

TRANSFORMATIVE SHIFTS IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: ANALYZING SOCIAL RESPONSES TO USTAZ HANAN ATTACKI'S TRANSITION FROM INDIVIDUAL AUTHORITY TO NAHDLATUL ULAMA (NU) MEMBERSHIP IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Religious social actors exert significant influence in disseminating their ideas to the public. The people has responded to the movement in religious organisation allegiance from Ustaz Hanan Attaki (UHA) to NU. The objective of this study is to examine the reaction to UHA's shift in religious affiliation, focusing on its impact on Indonesian millennials, who constitute a significant portion of its fan base, as well as the underlying reasons behind this transition. The study employed a qualitative methodology, utilising data retrieval techniques on popular social media platforms such as Instagram and Youtube. The author contends that this shift in affiliation direction demonstrates the robustness of traditional religious authority in Indonesia, where religious actors such as ustaz wield significant influence over societal religious transformation. The results suggest that UHA joined NU with the intention of broadening her activity in preaching the notion of hijrah. By affiliating with NU, she saw a chance to mitigate the past resistance encountered in East Java. This action ultimately elicited both positive and negative reactions from UHA followers on the internet, but it did not demonstrate any signs of causing conflict or exerting influence on the decision to alter UHA's religious affiliation.

Keywords: Ustaz Hanan Attaki; Religious performer; Traditional authority; Religious affinity

Abstrak

Aktor sosial keagamaan memegang peranan penting dalam mempromosikan ideologi mereka kepada khalayak. Fenomena bergesernya afiliasi ormas keagamaan dari sosok Ustaz Hanan Attaki (UHA) ke NU telah menimbulkan sejumlah respon dari masyarakat. Penelitian ini bermaksud untuk menganalisis respon perubahan afiliasi keagamaan UHA sebagai aktor yang sangat populer khususnya di kalangan milineal Indonesia dan apa motif dibalik perubahan afiliasi tersebut. Penelitian dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode kualitatif melalui penelusuran data-data di sosial media seperti Instagram dan Youtube. Penulis berargumen bahwa perubahan arah afiliasi ini menunjukkan kekuatan otoritas tradisional keagamaan di Indonesia, dimana aktor keagamaan seperti ustaz menjadi tokoh yang sangat berpengaruh dalam perubahan sosial keagamaan di masyarakat. Hasil mengindikasikan bahwa UHA bergabung ke NU karena ingin memperluas lahan garap konsep hijrah dalam dakwahnya, dengan bergabung ke NU ada peluang untuk mereduksi penolakan dakwahnya yang pernah terjadi sebelumnya di Jawa Timur. Perpindahan ini pada akhirnya memunculkan respon pro dan kontra di kalangan netizen pengikut UHA, namun demikian tidak menunjukkan adanya indikasi konflik maupun pengaruh atas keputusan perubahan afiliasi keagamaan UHA.

Kata Kunci: Ustaz Hanan Attaki; Aktor agama; Otoritas tradisional; Afiliasi keagamaan

A. INTRODUCTION

After Soeharto stepped down in 1998, the face of Indonesian Islam underwent a change that still affects the image of Islam in Indonesia as a whole. The assumption that Indonesian Muslims are known to be tolerant, friendly, and willing to compromise changed around, becoming the opposite. That assumption is now a figment of the imagination. Of course, the reality of Indonesian Muslims today is very different from the heyday of the New Order, around 1970-1980s, when Indonesian Muslims were very friendly, tolerant, and willing to compromise because under an authoritarian leader who earned the nickname "the smiling general," for Martin van Bruinessen, the face of Indonesian Islam changed as it should. But Soeharto was still Soeharto, and although he was always smiling like the face of Indonesian Muslims in his day, some bloody facts could not be covered up, namely the mass killings of accused Communists in 1965-1966, where the executioners were part of Indonesian Muslims themselves.

Lately, the face of Indonesian Muslims has been looking more and more different. Several conflicts across Indonesia reinforce this. The jihad movement, which has the support of the military and certain regional interest groups, has brought the banner of Islam into regional conflicts. And the area was transformed into a battlefield with fighters who might have logical implications for the division of the Indonesian nation (Noorhaidi Hasan 2006). Another is the terrorist group that has crossborder connections and carried out several simultaneous bombing attacks in several churches across Indonesia, such as the Christmas Eve bombing in 2000, the Bali bombing in October 2002, and many other recent cases. All this evidence is nothing but the face of Indonesian Islam today. This is the basis of the term "conservative turn," introduced by Martin van Bruinessen (Kersten 2017).

Thus, articles that discuss UHA and Hijrah Youth, Hijarah as an Islamic discourse, to the term conservative in the realm of Indonesian Islam, have been written by many previous researchers. For example, the article articles “*Generasi Muda, Agama Islam, dan Media Baru: Perilaku Keagamaan Gerakan Shift Pemuda Hijrah Bandung* (Abdurrahman 2020)”, “*Analisis Keberagaman Pemuda Hijrah Komunitas Shift Perspektif Emik-Etik* (Dilawati et al. 2020)”, where the first article focuses on analyzing the motives and meanings, and symbolic interactions of the Hijrah Youth movement, while the second article analyses the religiosity of hijrah youth in the Shift community at the Great Mosque of Trans Studio Bandung. Another article titled “*Hijrah According to the Islamic State: An Analysis of Dabiq*” (Uberman and Shay 2016), and article “*Gerakan Hijrah Dan Konstruksi Emosi Keislaman di Perkotaan*” (Fuad 2020), only focuses on discussing the Hijrah discourse and contrasts it with the construction of urban Muslim Islamic emotions as a reflection of the influence of the widespread hijrah movement in Indonesia, especially in urban areas. As for the conservative theme in the Indonesian Islamic landscape, there are several articles, such as “*Examining the Growth of Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia the Case of West Java*” (Lanti, Akim, and Dermawan 2019), and article “*Conservative Turn? Religion, State and Conflict in Indonesia*” (Hamayotsu 2014), which reviews in general about the style of Indonesian Islam which leads to the term conservative. Whereas pinnacle, the author focuses more on how UHA, with its Hijrah Youth after he changed direction, his preaching by joining a traditionalist authority such as Nahdlatul Ulama. Furthermore, this article is different from the previous article because it tries to clash the authority of the UHA with the traditionalist authority, which has experienced a lot of fragmentation.

According to Martin van Bruinessen, the Conservative Turn occurred around 2005 in the mainstream of Islam in Indonesia, finding its momentum with the birth of new authorities in the form of new Ustaz with millions of followers on social media and congregations in certain areas. This further strengthened the rejection of modernist and liberal views that Muhammadiyah and NU have always supported (Hamayotsu 2014). Therefore, this article aims to examine the responses of UHA's followers after she changed the direction of her proselytizing by becoming part of NU, which has a strong traditionalist authority in the Indonesian Islamic context. Furthermore, the urgency of this research is to examine the relationship between UHA's followers and non-followers, UHA herself, and by tracing the responses after she became part of the traditionalist authority. This is to determine the position of the UHA and the traditionalist authorities in Indonesia today.

Regarding Islamic sociology, Hanan Attaki's entry into the NU organization is equivalent to strengthening the assumption that Indonesia's traditionalist authority is unshakable. In contrast, religious authority refers to the influence and leadership recognized by individuals or community groups. Although with the existence of social media, traditionalist religious authority has experienced fragmentation and new challenges due to the birth of religious figures from various circles and even certain individuals, such as UHA itself, traditionalist relations that form the authority of Indonesian Islam can still play an important role in shaping beliefs, religious practices, and norms in Islamic communities. According to the author, this culminates in the "conservative turn" itself. UHA's existence proves this as a young Ustaz, and by utilizing social media such as Instagram and YouTube, she managed to become a figure of high authority, especially among young people born in an urban Islamic environment and never

studied at Islamic Boarding School. However, UHA's authority remains under the shadow of NU orthodoxy (Musahadah and Triyono 2019).

The author of this article argues that the UHA before it entered NU circles, was nothing less than the culmination of the conservative turn itself. This is reinforced by its young followers who come from urban Islam and are thirsty for Islamic knowledge. In addition, UHA and Pemuda Hijrah's activities seem to align with the policy or fatwa of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which firmly rejects that secularism, pluralism, and religious liberalism are contrary to Islam. This is reflected in the activities of UHA and Hijrah Youth, which have chosen to affiliate with fundamentalists and conservatives since their establishment in 2015. For example, it supported the case of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama being jailed for insulting the Quran and Islam and being affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), which the Indonesian government recently disbanded. Therefore, the author asks several questions: how do its followers respond? The above question is the basis of this research. Why did UHA choose to enter the traditionalist circle in the form of the most prominent Islamic organization in Indonesia, NU? This second question is to confirm UHA's reasons. On the other hand, it also demonstrates the existence of a single authority that draws back the conservative turn discourse on traditionalist authority. This attracts further research into the UHA, Pemuda Hijrah, and its followers. At least to ascertain whether there is still a conservative turn tendency in Indonesia, as Martin van Bruinessen and several other writers alleged in the context of Indonesian Islam today.

B. METHODOLOGY

This research is descriptive qualitative research. Qualitative research focuses on showing meaning, describing, clarifying, and

placing data in its context (Mahsun 2007). This research examines the persuasive rhetorical style of the text in the response of UHA followers on both Instagram and YouTube. The sources of this research are Instagram accounts and hashtags on Instagram after UHA enters NU. The accounts that are the source of data in this study are UHA accounts and movements such as *@beraniberhijrah* and *@pemudahijrah*. The number of followers and posts is the reason for choosing the UHA account and its movement as a data source. Each account not only uploads content in the form of text but also videos. The content used as data is limited to content data in the form of text, not video, focusing more on the response of UHA followers after entering NU. Content that is also included in the research data is text content that contains elements of the invitation to migrate. The research data was collected through the listening method. The use of the listening method is because the data is collected through listening to language use (Sudaryanto 2015). The advanced technique used is the free listening technique. The researcher is not involved in the conversation or text production. In other words, the researcher just listens to the use of language without being involved in its use. The researcher simply observes or listens to the text in the content on Instagram without being involved in the production of the text. The next technique used is the note-taking technique. After listening to the text on the Instagram content, the author took notes to collect the comments of UHA followers.

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Between The Traditionalist and The Conservative

In the first decade of Indonesia's independence, mainstream Islam was conventionally represented as consisting of two streams, 'modernist' and 'traditionalist,' with the major organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama as the locomotives. The 'modernists' usually come from urban and middle-class

backgrounds and tend to be educated in modern schools. The 'traditionalists' are mostly from the countryside or the lower classes, whose educational background comes from Islamic boarding schools—Islamic boarding schools are where the 'traditionalists' study Islam, Islamic law, and the history of Islam and do not study very general material (Bruinessen 2008). Furthermore, to trace the distinction between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists,' Deliar first and then spread in the study of Indonesian Islam with his work *"The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942"*. In Deliar Noer's book, in a watertight distinction, it is explained that 'modernists' are represented by Muhammadiyah and Persis, while 'traditionalists' are represented by NU and other grassroots organizations (Hooker 2014).

The distinction between 'modernists' and 'traditionalists' concerning Indonesian Islam is not new, as many early scholars have studied the development of Islam in the modern period, especially the development of Islam in the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent. It needs to be recognized that after so many years, the distinction has not been re-examined more critically and comprehensively to re-examine the typology of 'modernists' and 'traditionalists'. In the context of this paper, why the term 'traditionalist' is still used does not mean rejecting other possibilities, such as re-questioning whether 'modernist-traditionalist' refers to religious ideology or only at the level of praxis. This is especially so, given the recent sociological changes in Islamic thought and movements. It is also well known that attempts to revise the 'modernist-traditionalist' distinction have been made, such as Fazlur Rahman by introducing distinctions and typologies such as modernists and revivalists—modernists include classical modernists and neo-modernists. In contrast, revivalists include classical revivalists and neo-revivalists (Burhanuddin and Dijk 2013).

Therefore, in the context of this paper, the author still uses the term 'traditionalist' because NU, as a representation of Deliar Noer's distinction, is still the same. At the same time, NU still has characteristics and some timeless aspects that can be proven until now, such as the Islamic Boarding Scholl tradition that emphasizes oral and written knowledge transmission. This transmission of knowledge is used in Islamic Boarding Scholl and is often called 'traditionalist' in learning *fiqh*—where learning *fiqh* itself is the most essential thing in Islamic Boarding Scholl. Another evidence that the term 'traditionalist' is still relevant is the existence of Islamic Boarding Scholl that maintains the curriculum and 'traditional' teaching methods such as *sorogan*, *simaan*, and memorization, which are then usually called 'salafiyah' Islamic Boarding Scholl. However, the term 'salafiyah,' in the current context, is very confusing because of the 'Salafi' movement originating from the Saudi Islamic State, which is suspected of being a radically violent movement. The confusion in identifying between the 'salafiyah' of Islamic boarding schools and the 'salafiyah' movement originating from Saudi Arabia because the connotation of naming both is *al-salaf al-salih* which means 'the pious predecessors, namely the first three generations of Muslims at the time of the Prophet Muhammad'. However, it needs to be emphasized that the 'salafiyah' movement originating from Saudi Arabia in religious practice is very opposite to the practice of Islam in Indonesia (Bruinessen 2008).

In the development of Islam both in Indonesia and in other Islamic countries, the term 'conservative' has come to be recognized in a variety of recent phenomena, particularly as normative and practical issues stemming from Islamic texts and questioning the literal and exclusive adherence to sharia (Islamic moral ethics, and the adaptation of a more literal understanding of Islam in Indonesia's political and legal structures) (Kurzman 2002).

Martin van Bruinessen maps the term conservative as follows: "The term "conservative" refers to the various current phenomena that reject modernist, liberal, or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and social order of Islam. Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture. There are conservatives among traditionalist as well as reformist Muslims (i.e., in Nahdlatul Ulama as well as Muhammadiyah), just as there are liberals and progressives in both camps (Bruinessen 2013)." This conservative term indicates a shift in the face of Indonesian Islam from a more liberal, tolerant, and open-minded discourse of Islam to an intolerant, extreme understanding of Islam and the desire of Muslims to live under the umbrella of Islamic law as a whole. This new face of Indonesian Islam will be found in many cases of intolerance, from the prohibition of the construction of houses of worship other than Islam to the denial of each other, even among Muslims themselves.

Thus, by definition, the term conservative is very broad and general. Still, it is basically based on a strong rejection of interpretations of Islamic doctrine, such as *bid'a*, over human interpretations and fundamentalist interpretations of the correct *manhaj* method of practising human interpretation of Islam, which is often considered *bid'a*, and the method of interpretation of the *manhaj* are the main reasons for the emergence of conservatives, who consider that there is a discrepancy in the practice and teachings of Islam itself. Therefore, the existence of conservative Islam in Indonesia is a challenge and a threat to the continued existence of Indonesia as a multi-religious country. Conservative Islam will have a significant impact on social, cultural, and political conditions. The threat of conservative Islam is feared to push Indonesia into the pit of exclusivity and away from the

inclusiveness that has characterized Indonesian Islam (Sebastian, Hasyim, and Arifianto 2021). Although it cannot be denied that the term conservative is not a permanent term, but rather a label that can be applied to various Muslim groups that have efforts to exclude others, monopolize the truth, and judge the beliefs of other groups that have this connotation, for now, are referred to as Islamic conservatives. That is, conservative Islam is a static label and not a *sunnatullah* (given) but part of an evolving process between religion, society, politics, and the state (Hamayotsu 2014).

2. UHA and the Youth Hijrah (Shift)

Ustaz Hanan Attaki was born on December 31, 1981, with the full name Tengku Hanan Attaki, in an area that is very famous and strong with its Islamic religiosity, namely Aceh. He initially received his education at the Ruhul Islam Islamic Boarding School in Banda Aceh. Then, he received a scholarship and continued his education to a higher level, precisely at Al Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. At Al Azhar, he studied at the Faculty of Ushuluddin and majored in Tafsir al-Quran. On the other hand, he was also active with Islamic issues and was once the editor-in-chief of the Salsabila bulletin. On the other hand, he has many achievements in the field of Tilawatil Quran. While in Egypt, he has also tried many businesses, such as selling meatballs, jockeying to Hajar Rasward for pilgrims, and many other companies. Before returning to Indonesia, he married a woman from Bandung and went to Bandung to join his wife, Haneen Akira. She found a job with Ma'had Al-Imarat in 2007, an Islamic institution established through cooperation between the Muhammadiyah central leadership and the Asian Muslim Charity Foundation, which focuses on teaching Arabic (Interview with Bejo, April 14, 2018) (Akmaliyah 2020). In Bandung, she worked as a teacher at Habiburrahman Qur'an Tafsir School (STQ) and Jendela Hati and

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as the director of Salman Qur'an House at Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB).

UHA is famous for its lecturing style, often using contemporary, simple, and easy-to-understand language. It is also reinforced by the appearance of slang clothing, such as t-shirts combined with flannel shirts and beanies, and a storytelling style that often uses language that suits young people. The rest is supported by the content of his lectures, many of which concern daily and trivial matters but are often felt by many people. He usually raises topics related to sustenance, intention, prayer, patience, and soul mates. There are many exciting themes in language that young people understand. Hanan Attaki also has a YouTube account under the name Hanan Attaki. In addition to many video lectures, there are also travelling vlogs interspersed with Islamic values. This method of da'wah is very effective in embracing young people to get the impression that studying Islam is not rigid, not scary, but fun. So, the youth are interested in participating in the religious activities of UHA and Hijrah Youth (Dilawati et al. 2020).

While in Bandung, UHA founded the Hijrah Youth movement in March 2015 as a medium for da'wah. UHA and his friends founded this movement to invite as many young people as possible to return to studying Islam. Therefore, Hijrah Youth does not only dwell at one point or one place, namely at the Trans Studio Bandung Grand Mosque, in preaching. But there are many kinds of religious activities held by Shift with various variations, and this is stated in its programs, namely: *Routine Studies, Hijrah Youth Shift, Impromptu Hijrah Youth Shift, Ulin Hijrah Youth Shift, Hijrah Youth Quiz, Hijrah Youth Request Shift, Hijrah Challenge Youth Shift, Hijrah Youth Shift Give Alms Every Day, Charity Activities, Voice of Youth, Sempatkan Berkingat, Tarbiyah, Teras Tahfizh, Ngabuburide, Nongkrong Bareng UHA (Ustadz Hanan Attaki), Night*

City Rally, Less Waste, Shift Pemuda Hijrah Lazis, and Shift Pemuda Hijrah Care. Of the many programs held by Shift worshipers, routine studies are the most anticipated program. This is because, in routine studies, they can get religious knowledge from lectures delivered by Ustaz Hanan Attaki. The routine study will later be recorded and made into content distributed via YouTube, Instagram, and other modern platforms, but of all the religious activities, the centre of central Bandung. This city has long been known as a metropolis (Zahara, Wildan, and Komariah 2020).

Bandung is a city more associated with the nationalist movement than the Islamic movement. Although the Islamic Union (SI) was first established in Bandung in 1913, it still did not change the image of Bandung, whose community base is very moderate, nationalist, and not religious because the influence of SI itself at that time did not affect the social reality in Bandung at that time. But with the existence of the Hijrah Youth in Bandung today, all the images that used to be worldly shifted to a town with a religious character. Even so, Bandung is still known as a city that is very famous as a metropolitan city (Damanhuri et al. 2009). This does not close the identity of the city of Bandung that has been embedded since time immemorial. Even though it has undergone many changes, Bandung is still famous as a city with a million food, entertainment, and tourist attractions, all of which are supported by the existence of Bandung, which is very close to the capital city of Indonesia (Budiyantini and Pratiwi 2016). Therefore, the existence of Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung, although the congregation can be from anywhere, can be categorized as a representation of Indonesian urban Islam.

Youth Hijrah, created by UHA in 2015, is a phenomenon of contemporary Islamic religiosity in Indonesia, especially in urban Bandung, which manifests in various patterns and lifestyles. The

Hijrah phenomenon is not only followed by the youth but also by Indonesian artists. The massiveness of the Hijrah phenomenon was evident at the *HijrahFest* event, which was attended by tens of thousands of participants held at Fam Company at the end of 2019. At the *HijrahFest* event, well-known preachers for urban circles such as Abdul Somad, Adi Hidayat, Salim Fillah, Felix Siauw, and the most important—in the context of this article—is Hanan Attaki's (UHA) support for the event (Fuad 2020). Thus, the phenomenon of Hijrah, which is inseparable from UHA's Hijrah Youth, has many views in assessing its current existence, one of which is the assumption of the strengthening of Islamic revivalism (Murkilim 2017), the commodification of religious rebranding of Islam (Fuad 2020) to that which resonates with this article, namely the conservative turn in the face of Indonesian Islam (Sebastian et al. 2021). The various views on the phenomenon of Hijrah are inseparable from the connection to the transnational ideological currents growing in Indonesia through social media and many other media.

On the other hand, the word Hijrah stems from the Hijrah of the Prophet Muhammad SAW from Mecca to Medina to spread Islam with his preaching. But at this time, the concept of Hijrah is understood more broadly regarding several phenomena, such as the link to Hijrah in Salafi interpretation, that Muslims are obliged to Hijrah from places inhabited by infidels to Islamic countries (Sunesti and Hasan 2018). Or the traditional definition of Hijrah means migration from Dar al-Harb to Dar al-Islam, where the concept is considered to be originated by Abu Hanifa (699-767), the founder of the Sunni-Hanafi Madhab. In the terminology of hijra, several conditions must be carried out and can be called hijra if they are fulfilled. First, Muslims must be able to enjoy peace and security in their own country. Second, the country must be ruled by a Muslim ruler. Third, the government has a common border

with various Muslim countries. Dar al-Harb, on the other hand, refers to an area under the control of infidels who are at war with Islam and are likely to antagonize the Muslims residing in that country (Uberman and Shay 2016).

Regardless of the various definitions of Hijrah, the Hijrah Youth established by UHA is a new phenomenon that cannot be separated from various transnational ideologies today. The historicity of the first Hijrah movement in Indonesia, namely in the 1990s, was the establishment of the *Darul Arqam* Hijrah movement, which adopted the lifestyle of 17th-century society to realize Muslims who were "back to nature." In the current Indonesian context, Hijrah Youth represents the identity of Islamic movement groups such as Salafi, HTI, and other *tarbiyah* groups (Amna 2019). In more subtle language, groups such as Pemuda Hijrah or other groups are associated with hijra movement groups such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), *tarbiyah*, and *salafiyah*, which use da'wah methods and techniques that attract young people. In the context of this article, Pemuda Hijrah, led by UHA, is also a group that targets young people with da'wah methods that urban people favour. The Youth da'wah method is built on the vision of the movement to gain a lot of merit without leaving the culture of modernity. Hijrah Youth activities are divided into two ways, namely direct activities held at Al-Latif Mosque, Trans Studio Mosque, and online-based activities through Instagram, YouTube, and various other modern platforms (Setia and Dilawati 2021).

Therefore, the Hijrah Youth Movement, spearheaded by Ust. Hanan Attaki in February 2015, with the aim of introducing religion to young people in Bandung in a fun and friendly style. Basically, it encouraged the birth of new da'wah social media accounts, such as the Indonesia Without Dating account in September 2015, which echoed in various cities such as Medan. Likewise, other accounts include Hijrah Santun, Berani Hijrah,

Hijrah Cinta, and so on. Almost all communities that use the label "Hijra," with various variations, have networks between cities and have members in the thousands to millions. With the development of the Hijrah trend and the increase of urban Muslim movements in Indonesia, HijrahFest finds a firmer momentum in colouring contemporary Islamic movements in Indonesia. The series of phenomena above show that the Hijrah movement is social. Although there are various definitions of movements, most are based on the following points: goal-oriented or claim-changing collective action, some extra- or non-institutional collective action, some level of organization, and some level of continuity (Fuad 2020).

In the end, the increasing trend of transnational ideology leads to fundamentalism and radicalism movements, with the Hijrah movement being a potential supporter of transnational ideological movements targeting young people who are new to Islam. This results in facts from survey data showing that at the level/opinion, students and university students have religious views that tend to be radical (58.5%) and internal intolerance 51.1% and 34.3% external intolerance. However, from these data, there is a significant difference in terms of tolerance behaviour. They are more likely to be tolerant externally (62.9%) than internally (33.2%). This means that students are much more tolerant of adherents of other religions than differences within the internal Muslims, especially against sect groups or understandings that are considered deviant and heretical. There are not a few cases of intolerance in Indonesian society, one of which is intolerance in religion. The phenomena of forced dissolution of religious activities, burning places of worship, and banning the use of headscarves are real scenes in society. Not only different beliefs but the emergence of intolerant attitudes to adherents of different religions and those of the same religion (Addini 2019).

3. Allegiance to NU: Followers' Response

Hanan Attaki officially became a member of Nahdlatul Ulama on Thursday, May 11, 2023. This was revealed through his allegiance activities to become part of NU, guided by the Chairman of the East Java Nahdlatul Ulama Regional Board (PWNU), KH Marzuki Mustamar. The allegiance was carried out on the sidelines of the *halalbihalal* 1444 H Big Family of the Sabilurrosyad Gasek Islamic Boarding School in Malang, East Java. Previously, Hanan was in the spotlight because Banser often disbanded her recitations. After all, Hanan was considered by Banser to be a stooge of HTI or Salafi-Wahabi. However, with this allegiance, Hanan officially became part of Nahdlatul Ulama. As in UHA's statement after officially becoming part of NU: *"Alhamdulillah, tonight is the best night of my life since my mother gave birth to me. Because for a believer he is born twice, first his body by his biological parents, secondly his spirit is born by his teacher or murshid,"* Hanan Attaki was quoted as saying on NU Jatim's official website (11/05/2023), a statement he freely admits to interpreting. Of course, UHA's entry into the NU circle has generated a lot of speculative comments, both from its followers who are urban youth and vice versa, from individuals who have long been at odds and consider UHA to be conservative and affiliated with Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).

UHA said that when he performed Umrah, he prayed to be met by a murshid or teacher who could guide him to the path of Islamic da'wah in line with the passage of Allah SWT. So, he chose to join NU. NU has been better known as a large traditionalist and moderate organization. At the UHA attribution event, the Head of the Special Branch of Nahdlatul Ulama (PCINU) Australia, Nadirsyah Hosen, Caretaker of Sabilunnajah Bojonegoro, KH Anwar Zahid, Mayor of Malang H. Sutiaji and several other invitees

were also present. The following is attached to the UHA linking script, which was read at the phenomenal event:

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim ...

Asyhadu alla ilaha illallah, wa asyhadu anna muhammadar Rasulullah. Radhitsu billaha rabbah, wa bil islami dina, wa bi muhammadin nabiyya wa rasula.

1. I, Ustaz Hanan Attaki, declare by Allah that I am genuinely a Muslim, a believer, dhohiron was bathing.

2. I, Ustaz Hanan Attaki, declare my allegiance, take an oath, and follow the teachings of the faith of the ulama, Habib, and Kiai from among the Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah.

3. I, Ustaz Hanan Attaki, swear, take allegiance, for the sake of Allah, to truly enter and follow the jamiyah, congregation, and teachings of Nahdlatul Ulama, which was founded by Hadratussyaikh KH M Hasyim Asy'ari, KH Abdul Wahad Hasbullah, KH Bisri Syansuri, dhohiron wa bathinan, wa radhitsu bidzalika.

4. I, Ustaz Hanan Attaki, declare that I genuinely dhohiron wa bathinan accept the system of state, nation, NKRI, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, with the guidance of scholars, Habib from Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah.

5. Furthermore, we declare that we are ready to die defending Islam, prepared to die defending Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, ready to die defending and fighting for Nahdlatul Ulama, prepared to die for NKRI.

La haula wala quwwata illa billahil aliyil 'adzim

UHA has been refused to preach several times in several places. This is an essential record of her da'wah journey. In February 2023, UHA gave a lecture in Pamekasan Madura but was disbanded by Barisan Serbaguna Ansor (Banser) NU, which is none other than part of the Ansor NU Youth Movement. At that time, her lecture was suspected of causing divisions in the Islamic community of East Java because it was not following the culture in East Java. In addition, UHA was also rejected by PCNU Gresik, namely on July 30, 2022. The rejection was through the Gresik Mosque Takmir Institution (LTMG) by sending a letter of objection

to the Gresik Regent for the da'wah activities to be carried out by UHA.

In addition to these two places, UHA did not get permission to preach to the Regent of Jember. The lecture scheduled at the PKSPO GOR on Jalan Nusantara, Kaliwates District, on July 29, 2022, had to be cancelled because it did not receive permission from the Jember Regency Government. Next, UHA was also rejected by PCNU Situbondo, precisely at the Islamic Boarding School in Sukerejo. The rejection was because UHA was considered one of the HTI administrators officially disbanded by the government. The denial of UHA continues for a variety of different reasons. The rejection continued in other cities, such as Sidoarjo, which did not get permission from the local government. Next, in the Sumenep District, it was rejected because it did not get permission from the Sumenep Police and the GP Ansor in Bondowoso. The rejection was primarily based on the reason that UHA is part of HTI (Narasi.tv 2023).

Then, UHA's admission into NU circles can be linked to a variety of variables. The author lists at least two fundamental options, one of which is to broaden its horizons by using the book of Hijrah as its primary text for preaching. The author presents two arguments that support this: *First*, because UHA disagrees with NU, it has been rejected from "lectures" in a number of East Javan districts, including Jember, Gresik, and Pamekasan. It is obvious that this history will hinder UHA's da'wah efforts in the future. This could be the rationale behind his choice to swear loyalty yesterday. Even if he has a genuine motive for going through the "teacher-seeking procedure," this background cannot be denied. *Second*, observing NU's stance is still hostile to multinational groups like HTI and others of a similar nature. Joining UHA will have a lot of advantages. It resembles rowing three or two islands. This news will entice Thousands of UHA enthusiasts to learn more

about NU, together with colleagues, preachers from HTI followers, artists, and young Hijrah people. The UHA has a long history of involvement in Islamic da'wah and is influential. Lastly, there will be a gradual erosion and contraction of right-wing Islamic da'wah, which frequently carries the political objective of an "Islamic Caliphate." Converting Hijrah youth happens naturally and without force.

a. Traditionalist Respond

After the UHA officially became part of NU, what were the responses and views of UHA followers and NU followers? This question will lead the reader to the data the author will present and the analysis results. There are many unique and interesting comments and views regarding the entry of UHA into NU. More so because before UHA entered the NU circle, its events or recitations held in several places were disbanded by GP Anzor. GP Anzor is a youth, community, national, and religious organization with a populist character. Anzor Youth Movement, abbreviated as GP Anzor, is an autonomous organization under Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). GP Anzor was initially a continuation of Ansoru Nahdlatul Oelama (ANO), which was transformed into GP Anzor on April 24, 1934, in Banyuwangi, East Java.

GP Anzor's response to UHA's entry into NU circles is one of the most exciting and vital data to present as a representation of a populist community. This is also because GP Anzor has several times disbanded da'wah events held by UHA and Hijrah Youth. The following is the response of the Treasurer of PW GP Anzor East Java. PW GP Anzor East Java Treasurer M Fawait is grateful that the millennial Ustaz finally chose to join NU:

upholds Islam rahmatan lil alamin, which is cool and polite, according to the wisdom of the archipelago,"

"Our stance is not about NU or not NU. But once again, it is related to his recitation. As long as the community needs it, does not make noise, is accepted by the community, it is fine,"

"We are friendly with all. We are good friends even with friends across religious organizations. We take care of each other for the integrity of NKRI. We are committed to NKRI"(www.detik.com 2023).

Another response to UHA's entry into NU came from Digital Da'wah Academic at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, Muhammad Fanshoby. In his view, UHA's joining NU can at least make her followers sympathize with NU. The reason for his statement is none other than because UHA, apart from being a Ustaz, is a social media influencer. This Ustaz and content creator has an undeniable power for him to influence many people. Thus, with the entry of UHA into NU, it is hoped that it can also influence UHA followers to sympathize with NU, and it is also possible to enter NU. This possibility is not without reason, but because the average UHA follower comes from urban Islam and young people who have never received education at Islamic Boarding School.

"Urban youths trust social media preachers more than conventional preachers. They may even confront the conventional cleric's words with the social media cleric (www.republika.id 2023)."

Another response from the Chairman of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) in the Da'wah and Ukhuwah, KH Cholil Nafis, also responded to the entry of UHA into NU circles. He thinks that a muqallid (layman) Muslim will be inspired by his teacher, who then follows in his teacher's footsteps. For him, UHA followers are not muqallid because they are masses based on social media that allow them to track UHA as their Ustaz. The Deputy Chairman of the East Java Nahdlatul Ulama Regional Board (PWNU), KH Abdussalam Shohib, emphasized this response and frankly invited UHA followers to join the NU circle as UHA had pledged to become NU.

b. Urban Followers' Respond

Indonesia's Islamic urban society is inseparable from the metropolitan area itself. Bandung is an urban area but also

paradoxical between cosmopolitanism and conservatism. Historically, the Dutch government established Bandung by injecting elements of global modernity and cosmopolitan culture (Martin-Iverson 2011). Interestingly, UHA and Pemuda Hijrah were born and raised in Bandung. Even the followers, apart from followers on Instagram and YouTube, also come from the community and youth of Bandung and its surroundings. This is also reinforced by the fact that Bandung is not like East Java, which is very strong in NU, because it is based on the fact that around Bandung, there are people who hold local beliefs, such as *Sunda Wiwitan* and several other religions (Widiawaty, Dede, and Ismail 2019). UHA and Hijrah Youth are proliferating and influencing many young people, making UHA an Ustaz figure with popularity and authority over his followers.

Figure 1.
News of USA's pledge of allegiance to NU



However, UHA's entry into Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest religious organization in Indonesia (Barton, Yilmaz, and Morieson 2021), has drawn many responses from its followers. Not only

reactions in the form of support responses, but some responses sneer and even scorn for entering the NU organization. Interestingly, UHA's entry into the NU circle solidifies the author's argument that traditionalist authority in Indonesia cannot be underestimated and underestimated its hegemony.


Figure 2.
UHA wearing a T-shirt with the image of NU Founder Muhammad Hasyim Asy'ari on Instagram



Figure 3. Responses or feedbacks on Instagram

Snide Comments	Neutral Comments	Supportive Comments
<p>assalamualaikum_burger 5 h Ketika Kamu dibenci, Kamu dimusuhi, masalah dan berkumpul dengan mereka yang membencimu, niscaya kelak mereka akan mengerti siapa Kamu... Salut buat Ustadz @hanan_attaki</p>	<p>whyukin 4 h Apapaun gerakannya. Salinh mng hormati.. semua dipertanggungjawabkan sendiri2 di akhirat</p>	<p>abah_lima_jagoan 32 m Masya Allah... Dulu sebelum menjadi nahdliyin, saya sangat kagum dengan ustad @hanan_attaki dg suara seraknya. Lantunan ayat2 suci nya sangat merdu didengar... Sekarang lebih kagum lagi setelah memakai peci dan sarung... Semakin terlihat santun dan bersahaja...</p>
<p>baturbareto 3 h Alhamdulillah aman sekarang mah, gak khawatir lagi dibubarin Banser.. semangat pengajiannya tadz. 🙏</p>	<p>dhyrz 5 h Pecinya berubah jadi Nuansa NU ya tad. Padahal bagus ciri khas ustad yg kemarin2</p>	<p>dedemuryanah 4 h Masyaalloh... Kaosnya bagus KH. Hasyim Aay'ari, kapan ustadz ke kota jombang, kami santri mbah Hasyim kepingin ustadz kekota kami 🍀🍀</p>

Figure 3.
UHA Lecturing On Youtube After Being Officially Pledged to NU
Response or Feedback on Youtube



The various responses or comments divided into three categories: cynical comments, neutral comments, and supportive comments, based on two social media, Instagram and YouTube, indicate that UHA's entry into NU has generated a lot of debate. Some are supportive, some are mediocre, and some are cynical

because UHA has entered the traditionalist circle. However, all of these comments are reasonable and permissible for the author. UHA is a figure who has religious authority over his followers in various regions throughout Indonesia. But what is more interesting is that UHA's entry into NU seems to erode the notion that the "conservative turn" has lost its contextualization. Or, in the author's terms, the loss of conservative hegemony and dominance over traditionalist authority with the joining of the UHA into the NU.

4. Conservative Turn to Traditionalist Religious Authority

This article wants to deny that the Conservative turn can affect traditionalist religious authority. The author's argument is strengthened by the transition of leadership every period; each leader in the context of NU as a traditionalist representation has a different vision and mission and always prioritizes noble national values. For example, the current NU leader strongly rejects identity politics and asks all levels of NU society not to involve NU as an institutional organization in practical politics. However, it cannot be denied that the existence of modern technology encourages traditionalists to adapt and try to maintain the originality of Indonesian Islam, which is moderate and tolerant of all the conditions of multicultural Indonesia. The joining of UHA into NU is precisely the important point that this article wants to show where the phenomenon is strong evidence that traditionalist religious authority is unshakable and should remain the true face of Indonesian Islam.

The trend of conservative turn in Indonesia lately seems to be eroding, with some conservative representative figures starting to join the traditionalist authority. In this paper, the entry of UHA into NU proves that the traditional trend in Indonesia is beginning to fade. This is also under what Martin van Bruinessen said in

"Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the Conservative Turn" that liberal and progressive voices from the past have not been completely silenced (van Bruinessen 2008). This is also reinforced by researchers' doubts that the conservative and fundamentalist majority cannot be taken for granted because a change in leadership regime can also change the course of democracy if the conservative trend is associated with freedom of expression, opinion, and ideology. This is because liberal thought can flourish when protected by an authoritarian regime. In the context of the current government, many organizations considered deviant and not under Indonesia have been dissolved, such as HTI, Annas, FPI, and many others.

Even the assumption of a conservative turn that is allegedly due to the influence of the Middle East, especially the Arabian Peninsula, with the return of students from Arabia, institutions funded by Saudi Arabia, and transnational Islamic movements, cannot strengthen the assumption of a conservative turn. This is because recently, there has also been a lot of confrontation from the traditionalist community to return to being critical and mediocre towards Arab groups that have power and authority in Indonesia. It is also strongly criticized that there is no need for the Arabization of Islam in the context of Indonesian Islam (Liddle 1996). Thus, Muhammadiyah and NU do not stop cleaning up the influence of Islamists, Salafists, and fundamentalists with the assumption that they should not exist in multicultural Indonesia—with many religions and beliefs that are still maintained today. On the other hand, the activities of the two most prominent organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, also fall into the spectrum of religious authority contestation between traditionalists and Arabs, who have played a significant role in Indonesian socio-cultural society for some time (Barton et al. 2021).

D. CONCLUDING REMARKS

As a result, this paper assumes that the traditionalist authority centred on NU is undeniably powerful. Indonesian Islam is commonly divided into two significant currents: modernists or reformists like Muhammadiyah and traditionalists like NU. As a result, the conservative turn trend that began outside the two major organizations has already started to return to the mainstream, which can be part of Muhammadiyah or NU, such as UHA, which chose to be part of NU. UHA who have chosen to join NU, like traditionalists, should appreciate and practice the commemoration of the Prophet's *Maulid*, *dhikr* in a congregation or reading poems praising the Prophet, haul, or observance of the death of a respected person, pilgrimage to the graves of scholars, and many other practices.

As the author assumes, the UHA's entry into NU circles can be attributed to several factors. The author assumes that the UHA expanded its influence by emphasizing the concept of Hijrah in its preaching. This strategic move aims to counter past rejection in areas in East Java due to disagreements with NU. Despite the potential for sincere intentions, past conflicts may impact UHA's future proselytizing efforts. In addition, allying with NU provides strategic advantages, attracting thousands of UHA devotees and fostering collaboration with HTI followers, artists, and young migrating individuals. This collaboration can contribute to the natural conversion of Hijrah youth, gradually reducing the influence of politically motivated right-wing Islamic proselytizing.

Based on two social media platforms, Instagram and YouTube, the various responses or comments divided into three categories, cynical remarks, neutral comments, and supportive comments, indicate that UHA's entry into NU has generated a lot of debate. Because UHA has entered the traditionalist circle, some are very supportive, some are mediocre, and some are cynical. All

these comments, however, are reasonable and permissible in the author's opinion. UHA is a religious authority figure for his followers in various regions of Indonesia. Moreover, UHA's entry into NU undermines the notion that the "conservative turn" has lost its contextualization. Or, in the author's words, the loss of conservative hegemony and dominance over traditionalist authority because of the UHA's merger with the NU.

The UHA's traditionalist practices will undoubtedly impact its followers, who may have previously rejected these practices. Thus, the conservative turn that NU and Muhammadiyah thought was unstoppable has proven deflectable. The moderate concept's marginalization and alienation in Indonesian society for decades. It shows that traditionalist authority is far more hegemonic and widely accepted by Indonesian culture. The UHA's traditionalist practices will undoubtedly impact its followers, who may have previously rejected these practices. Thus, the conservative turn that NU and Muhammadiyah thought was unstoppable has proven deflectable. This at least highlights the position of the moderate concept, which has been marginalized and alienated in Indonesian society for decades. This demonstrates that traditionalist authority is far more hegemonic and widely accepted by Indonesian culture.

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