driven by the power of local knowledge and ethical relations that enable decision-making to in complex realities, such as national and local political contexts, situations of internal NGOs, NGO networks, grassroots community conditions, and so on.

The LANGO power move represents special knowledge and rationality that is often referred to as "savoir", which is a process in which the subject is shaped by what he knows or also the knowledge that spreads concretely in a social formation and unique history (a blend of political, economic, social, and practical knowledge).

It is these conditions that allow LANGO to initiate, practice, and maintain these various manoeuvres and tactics. In four classifications, it describes the complexity, contradiction, and practise of LANGO's power movement in carrying out resistance to neoliberal government in various tactics: promotion, contextual adaptation, avoidance or evasion, and extreme resistance for two decades.

It is precisely in this context that the productive power relations of LANGO's "servants" eventually return to the ethical-subject struggle for acquiring "truth" through practical exercises

for self-mastery or “self-mastering” (“the self is the concern of his final turn to ethics” or “care of the self”), which has no end (infinite). This process shows the "genealogy of present" of ways of life, the art of living, and the aesthetics of existence in the LANGO social movement arena.

E. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This article has presented historical, sociological, and political narratives related to the strategy of the LANGO movement in the face of a neoliberal government that appears to practise good governance. In this article, LANGO, as part of civil society, promotes and maintains the spirit of independence and non-engagement with state entities, private corporations, and donors. In practice, LANGO is not completely dependent on access to resources close to dominant power countries, corporations, and donors, but instead implements managerial mechanisms that are sourced from the public and civil society collectivities.

Technically, LANGO uses conceptual tools such as Result-Based Management, Logical Framework Analysis, and Theory of Change in working on advocacy agendas. However, that does not mean that LANGO is only included in the grand framework of neoliberal governmentality because, in its institutional practice, LANGO continues to prioritise the values of independence and is far from capital accumulation. It is at this point that LANGO uses tactics through discourse and movement to remain contextually 'relevant' while emphasising “will to reinforce” with fighting tools like discourse and knowledge.

In this case, the Foucaultian discourse analysis framework is useful for providing a new reading regarding the dynamics of LANGO, which is not always fully absorbed into the discourse of neoliberal governmentality but is not completely separated from the knowledge and managerialism framework. This meaning opens

the horizon of understanding to capture the complexities of LANGO tactics that don't just sit there in a position of binarity, but try to scheme and fight in the circuit in the course of knowledge and power in the midst of the swift currents of neoliberalism governmentality.

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