

Against Unchecked Price Intervention: *Maslahah 'Ammah* and *Ta'sir* in Islamic Economic Law

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Abstract: Market distortion in the form of hoarding, monopoly, fraud, cartel behavior, and manipulation of supply shows that price formation does not always reflect fairness. In Islamic economic law, state intervention in market prices, known as *tas'ir*, remains a debated issue because the Prophet refused to impose prices in a market that operated naturally. However, contemporary market conditions often require public authority to prevent exploitation and protect access to essential goods. This article analyzes *maṣlahah 'āmmah* as a legal-ethical criterion for assessing the legitimacy of *tas'ir* for consumers, producers, and the state. Normative-conceptual legal research is employed through library research on Qur'ānic verses, Hadith reports, *tafsir* works, *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, and public policy studies. The analysis uses thematic *tafsir*, *maqāṣid* reasoning, and public policy analysis. The findings show that *tas'ir* is legitimate when market prices are distorted by harmful practices and when intervention protects public welfare without creating new injustice. *Mashlahah 'āmmah* in *tas'ir* must therefore be understood as proportional protection of consumers, producers, and the state through a policy framework grounded in *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, evidence, and accountability.

Abstrak: Penetapan harga oleh negara dalam konsep *tas'ir* tidak dapat dilepaskan dari persoalan keadilan pasar. Harga yang terbentuk melalui mekanisme permintaan dan penawaran dapat diterima selama pasar berjalan wajar. Persoalan muncul ketika harga dipengaruhi oleh penimbunan, monopoli, kartel, kecurangan, manipulasi pasokan, atau penguasaan distribusi oleh aktor tertentu. Artikel ini menganalisis *maṣlahah 'āmmah* sebagai ukuran legal-etis dalam menilai legitimasi *tas'ir* bagi konsumen, produsen, dan negara. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode hukum normatif-konseptual melalui studi kepustakaan terhadap ayat-ayat al-Qur'ān, Hadis, *tafsir*, literatur *uṣūl al-fiqh*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, dan kajian kebijakan publik. Analisis dilakukan dengan pendekatan *tafsir* tematik, penalaran *maqāṣid*, dan analisis kebijakan publik. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa *tas'ir* dapat dibenarkan apabila harga pasar tidak lagi mencerminkan kewajaran, tetapi terbentuk melalui praktik yang menimbulkan mafsadah. Legitimasi *tas'ir* tidak cukup didasarkan pada klaim kepentingan publik, tetapi harus diuji melalui perlindungan yang proporsional terhadap konsumen, produsen, dan negara. *Mashlahah 'āmmah* dalam *tas'ir* menuntut kebijakan harga yang berbasis *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, bukti kerusakan pasar, proporsionalitas, transparansi, dan akuntabilitas.

Keywords:
Maṣlahah 'Ammah; Tas'ir; Price Intervention; Islamic Economic Law; Market Justice.

Introduction

Market prices are often treated as the result of natural interaction between supply and demand. This assumption is acceptable when the market operates fairly, competition remains open, information is available, and no actor controls the circulation of goods. The problem appears when price formation no longer reflects ordinary market movement. Hoarding, fraud, cartel practices, manipulation of supply, monopoly, and unequal access to distribution may push prices away from fairness. In such situations, the market does not merely produce economic fluctuation. It produces legal and ethical problems because the public, especially vulnerable consumers, may lose access to basic goods, while producers and small traders may also be trapped by policies that ignore production costs and distribution risks.¹

Tas'ir refers to the act of determining, limiting, or regulating market prices by public authority in order to control price movement and prevent harm in economic exchange. In Islamic legal discourse, *tas'ir* is not identical with every form of market price formation, because ordinary prices may arise naturally through supply and demand. The term is more specifically used when the authority intervenes in price formation, either through binding price determination, maximum retail prices, minimum prices, price references, or other corrective instruments. Its legal status becomes debated when such intervention touches the balance between market freedom, protection of consumers, legitimate profit for producers, and the public responsibility of the state.²

The question of state intervention in market prices is therefore not a simple opposition between free market and price control. In Islamic legal discourse, this problem is discussed through the concept of *tas'ir*. *Tas'ir* has been a contested issue because one prophetic report records the Prophet's refusal to set prices when people complained about rising prices. This report is often read as a warning against state coercion in a market that still functions naturally. Yet Islamic legal thought also recognizes that public authority has a responsibility to prevent injustice, fraud, and harm in *mu'amalah*. The Qur'ān prohibits unlawful appropriation of wealth, dishonest measurement, *ribā*, and unjust transactions. These principles show that market freedom is not free from moral and legal evaluation.³

The tension between the Hadith on *tas'ir* and the Qur'ānic principles of economic justice becomes more complex in contemporary market conditions. Modern commodity prices may be influenced by global supply chains, corporate concentration, speculative behavior, distribution bottlenecks, and information asymmetry. Price increases may occur naturally, but they may also be produced through deliberate restriction of supply or unfair control over essential commodities. When the latter occurs, the refusal to intervene may indirectly preserve harm. Conversely, intervention without accurate diagnosis may also create new injustice, especially when the state imposes a price that

¹ Abdurrohman Kasdi, "Permintaan Dan Penawaran Dalam Mempengaruhi Pasar (Studi Kasus Di Pasar Bintoro Demak)," *BISNIS: Jurnal Bisnis Dan Manajemen Islam* 4, no. 2 (2016): 18, <https://doi.org/10.21043/bisnis.v4i2.2688>.

² Zahratul Amal, "Hukum Ta'sir Dalam Tinjauan Fikih Muamalah (Studi Pendapat Mazhab Maliki)," *Skripsi*, 2022, 1-55.

³ K. A. Kusuma, "The Concept of Just Price in Islam: The Philosophy of Pricing and Reasons for Applying It in Islamic Market Operation," *Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Accounting and Finance*, 2019, 782-799., <https://doi.org/doi:10.2991/icaf-19.2019.19>.

harms producers, farmers, or traders. This is the central dilemma of *tas'ir* in contemporary Islamic economic law.⁴

The concept of *maṣlahah 'āmmah* offers a possible criterion for addressing this dilemma. *Mashlahah 'āmmah* cannot be understood as a general slogan for public benefit or as a convenient justification for state intervention. It must be tested through the objectives of Islamic law, especially the protection of life, property, and lawful economic conduct. In price policy, public benefit is not identical with cheap prices. A low price may benefit consumers but harm producers if it does not cover production costs. A high price may benefit producers but burden the public if it is caused by hoarding or manipulation. A government policy may claim to protect welfare but fail when it lacks transparency, reliable data, or fair implementation. *Mashlahah 'āmmah* must therefore be measured through the proportional protection of consumers, producers, and the state as regulator.⁵

Previous studies have discussed *tas'ir* and market intervention from several perspectives. Qalbia's study on Ibn Taymiyyah shows that *tas'ir* may be legalized for the sake of *jalb al-maṣāliḥ wa dar' al-mafāsīd*, but the discussion does not fully explain how *maṣlahah* should be assessed among different economic actors.⁶ Bella et al., examine government intervention in the case of fuel price inflation in Indonesia and conclude that intervention may be justified when it protects the public and does not harm society.⁷ Musaddad, Zainol, and Maamor discuss Ibn Taymiyyah's thought on price regulation in housing affordability and argue that price control may be necessary when market distortion burdens the public.⁸ Other studies on Ibn Taymiyyah's economic thought, HET (*Harga Eceran Tertinggi* - Maximum Retail Price) policy, and the prices of medicines and medical devices during the Covid-19 pandemic also confirm that classical Islamic economic thought remains relevant for addressing market injustice.⁹

These studies are important, but they tend to emphasize either the permissibility of intervention, the role of government, or the relevance of classical economic thought to specific sectors. The unresolved issue lies in the criterion of *maṣlahah 'āmmah* itself. Many studies state that *tas'ir* is allowed when it serves public interest, yet they do not sufficiently explain how public interest should be measured when consumers, producers, and the state do not always have the same interest. A price ceiling may

⁴ A. Patuti et al., "The Position of al-Tas'ir al-Jabāri in the View of the Rule of Yutaḥammal al-Ḍarar al-Khāṣ Li Da' al-Ḍarar Al-'Ām. Al-Khiyār," *Jurnal Muamalah Dan Ekonomi Islam* 3, no. 2 (2023): 1083-98.

⁵ Hayatullah Laluddin, "Maslahah's Role as an Instrument for Revival of Ijtihad," *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 8, no. 1 (2015): 27-34.

⁶ Farah Qalbia and M. Reza Saputra, "Pemikiran Ekonomi Ibnu Taimiyah: Konsep Mekanisme Pasar, Harga Adil Dan Peran Pemerintah Dalam Ekonomi," *MASMAN: Master Manajemen* 1, no. 2 (2023): 1-20.

⁷ Alif Mujiyana Eka Bella et al., "Market Intervention Policy in The Case of Rising Rice Prices in Indonesia From The Perspective of Ibn Taimiyah," *Journal of Islamic Economic Laws* 7, no. 01 (2024): 36-55, <https://doi.org/10.23917/jisel.v7i01.3484>.

⁸ Hafirda Akma Musaddad et al., "Ibn Taimiyah's Thought on Price Regulation in Housing Affordability," *International Journal of Islamic Thought* 22, no. 1 (2022), <https://doi.org/10.24035/ijit.22.2022.237>.

⁹ Zuhrotun Nisa et al., "Analisis Harga Obat Dan Alat Kesehatan Di Masa Pandemi Covid-19 (Studi Literatur Pemikiran Ibnu Taimiyah Dan Abu Yusuf)," *Ekonomi Islam* 13, no. 1 (2022): 10-25.

protect consumers but harm farmers.¹⁰ A subsidy may ease the burden of the public but weaken fiscal capacity. A non-intervention policy may protect market freedom but allow exploitation to continue.¹¹ This article addresses that gap by placing *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* not as a general justification, but as a legal-ethical criterion that must be tested through *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah*, and public policy analysis.

The novelty of this study lies in its attempt to construct an integrative reading of *tas‘īr*. The Qur’ānic principles of justice, lawful trade, and the prohibition of market distortion are not treated separately from the Hadith on price setting. Both are read through their legal purpose and socio-economic context. The integrative model proposed in this study connects four elements: *naṣṣ* as the normative foundation, *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah* as the direction of protection, *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* as the criterion of proportionality, and public policy as the instrument of implementation. Through this model, *tas‘īr* is not reduced to a binary ruling of prohibited or permitted. It becomes a conditional legal-policy mechanism whose legitimacy depends on market condition, evidence of harm, proportionality, and policy accountability.

This study aims to analyze the concept of *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* in *tas‘īr* for economic agents through Qur’ānic exegesis and contemporary public policy perspective. The discussion is guided by three questions. First, how can market price intervention be understood in public policy so that it produces *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* rather than partial benefit? Second, how do the Qur’ān and Hadith provide normative legitimacy for addressing market distortion and economic injustice? Third, how can an integrative model between *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah*, *maṣlahah ‘āmmah*, and public policy be constructed to assess the legitimacy of price intervention? By answering these questions, this study seeks to contribute to Islamic economic law by offering a more balanced framework for evaluating *tas‘īr* in modern market realities.

Method

This study employs normative-conceptual legal research with a qualitative approach. The object of analysis is the concept of *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* in *tas‘īr*, especially in relation to market distortion, price intervention, and the protection of economic agents. The study does not examine a specific empirical market as a field case, but analyzes the normative and conceptual basis of price intervention through Islamic legal sources and contemporary public policy discourse.

The primary materials consist of Qur’ānic verses related to justice, lawful exchange, unlawful appropriation of wealth, fair measurement, *ribā*, and market ethics, as well as Hadith reports concerning *tas‘īr*, *iḥtikār*, and deceptive transactions. Classical and contemporary tafsīr works, *uṣūl al-fiqh* literature, and writings on *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah* and *maṣlahah* are used to clarify the legal-ethical foundation of the discussion. Secondary materials include journal articles, books, and policy-related studies on market intervention, price regulation, welfare economics, and Islamic economic law.

¹⁰ Fachrounissa Zein Vitadiar and Tika Widiastuti, “Analisis Faktor Penyebab Distorsi Harga Pasar Dan Penanggulangan Dampaknya Dalam Perspektif Islam,” *Jurnal Masharif Al-Syariah: Jurnal Ekonomi Dan Perbankan Syariah* 8, no. 1 (2023): 256–74.

¹¹ Vitadiar and Widiastuti, “Analisis Faktor Penyebab Distorsi Harga Pasar Dan Penanggulangan Dampaknya Dalam Perspektif Islam.”

The data were collected through library research by selecting materials that directly discuss *tas'ir*, *maṣlaḥah*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, market distortion, and public intervention in pricing. The selection was based on thematic relevance, conceptual contribution, and the ability of each source to explain the relationship between normative Islamic texts and contemporary economic policy. The study gives priority to sources that discuss Islamic legal reasoning, Qur'ānic economic ethics, classical Islamic economic thought, and modern public policy instruments.

The analysis was conducted in four stages. First, the relevant Qur'ānic verses and Hadith reports were identified and interpreted through a thematic tafsīr approach. Second, the legal reason and context of the texts were examined to distinguish between normal market conditions and distorted market conditions. Third, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* and *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah* were used to assess whether price intervention protects life, property, and lawful economic conduct without creating greater harm. Fourth, the findings were integrated with public policy analysis to formulate a model for assessing the legitimacy of *tas'ir*. Through this procedure, the study constructs an integrative framework that connects *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah*, and policy instruments in evaluating price intervention for consumers, producers, and the state.

Results and Discussion

Market Distortion and the Legal Debate on *Tas'ir*

The discussion of *tas'ir* cannot be separated from the distinction between a normal market and a distorted market. In a normal market, prices emerge from the interaction between supply and demand without coercion, manipulation, hoarding, fraud, or monopolistic control.¹² Such a market reflects voluntary exchange and allows sellers and buyers to reach a price that is mutually accepted. In this situation, excessive state intervention may create a new form of injustice because the authority may impose prices that do not correspond to production costs, scarcity, distribution risks, or the legitimate interest of economic actors. This explains why *tas'ir* has long been debated in Islamic legal thought.

The debate is rooted in the prophetic report in which the Prophet refused to set prices when people complained about rising prices. The refusal does not necessarily indicate an absolute prohibition of all forms of price regulation. Rather, it shows that price intervention becomes problematic when the market still operates naturally and no party is proven to have created distortion. If the increase in prices results from natural scarcity, rising costs, or an ordinary imbalance between supply and demand, coercive price fixing may harm sellers and producers. In that condition, the state's intervention may contradict the very justice that Islamic law seeks to protect.¹³

The situation changes when the market no longer operates fairly. Modern markets are not always shaped by direct encounters between sellers and buyers. Prices may be influenced by cartels, hoarding, information asymmetry, speculative practices, distribution control, and the dominance of a few large actors over essential commodities.

¹² Kusuma, "The Concept of Just Price in Islam: The Philosophy of Pricing and Reasons for Applying It in Islamic Market Operation."

¹³ Muwaffaq al-Dīn 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad Ibn Qudāmāh, "Kitāb Al-Buyū', Bāb Shurūṭ al-Bay'," in *Al-Mughnī*, vol. 6 (Dār 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1997), no. 3451.

These forms of distortion weaken the moral assumption of a free and fair market.¹⁴ When the poor cannot access staple goods because prices are manipulated, the issue is no longer merely economic. It becomes a legal and ethical problem because market injustice threatens public welfare and damages the protection of life and property.

In this sense, *tas'ir* should not be read only as state coercion over market prices. It should be understood as a spectrum of public intervention designed to restore justice when the market fails to protect the public interest. *Tas'ir al-jabāri* refers to direct and binding price regulation imposed by the authority, usually in the form of maximum or minimum price determination. This type of intervention may be justified only under strict conditions, especially when market distortion produces harm that cannot be corrected through ordinary market mechanisms. By contrast, *tas'ir al-irshādī* refers to persuasive and corrective guidance through public information, price recommendations, transparency measures, market education, and cooperation with traders. This second form does not abolish market mechanisms but seeks to guide them toward fairness and stability.¹⁵

The distinction between *tas'ir al-jabāri* and *tas'ir al-irshādī* is important because government intervention is not always identical with rigid price fixing. In many cases, the state may begin with lighter instruments, such as market monitoring, distribution supervision, public price references, subsidies, or anti-hoarding measures. Coercive price fixing becomes a last resort when softer instruments fail to prevent wider harm. This layered understanding prevents two extreme positions. The first extreme rejects all price intervention by relying only on the literal meaning of the prophetic refusal. The second extreme allows the state to fix prices without sufficient evidence of market distortion. Both positions are inadequate because both may produce injustice in different ways.

Modern public policy theory helps clarify this problem. Keynesian economics, for example, departs from the assumption that market mechanisms do not always produce equilibrium by themselves. Under certain conditions, the state may need to intervene through fiscal or monetary instruments to stabilize economic life and protect public welfare. Although Keynesian theory is not an Islamic legal theory, its basic insight is relevant: public authority has a role when market mechanisms fail to secure social stability.¹⁶ In the context of *tas'ir*, this insight supports the argument that non-intervention is not always morally neutral. When market failure harms the public, passivity may indirectly preserve injustice.

Pareto's concept of efficiency also contributes to the discussion, although it has limitations. A policy is considered efficient when it can improve one party's welfare without making another party worse off. This framework reminds policymakers that price intervention should not protect consumers by sacrificing producers without justification. However, Pareto's approach is not sufficient because it focuses more on

¹⁴ Mustapa Khamal Rokan, "MARKET FAIRNESS IN ISLAMIC ECONOMICS LAW AND ETHICS: A Study on Modern and Traditional Market Regulations in Indonesia," *MIQOT: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman* 39, no. 1 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.30821/miqot.v39i1.43>.

¹⁵ Patuti et al., "The Position of al-Tas'ir al-Jabāri in the View of the Rule of Yutaḥammal al-Ḍarar al-Khāṣ Li Daf' al-Ḍarar Al-'Ām. Al-Khiyār."

¹⁶ Norashikin Adam et al., "The Impact of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty and Volatility on Stock Markets: Evidence from Islamic Countries," *Asian Economic and Financial Review* 12, no. 1 (2022): 15–28, <https://doi.org/10.18488/5002.v12i1.4400>.

efficiency than distributive justice.¹⁷ A policy may be efficient in a technical sense but still fail to protect vulnerable groups.¹⁸ For this reason, the *tas'ir* debate requires a more normative framework that can assess justice, public interest, and the distribution of harm.

Pigou's welfare economics gives a stronger basis for state intervention in the presence of externalities and market failure. If certain economic practices impose harm on others without being reflected in market prices, the state may correct them through taxation, subsidies, or regulation. This logic is close to the Islamic concern with preventing *mafsadah* and protecting *maṣlahah*.¹⁹ Hoarding staple goods, manipulating supply, or exploiting consumers during scarcity creates social costs that cannot be left to the market alone. Public intervention, therefore, can be seen as a corrective instrument when private economic behavior produces wider social harm.²⁰

The Islamic legal debate on *tas'ir* and modern public policy theory meet at one central point: intervention must be justified by evidence of harm and directed toward public welfare. The state cannot intervene merely because prices are high, nor can it remain passive when prices are manipulated. The decisive issue is whether the market increase reflects a natural process or a distorted structure. If distortion exists, the state has a responsibility to restore fairness. If distortion does not exist, coercive intervention may become a form of injustice against sellers and producers.

This discussion shows that *tas'ir* must be placed between two normative boundaries. On the one hand, the prophetic refusal to fix prices protects market actors from arbitrary state coercion. On the other hand, the Qur'anic principles of justice, honesty, fair measurement, and the prohibition of unlawful appropriation require the state to prevent market practices that harm society. The legitimacy of *tas'ir*, therefore, depends not only on the existence of public authority but also on the clarity of its moral and legal justification.

The next question is how to determine whether an intervention truly serves the public interest. Market distortion alone does not automatically make every price policy legitimate. A policy may claim to protect consumers but still harm producers, weaken supply, burden the state budget, or create new opportunities for corruption. For this reason, *tas'ir* needs a more precise criterion. That criterion is *maṣlahah 'āmmah*, understood not as a rhetorical justification for state power, but as a measurable legal-ethical standard that considers consumers, producers, and the state proportionally.

Mashlahah 'Āmmah as the Criterion of Price Intervention

The legitimacy of *tas'ir* cannot be determined merely by the existence of market distortion. A distorted market may justify public intervention, but intervention itself still

¹⁷ Vilfredo Pareto, *Manual of Political Economy* (Augustus M. Kelley, 1971). p. 89.

¹⁸ Amartya Sen, *On Ethics and Economics*, 20. repr, *The Royer Lectures* (Blackwell, 2010); Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon, "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," *Credit and Capital Markets - Kredit Und Kapital* 52, no. 4 (2019): 505-26, <https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.4.505>.

¹⁹ Arthur Cecil Pigou, *The Economics of Welfare* (Macmillan and Co, 1920). p. 203.

²⁰ Ulinuha Saifullah, "Commodity Hoarding (Ihtikar) in Surah Al-Hashr: Exploring Historical Roots and Reassessing Interpretative Perspectives," *Az-Zarqa': Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 15, no. 1 (2023): 43-61.

requires a clear legal and ethical criterion.²¹ In Islamic legal reasoning, that criterion is *maṣlaḥah ‘āmmah*. The concept of *maṣlaḥah* is not a loose justification that allows the authority to regulate prices as it wishes. It is a normative standard that measures whether a policy protects the public, prevents harm, and remains proportionate to the interests of all economic actors involved in the market.²²

Al-Ghazālī’s classification of *maṣlaḥah* is useful for clarifying this point. Based on its scope and degree of clarity, *maṣlaḥah* can be divided into several levels, including *maṣlaḥah* related to the wider public, *maṣlaḥah* concerning the majority, and *maṣlaḥah* attached to a particular person or case. In *Shifa’ al-Ghalīl*, al-Ghazālī states:²³

“*Wa-tanqasimu qismatan ukhrā bi-al-iḍāfati ilā marātibihā fi al-wuḍūḥ wa-al-khafā’*, [fa-minhā mā yata’allaqu bi-maṣlaḥatin ‘āmmah, fi ḥaqqi al-khalqī kāffah], *wa-minhā mā yata’allaqu bi-maṣlaḥati al-aḡḡlab*, *wa-minhā mā yata’allaqu bi-maṣlaḥati shakhsin mu’ayyanin fi wāqī’atin nādirah*, *wa-tatafāwatu hadhihi al-marātibu bi-tafāwuti maṣāliḥihā fi al-zuhūr*, *wa-kullu dhālika ḥujjatun bi-sharṭi allā yakūna gharīban ba’īdan*, *wa-bi-sharṭi allā yuṣādimā naṣṣan*, *wa-lā yata’arraḍa lahu bi-al-taghyīr.*”

This statement shows that *maṣlaḥah* can be used as legal reasoning only when it is not strange, remote, or contradictory to an authoritative text. In the context of *tas’īr*, this requirement is crucial. Price intervention cannot be called *maṣlaḥah* simply because it lowers the price for consumers. If a price ceiling ignores production costs, distribution risks, or the livelihood of farmers and traders, it may create a new injustice. Conversely, refusing intervention in the name of market freedom may also create harm when consumers are exposed to hoarding, monopoly, or speculative price manipulation. *Maṣlaḥah ‘āmmah* requires a proportional assessment of both sides.²⁴

For this reason, *maṣlaḥah ‘āmmah* in *tas’īr* must be distinguished from partial interest. Consumers may benefit from lower prices, but producers may suffer if the regulated price does not cover their costs. Producers may benefit from higher prices, but consumers may be harmed when staple goods become unaffordable. The state may claim to protect public order, but public policy may fail if it burdens the budget, weakens supply, or creates corruption in distribution. A price policy deserves to be called *maṣlaḥah ‘āmmah* only when it avoids privileging one party while transferring excessive harm to another.

This proportionality is closely related to *maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah*. The classical theory of *maqāṣid* identifies five fundamental protections, namely *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, *ḥifẓ al-aql*, *ḥifẓ al-nasl*, and *ḥifẓ al-māl*.²⁵ In the specific case of *tas’īr*, however, the most relevant dimensions are *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, *ḥifẓ al-māl*, and *ḥifẓ al-dīn* in the ethical sense of lawful and just transactions. This does not mean that the other *maqāṣid* are irrelevant, but the legal

²¹ Firdaus Firdaus and Zainal Azwar, “The Role of Substantive Understanding Approach in the Changes of Fiqh,” *Al-‘Adalah* 17, no. 1 (2020): 71–96.

²² Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki and Nurdianawati Irwani Abdullah, “Maqasid Al-Shari‘ah, Maslahah, and Corporate Social Responsibility,” *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 24, no. 1 (2007): 25–45, <https://doi.org/10.35632/ajiss.v24i1.415>.

²³ Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali, *Syifā’ al-Ghalīl Fi Bayān Ash-Shabah Wa al-Mukhayyil Wa Masālik at-Ta’līl* (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1999), p. 101.

²⁴ Dedi Sunardi et al., “Legal Awareness of Micro and Small Enterprise Operators Regarding Halal Certification: A Maslaha Perspective,” *Ijtihad : Jurnal Wacana Hukum Islam Dan Kemanusiaan* 24, no. 1 (2024): 23–45, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijthad.v24i1.23-45>.

²⁵ Asy-Syāṭibī, *Al-Muwāfaqāt Fi Uṣul Asy-Syari‘ah* (Dār al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 2004).

argument for price intervention is strongest when it is connected to the protection of life, property, and the moral integrity of market exchange.

Hifz al-nafs provides the basis for protecting public access to essential goods.²⁶ Staple foods, medicines, fuel, and other basic necessities are not ordinary commodities when their scarcity or price manipulation threatens the survival of society. If price increases prevent vulnerable groups from obtaining basic needs, the issue can no longer be treated as a normal market fluctuation. It becomes a matter of protecting life and preventing social harm. In such a condition, the state may intervene to ensure availability, affordability, and fair distribution, as long as the intervention does not produce greater harm.

Hifz al-māl provides another important criterion. Islamic law protects property not only from theft or direct seizure, but also from fraudulent and unjust economic practices. The Qur'anic prohibition against consuming wealth unlawfully and the command that trade should occur through mutual consent provide the moral foundation for market justice. Manipulation of supply, reduction of measurement, speculative hoarding, monopoly, and deceptive pricing violate this protection because they take wealth through distorted exchange.²⁷ *Tas'ir*, therefore, can be justified when it functions to protect the property of consumers from exploitation and the property of producers from arbitrary state coercion.

Hifz al-dīn is relevant in a more specific sense. It does not mean that every price policy is directly a matter of religious preservation. Rather, it means that economic policy should maintain the ethical boundaries of *mu'āmalah*. Market exchange must avoid *ribā*, *gharar*, fraud, coercion, and injustice.²⁸ In this sense, *tas'ir* is connected to *hifz al-dīn* when it prevents market practices that undermine the moral order of Islamic transactions. Price regulation is not an act of worship in itself, but it may become part of religiously informed public responsibility when it protects lawful and fair economic conduct.

The *maqāṣid* framework also prevents the misuse of *maṣlahah*. A policy cannot be justified merely because the state declares it beneficial. *Mashlahah* must be tested through several questions. Does the policy respond to a real harm or only to political pressure? Does it protect the public or only certain groups? Does it contradict a clear text or does it operate within the moral purpose of the text? Does it reduce *mafsadah* or merely shift harm from one actor to another? These questions are necessary because *tas'ir* may easily become a populist instrument if it is not controlled by *maqāṣid* and evidence.

This is why *maṣlahah 'āmmah* in *tas'ir* should be understood as a three-sided equilibrium. The first side is the consumer, who must be protected from exploitative prices and loss of access to basic needs. The second side is the producer or seller, who must not be forced to sell below reasonable cost or deprived of legitimate profit. The third side is the state, which must regulate the market transparently, maintain supply,

²⁶ Irfan Syauqi Beik et al., "Methodologies and Smart Techniques Recommended in Analyzing Maqasid Al-Shari'Ah for Islamic Economics and Finance," in Teaching and Research Methods for Islamic Economics and Finance, 1st ed., by Mohd Ma'Sum Billah (Routledge, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003252764-6>.

²⁷ Muhammad Shahrul Ifwat Ishak and Nur Syahirah Mohammad Nasir, "Maqasid Al-Shari'ah in Islamic Finance: Harmonizing Theory and Reality," The Journal of Muamalat and Islamic Finance Research, June 1, 2021, 108-19, <https://doi.org/10.33102/jmifr.v18i1.334>.

²⁸ Ahmad Solahuddin, "Ribā in The Qur'an and The Bible: Comparative Legal-Ethical Perspectives on Economic Justice," Az-Zarqa': Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam 17, no. 1 (2025): 124-47.

prevent hoarding, and evaluate the impact of its policy. If one of these sides is ignored, price intervention may solve one problem while creating another.

Thus, *maṣlahah* 'āmmah is not identical with cheap prices. It is a broader legal-ethical standard for assessing whether price intervention restores justice in the market. A cheap price that destroys producers is not *maṣlahah*. A high price caused by manipulation is not market freedom. A state policy without transparency is not public welfare. The value of *tas'ir* lies in its ability to protect the public while maintaining proportional justice among market actors.

This understanding leads to the need for an integrative model. The text provides normative boundaries, *maqāṣid* determines the direction of protection, *maṣlahah* measures the balance of benefits and harms, and public policy provides the instruments for implementation. Without such integration, *tas'ir* may be trapped either in rigid textualism or in unrestricted state intervention. The next section therefore discusses how *naṣṣ*, *maqāṣid*, and public policy can be integrated in formulating a fair and accountable model of price intervention.

Integrating *Nash*, *Maqāṣid*, and Public Policy

The discussion in the previous section shows that *maṣlahah* 'āmmah cannot be reduced to a general claim of public benefit. It must be tested through legal, ethical, and policy considerations. This is where an integrative approach becomes necessary. *Tas'ir* is located at the intersection between normative texts, the objectives of Islamic law, and the practical instruments of public policy. If one of these elements is isolated from the others, the legal reasoning becomes incomplete. A purely textual reading may fail to respond to market distortion, while an unrestricted policy approach may turn state intervention into arbitrary control over economic actors.

The normative texts of the Qur'an and Hadith provide the moral foundation of market justice. The Qur'an prohibits unlawful appropriation of wealth, fraud in measurement, *ribā*, and any form of transaction that violates fairness and mutual consent.²⁹ The Hadith on the Prophet's refusal to set prices also carries an important normative message. It protects the market from unjust coercion by authority when price changes occur naturally. However, the Hadith should not be detached from the condition in which it emerged.³⁰ The refusal of *tas'ir* occurred when the market was not proven to be distorted by hoarding, cartel behavior, or manipulation. The text therefore does not close the door to all forms of intervention, but warns against intervention that creates injustice.

A rigid literal approach faces difficulty when applied to the structure of modern markets. Contemporary prices are not always formed through simple supply and demand. They may be shaped by global supply chains, information asymmetry, speculative accumulation, digital platforms, corporate concentration, and distribution bottlenecks. In such situations, the formal appearance of market exchange may hide

²⁹ Ahmad Hujaj Nurrohim et al., "Usury in Online Loans and Pay Later: From Historical Perspective to Its Contextualization on Modern Practice," *Az-Zarqa': Jurnal Hukum Bisnis Islam* 15, no. 2 (2023): 283–306, <https://doi.org/10.14421/azzarqa.v15i2.3303>.

³⁰ Waeibrorheem Waemustafa, *Theory of Gharar and Its Interpretation of Risk and Uncertainty from the Perspectives of Authentic Hadith and the Holy Quran: Review of Literature*, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.6084/M9.FIGSHARE.4042998.V1>.

coercive economic power. A consumer may appear to buy voluntarily, yet that choice is constrained by scarcity that has been deliberately created. A trader may appear to set a price freely, yet the price may be influenced by upstream actors who control supply. These realities require a method of legal reasoning that reads the text together with the actual structure of harm.³¹

Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah provides that mediating framework. It does not replace the text, but clarifies the direction of legal protection intended by the text. In *tas'ir*, *maqāṣid* directs attention to the protection of life, property, and lawful economic order. *Hifẓ al-nafs* requires the state to prevent conditions in which people lose access to basic necessities. *Hifẓ al-māl* requires the protection of wealth from exploitation, manipulation, and arbitrary coercion. *Hifẓ al-dīn*, in this specific context, requires market conduct to remain within the ethical boundaries of *mu'āmalah*, including honesty, transparency, and the avoidance of unlawful gain. These *maqāṣid* do not automatically legalize every price regulation, but they provide the standard by which intervention must be judged.

Maṣlaḥah then functions as the instrument for assessing whether the policy truly serves those *maqāṣid*. The assessment cannot stop at intention. A government may intend to protect consumers, yet the policy may reduce supply if producers are forced to sell below reasonable cost. A policy may intend to stabilize prices, yet it may create rent-seeking if distribution is not transparent. A policy may claim to prevent hoarding, yet it may fail if market data are weak and enforcement is selective. *Maṣlaḥah 'āmmah* therefore requires evidence, proportionality, and accountability. It asks whether the intervention responds to real harm, protects the public, avoids contradiction with authoritative texts, and does not create a greater *mafsadah*.

Public policy supplies the practical instruments for that assessment. In modern governance, price intervention does not need to take only one form. The state may use market monitoring, publication of reference prices, subsidies, food reserves, import regulation, distribution control, anti-hoarding enforcement, consumer protection, or maximum retail price policies.³² These instruments differ in their level of coercion. *Tas'ir al-irshādī* may be sufficient when the market can still be corrected through guidance and transparency. *Tas'ir al-jabārī* may be justified only when distortion has caused wider harm and softer instruments are no longer adequate. This layered approach prevents intervention from becoming excessive while still allowing the state to act when public welfare is at risk.³³

The key point in this integrative model is the identification of *'illah* and context. The prohibition of *tas'ir* in the Hadith should be read through the reason behind the prohibition: preventing injustice caused by coercive price fixing in a market that was not distorted. When that *'illah* is absent because the market is damaged by hoarding, monopoly, or manipulation, the legal assessment changes. This does not mean that the text is ignored. Rather, the text is applied through its purpose. The same concern for justice that prevents arbitrary intervention also supports corrective intervention when market actors create harm.

³¹ J. Fischer, *The Halal Frontier: Muslim Consumers in a Globalized Market*, 1st ed. 2011, Contemporary Anthropology of Religion (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2011), <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230119789>.

³² Adam et al., "The Impact of Global Economic Policy Uncertainty and Volatility on Stock Markets."

³³ Patuti et al., "The Position of al-Tas'ir al-Jabārī in the View of the Rule of Yutaḥammal al-Ḍarar al-Khāṣ Li Daf' al-Ḍarar Al-'Ām. Al-Khiyār."

This model also requires *tasykhīṣ al-wāqī'*, namely a careful diagnosis of economic reality. Policymakers must determine whether price increases are caused by natural scarcity, rising production costs, distribution disruption, or deliberate manipulation. Each cause requires a different response. If prices rise because production costs increase, a coercive price ceiling may harm producers. If prices rise because of hoarding or cartel behavior, anti-hoarding enforcement and temporary price regulation may be justified. If prices rise because supply is limited, subsidies, reserves, or controlled imports may be more appropriate than simple price fixing. Without this diagnosis, *tas'īr* risks becoming a symbolic policy rather than a just policy.³⁴

An integrative approach therefore operates through several movements. First, the relevant texts are identified, especially the texts concerning justice, lawful exchange, the prohibition of fraud, and the Hadith on *tas'īr*. Second, the *'illah* and historical context of those texts are examined. Third, the actual market condition is diagnosed through reliable data. Fourth, the policy is tested through *maqāṣid* and *maṣlahah 'āmmah*. Fifth, the least harmful and most effective policy instrument is selected. Sixth, the impact of the policy is evaluated so that intervention can be continued, modified, or revoked when conditions change.

This model avoids two weaknesses. It avoids rigid textualism because it does not treat the Hadith on *tas'īr* as an absolute ban detached from market reality. It also avoids policy pragmatism because it does not allow the state to intervene merely in the name of public welfare without normative and empirical justification. The model places *naṣṣ* as the source of legal boundaries, *maqāṣid* as the direction of protection, *maṣlahah* as the criterion of proportionality, and public policy as the instrument of implementation.

The integrative model can be summarized as follows: the text provides the normative foundation; the *'illah* and market context determine whether the case falls under normal or distorted market conditions; *maqāṣid* tests whether intervention protects life, property, and lawful exchange; public policy translates that protection into concrete instruments; and evaluation ensures that the policy does not create new harm. Through this structure, *tas'īr* is no longer seen as a simple opposition between prohibition and permission. It becomes a conditional legal-policy mechanism whose legitimacy depends on justice, evidence, proportionality, and the realization of *maṣlahah 'āmmah*.

Testing the Model through Price Intervention Policy

The integrative model discussed in the previous section needs to be tested through a concrete policy situation. Price intervention over staple commodities provides an appropriate illustration because it contains all elements of the *tas'īr* debate: market fluctuation, public access to basic needs, the interest of producers and traders, and the state's responsibility to prevent wider harm. The case of maximum retail price policy, commonly known as *Harga Eceran Tertinggi* or HET, can be used to show how *naṣṣ*,

³⁴ Mayadina Rohmi Musfiroh et al., "The Urgency of Maslahah in the Formulation of Fatwa and Legislation in Indonesia: An Analytical Study," *Ulul Albab: Jurnal Studi Dan Penelitian Hukum Islam* 8, no. 1 (2024): 80-92.

maqāsid, *maṣlahah*, and public policy interact in determining the legitimacy of price intervention.³⁵

The first step is identifying the legal problem. A rise in the price of a staple commodity does not automatically justify *tas'ir*. Price increases may occur because of natural scarcity, higher production costs, climate disruption, transportation problems, or changes in demand. In these situations, direct price fixing may not solve the problem and may even harm producers. The legal problem becomes different when price increases are caused by hoarding, cartel practices, distribution manipulation, or deliberate restriction of supply. When the market is no longer operating fairly, the issue is not merely price fluctuation but economic injustice.³⁶

At this stage, the relevant texts must be read together. The Hadith on the Prophet's refusal to set prices establishes an important warning against arbitrary intervention in a normal market. At the same time, the Qur'anic principles of justice, lawful exchange, honest measurement, and the prohibition of unlawful appropriation of wealth provide the basis for preventing market abuse. The prohibition of *iḥtikār* and deceptive trading practices further strengthens the argument that the market cannot be left unregulated when certain actors deliberately create scarcity or exploit the public.³⁷ The normative question, therefore, is not simply whether *tas'ir* is allowed or prohibited, but whether the condition of the market justifies corrective intervention.

The second step is *tasykhīṣ al-wāqi'*, namely diagnosing the actual socio-economic condition behind price movement. This diagnosis requires reliable data on production, stock availability, distribution channels, price changes, trader behavior, consumer purchasing power, and the role of dominant market actors. If the data show that production is sufficient but supply disappears from the market, the problem may lie in distribution control or hoarding. If the data show that production has genuinely declined, the policy response should not rely only on price ceilings but must also address supply. If the data show that price increases are caused by rising input costs, then forcing producers to sell at low prices may create a new injustice.³⁸

This distinction is crucial because *tas'ir* must respond to the real cause of harm. A maximum retail price may be appropriate when market actors manipulate supply and exploit consumers. However, the same policy may fail when scarcity is caused by weak production or distribution disruption. In the latter case, subsidies, food reserves, controlled imports, transportation support, or distribution repair may be more effective. The state must therefore avoid treating all price increases as the same legal-policy problem. The integrative model requires the state to connect the *'illah* of the legal text with the factual cause of the market problem.³⁹

³⁵ Ali Murtadho et al., "Reconstructing Integrative Islamic Economics: Imam Mālik's Substantive Legal-Economic Framework in al- Muwaṭṭa' and Its Relevance for Contemporary Plural Legal System," *Contemporary Issues on Interfaith Law and Society* 4, no. 1 (2025): 141–82.

³⁶ Timur Kuran, "On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 21, no. 2 (1989): 171–91, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002074380003227X>.

³⁷ Murtadho et al., "Reconstructing Integrative Islamic Economics: Imam Mālik's Substantive Legal-Economic Framework in al- Muwaṭṭa' and Its Relevance for Contemporary Plural Legal System."

³⁸ Muhammad Salman Al Farisi et al., "Consumer Behavior of Muslim Minorities in Purchasing Halal Products: A Maslahah Perspective," *Jurnal Ilmiah Al-Syir'ah* 22, no. 2 (2024): 221–32.

³⁹ R. Hassan, "Islamic Sustainable Finance Paradigm," in *Islamic Sustainable Finance: Policy, Risk and Regulation* (2024), Scopus, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003395447-3>.

The third step is assessing *maṣlahah*. A HET policy over staple commodities may protect consumers from exploitative prices, especially poor households whose income is highly sensitive to food prices. This protection is related to *ḥifẓ al-nafs* because access to basic needs is necessary for survival and social stability. It is also related to *ḥifẓ al-māl* because consumers must be protected from price manipulation and unlawful economic extraction. However, *maṣlahah* assessment must also consider producers, farmers, distributors, and small traders. If the HET is set below reasonable production and distribution costs, the policy may reduce supply, discourage production, or shift the burden of public welfare onto producers.⁴⁰

For that reason, the legitimacy of HET depends on proportionality. The policy should not merely aim to create cheap prices. It must seek fair prices. A fair price protects consumers from exploitation while still allowing producers and traders to recover costs and obtain reasonable profit. This balance reflects *maṣlahah ‘āmmah* because it considers the interests of the public without eliminating the legitimate rights of economic actors. If the state wants to keep prices affordable while production costs remain high, subsidies or distribution support may be more just than imposing a rigid ceiling on sellers alone.

The fourth step is formulating the policy instrument. In a distorted market, *tas ‘ir al-jabārī* may be used in the form of a temporary maximum retail price. Yet this instrument should be accompanied by other measures, such as market monitoring, anti-hoarding enforcement, stock transparency, distribution control, and sanctions against actors who deliberately restrict supply. Without these supporting instruments, HET may become ineffective because sellers can avoid formal prices through hidden transactions, reduced stock, or lower product quality. Price regulation must therefore operate as part of a broader public policy package, not as a single administrative command.

Tas ‘ir al-irshādī may also be used before or alongside coercive regulation. The state may publish reference prices, provide transparent market information, coordinate with producers and distributors, and educate consumers about fair pricing. This softer approach is important when the market has not fully collapsed but shows signs of instability. It also prevents the state from moving too quickly into coercive intervention. If guidance, transparency, and supervision are sufficient to restore fairness, coercive price fixing should not be the first option. This approach is more consistent with the principle of minimizing harm.⁴¹

The fifth step is implementation and evaluation. A price intervention policy must have a clear duration, measurable indicators, and an exit strategy. If HET is imposed because of hoarding or temporary disruption, the policy should be reviewed when stock normalizes and prices stabilize. If the policy continues after the market has recovered, it may distort the market and harm producers. If the policy fails to reduce harm or creates greater *mafsadah*, it must be revised or revoked. This evaluative requirement is important because *maṣlahah* is not static. A policy that is beneficial in one condition may become harmful when the condition changes.

⁴⁰ Adi Santoso and Yuyun Kristinawati, "Strategic Innovation Isn Islamic Organizations: Exploring the Gold Ocean Strategy Framework," *JEMASI: Jurnal Ekonomi Manajemen Dan Akuntansi* 21, no. 1 (2025): 100–117.

⁴¹ Kusuma, "The Concept of Just Price in Islam: The Philosophy of Pricing and Reasons for Applying It in Islamic Market Operation."

The application of the integrative model shows that *tas'ir* is not a simple matter of state power over prices. It is a conditional legal-policy mechanism. Its legitimacy depends on the presence of market distortion, the relevance of *'illah*, the protection of *maqāṣid*, the proportionality of *maṣlahah*, and the accountability of public policy. A normal market should not be subjected to arbitrary coercion. A distorted market should not be left to harm the public. The state's task is to distinguish between the two and choose the least harmful instrument to restore justice.⁴²

Through this framework, the HET policy can be understood as legitimate when it responds to real market distortion, protects access to basic goods, prevents exploitation, and remains fair to producers and traders. It becomes problematic when it is imposed without data, used for political popularity, or designed without regard to production costs and distribution realities. The strength of the integrative model lies in this balanced assessment. It does not turn the Hadith on *tas'ir* into an absolute barrier to intervention, but it also does not allow *maṣlahah* to become an unrestricted justification for state control.⁴³

The model may be presented in a simplified scheme: first, identify the relevant *naṣṣ* and its *'illah*; second, diagnose the market condition through *tasykhīṣ al-wāqī'*; third, test the policy through *maqāṣid* and *maṣlahah 'āmmah*; fourth, select the appropriate policy instrument; and fifth, evaluate its impact on consumers, producers, and the state. This sequence ensures that price intervention remains legally grounded, empirically informed, and ethically accountable.

Conclusion

Tas'ir cannot be adequately understood through a simple dichotomy between prohibition and permissibility. The Hadith reporting the Prophet's refusal to impose prices remains a fundamental normative reference that cautions against arbitrary state intervention in markets that operate under normal and fair conditions. Nevertheless, a comprehensive reading of Islamic legal sources shows that this prophetic position cannot be detached from broader Qur'ānic principles concerning justice, lawful exchange, transparency in transactions, honest measurement, and the prohibition of consuming wealth unjustly. These principles collectively establish that public authority bears responsibility for preventing economic practices that generate harm and undermine social welfare. Accordingly, price intervention becomes legally and ethically justifiable when market prices no longer reflect natural supply and demand but are instead distorted by hoarding, monopoly, cartel behavior, manipulation, fraud, speculation, or unequal control over production and distribution channels. In such circumstances, *tas'ir* functions not as an infringement upon market freedom but as a corrective mechanism intended to restore fairness, protect access to essential goods, and prevent exploitation of vulnerable groups within society.

⁴² Saim Kayadibi, "The Theory of Syar'ah Oriented Public Policy," *AHKAM : Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 15, no. 2 (2015), <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v15i2.2861>.

⁴³ Liam Phelan et al., "Cooperative Governance: One Pathway to a Stable-State Economy," *Environmental Politics* 21, no. 3 (2012): 412-31, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2012.671572>; Trisiladi Suprijanto, "The Role of Profit Rate in Islamic Monetary Policy:," in *Research Anthology on Macroeconomics and the Achievement of Global Stability*, ed. Information Resources Management Association (IGI Global, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-6684-7460-0.ch029>.

The central finding of this article is that *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah* in the context of *tas'ir* should be understood as a proportional and balanced legal-ethical criterion rather than as a broad or subjective claim of public benefit. A pricing policy cannot automatically be regarded as beneficial merely because it lowers prices for consumers. Genuine public welfare requires consideration of all stakeholders involved in the economic process, including producers, farmers, traders, distributors, consumers, and the state. A policy that suppresses prices to the extent that producers suffer losses and lose incentives to maintain production cannot be categorized as *maṣlaḥah*. Likewise, excessively high prices resulting from market manipulation cannot be justified in the name of economic freedom. Based on this understanding, the article proposes an integrative framework that combines *naṣṣ* as the normative foundation, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* as the orientation of legal protection, *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah* as the criterion for evaluating proportionality and fairness, and public policy as the practical instrument of implementation. This framework contributes to contemporary discussions on Islamic economic governance by offering a middle path between unrestricted market liberalism and excessive state control. Through this approach, the legitimacy of *tas'ir* depends on clear evidence of public harm, accurate assessment of market conditions, proportional intervention, transparency in decision-making, and accountability in policy implementation.

Despite these contributions, this study remains limited by its normative-conceptual nature and does not include empirical investigation of specific markets or commodities. The discussion of maximum retail price (*Harga Eceran Tertinggi - HET*) policies and interventions in staple commodity markets serves primarily as an illustrative application of the proposed framework rather than as a comprehensive case study. Future research should therefore examine the practical effectiveness of this model through empirical studies involving commodities such as rice, cooking oil, fuel, medicines, and other strategic goods. Such studies may evaluate production costs, distribution structures, consumer vulnerability, market concentration, and state regulatory capacity in order to determine whether price interventions genuinely achieve *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah*. Comparative research across Muslim-majority countries would also be valuable for identifying different regulatory approaches and assessing the extent to which contemporary pricing policies successfully balance market efficiency, social justice, and public welfare in accordance with the objectives of Islamic law.

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Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.

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