

Mass Rallies: An Overview of *Santri* Rejection on the Five-day School Policy in Indonesia

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Abstract

The Regulation of Ministry of Education and Culture No. 23 of 2017 concerning School Day resulted in a tremendous wave of protest. The public takes part in different sides, the pro and the contra. This research uses a hermeneutical paradigm with causal historical analysis. The results of the study show that the refusal among the pesantren community is based on a robust doctrine of the fiqh rules as a form of orthodoxy and adherence to the values taught by the pesantren. Second, the government is playing with language on its policy. In the context of full-day school regulation, the government still uses euphemism as a strategy of education political ethic. Third, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has a very central role in rejecting the five-day school policy.

Keywords: *Santri, Permendikbud (The Decree of Ministry of Education and Culture), Full Day School, Islamic Boarding School, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)*

Abstrak

Permendikbud nomor 23 tahun 2017 tentang Hari Sekolah menuai gelombang protes. Publik terbelah antara mereka yang pro dengan yang kontra. Penelitian ini menggunakan paradigma hermeunetis dengan analisis historis kausal. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa penolakan kalangan pesantren didasari oleh doktrin kuat kaidah fikih sebagai bentuk ortodoksi dan kepatuhan terhadap nilai-nilai yang diajarkan pesantren. Kedua, pemerintah menggunakan permainan bahasa di dalam kebijakannya. Dalam konteks kebijakan full day school ini, jasa eufemisme masih digunakan oleh pemerintah sebagai strategi etika politik pendidikan. Ketiga, Nahdlatul Ulama memiliki peran yang sangat sentral dalam penolakan kebijakan lima hari sekolah.

Kata Kunci: *Santri, Permendikbud, Full Say School, Pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)*

Introduction

Minister of Education in Indonesia, Muhadjir Effendy, issued Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017. This regulation obliges all elementary and secondary schools in Indonesia to carry out teaching and learning activities a full day from Monday to Friday. Muhadjir claimed the contents of the regulation include two main aspects of Education, namely character education and general knowledge. This was based on the President's statement in his speech about the ideal education for Indonesia

Previously, Minister Muhadjir reportedly raised his idea of an eight-hour school system. He explained that it does not mean students have to study in class continuously for a full day.¹ This program aims to ensure that students also get extracurricular activities such as sports and character education.

Interestingly, one day before the press release, he said that it would be better to make students stay at school rather than having them at home alone while their parents work. This idea resulted in a tremendous wave of protest. The minister, however, insisted on issuing the regulation. On June 12, 2017, he signed the Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017 entitled "School Day."




Figure 1. Chronology of the FDS Polemic and Debate

¹ "Full Day School" Tak Berarti Belajar Sehari di Sekolah, Ini Penjelasan Mendikbud", <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/09/08530471/.full.day.school.tak.berarti.belajar.seharian.di.sekolah.ini.penjelasan.mendikbud>.

This study uses a qualitative approach with the hermeneutic paradigm. This study focuses on public criticism towards Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017. The criticism starts from within the society, and then it leads to protest actions on the street and eventually to high-level political action played by *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)* as a representation of *pesantren*. There are two sources of data collection in this research, i.e., primary and secondary data. First, researcher conducted in-person interviews with contra parties including *santri*. Second, secondary data were acquired from free sources relevant to this issue, such as mass media (online and offline) and *Nahdlatul Ulama's* official documents.

This study uses historical causal analysis to express the roots of the historicity of an event in a more in-depth public policy issued. This study aims to reveal the narratives built by Islamic boarding schools that reject Ministerial Regulation No.23 of 2017.

Dance on the Rule: Rejection Framework

Circle of Islamic boarding schools (*Pesantren*)² is those who are concerned with religious disciplines. One of the disciplines that are *mbalung sumsum* (ingrained) taught in Islamic boarding schools is the rule of *Fiqh* (Islamic Jurisprudence).³ In the rules, there are a well-known adagium *dar'ul mafāsīd muqaddamun alā jalbil mashālih* which means to prevent harm or damage taking precedence over bringing benefit.⁴ Several scholars say that

² See Ibid. also Martin Van Bruinessen, "Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia," in *The Madrasa in Asia*, 2008, 214-45 According to the Islamic Scholars, Pesantren usually have the Mardasah—local variant of boarding school—for more explanation see Kamaruzzaman Bustamam-ahmad, "Educational Practice: Lessons to Be Learned from Madrasah and Religious," *Indonesia Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 5, no. 1 (2015): 29-48, Ronald Lukens-bull, "Madrasa by Any Other Name Pondok, Pesantren, and Islamic Schools in Indonesia and Larger Southeast Asian Region," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 04, no. 01 (2010): 1-21.

³ Imam Sutomo, "Modification of Character Education into Akhlaq Education for The Global Community Life," *Indonesia Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 4, no. 2 (2014): 291-316. also see Hasan Baharun, "Total Moral Quality: A New Approach for Character Education in Pesantren," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islam Studies* 21, no. 1 (2017): 57-80.

⁴ Abil Faidl Yasin bin Isa Al-Fadani, *Fawaidul Janiyyah fi Hasiyyah Mawahibul Saniyyah* (Baerut: Darul Basyair al-Islamiyyah, 1996) Vol. I p. 93-94 see also ini Nazam *Faraidul Bahiyyah* its said *qad rajaal fiqhi ila qaidatin wahidatin mukammila wahia l'tibaru jalbil mashalihi wa dar'I lil mafasidil qabihi*. See Jaluddin As-Suyuthi, *Faraidul Bahiyyah ala Nadzmi Qawaidul Fiqhiyyah* (Bairut: Darul Basyair al-Islamiyyah, 1996) Vol. I p. 94.

this rule is the core frame of all kinds of law. This means that Islamic Law boils down to achieving benefit for humans.

The contra-side seems to do a series of rejections by basing it on this popular rule, even though they do not cite this rule explicitly. *Pesantren* community has the characteristic to involve religious reasons in decision making and their actions.⁵

With such character and political views, it is understood that people outside *NU* often assume that *NU* does not have a definite model in politics. This attitude of flexibility becomes the political model of *NU*.⁶ Aside from political and state affairs, for example, related to government regulations, *pesantren* recognizes the rule of fiqh “*tasharruful imām alar raiyyah manūthun bil maslahah*,” where a leader has to make policies that are fully aimed to the benefit of the people. This rule emphasizes that the benefit of the people is the ultimate goal of all policies in a country.⁷

From the perspective of the *pesantren* community, government policies should provide positive outcomes that enhance the community. If the policy is detrimental to the community then it should be canceled.⁸ On this basis, the *pesantren* community rejects the Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017 concerning School Day. This policy is considered to have several loopholes which eventually drag it into bureaucratic pollution. There are at

⁵ Mohammad Hamid Mohammad, “Al-Islam Al-Indunisy Wa Takhdhiyatil Waqi Bayna Gharsyir Ra’yi,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 11, no. 02 (2017): 551–68. also see Dadi Darmadi, “Tears and Cheers in Jombang: Some Notes on the 33rd Nahdlatul Ulama Congress,” *Studia Islamika* 23, no. 1 (2016): 185–92. Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Kekecualian NU* in *Majalah Tempo*, 10 August 2015.

⁶ Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Pasir Panjang: ISEAS, 2009). p. 103.

⁷ for more discussion about political view and framework of Nahdlatul Ulama see Robin Bush, “Redefining ‘Political Islam’ in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama Dan Khitah ’26,” *Studia Islamika* 7, no. 2 (2000): 59–85 and Faisal Ismail, “The Nahdlatul Ulama Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of Indonesian State,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 05, no. 02 (2011): 247–81. Alexander R Arifianto, “Practicing Ehat It Preaches? Understanding the Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama,” *Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 2 (2017): 241–64. Muhammad Noor Harisuddin, “Islam Wa Fiqh Nusantara: Al-Tanafus Ala Al-Huwiyah Wa Alaqt Al-Sultah Wa Al-Ramz Al-Dini Li Jamiyyah Nahdlatul Ulama,” *Studia Islamika* 24, no. 3 (2017): 503–54.

⁸ Eka, “Revisiting Character Education from Islamic Perspective: A Quest for Character-Based Education in Indonesia,” *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamis Studies* 21, no. 1 (2017): 1–32.

least five loopholes which make the policy fall into the category of bureaucratic pollution.⁹ These loopholes include, *first*, Ministerial Regulation No. 23 of 2017 does not mention and discuss what is the implementation of Strengthening Character Education previously campaigned to the public. The policy tends to focus on how to regulate school hours. Strengthening students' character cannot be implemented by adding study duration. The good and bad character of students are not linear or determined by the duration of "staying" in the school environment. Those are completely different things and cannot be compared.¹⁰

Second, practical abilities such as problem-solving, teamwork, communication, critical and creative thinking occupy the top position to support students in society or while entering the workforce. These capabilities should get a greater portion of education. They will not be achieved from only theoretical teaching in the classroom, moreover by extending learning time. This opinion is by the survey of *Intelligence Unit, The Economist* in 2017.¹¹

Third, from the research conducted by the Ma'arif NU Institute, it was found that the majority of schools in Indonesia are not ready to implement the five-days school/eight-hour program (*Full Day School*). Many schools do not have adequate and representative facilities to support this program. *Fourth*, the real reason for implementing this program is the worry that children have behavioral problems if left alone by their parents all day. This is not entirely true. Many big cities in Indonesia still have high social control, upholding cultural values, and local wisdom. Not all students are left alone at home when their parents work. *Fifth*, the implementation of the five school days will threaten the existence of thousands of *madrasa diniya*,¹² which are

⁹ Lawrance J Peter called this pollution with "bureaucratic pollution" see Lawrance J. Peter, *Peter Principle* (Newyork: Pan Books, 1971).

¹⁰ Interview with Arifin Junaidi (Chairman of LP Ma'arif Nahdlatul Ulama)

¹¹ <https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/Drivingtheskillsagenda.pdf>

¹² This Madrasa diniya a part of pesantren that concentrate for religious educational. Lukens Bull devide for basic are of Curriculum in Pesantren: Religious Studies (diniyah/ngaji), character development (*pengalaman*), vocational training (*keterampilan*), general education (*sekolah*) see Lukens-bull, "Madrasa by Any Other Name Pondok, Pesantren, and Islamic Schools in Indonesia and Larger Southeast Asian Region." p.9, Syamsun Ni'am, "Pesantren : The Miniature of Moderate Islam Indonesia," *Indonesia Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies*, no. June 2015 (2015): 111-34. Ibid.

spread throughout almost all of Indonesia. *Madrassa diniya* has been standing alone and cared for independently by the local community.¹³

This position for *pesantren* is the same as the situation ‘Rubbing salt into the wound.’ All this time, *madrassa diniya* stands independently without government assistance. When the government has a policy related to education, *madrassa*’s existence is threatened. Of course, considering the above rules and looking at the harm that has been caused, *pesantren* regards that the steps taken by the government are having a bad impact on the sustainability of the *madrassa diniya*.¹⁴

Regarding the position of the *madrassa diniya*, although in this context, the researcher opposes to the view of Asmadji AS Muchtar, it is interesting to present his conception about the *madrassa diniya*’s position. In his article titled NU School which was published in *Kompas Daily*,¹⁵ Asmadji assumed that *madrassa diniya* is an NU school. *Madrassa diniya* has a vital role in building student character. *Madrassa diniya* is not merely seeding knowledge and religious insights, but more than that. *Madrassa diniya* is proven to guard the formation of character and moral of children.¹⁶ The conception offered by Muchtar about the NU school—although not entirely justifiable—at least it deserves to be underlined. However, it is also important to point out that summarizing the definition of NU schools by only covering *madrassa diniya* is a misconception that cannot be tolerated. Because in the article described by Asmadji, *madrassa diniya* was established by the local community outside the *pesantren* (*diniyah takmiliah*). This type of *diniyah* is used to fill up the lack of religious studies which cannot be fulfilled by the school. Usually children attend school in the morning and attend *madrassa*

¹³ Hamruni, “The Challenge and The Prospect of Pesantren in Historical Review,” *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 5, no. December (2016): 413–29.

¹⁴ Mohammad Kosim, “Pesantren on the Frame of Government Policies,” *Karsa: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Keislaman* 23, no. 20 (2015): 221–240, Muhammad Latif Fauzi, “The Roles of Kyai and Pesantren in Preserving Islamic Tradition and Negotiating Modernity,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, no. 01 (2012): 124–44.

¹⁵ Asmadji AS Muchtar, *Sekolah NU* opinion ni Harian Kompas, 3 June 2015. For the dissenting opinion see Fariz Alnizar, *Pesantren dan Pendidikan Mutakhir Kita* ini Harian Kompas, 7 August 2017.

¹⁶ For more explanation see Asrori S. Karni, *Etos Studi Kaum Santri: Wajah Baru Pendidikan Islam*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2009) and Mastuki HS, *Kebangkitan Santri Cendikia: Jejak Historis, Basis Sosial, dan Persebarannya*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Compass, 2016).

diniya in the afternoon. This is called as *Diniyah Takmiliah*, which is a model adopted from the *pesantren* tradition. In Islamic boarding schools, usually besides studying at school, *santri* also studies religion at the *madrassa diniya*. Of course the *madrassa diniya* has a clear curriculum and level.¹⁷

Full-day school program indeed will affect almost all *madrassa diniya*. There are many *madrassas* that are run by funding from the local community.¹⁸ Their position seemed to be a stepchild. The contribution given is obvious and cannot be underestimated, mainly related to the issue of demoralization (moral decadence) and also radicalism that targets the younger generation. There is also an argument that if the full-day school is applied, the school will provide religious teachers for extra-curricular activities. However, such conditions are feared to foster the seeds of radicalism. Some researches show that *Rohis* activities at school are easily entered by radical movements.¹⁹

It becomes clear to us that the framework of rejection performed by *pesantren* is based on ideological reasons, maintaining the existence of *madrassa diniya* as part of efforts to preserve religious teachings. It was also based on practical reason as an effort to dispel and cut radicalism in the school environment targeting young people.

Language Power: Five-Day School Narrative

Language is power. “Language is power and authority,”²⁰ thus Bourdieu said. The power of language exceeds any strength. In term of governance, language can strengthen and perpetuate power, even to

¹⁷ Syamsul Hadi, “Education Hybridization of Pesantren and Its Challenges in Rural Industrialization,” *Jurnal Pendidikan Islam* 5, no. December (2016): 261–85.

¹⁸ Jamhari Makruf, “New Trend of Islamic Education in Indonesia,” *Studia Islamika* 16, no. 2 (2009): 243–90, Ahmad Asrori, “Contemporary Religious Education Model on the Challenge of Indonesian Multiculturalism,” *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 10, no. 02 (2016): 261–84, Ismail Thoib, “Menggagas Reformasi Pendidikan Islam: Telaah Filosofis Paradigmatik,” *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamis Studies* XI, no. 1 (2007): 141–56.

¹⁹ See *Analytical and Capacity Development Partnership (ACDP)* 2015 and Wahid Foundation pada tahun 2017.

²⁰ Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Power* (New York: Pinguin, 1988). p. 21 and see Riyadi Santoso, *Semiotika Sosial* (Surabaya: Eureka, 2003). P. 56 also, David A Morand, “Language and Power: An Empirical Analysis of Linguistic Strategies Used in Superior- Subordinate Communication,” *Journal of Organizational Behaviour* 248, no. October 1998 (2000): 235–48.

undermine anything. A powerful language can hit, pierce, and knockdown anything, including the most powerful ones: ideology, belief, or trust.²¹ Civilization is built through words. In Indonesia's political history such as New Order era, language becomes an essential instrument in perpetuating power.²²

In the New Order period, the government was very concerned about the use of language in their policies. There were no price increases but price adjustments. People who were considered treason and dissidents were not detained or imprisoned but secured by the government. There was no Hobo or bum, but homeless. There were no hookers, but prostitutes or commercial sex workers. No one is poor, but those who live below the poverty line. That is the greatness of language. It can manipulate and wrap the actual reality into whatever people want: so artificial. What does price adjustment mean? What is it customized for? What is the meaning of being secured? Are their secured objects safe? That is a euphemism. History shows that euphemism is often misused as a tool for manipulating circumstances. Even Daniel Dekhadie said that euphemism is not a linguistic phenomenon, but a phenomenon of power. Language formulates power and power to form language.²³

Through euphemism, the government tried to arrange its power. In this context discussing full-day school became very important and exciting. Instead of using the term "Full day school," which was raised around August 2016, they preferred to use the term "School Day" in *Permendikbud* No. 23 of 2017. The problem became complicated, and many people are questioning what the Minister of Education and Culture wants. The Minister of Education and Culture said that *Permendikbud* was an implementation of the character strengthening the program as a form of *Nawa Cita*, a mandatory program from the Jokowi-JK Government. The problem was that the regulation did not

²¹ Fariz Alniezar, *Problem Bahasa Kita: Kritik Bahasa Dari Iwak Pitik sampai Arus Balik* (Jogjakarta: Kaktus, 2017). p. 4.

²² John Fiske, *Introduction To Communication Studies* (Routledge: Methuen & Co.Ltd, 1990). p. 164.

²³ Daniel Dhakidae, *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan* (Jakarta: KPG, 2006) p. 420. For more explanation about language and power see Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2006) and Yudi Latif dan Ida Subandy Ibrahim, *Bahasa dan Kekuasaan: Politik Wacana di Panggung Orde Baru*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1996) also Fatkhur Rokhman, *Politik Bahasa Penguasa* (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 2016)

explain what forms of character education are used in the regulation. The government in this context through the Minister of Education and Culture seemed to be using language power through euphemism again. Euphemism proved to be the best-selling instrument used by the authorities to “fool” and outwit the public.²⁴

In the context of the New Order government, Benny Hoed noted that the government used four primary functions of language to perpetuate their power. First, they eliminated their enemies from public memory. Second, they built a sharp image as a Government. Third, they stifled the movement of civil resistance. Fourth, they cleaned themselves from sin.²⁵

In the present context, these four functions are still used, especially the second primary function. Language is used as a tool to build the government's image. At the dictum of the Minister of Education's consideration, there are at least three reasons for issuing the regulation.²⁶ *First*, restoration of character education in schools is needed to prepare students facing challenges of the globalization era. *Second*, it is necessary to optimize the role of the school in the restoration. *Third*, based on the considerations referred to in points a and b, it is necessary to stipulate *Permendikbud* on School Day (Copy of *Permendikbud* No. 23 of 2017).

These arguments contradict with the latest findings of the survey *Intelligence Unit, The Economist* in 2017. This study states that globalization requires us to have not only the character but also the most important is to be able to solve problems, to collaborate, to communicate, to have critical and creative thinking. These skills occupy the highest position in supporting people's performance in facing the workforce.

Moreover, the keywords in the dictum are the restoration of character education by optimizing the school's role. However, their solution is

²⁴ Daniel Dhakidae, *Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan* (Jakarta: KPG, 2006) p. 420. For more explanation about language and power see Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Culture in Indonesia*, (Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Publishing, 2006) and Yudi Latif dan Ida Subandy Ibrahim, *Bahasa dan Kekuasaan: Politik Wacana di Panggung Orde Baru*, (Bandung: Mizan, 1996) also Fatkhur Rokhman, *Politik Bahasa Penguasa* (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 2016).

²⁵ Fatkhur Rokhman, *Politik Bahasa Penguasa* (Jakarta: Buku Kompas, 2016). p. 99.

²⁶ See Permendikbud No.23 Tahun 2017.

extending learning time in the school. So, instead of strengthening character education, what happens is the opposite.²⁷

Jihad: Rejection Narrative

Pesantren's people or santri are among those who have been regarded as the antithesis of modernists.²⁸ Many people call the *pesantren's* people as traditional circles. In the records of researchers, santri who have historically been actively involved in the independence war has rarely taken action to go down the road. In a broader context, NU as a representative organization of the santri was never recorded to go against the government. Instead, NU often became an organization that gave ideological legitimacy to the government's essential policies for the sake of the nation's integrity.²⁹

In the last twenty years, Santri has done protests only twice through mass rallies. The first was when Abdurrahman Wahid was ousted. As many researchers stated, there were thousands of students among the santri who "took to the streets" and even planned to go to Jakarta to respond to Gus Dur's dismissal as President. Second, on the momentum of the issuance of *Permendikbud* No. 23 in 2017.

²⁷ See *the Economist Driving the Skill Agenda: Preparing Student for the Future*, p. 3

²⁸ Noorhaidi Hasan, "Education, Young Islaist and Integrated Islamic Schools in Indonesia," *Studia Islamika* 19, no. 1 (2012): 77-111. Irhamni, "Kearifan Lokal Pendidikan Pesantren Tradisional Di Jawa: Kajian Atas Praktek Penerjemahan Jenggotan," *Ulumuna: Journal of Islamic Studies* XV, no. 1 (2011): 95-118.

²⁹ Moch Tolchah, "The Political Dimension of Indonesian Islamic Education in The Post-1998 Reform Period," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 08, no. 02 (2014): 284-98. Mohammad Hasan, "Wasatiyyah Islam in The Pesantren Islamic Education Tradition Framework," *Karsa: Jurnal Sosial Dan Budaya Keislaman* 26, no. 2 (2018): 177-94. Hanun Asrohah, "The Dyanamics of Pesantren Responses toward Modernity and Mechanism Mechanism in Organizing Transformation," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 05, no. 01 (2011): 66-90.




Figure 2. Graph of Rejection Waves

Large-scale protest rally became one form of rejection. It was noted that santri held a protest rally in almost all major cities and provincial government centers in Java. There are three forms of protest rally ' performed by pesantren people — first the protest rally on the streets — secondly, a protest rally by holding a joint prayer and istighotsah. Third, protest rally by channeling opinions through cyberspace or social media.

Interestingly, the three activities involved thousands of participants. PBNU’s role in resonating the rejection to Permendikbud is visible. War of comments began to be seen even since the Permedikbud was only being discussed. The Nahdlatul Ulama, represented by the PBNU, was very evidently persistent in rejecting the idea. Many times, the PBNU Chairperson, Said Aqil Siroj, said that he strongly opposed the five-day school policy or full-day school.

Table 1. This is a Table Kind of Rejection

Number	Date	Location	Form
1	June 14, 2017	Pasuruan	Rally
2	August 7, 2017	Lumajang	Rally
3	August 11, 2017	Semarang	Rally
4	August 15, 2017	Tasikmalaya	Rally
5	August 16, 2017	Surabaya	Rally

6	August 20, 2017	Pasuruan	Rally
7	August 24, 2017	Surakarta	istighotsah
8	August 30, 2017	Cirebon	Rally

A series of protest rally was not born of space. There were provocateurs, and there was also a director who ‘controlled’ the series of a protest rally. The Director is, of course, PBNU. Nahdlatul Ulama through PBNU became the main actor in the rejection of Permendikbud's policy No. 23 on School Day. Nahdlatul Ulama issued an attitude statement, even twice. First on June 15, three days after the Minister of Education signed. The release titled "Reject Full Day School" contains six crucial points and one closing point.





Figure 3. Press Release of PBNU rejecting Full Day School

On July 7, 2017, or about a month after that, the PBNU issued another press release. The release explicitly states that the five-day school policy must be stopped. Interestingly, on August 7, 2017 PBNU issued an instruction letter concerning the rejection to the entire board of NU starting from the Central level, the Region to the Branches to the grassroots level. This instruction led to a series of rally and also the refusal for rejection. It became increasingly apparent. The unique form of rejection is through social media. The official accounts of the Nahdlatul Ulama and also the NU community on Twitter are busy using the #JihadTolakFDS hashtag. This wave of rejection is very massive; even the hashtag became a trending topic for more than 18 hours.³⁰

³⁰ <http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/80286/jihadtolakfds-trending-topic-teratas-di-twitter>



Figure 4. PBNU's instructions to PWNU, PCNU and Banom Institution Tools to Refuse FDS

It is interesting to discuss the terminology of jihad in the rejection of full-day school policy. Because it is very rarely used by *pesantren*. Especially considering the terminology of jihad has been so damaged by fundamentalist groups. This means that the *pesantren* is not easy to sell the terminology of jihad. Jihad is a sacred terminology. It must not be used carelessly. If the *pesantren* uses it, then the scale or event that is fought is not an ordinary event. From this, we can conclude that the rejection of the five-day school or *full-day school* policy is conceptualized as defending religion.³¹

The long struggle of the *pesantren* has led to the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 87 of 2017. The Nahdlatul Ulama through PBNU encouraged the government to issue the Presidential Regulation on the consideration of strengthening character education, not about study hours and school days as previously stated in *Permendikbud* No. 23 of 2017. In the Presidential Regulation No.87 of 2017 released in The State Palace on Wednesday (6/9). The President not only accompanied by the relevant Ministers but also accompanied by religious leaders from various CSOs. From

³¹ in *Qawaidul Fiqhiyya* there is *kulliyatul khams* that include *hifdzuddin*. See Izzuddin Ibnu Abdissalam, *Qawaidul Ahkam fi Mashalihil Anam* (Kairo: Maktabah Kulliyatil Azhariyyah: 1991) Vol 1. p. 97.

Nahdlatul Ulama, there was the Chairperson of KH. Said Aqil Siroj, Secretary-General Helmy Faishal Zaini, PBNU Chairperson Robikin Emhas, Chairperson of PP LP Ma'arif HZ. Arifin Junaidi, and Chairperson of PP RMI NU Abdul Ghoffarozin.³² (Interview with Helmy Faishal Zaini). As usual, what has been done by PBNU has art in conveying aspirations, just like others NU's work before. NU can play its role very well through "high-level politics."

Conclusion

Consideration to reject fatigue before it truly brings benefit is a solid doctrine that is not only studied but also guided by the pesantren. This seems to be the primary reason used by the pesantren to reject the five-day school policy. This consideration of the masalah mudarat has a substantial and entrenched base of orthodoxy. It is not only profane-momentary and pragmatic but more than that it is also historical-ideological. The government still uses language games to grip its power in order to make their program will run smoothly. In the context of this full-day school policy, euphemism is still used by the government. Policyholders seem to play the word very well by getting the term five school days to replace the full-day school term. Nahdlatul Ulama has a very central role in rejecting the five-day school policy. First, it acts as a conductor who resonates and defeats all forms of rejection, with various variants and forms. Both in cyberspace and the real world. Secondly, the Nahdlatul Ulama, in this case, the PBNU proved to play a high level of politics. PBNU elite seems very observant and also careful in taking sympathy and influencing the government to issue Presidential regulation, which canceling Permendikbud No.23 in 2017.

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³² Interview with Secretary General of PBNU, Helmy Faishal Zaini 10 Oktober 2017

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