THE NIQAB AMONG PATTANI, SALAFI, AND NAHDLIYIN STUDENTS: PIETY, SAFETY, AND IDENTITY

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Abstrak

Saat ini pengguna niqab atau cadar tidak hanya berasal dari Muslimah konservatif melainkan juga dari kalangan Muslimah moderat. Maraknya pengguna cadar membuat resah komunitas termasuk institusi pendidikan Islam karena dikaitkan dengan pertumbuhan radikalisme Islam. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif yang bertujuan untuk mengungkap fenomena penggunaan cadar di IAIN Purwokerto pada tahun 2018-2019. Subjek penelitian diseleksi berdasarkan gender-based yaitu para mahasiswi pengguna cadar yang terbagi menjadi tiga kelompok yaitu mahasiswi Pattani, mahasiswi Nahdliyin, dan mahasiswi Salafi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa penggunaan cadar di IAIN Purwokerto memiliki beberapa tujuan. Mahasiswi Pattani menganggap cadar sebagai media untuk meraih akhlak yang lebih baik. Mereka tidak menyetujui cadar sebagai tolok ukur kesalehan seseorang. Hal tersebut juga diamini oleh mahasiswi Nahdliyin yang menyatakan bahwa religiusitas lebih ditunjukkan oleh ketaatan dan akhlak. Dia memakai cadar dengan alasan kenyamanan. Sementara mahasiswi Salafi menyatakan cadar sebagai identitas, kesalehan, serta kesempurnaan perempuan. Ketiga kelompok mahasiswi tersebut mengakui bahwa cadar memiliki fungsi perlindungan diri bagi pemakainya meskipun hanya pseudo-safety. Pengguna cadar di IAIN Purwokerto sama sekali tidak terafiliasi dengan organisasi ekstremis. Hasil penelitian ini dapat menjadi bahan pertimbangan bagi pihak kampus dalam mengeluarkan kebijakan terkait pengguna cadar di kampus.

Kata Kunci: Cadar; Kampus Islam; Radikalisme; Konservatisme; Moderat

Abstract

Recently, the niqabi (women who wear niqab) come not only from the conservative but also the more moderate Muslim women. The increasing use of the veil has unsettled communities, including Islamic educational institutions, because it is associated with the rise of radicalism. This qualitative research aims to describe the phenomenon of niqabi student in the Islamic State Institute of Purwokerto (IAIN Purwokerto) between 2018 and 2019. The data were collected thorugh in-depth interviews and observation to three groups of informants: Pattani students, Nahdliyin students, and Salafi students. The data were subjected to Creswell's phenomenological research. The result showed that the niqabi at IAIN Purwokerto had several motives. While Pattani students expected wearing niqab as a medium to achieve better morals, they refused to believe that niqabi women were more pious than their non-niqabi counterparts. Likewise, the Nahdliyin student admitted that the niqab was not necessarily demonstrating individual level of religiosity which is exhibited through their submission to Islamic tenets and good behavior. Meanwhile, Salafi students considered the niqab to be a woman's identity, piety, and perfection. All niqabi students expressed that the niqab has a self-safety function although pseudo safety. Niqabi students at IAIN Purwokerto were not affiliated with radicalism. The result of the study can be used for the campus in issuing policies related to niqabi on campus.

Keyword: *face covering; Islamic campus; radicalism; moderate; conservative*

introduction

Head covering comes in different shapes and indicates the identity of the wearer in Indonesia. *Selendang*, for example, was commonly worn by Indonesian women from the Nahdlatul Ulama. While a more enclosed veil is worn by Muhammadiyah women,[1] *Niqab* or *cadar* is more popular among conservative Muslim women such as the Tablighi Jamaat (JAT), the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII), and Salafi.[2] Meanwhile, *chador*, worn by Afghan Shia women, is relatively unpopular among Indonesian women. However, since the Indonesian post-reformation era or the last decades, veil has been manifested in many things from clothes of piety and Muslim identity[3] to alternative fashion and a new lifestyle.[4] Likewise, face coverings is no longer limited to women from conservative and old-fashioned groups but now gains popularity among modern urban communities with a more moderate religious understanding.

Before the 1990s, veil had a small group of wearers limited to religious women with high level of spirituality. Similarly, face coverings were only worn by Muslim women who were affiliated with conservative Islamic groups. The *niqab* was worn together with a wide black robe with a monotonous style. Meanwhile, male Muslims wore a long flowing robe (*jalabiyya*, similar to *sherwani,* traditional Indian men's clothes), turbans, and ankle-length trousers, and distinctive physical features, such as long beard and the dark spot on their forehead as a sign of prostration.[5] At that time, *niqabi* women did not appear much in the public sphere since they only took care of domestic affairs.

As the 1998 reform promoted freedom of speech and expression in Indonesia, the policy that prohibited veiling issued during the New Order was no longer in effect.[6] Since 2010, together with the massive use of social media, people have been at ease in promoting various cultural elements to others, including Islamic learning and head-covering.[7] Veiling is no longer religious clothes but a trend.[8] When Muslimah clothes is combined with veil and *niqab* becomes public consumption. Carla Jones doubted the spirituality of Muslim women who flaunt their beauty in front of men.[9] Meanwhile, Moors attributed the phenomenon with consumerism that sweeps through Indonesian women since the last decade.[10] Consumerism is a key to bridge identity crisis and the new found truth experienced by Indonesian Muslim youth.[11]

Today, the *niqabi* women try to show their existence along with freedom of expression and empowerment by establishing *niqabi* group as *Niqab* Squad. Initiated by Indadari, a television celebrity who turned her life to a more religious lifestyle (*hijrah*), the *Niqab* Squad has shown their existence as women who are capable in various aspects of life.[12] Promoting themselves in websites and social media platforms such as

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1. Lis Safitri, "Fashion Muslimah Indonesia yang Kian Kekinian," dalam *Muslim Millenial: Catatan & Kisah Wow Muslim Zaman Now*, ed. oleh Subhan Setowara (Bandung: Mizan, 2018), 63–70.

2. Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Salafi movement in Indonesia: transnational dynamics and local development," *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 27, no. 1 (2007): 83–94.

3. Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi, "Javanese women and Islam: Identity formation since the twentieth century," *Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 1 (2012): 109–40.

4. Safitri, "Fashion Muslimah Indonesia yang Kian Kekinian."

5. Noorhaidi Hasan, "Salafi Madrasahs and Islamic Radicalism in Post-New Order Indonesia," dalam *Islamic Studies and Islamic Education in Contemporary Southeast Asia*, ed. oleh Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-Ahmad dan Patrick Jory (Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Ilmuwan, 2011).

6. Dewi, "Javanese women and Islam: Identity formation since the twentieth century."

7. Dindin Solahudin dan Moch Fakhruroji, "Internet and Islamic learning practices in Indonesia: Social media, religious populism, and religious authority," *Religions* 11, no. 1 (2020): 19.

8. Safitri, "Fashion Muslimah Indonesia yang Kian Kekinian."

9. Carla Jones, "Fashion and faith in urban Indonesia," *Fashion Theory* 11, no. 2–3 (2007): 211–31.

10. Annelies Moors, "NiqaBitch and Princess Hijab: Niqab activism, satire and street art," *Feminist Review* 98, no. 1 (2011): 128–35.

11. Yusar Muljadji, Bintarsih Sekarningrum, dan RA Tachya Muhammad, "The Commodification of religious clothes through the social media: The identity crisis on youth Muslim female in urban Indonesia," *Revista Română de Jurnalism si Comunicare* 12, no. 2/3 (2017): 53–65.

12. Niqab Squad Official, "Niqab Squad Official," 2021, https://niqabsquad.org.

Instagram, the Niqab Squad are against the stigma of *niqabi* women as old-fashioned, passive, useless, helpless, and subjective to control. This effort also occurred among the Muslim women in the USA who use significant amount of social network to build community and regain control for representing their faith and their lives.[13] On the contrary, face-covered Muslim women from Saudi Arabia cannot feel the freedom of expression accommodated by social media since they did not dare to upload their photos without blurry effect.[14]

Niqab is often associated with radicalism.[15] Dzuhayatin's research stated that 30% of veiled women in Indonesia and Egypt are dissatisfied with the governments running a secular state and 50% agree with *khilafah* as the system of government following Islamic tenets.[16] Stigmatization to all *niqabi* women to be affiliated with terrorism has encouraged social discrimination even some countries ban wearing *niqab* in public sphere. The *niqabi* women in Italy and Egypt are often treated unfairly and discriminated against in daily life, even those in France and the United Kingdom face discrimination in political setting.[17] Preventing the *niqab* in public life certainly violates human rights and freedom of expression.[18] The results of the research conducted by Saiya and Stuti stated that the prohibition and discrimination against veiling or wearing a *niqab* have not decreased the number of terror in the world. Violent terrorism still occurs in some countries (e.g., France and Canada) where face veiling is banned. In fact, this policy is dangerous because it deprives the freedom of religious expression and Muslim women's rights as well as undermining religion.[19]

The increase of conservatism and *niqabi* women has led many institutions to issue the ban of the *niqab*. UIN Sunan Kalijaga has called out the students to leave the *niqab* on campus. Also, the Ministry of Religious Affairs dismissed a *niqabi* lecturer at IAIN Bukittinggi although the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology later revealed that that the genuine reason for dismissal was not the *niqab* but indiscipline.[20] The other Islamic campuses have decided to not issue any controversial policy related to *niqab* banning despite their underlying concerns. To name a few, IAIN Purwokerto wonders how the number of *niqabi* student is increasing lately.

Previously, the face-covering in Indonesia had almost certainly been worn only by the conservative Muslims. However, the phenomenon has currently changed since the wearers expand to the more moderate Muslim women. This qualitative research aims to describe the phenomenon of *niqabi* women in IAIN Purwokerto where several *niqabi* women students appeared on a Nahdlyin-based campus.

13   Gordon Alley-Young, "Whose niqab is this? Challenging, creating and communicating female Muslim identity via social media," 2014.

14   Hala Guta dan Magdalena Karolak, "Veiling and blogging: Social media as sites of identity negotiation and expression among Saudi women," *Journal of International Women's Studies* 16, no. 2 (2015): 115–27.

15   Mark Woodward dkk., "Muslim education, celebrating Islam and having fun as counter-radicalization strategies in Indonesia," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 4, no. 4 (2010): 28–50.

16   Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, "Islamism and nationalism among niqabis women in Egypt and Indonesia," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 1 (2020).

17   Luna Droubi, "The Constitutionality of the Niqab Ban in Egypt: A Symbol of Egypt's Struggle for a Legal Identity," *NYLS Law Review* 56, no. 2 (2012): 688–709; Sylvie Tissot, "Excluding Muslim women: From hijab to niqab, from school to public space," *Public Culture* 23, no. 1 (2011): 39–46; Anna Piela, "Wearing the Niqab in the UK: Exploring the embodied 'shape a moral action can take,'" *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 87, no. 2 (2019): 512–42; Letizia Mancini, "Burqa, Niqab and Women's Rights," dalam *The Burqa Affair Across Europe* (Routledge, 2016), 31–42.

18   KR Carriere, G Garney, dan FM Moghaddam, "Terrorism as a form of violence," *Vazsonyi AT, Flannery D, & DeLisi M: The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior and Aggression*, 2018, 626–44; Shaira Nanwani, "The burqa ban: An unreasonable limitation on religious freedom or a justifiable restriction," *Emory Int'l L. Rev.* 25 (2011): 1431.

19   Nilay Saiya dan Stuti Manchanda, "Do burqa bans make us safer? Veil prohibitions and terrorism in Europe," *Journal of European Public Policy* 27, no. 12 (2020): 1781–1800; Ifeanyi V Madu, *The Burqa Ban in France and Its Potential Implications on Islamic Terrorism* (Walden University, 2015).

20   Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, "[Disinformasi] Dosen Dipecat Karena Bercadar," 2019, https://www.kominfo.go.id/content/detail/17624/disinformasi-dosen-dipecat-karena-bercadar/0/laporan_isu_hoaks.

This research was conducted in 2018 and 2019.

The data were collected through in-depth interviews and observations. The informants were selected on a survey basis from a gender-based group, namely the *niqabi* Muslim women, divided into three groups: Pattani students, Nahdliyin student, and Salafi students. All informants' names were abbreviated. The data were analyzed using the Creswell's technique on a phenomenological approach, i.e., describing personal experience of the phenomenon being studied; listing important statements; grouping the statements; reflecting through imaginative variation, structural description, and divergent perspectives; constructing meaning and essential experience; and reporting the result of research.[21]

Religious life in IAIN Purwokerto

Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Purwokerto has five faculties: Faculty of Education, Faculty of Islamic Law, Faculty of Economic and Islamic Bussines, Faculty of Da'wah and Communication, and the Faculty of Ushuluddin, Adab, and Humanities (FUAH). The lecturers and education staff of IAIN Purwokerto came from different background: 85% Nahdlatul Ulama culture, 10% Muhammadiyah, and the rest from other Islamic groups including but not limited to Salafi, puritanical Nahdlatul Ulama, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia.[22]

The students come from various regions in Indonesia but mostly are from Java. Additionally, IAIN has a partnership with the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MoRA) to bring up Muslim students from Pattani, Southern Thailand. The first batch of exchange students/international students was in 2014, and in 2019 there were 34 male and 11 female international students from Pattani. Thai students in IAIN Purwokerto have a unique appearance, especially the *niqabi* women, and have limited social life only among themselves.[23]

IAIN Purwokerto requires all first-year students who did not pass the tests of reading the Quran and the basics of practising worship (*baca tulis al-Quran dan praktik pelaksanaan ibadah*/BTAPPI) to live in *pesantren mahasiswa* or Islamic boarding school for at least one year. Every year, more than 70% of students undergo this procedure. Considering the inexpensive and modest lifestyle in *pesantren*, most students stay longer for some years. In 2019, there were 25 *pesantren mahasiswa* most of which were affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and owned by IAIN lecturers, but only one pesantren was affiliated with Muhammadiyah.[24]

The students gain Islamic teaching not only from the campus but also from *pesantren mahasiswa* and the city mosques. Studying Islam in *halaqah* at the campus did not found at all. It is probably because of the boredom in studying Islam where students learn the same materials on both campus and *pesantren*. It happened to the students who live and are affiliated with NU culture. Meanwhile, a small number of students are accustomed to attending the Quran recitation in Salafi-dominated mosques.

The mosques in Purwokerto (e.g., Masjid Agung Baitussalam, Masjid Jenderal Soedirman, Masjid Asy-Syifa, Masjid Bhayangkara, Masjid Darussalam, Masjid Al-Islah, and Masjid Fatiaruzzahra) provide recitation schedules for various Islamic groups, such as Salafi, Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, Muallaf Center, Al-Irsyad, and others.

Niqabi in IAIN Purwokerto

Some *civitas academica* of IAIN are concerned about the growing number of female students wearing the *niqab*. Every year, there will be new niqabi wearers or female students wearing a wider veil. .[25] This concern is indeed unfounded because most conservative Muslim and even radical Islamic groups usually wear a long and wide veil and face-covering.[26] However, the veil is not necessarily an integrated characteristic of the communities. The number of niqabi students

[21] John W Creswell dan Cheryl N Poth, *Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches* (Sage publications, 2016).

[22] Interview with SP, vice of rector, 13 December 2018.

[23] Interview with FE, campus administrator, 8 December 2018.

[24] Interview with MK, director of Ma'had al-Jami'ah, 14 December 2018.

[25] Interview with DA and AY, lecturers, 5 December 2018.

[26] Woodward dkk., "Muslim education, celebrating Islam and having fun as counter-radicalization strategies in Indonesia."

in IAIN is indefinite but it comes between a dozen and twenty.

The most visible group who wear face-covering are Pattani female students, accounting for 6 out of 11. Four of them have worn the *niqab* since they were in Thailand, while the others covered their faces after studying in Indonesia.[27] It should be understood that Muslims in Southern Thailand have a more conservative understanding of Islam than the moderate Muslims in Indonesia. The majority of Muslims in Southern Thailand live in Islamic cultures and thoughts similar to those of Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia but a little more conservative, especially in the social life between men and women. Wearing *niqab* is common for Muslims there, especially women from Islamic schools (*pesantren*), as revealed by AL:

> *Wearing niqab is common in Southern Thailand, many women especially from Islamic school wear it. I wonder how niqab becomes uncommon in Indonesia and how man and woman can socialize freely… in Thai pesantren woman and man do not interact at all.*[28]

An interesting story happened to NL. During her life in Thailand, she was happy being a "pop" Muslim who loved pop lifestyle by listening to western music and watching teen romance movie. She was against wearing the *niqab* andevidently mocked her sister-in-law for wearing the *burqa*. However, when she started studying in Indonesia she felt the need to wear *niqab* as self-protection.

> *I used to hate niqab… I realized that I live far from my parents, if not myself, who else would protect me? That's why I decided to wear a niqab so that I wouldn't be disturbed… during the first semester my friend said that a senior had a crush on me, he wants to meet me in front of the class during break time. Ah, I don't like it, I feel*

so humiliated when he bothered me.[29]

Wearing a *niqab* for NL is self-protection in social life and prevents public harassment. In her homeland, she has always worn the "standard veil" (a medium-long which covers the abdomen) to secure herself. However, after coming to Indonesia, she needs a wider and close-fittingcloth to cover her body and face instead of the standard veil. Avoiding *fitnah* (temptation) is the other reason. When she can not take care of her body, it may attract a man's attention which constitutes as the worst temptation. For her, as common in Pattani's social life, men are not allowed to mingle with women, so she refuses to hang out with men except for academic activities. NL was considered the most progressive student among wonen Pattani students. She devoted her free time to reading political books, Gus Dur's tolerant thoughts, Gus Mus's poetry, and even controversial-liberal books. She also participated in some student activity units such as Himpunan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, the campus community art, and others. However, she still wore the *niqab* for self-protection and avoiding *fitnah*.

Similarly, MR only wore the *niqab* since 2017 when starting her study in IAIN Purwokerto. The first time she decided to cover her face, her family disagreed with her decision. Different from NL, MR occupied her intention of improving morality instead of protection. She believed that *niqab* can motivate herself to practice better morals, such as managing her anger. Ever since she wore the *niqab*, MR has felt happier and more patient than before.

> *I used to get angry easily, very sensitive, and negative thinking. After wearing a niqab, I behave better than before, I am more patient, and better in managing emotion.*[30]

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[27] Interview with NW, Pattani student, 21 December 2018.

[28] Di sana (Thailand Selatan) biasa orang bercadar, jum-lahnya sangat banyak terutama di kalangan pesantren. Saya merasa heran di Indonesia cadar menjadi aneh dan bagaimana pergaulan laki-laki perempuan di sini bebas bermain bersama … Di pesantren di sana laki-laki dan perempuan sama sekali tidak bertemu. Interview with AL, male Pattani student, 29 December 2018.

[29] Saya dulu gak suka dengan cadar … saya sadar jauh dari orang tua, jika bukan saya sendiri siapa lagi yang akan melindungi? Makanya saya putuskan untuk meng-gunakan cadar supaya gak diganggu … pernah waktu semester awal ada teman bilang, "Kamu ditanyain tuh oleh kakak kelas, katanya nanti istirahat minta ketemu di depan kelas". Ih, saya gak suka banget, saya merasa gimana gitu digangguin seperti itu. Interview with NL, Pattani student, 1 January 2019.

[30] Dulu saya itu suka marah-marah, sensitif sekali. Setelah pakai cadar akhlak saya menjadi lebih baik, lebih ten-

The Pattani students' *niqab* are unique in shape and color. MR and her friends wore colorful *niqab* together with their trendy clothes. They even wore bright colors like lemon yellow and pink. The face cover not always color coordinate with veil but matched the clothes and skirt. They did not wear wide robes but a typical Malay *kurung* shirt, wide skirts, and standard veils that covered breast, and face covering. For example, in the interview, MR wore a turmeric yellow shirt, black skirt, yellow veil, black *niqab*, and black hand-sock. Meanwhile the other Thai students also look fashionable wearing fashionable brooch. Their fashion style include matching color in clothes, *niqab* and face make-up. A *niqab*i student, LT, applied a simple make-up look with soft eye shadow and eyeliner.

All Pattani *niqab*i students agreed that the *niqab* did not show the level of religiosity whether in practicing *sunnah* (prophetic traditions) or in covering intimate parts of women (*aurat*). They argued that the face and the palms are included to the may-be-exposed part of women's body as stated by qv. An-Nur (24): 31 *illā mā z}ahara minhā*. Although they wore *niqab* all day, they would take it off during prayer. Here, we can conclude three reasons for Pattani students to wear the *niqab*: 1) strong influence of religious-cultural background of Thai Muslims, 2) intent to improve morals, and 3) self-safety.

The other *niqab*i students at IAIN Purwokerto were Salafi partisans in a very small number. A *niqab*i Salafi student I managed to meet was CN from Primary School Teacher major who recently finished her study when being interviewed. She stated that the number of *niqab*i Salafists was rare, especially those who dare to wear the *niqab* on campus. She wore a *niqab* for ideological reasons. Following Salafi tenets, the *niqab* is *sunnah muakkadah* (an almost obligatory prophetic tradition) for women.

When interviewed, CN has already worn the *niqab* for about six months, previously she only dared to wear a wide veil that covers the buttocks and hands. When traveling, CN wore a *niqab* with confidence, but she did not dare to cover her face on campus. Covering her face with a mask is an alternative way to follow the prophet's

sunnah without being stigmatized on campus. Another Salafi student, AS, admitted to starting wearing a mask in daily life except at the campus. Since CN wore the *niqab*, her classmate stared at her strangely. Even though she was never discriminated against in academic life, but some of her friends were curious about her reason for covering her face in an Islamic campus where it is uncommon.

Sometimes I wonder how an Islamic campus did not uphold Islamic teaching at all. The *niqab* is uncommon here. In fact, *niqab* is sunnah. I heard a rumor that the campus will issue a *niqab* ban for students. It is so weird, right? Never mind, Islam began as something strange, and it will return to being strange just as it began.[31]

CN has been actively participating in Salafi teaching in several city mosques since she was a student of vocational high school. Besides the ease of accessing Islamic teaching, Salafi ideology was perceived by CN as appropriate and reassuring to her spirituality. As a first-year student, CN tried to wear a wider veil and keep going from time to time until she dared to cover her face at the final year of her study.

Different from Pattani students, CN and AS wore wide dark shirts, wide robes, and long veils to protect themselves from fitnah. CN confessed being uneasy as a woman since she is prone to be a source of sins. She has to cover her face to avoid the sin of attracting men's attention. Similar to loose-fitting clothes, dark colored clothes is regarded the most neutral color that is unlikely to attract men's attention. Likewise, the color and shape of clothes, dark clothes are regarded as the most neutral color that is unlikely to attract men's attention. She admitted that self-protection by wearing a *niqab* and wide robe is not only her commitment to Allah but also her responsibility to her parents. She agreed that women not only live not only for themselves but determine the good and bad of others' lives, especially their fathers or husbands.

CN and some Salafi students were not

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ang, dan emosi menjadi lebih terkendali. Interview with MR, Pattani student, 1 January 2019.

[31] Terkadang saya merasa aneh, ini kan kampus Islam, tetapi kok tidak Islami sama sekali. Di sini cadar itu dianggap asing. Padahal cadar itu sunnah. Isu-isunya kampus akan menerbitkan larangan bagi mahasiswa yang bercadar, aneh ya? Tapi gak apa-apa, kan Islam itu asing dan akan kembali asing. Interview with CN, Salafi student, 18 December 2018.

involved in campus student activities at all. She went to campus only for regular study. However, she was zealously studying Islam in the city mosques almost every day. Although she was still a student of the Faculty of Education, she had no difficulties when teaching her students how to read the Quran. She argued that her voice remained clear when teaching and she could deliver her knowledge well. However, she did not plan to work after graduating since her future husband will bear the burden of family livelihood later. Taking care of her self, performing the compulsory worship, and obeying her husband is enough to be bestowed by the heaven.

Another *niqabi* student is DN, a student of the Faculty of Economics and Islamic Business (FEBI). DN followed Nahdlatul Ulama's teaching and culture in her daily religious life although she did not learn Islam from *pesantren* except for her first-year study. Sometimes, she learned Islam from the contemporary-famous ustadz such as Abdus Somad, Habib Lutfi, and others. The Nahdliyin (someone who affiliated to Nahdlatul Ulama) student mentioned comfort as the reason for covering her face. The *niqab* was proper for Indonesian Muslim women today since the number of *niqabi* women has increased and they promoted themselves on social media platforms. Unlike other Pattani students who were uncomfortable interacting with male students, DN is friendly with her male classmates.[32]

Similar to Salafi and Pattani *niqabi* students, DN wore a *niqab* for self-protection. She used to wear a long veil and wide robe, but once she tried to cover her face, she felt comfortable. When wearing a short headscarf, she was teased by a male student and it made her uncomfortable. However, wearing a robe and a long veil gained her respect from her friends, and after wearing the *niqab*, the respect grew even more. She felt highly dignified and safe because of the *niqab* and was never disturbed again especially by men.

Niqab and Self-Safety

Most *niqabi* students stated self-safety and personal protection as their main motivation for wearing the *niqab*. This protection may keep them from physical harassment while reinforcing psychological comfort in social interactions. Men

who frequently tease women cannot be tolerated. Therefore, the presence of *niqab* becomes self-boundaries (*hijab*) in making the distance between herself and others.

In the psychological aspect, the term psychological safety refers to freedom from implied threats to personal well-being.[33] This term is common in leadership management.[34] Several studies related to this have been carried out by Wanles and Kessel who mentioned that psychological safety is closely related to personal happiness and productivity.[35] Psychological safety is different from physical safety that refers to the absence of physical abuse. Several researchers, such as Torrie and Meredith, associate clothing with psychological safety.[36] Similarly, Mahanani stated that Salafi women wear hijab syar'i for security reasons in addition to several other pragmatic reasons.[37]

The Pattani *niqabi* students, Nahdliyin student, and Salafi students shared common values in self-safety during social interaction as the main reason to wear a *niqab*. They felt more protected and respected when wearing the *niqab* and wide clothes rather than the standard veils and clothes. For Salafi and Nahdliyin student, the respect and sense of safety they earn increase with the length of their veil and robe.

32   Interview with DN, Nahdlyin student, 16 January 2019.

33   Alexander Newman, Ross Donohue, dan Nathan Eva, "Psychological safety: A systematic review of the literature," *Human Resource Management Review* 27, no. 3 (2017): 521–35.

34   M Lance Frazier dkk., "Psychological safety: A meta-analytic review and extension," *Personnel Psychology* 70, no. 1 (2017): 113–65.

35   Shannon B Wanless, "The role of psychological safety in human development," *Research in Human Development* 13, no. 1 (2016): 6–14; Maura Kessel, Jan Kratzer, dan Carsten Schultz, "Psychological safety, knowledge sharing, and creative performance in healthcare teams," *Creativity and innovation management* 21, no. 2 (2012): 147–57.

36   Torrie K Edwards dan Catherine Marshall, "Undressing policy: a critical analysis of North Carolina (USA) public school dress codes," *Gender and Education* 32, no. 6 (2020): 732–50; Meredith Johnson Harbach, "Sexualization, sex discrimination, and public school dress codes," *U. Rich. L. Rev.* 50 (2015): 1039.

37   Prima Ayu Rizqi Mahanani, "Praktik Konsumsi Jilbab Syar'i Dan Cadar Di Kalangan Perempuan Salafi Dalam Perspektif Budaya Konsumen," *JURNAL SOSIAL: Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* 20, no. 2 (2019): 91–97.

The Quran reveals the guidance in social interaction between man and woman in qv. An-Nur (24): 30-31 by reciprocal principles of *ghad}d}ul bas}ar* and *hifz} al-furūj*. The students did not mention these tenets whatsoever, but only repeated the subordination of women as a source of temptation *fitnah*. The physical body of women is stated as a curse that has to be treated carefully. They admitted *fitnah* as temptations that can arouse male sexual desire. Limiting physical appearance and attitude are women duties to prevent being *fitnah* and save herself and her family from the hell.

Concerning the students' confession, there are two important issues. *First*, the existence of men is always a threat to women and does not provide sense of security sense in daily interactions. When the students felt threatened, they resolved their problem by blaming themselves and performing self-defense by wearing *niqab* to set a boundary. They did not blame the men as the perpetrators. They live in patriarchal culture, approving men's power that should respect women regardless of their choice of outfit through ghad}d}ul bas}ar(mindset control).

Second, *niqab* discerned as self-safety is merely pseudo-safety. Most people are stereotyping *niqabi* women as terrorists or at least radical and putting extra cautions of *niqabi* women. The students were catcalled by people in public facilities because their appearance attracted public attention. It was confessed by both Salafi students and Pattani students. CN admitted that she was shunned by other people at the bus stop and was stared hard because of her black *niqab*. The Pattani students admitted being teased and called *ukhti* (sister) frequently on the street when they went back home after campus.

In addition, the campus life did not seem to welcome *niqabi* students, making them uncomfortable studying in campus. It was evident when Salafi student initially wore only face masks to substitute *niqab* in campus. Wearing the mini-*niqab*, a mask instead of a veil, made them feel safer because it is considered more natural and socially acceptable than *niqab*. They only received little questions about their reasons and religious affiliations when wearing a mask. Danial's research reveals that wearing a mask is considered an alternative resistance against the

ban of the *niqab*.[38] Therefore, in terms of security reason, *niqab* provides pseudo-safety because the wearers are not properly secured and protected from any discriminations and harassments.

Niqab and Piety

Wearing the *niqab* as a form of obedience to religious teaching was only admitted by the Salafi students. The *niqab* is *sunnah muakadah* (almost obligatory prophetic traditions) and the highest level of women perfection in appearance. The standard veil and dress do not meet the Islamic tenets. On the contrary, Pattani students and Nahdliyin student disagreed to the notion that the *niqabi* women is more Islamic or more pious than the veiled woman.

In light of Weber's social action theory,[39] the primary motives of students wearing face-covering can be categorized as the value of rational social action since their decision is based on conscious considerations of ethics, customs, religions, and other values. While the Pattani and Nahdliyin students did not admit *niqab* as merely piety cloths, Salafi students did. Covering their face was not their primary goal, but a medium to achieve good behavior in Islamic virtue. Determination in wearing *niqab* were conscious and rational actions based on religious teaching.

The Pattani and Nahdliyin students have not given their pertinence to continue wearing *the niqab* after pursuing their aims. However, they felt comfortable to continue covering their face. Although the Nahdliyin student admitted that *niqab is* the best clothes for her these day to give comfort, protection, and ease for her activities, she is unsure of whether to continue wearing *the niqab* or not.

Similarly, the Pattani students were unsure of wearing *niqab* or taking it off after graduating from IAIN Purwokerto. It is possible to remain a *niqab* wearer if it is effective to internalize Islamic virtue after they return to their homeland.

Several scholars have discussed the veil

38 Danial Danial, "Fenomena Penggunaan Niqab Oleh Mahasiswi Perguruan Tinggi Islam Negeri Di Kota Kendari (Studi Living Qur'an," *Al-Izzah: Jurnal Hasil-Hasil Penelitian* 14, no. 2 (2019): 87–103.

39 Talcott Parsons, *The structure of social action*, vol. 491 (Free press New York, 1949).

and *niqab* as piety. Carla Jones agreed that veil is a religious identity and should only be used for piety clothes. She even questioned the spirituality of fashionable-veiled women, since fashion trend is contrary to piety as religious teaching. Religion expects modesty rather than the fashion that makes them attractive.[40] It was contrary to Bucar who stated that head covering is currently recognized as both religious motives and others such as social and political motives.[41] Her statement is in line with Fealy related to consumerism and religious life as well as Safitri who stated that head covering and Muslim dress have become an alternative fashion for Muslims today.[42]

Fashion is inseparable from Indonesian women's clothing. Fashion has integral to any clothes of Indonesian women. The simplest face-covering was the Salafi's *niqab* as a dark-long *niqab*. The Salafi women wear a robe in addition to monotonous, non-motived, and non-styled dresses unlike the fashionable ones worn by most Indonesian women. Kind of *niqab* is considered as piety clothes *an sich* by Salafi-affiliated students. Meanwhile, the colorful *niqab* with simple eye makeup worn by Pattani students and the stylish robe of Nahdliyin students did not break the basic principles of Islam in Pattani and Nahdliyin students' thought.

Niqab and Identity

The theory of identity was written by Erik Erikson and Sigmund Freud. The theory has developed exponentially after being criticized and evaluated by other scholars, such as Gerald Adams and Sheila Marshall who argued that the formation of identity is very much influenced by two factors: macro and micro factors.[43] Macro-environment or external factors include the economic conditions, the culture of the community where somebody lives, demographics, politics, values, social class, and race. Meanwhile, microenvironment factors consist of interpersonal communication skills, written words, media, and daily routines or internal factors that occurs in personal.

Research related to veiling and identity was carried out by Read and Bartkowski who examined conflicts between Muslim elites who promote the veil as a Muslim identity and feminist groups who promote anti-veiling in Texas.[44] Meanwhile, Croucher researched the lives of French Muslim women and their efforts to oppose the veiling ban in public life.[45] Both research agreed that veiling is not merely a symbol but a fundamental part of Muslim identity. Research on veiling as the identity of women in Indonesia was undertaken by Dewi who described the formation of Javanese women's identities from traditional *kemben* to the *kerudung* and Muslim clothing.[46] Meanwhile, Safri studied veil as the identity symbol of transgender women in Indonesia.[47]

Zempi studied *niqabi* women more specifically in the United Kingdom.[48][49] From her research title, "It's a part of me, I feel naked without it", Zempi concluded that the *niqab* emerged as a personal choice, an expression of religious piety, public form of modesty, and property of the *ummah*. It was also perceived as a form of agency and non-conformity to the Western consumerism culture and lifestyle. The

40 Carla Jones, "Images of desire: Creating virtue and value in an Indonesian Islamic lifestyle magazine," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 6, no. 3 (2010): 91–117.

41 Elizabeth Bucar, *Pious Fashion: How Muslim Women Dress* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017).

42 Greg Fealy, "2. Consuming Islam: Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia," dalam *Expressing Islam* (ISEAS Publishing, 2008), 15–39.

43 Gerald R Adams dan Sheila K Marshall, "A developmental social psychology of identity: Understanding the person-in-context," *Journal of adolescence* 19, no.

5 (1996): 429–42.

44 John P Bartkowski, "A Case Study of Identity Negotiation among Muslim Women in Austin, Texas," *Gender Through the Prism of Difference*, 2016, 275.

45 Stephen M Croucher, "French-Muslims and the hijab: An analysis of identity and the Islamic veil in France," *Journal of Intercultural Communication Research* 37, no. 3 (2008): 199–213.

46 Dewi, "Javanese women and Islam: Identity formation since the twentieth century."

47 Arif Nuh Safri, "Jilbab Sebagai Simbol Perjuangan Identitas (Studi atas Pemakaian Jilbab di Kalangan Waria DI Yogyakarta)," *Musāwa Jurnal Studi Gender dan Islam* 18, no. 1 (2019): 19–33.

48 Irene Zempi, "'It's a part of me, I feel naked without it': choice, agency and identity for Muslim women who wear the niqab," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39, no. 10 (2016): 1738–54.

49 Ibid.

results of Zempi's study are in line with Yeste on *niqabi* in Spain.[50]

The *niqabi* student of IAIN Purwokerto expressed *niqab* as a Muslim identity, but only Salafi students upheld its fundamental identity for Muslim women. Salafi students perceived that one of woman's perfection lies in how fully covered her body is. Her religious understanding assumed that unconcealed clothes without face-covering showed the imperfection of Muslim women's identity. Woman's dignity lies on self-protection from becoming a public show. Her body and physical beauty can only be enjoyed by her husband. Allowing other men to perceive her physical beauty and voice means she cannot take care of herself from the hell.

Contrary to the Pattani and Nahdliyin students who believe that Muslim woman's identity is veil not the *niqab*, the main Muslim identity lies in morality and religious practice, not the niqab itself.The main Muslim identity lies in morality and religious practice, not in the *niqab* itself. Sufficient clothes for a Muslim woman includes a head covering and loose clothing since their interpretation on the intimate part of women's body exclude face and palms.

The different views on Muslim identity are influenced by macro and micro environmental factors. Salafi students argued that *niqab* is a Muslim identity because it is closely related to conservative Salafism tenets. They received Islamic teaching only from Salafism from daily Islamic teaching at city mosques and online preaching on the radio, YouTube, websites, and social network sites as the only truth. The students have no religious education background other than the campus and Salafism.

The religious thought and Muslim life in Southern Thailand have influenced the Pattani students in wearing *niqab* as well. The social disparity of Muslim life in Thailand and Indonesia gave an impact, especially in social life. The conservative religious understanding of Muslims in Southern Thailand support the student to make a stable decision in wearing *niqab* to practice moral identity in social life as the Muslims in their homeland do. The moderate Muslims call themselves *ahlussunah,* but their religious understanding forbids nonfamily men and women to interact in daily life except for justified reasons. Facing a different socio-culture, Pattani Muslim women chose to wear *the niqab* to reach the respectable *muslimah* moral identity.

On the contrary to the Nahdliyin student expressed *niqab* as a cloth of freedom. Similar to Pattani student, the Nahdliyin studentadmitted that the expected clothes as Muslim identity in public life are head-covering and loose clothes covering the intimate parts of a woman's body. Furthermore, a woman is free to choose the type, color, and size of clothes she has worn. Meanwhile, the most fundamental identity for a woman is morality.

Were *Niqab*i Students affiliated with Radicalism?

The definition of radicalism and extremism is vague. The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) requires four characteristics of radicalism: intolerant, fanatic, exclusive, and revolutionary action to change the stable condition.[51] Marshal Hodgson, as stated by Umar, emphasized that Islamicate civilization include religious activities that are deeply embedded in local and regional cultures.[52] Likewise, Barton argued that radicalism is an ideology that believes Islam can and should form the basis of political ideology.[53] In light of Fealy's statement that the radicals do not trust the government policy, they often take over the security function of Indonesian army and police.[54]

[50]   Carme Garcia Yeste dkk., "Muslim women wearing the niqab in Spain: Dialogues around discrimination, identity and freedom," *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 75 (2020): 95–105.

[51]   National Counter Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme), *Strategi Menghadapi Paham Radikalisme Terorisme–ISIS* (Jakarta: Belmawa, 2016).

[52]   Muhammad Sani Umar dan Mark Woodward, "The Izala effect: unintended consequences of Salafi radicalism in Indonesia and Nigeria," *Contemporary Islam* 14, no. 1 (2020): 49–73.

[53]   Greg Barton, "Islamism and Indonesia: Islam and the Contest for Power after Soeharto," *The Review (September 2002)*, 2002, 2.

[54]   Greg Fealy, "Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: The faltering revival?," dalam *Southeast Asian Affairs 2004* (ISEAS Publishing, 2004), 104–22; Akh Muzakki, "The roots, strategies, and popular perception of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 8, no. 1 (2014): 1–22.

In addition, there is an unclear distinction between extremism and radicalism. Extremism is sometimes equated with violent terrorism, as stated by Ferrero and Greg Simon.[55] Meanwhile, based on Wijsen's study, Indonesians define Islamic radicalists and extremists as excessive Muslims and contradicting peace.[56] However, we defined radicalism in the form of intolerance, fanaticism, exclusiveness, revolution, and most importantly, the belief that Islam should establish the basis of politics and government. These radicals do perform aggressive actions but without the bomb violence which is a characteristic of terrorists.

All the *niqabi* students have moderate religious thought, except for Salafi students who are affiliated with more conservative Islam. However, Salafi does not oppose the government nor want to replace the government system with an Islamic system despite their desire to embed Islamic teachings in life. Interestingly, Salafi teaches loyalty to the government as Wahabi's close relationship with the government of Saudi Arabia.[57] However, they have other characteristics such as intolerance.[58]

Therefore, it is crucial to notice is the growth of conservatism which potentially destroys the social cohesion and moderation of Indonesian Muslims. Indonesian Muslims are pluralistic, inclusive, and known as the Muslims with smiling faces.[59] The rise of conservatism may erode the Indonesian culture manifested in Muslim life.

The Salafi female students admitted the subordination of women to men since women have started not to reach their level of education and unwilling to work in the public sector. For Salafi female students women only need to stay at home and proclaim self-submission to their husbands to get the glory of life and heaven in the hereafter. They also refuses to appear in a public environment without apparent reasons. Limiting women's movement will foster injustice in life and violate the spirit of Islam. Likewise, limiting education for women potentially reduce the number of educated women and family education especially to children. Therefore, their persistence in exclusive religious belief may create intolerance that is incompatible with religious values and the conditions of Indonesian communities.

Conclusions

The *niqabi* students of IAIN Purwokerto came from various religious backgrounds including conservative and moderate Muslim. While most *niqabi* students were Pattani students who share moderate understanding of Islam with Nahdliyin, Salafi students are affiliated to conservative religious understanding.

The students wear the *niqab* for various reasons. Niqab is a medium to achieve morality among the Pattani, a freedom of expression for the Nahdliyin, and an attempt to reach religious perfection for the Salafi. They agreed the *niqab* is safety clothes although only pseudo-safety. The Pattani and the Nahdliyin students agreed that a *niqabi* woman is not always more pious than a non-*niqabi* woman since piety is determined by morality. Meanwhile, the Salafi students admitted that the *niqab* veil is the main Muslim identity and a display of woman religiosity.

Examining the reasons and religious background of the students, we conclude that the *niqabi* at IAIN Purwokerto is not associated with radicalism and terrorism. We uncover several issues that needs comprehensive study, such as the impact and the possibility of the growth of conservatism in campus that can disrupt the social cohesion, as well as gender equality education and protecting individual human rights.

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[56] Frans Wijsen, "'There are radical Muslims and normal Muslims': an analysis of the discourse on Islamic extremism," *Religion* 43, no. 1 (2013): 70–88.

[57] Abu Adam Al Atsari, "Nasehat Untuk Ahlus Sunnah Dalam Menghadapi Tahun Politik Di Indonesia," 15 April 2019, https://lpmpbanten.kemdikbud.go.id/nurul-ilmi/tausiyah/nasehat-untuk-ahlus-sunnah-dalam-menghadapi-tahun-politik-di-indonesia/.

[58] The data related to Salafi and radicalism are based on research by UNUSIA, "Transmisi Ideologi Gerakan Keislaman pada Civitas Akademika Perguruan Tinggi di Jawa Tengah dan DIY, 2019, unpublished research.

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STANDAR PENULISAN ARTIKEL

NO	BAGIAN	STANDAR PENULISAN
1.	Judul	1) Ditulis dengan huruf kapital. 2) Dicetak tebal (**bold**).
2.	Penulis	1) Nama penulis dicetak tebal (**bold**), tidak dengan huruf besar. 2) Setiap artikel harus dilengkapi dengan biodata penulis, ditulis di bawah nama penulis, dicetak miring (*italic*) semua.
3.	Heading	Penulisan Sub Judul dengan abjad, sub-sub judul dengan angka. Contoh: A. **Pendahuluan** B. **Sejarah Pondok Pesantren...** 1. *Lokasi Geografis* 2. *(dst).*
4.	Abstrak	1) Bagian Abstrak tidak masuk dalam sistematika A, B, C, dst. 2) Tulisan **Abstrak** (Indonesia) atau **Abstract** (Inggris) atau ملخص (Arab) dicetak tebal (**bold**), tidak dengan hurub besar. 3) Panjang abstrak (satu bahasa) tidak boleh lebih dari 1 halaman jurnal.
5.	Body Teks	1) Teks diketik 1,5 spasi, 6.000 – 10.000 kata, dengan ukuran kertas A4. 2) Kutipan langsung yang lebih dari 3 baris diketik 1 spasi. 3) Istilah asing (selain bahasa artikel) dicetak miring (*italic*). 4) Penulisan transliterasi sesui dengan pedoman transliterasi jurnal Musãwa.

NO	BAGIAN	STANDAR PENULISAN
6.	Footnote	1) Penulisan: Pengarang, *Judul* (Kota: Penerbit, tahun), hlm. Contoh: Ira M. Lapidus, *Sejarah Sosial Ummat Islam*, terj. Ghufron A. Mas'udi (Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, 1988), 750. 2) Semua judul buku, dan nama media massa dicetak miring (*italic*). 3) Judul artikel ditulis dengan tanda kutip ("judul artikel") dan tidak miring. 4) Tidak menggunakan *Op. Cit* dan *Loc. Cit.* 5) Menggunakan *Ibid.* atau نفسه المرجع (Arab). Dicetak miring (*italic*). 6) Pengulangan referensi (*footnote*) ditulis dengan cara: Satu kata dari nama penulis, *1-3 kata judul*, nomor halaman. Contoh: Lapidus, *Sejarah sosial*, 170. 7) Setelah nomor halaman diberi tanda titik. 8) Diketik 1 spasi.
7.	Bibliografi	1) Setiap artikel harus ada bibliografi dan diletakkan secara terpisah dari halaman body-teks. 2) Kata **DAFTAR PUSTAKA** (Indonesia), **REFERENCES** (Inggris), atau مصدر (Arab) ditulis dengan hurur besar dan **cetak tebal** (**bold**). 3) Contoh penulisan: Lapidus, Ira M., *Sejarah Sosial Ummat Islam*, terj. Ghufron A.M., Jakarta: PT. Raja Grafindo Persada, 1988. 4) Diurutkan sesuai dengan urutan alfabet.

PEDOMAN TRANSLITERASI

Transliterasi Arab-Latin yang digunakan dalam tulisan berbahasa Inggris pada Jurnal *Musãwa* ini adalah literasi model L.C. (*Library of Congress*). Untuk tulisan berbahasa Indonesia, memakai model L.C. dengan beberapa modifikasi.

A. Transliterasi Model L.C.

ح = ḥ	ج = j	ث = th	ت = t	ب = b	ا = -
س = s	ز = z	ر = r	ذ = dh	د = d	خ = kh
ع = '	ظ = ẓ	ط = ṭ	ض = ḍ	ص = ṣ	ش = sh
م = m	ل = l	ك = k	ق = q	ف = f	غ = gh
	ي = y	ء = '	هـ = h	و = w	ن = n

Pendek   a = ◌َ   i = ◌ِ   u = ◌ُ
Panjang   ā = ◌َا   ī = إي   ū = أو
Diftong   ay = إي   aw = أو
Panjang dengan *tashdid* : iyy = إي ; uww = أو
Ta'marbūtah ditransliterasikan dengan "h" seperti *ahliyyah* = أهلية atau tanpa "h", seperti *kulliya* = كلية ; dengan "t" dalam sebuah frasa (*constract phrase*), misalnya *surat al-Ma'idah* sebagaimana bacaannya dan dicetak miring. Contoh, *dhālika-lkitābu la rayba fih* bukan *dhālika al-kitāb la rayb fih*, *yā ayyu-hannās* bukan *yā ayyuha al-nās,* dan seterusnya.

B. Modifikasi (Untuk tulisan Berbahasa Indonesia)

1. Nama orang ditulis biasa dan diindonesiakan tanpa transliterasi. Contoh: As-Syafi'i bukan al-Syāfi'i, dicetak biasa, bukan *italic*.
2. Nama kota sama dengan no. 1. Contoh, Madinah bukan Madīnah; Miṣra menjadi Mesir, Qāhirah menjadi Kairo, Baghdād menjadi Baghdad, dan lain-lain.
3. Istilah asing yang belum masuk ke dalam Bahasa Indonesia, ditulis seperti aslinya dan dicetak miring (*italic*), bukan garis bawah (*underline*). Contoh: *...al-qawā'id al-fiqhiyyah; Isyrāqiyyah; 'urwah al-wusqā,* dan lain sebagainya. Sedangkan istilah asing yang sudah populer dan masuk ke dalam Bahasa Indonesia, ditulis biasa, tanpa transliterasi. Contoh: Al-Qur'an bukan Al-Qur'ān; Al-Hadis bukan al-Hadīth; Iluminatif bukan illuminatif, perenial bukan perennial, dll.
4. Judul buku ditulis seperti aslinya dan dicetak miring. Huruf pertama pada awal kata dari judul buku tersebut menggunakan huruf kapital, kecuali *al-* yang ada di tengah. Contoh: *Ihyā 'Ulūm al-Dīn.*

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