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DAFTAR ISI

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IMPERFECT PEACE AND THE ZAWIYA IN THE EASTERN RIF: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SUFI BROTHERHOODS IN POST-INDEPENDENCE MOROCCO

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Abstract

This article presents a theoretical approach rooted in Peace Research to examine the religious landscape of the eastern Rif following Morocco's independence. The period of independence positioned religious entities at a critical juncture in their long history, representing a volatile time for the Sufi brotherhoods associated with these zawiya. The social spaces created by the zawiya have been influenced by new sociocultural dynamics, leading to their transformation and adaptation in response to contemporary demands. This study aims to guide the reader toward understanding peace as an ongoing journey that coexists with conflict, highlighting the peaceful elements that emerge within these Sufi entities. Insights derived from research on peace, particularly the theory of Imperfect Peace, illuminate the dynamism of the zawiya, their roles as agents of social harmony, and the spatial and temporal transformations they undergo in the pursuit of continuous and transformative peace. This exploration focuses on one of the most deeply rooted entities in the eastern Rif.

Keywords: Imperfect Peace, peacebuilding, Zawiya, Rif, independence.

Abstrak

Artikel ini meneliti pendekatan teoretis yang berakar pada penelitian perdamaian untuk mengkaji lanskap keagamaan di Rif timur pasca kemerdekaan Maroko. Periode kemerdekaan di sana menempatkan entitas-entitas keagamaan pada titik kritis dalam sejarah panjang mereka, yang mewakili masa yang sangat tidak stabil bagi persaudaraan Sufi yang terkait dengan Zawiya ini. Ruang sosial yang diciptakan Zawiya dipengaruhi oleh dinamika sosio-kultural baru yang mengarah pada transformasi dan adaptasi menghadapi tuntutan-tuntutan kontemporer pada masanya. Studi ini bertujuan membahas perdamaian sebagai perjalanan berkelanjutan yang hidup berdampingan dengan konflik, dengan menyoroti elemen-elemen damai yang muncul dalam entitas-entitas Sufi ini. Wawasan yang diperoleh dari penelitian tentang perdamaian, khususnya teori Perdamaian yang Tidak Sempurna, menyoroti dinamisme Zawiya, peran mereka sebagai agen harmoni sosial, dan transformasi ruang-waktu yang mereka alami dalam mengejar

perdamaian yang berkelanjutan dan transformatif. Eksplorasi ini berfokus pada salah satu entitas yang paling mengakar di Rif Timu, Maroko.

Kata kunci: Perdamaian yang Tidak Sempurna, pembangunan perdamaian, Zawiya, Rif, kemerdekaan.

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الملخص

يقدم هذا المقال مقاربة نظرية متجذرة في بحوث السلام لفحص المشهد الديني في منطقة الريف الشرقي بعد استقلال المغرب. وضعت فترة الاستقلال الكيانات الدينية في نقطة تحول حاسمة في تاريخها الطويل، مما يمثل فترة غير مستقرة بشكل خاص للأخويات الصوفية المرتبطة بهذه الزوايا. لقد تأثرت المساحات الاجتماعية التي خلقتها الزاوية بالديناميكيات الاجتماعية والثقافية الجديدة، مما أدى إلى تحولها وتكيفها استجابةً للمطالب المعاصرة. يهدف هذا البحث إلى توجيه القارئ نحو فهم السلام كرحلة مستمرة تتعايش مع الصراع، مع تسليط الضوء على العناصر السلمية التي تظهر داخل هذه الكيانات الصوفية. تقدم الرؤى المستخلصة من بحوث السلام، وخاصة نظرية السلام غير المكتمل، إضاءة حول ديناميكية الزوايا، وأدوارها كعوامل للتناغم الاجتماعي، والتحولات الزمانية والمكانية التي تخضع لها في سعيها لتحقيق السلام المستمر والتحويلي. يركز هذا الاستكشاف على واحدة من أعمق الكيانات المتجذرة في الريف الشرقي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: السلام غير المكتمل، بناء السلام، الزاوية، الريف، الاستقلال.

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INTRODUCTION

The article " The Zawiya in the Eastern Rif (1956-1999) from Peace Research: The Imperfect Peace theory" is part of the doctoral thesis project *The Postcolonial Zaouia in the Eastern Rif: Spaces of Peace and Conflict Management*. This work is an approach from peace research and specifically from the theory of imperfect peace, focusing on the transition undergone by religious entities with a Sufi tendency in northeastern Morocco during the first decade of independence. Peace Research emerged as a result of the hardships caused by the First and Second World Wars, leading to an urgent need to rethink coherent and solid mechanisms for addressing these macro-conflicts. This led to efforts aimed at containing wars and focusing on specific spaces, in this case, the regions affected by the wars. Broadly speaking, Peace and Conflict Research, in its embryonic stage in the mid-20th century, aimed to study violence in order to prevent its outcomes, such as war, discrimination, and oppression. The convergence of various humanistic disciplines propelled conflictology theories to develop new ways of diagnosing, analyzing, and interpreting violence, peace, justice, and their intersections. The result of this convergence gave rise to two major branches: those theories that study peace in its broad spectrum to achieve peace and resolve conflicts, and those that research violence for the same purposes. The refinement of these studies tends to move beyond violence as an analytical variable, focusing on peace as an equally valid system of analysis. In

short, understanding violence leads to a partial peace, but understanding peace in its full spectrum leads to a broader and more lasting peace.

Any theory of peace is based on equality and respect for human rights, which is defined as the set of activities focused on training, dissemination, and information aimed at creating a universal culture of human rights. These activities are carried out by transmitting knowledge and shaping attitudes to impart values of dignity and freedom to individuals.[1]. This approach promotes understanding, tolerance, gender equality, and the creation of bonds of understanding between different populations, nations, ethnicities, religions, and languages. [2]. The purpose of this framework is to "guarantee fundamental freedoms, peace, human rights, and participatory democracy, while simultaneously fostering sustainable and equitable economic and social development."[3]

Regarding the epistemological issue of peace, it has expanded since its institutional beginnings in prominent international organizations [UN, NGOs, etc.] to new multidisciplinary academic spheres, encompassing complex branches of knowledge and society. From these previous spheres of action, which have primarily focused on ending direct violence, materialized in wars and crimes against humanity, Peace Research has moved beyond, seeking to revive and maintain social and cultural harmony peacefully over time. In short, the human sciences have undergone a rethinking, advocating for an epistemological turn, which represents a gradual break from traditional social science. This shift opens new avenues of research, incorporating the inclusion of peace, the questioning of violence, and the understanding of conflict as an inherent aspect of the human condition.

The object of this research is the study of peaceful manifestations within the network of zawia in the Eastern Rif between 1956 and 1999, based on the conceptual premises of imperfect peace. In the same vein, it provides an insightful approach to the metamorphosis of the religious centers mentioned above, breaking down some of the manifestations of peace, or those relating to peace, that may have contributed to improving the social life of the people in the region. In this regard, it is essential to highlight the historical period that saw the transformation of the zawia in the management of various types of social conflicts, and, if applicable, in their search for social peace. The primary objective of this article is to present a theoretical framework, grounded in the principles of imperfect peace theory, for examining the zawia during a politically transitional period of particular significance to the Maghreb region, and a critical juncture for the survival of these

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[1] Rayo, José Tuvilla. "Cultura de paz, derechos humanos y educación para la ciudadania democrática." (2004): 46.

[2] López, Mikel Berraondo. *Los derechos humanos en la globalización: mecanismos de garantía y protección*. Vol. 3. Alberdania, (2004): 262.

[3] López, Mikel Berraondo. *Los derechos humanos, t.,t., 358*.

entities. These entities are considered champions of social peace in the Eastern Rif. The methodology of this article involves a bibliographic review of Peace Research, particularly those sources related to imperfect peace theory. The approach to the zawia is based on a documented review of both primary and secondary sources, to examine the peaceful variants that may have arisen or been generated by the zawia in the Eastern Rif from 1956 to 1999.

From the country's independence in 1956 until 1966, significant events occurred that greatly affected the zawia, including: (1) The sultanate of Mohamed V until 1961, (2) The reign of Hassan II from 1961, (3) The Sand War between Algeria and Morocco in September 1963, among others. Two events, initially marked by political continuity but differing in their perspective on the zawia, stand out: The appointment of Mohamed V as King of Morocco in 1961, which led to coercive measures towards some zawia, and the ascension of Hassan II in 1961, who, with his title of Commander of the Faithful, opened a new horizon for Sufi entities until 1999. Finally, the socio-cultural changes affecting the zawia were particularly relevant, especially for those located on the borders, notably in a significant number of zawia in Berkane. The sample in this article includes The Bekawiyya-Zianiyya Zaouia, The Habriyya Zaouia, The Zaouia of Mount Zegzel, and The Boutchichia Zaouia of Madagh. These samples are representative in order to provide the most complete possible image of the zawia entities in the Eastern Rif, as well as the impact of regional events that have shaken these entities.

Hypothetically, it is believed that the period from 1956 to 1966 was a critical time for most of the zawia in the Eastern Rif, threatening their very survival. However, these entities managed to navigate and play their role as agents of social peace in each of the significant events of this decade, reversing the situation in their favor. They made social peace [from the Islamic conception of peace] their banner and moral foundation, securing a social space in defense of social harmony in the region.

PEACE RESEARCH AND THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT PEACE

The early paradigms of conflict and peace focused more on developing polemology than irenology.[4], mainly because the phenomenon of war itself needed to be explained rationally, diagnosing and preventing its phenomenology: to abolish it, war had to be understood and studied. Thus, the concept of peace was developed as the absence of war or as a state of non-war, referred to as negative peace. The emergence of new forms of war, particularly the infamous Cold War between the United States and the USSR, underscored the need to minimize war as much as possible. In contrast to the focus on

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[4] Martínez Guzmán & Muñoz. Investigación para la paz. Enciclopedia de paz y conflictos, (2004): 595-598.

diagnosing violence as the central axis of Peace Research, the theory of positive peace was developed, based on just reconstruction, with positive values and the necessity of its durability. However, some scholars in the pacifist field considered this peace to be a utopia, hardly achievable.

In this context, Peace Research became consolidated, with the most prominent representative of conflict theories, from the perspective of eliminating violence, being the Norwegian mathematician and sociologist Johan Galtung.[5]. This scholar can be considered one of the primary proponents of peace and conflict studies as a distinct discipline within the social sciences. The latest idea of conflict resolution revived assumptions about human nature itself. While others, like Hobbes, defended the predatory nature of human beings, Galtung argued that conflict resolved through violence is inevitable; however, the resolution itself conditions human attitudes towards a violent or peaceful outcome. The primary focus of his ideas on conflict is its inherent nature in humans, as well as in other living beings. However, he posits that humans must employ ideas, means, and actions to channel conflict toward a peaceful resolution, thereby avoiding violence or its consequences.

Galtung[6] classifies conflicts according to their scope and the factors involved. The first level is the "micro" level, referring to disputes that arise between individuals with opposing interests. The second level, referred to as "meso," encompasses conflicts that generate disputes and controversies within a society, state, or nation. The level that involves two states, and which is of most significant concern to our scholar, is termed "macro." As Galtung) states, "an expanded conception of violence entails an expanded conception of peace."[7]. However, the maturation of the Norwegian scholar's theories and those of his followers gave a significant push to the epistemological shift toward peace.

Three trends are proposed to advance peace studies: (1) empirical peace studies, which seek the correlation between theoretical frameworks and the realities to which these theories are subjected; (2) empirical-critical peace studies, which aim to transform reality through a critique of values with the goal of redirecting this reality toward a new form of pacification; and, finally, (3) the so-called constructivist peace studies, which "tend to harmonize theories with values, producing visions of a new reality where values predominate over academic proposals".[8]

Current trends in Peace Research in our immediate territorial space, namely the Mediterranean, are in a state of maturity, shaped by the theoretical-conceptual conflicts

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[5]   Galtung, J. Investigaciones teóricas: sociedad y cultura contemporáneas. (1995).

[6]   Galtung, J. Investigaciones teóricas: sociedad y cultura contemporáneas. (1995): 346.

[7]   Galtung, J. Investigaciones teóricas…, t.,t., 346.

[8]   Galtung, J. Investigaciones teóricas… , t.,t., 348.

surrounding the concepts of Imperfect Peace (cf. Muñoz, 2001) and neutral peace.[9] These theories share the aim of creating new horizons to focus more on peace rather than merely studying violence. As Muñoz (2010) puts it the "violentological" approach is not free from a certain cognitive dissonance, sometimes bordering on schizophrenia. Since peace is desired, sought, and valued more, but is still thought of in terms of violence, this ultimately leads—after a corrupt process—to the view that violence becomes clearer. Many of the "prejudices" with which peace is perceived thus depend not only on the ethical and axiological premises from which they start but also on the methodologies used to approach it, as well as the epistemological and ontological postulates that underlie them.[10]

Consequently, Muñoz and Rueda[11] recognize the need to go further in these investigations, which have considered peace in terms of positive [lasting, total] and negative [absence of violence] peace, in order to introduce the term *Imperfect Peace*, which embraces pacifist experiences in constant conflict with violence. The term *Imperfect Peace* refers to all experiences or instances in which conflicts have been peacefully regulated; that is, where individuals and/or human groups have chosen to facilitate the satisfaction of their own and others' needs, without any external force preventing it[12]. This concept also requires constant vigilance, as this peace must be continually perfected in alignment with the complexity of violence and the demands of conflict. In short, the imperfection of this peace is not so much due to its conceptualization, but to the fact that it must be understood as an unfinished peace, transforming according to the needs of the moment and the space.

The famous phrase by Gandhi, "there is no way to peace, peace is the way" is applied within the theory of imperfect peace. In this theory, it refers to those elements and variables in the processes of pacification that are considered and are in constant movement in conflicts that have been peacefully regulated. According to its proponent, it is stated that imperfect peace is peace understood as unfinished processes, immersed in the uncertainty of the complexity of the cosmos, which humanizes us and opens up real possibilities for thought and action". In these initial insights into imperfect peace, it can be said that the dynamic processes of change experienced by humanity and the environment require continuous accompaniment. That is, the new demands of the moment make it necessary to reconsider new approaches to and of peace in order to respond to these new demands.

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[9]   http://www.redalyc.org/pdf/105/10512244007.

[10]   Retrieved from http://www.ugr.es/~fmunoz/documentos/pimunozespa%C3%B1ol.pdf). own translation.

[11]   Muñoz and Rueda, B. M. Una Cultura de Paz compleja y conflictiva. La búsqueda de equilibrios dinámicos. Revista de paz y conflictos, 3, (2010): 44-61.

[12]   Muñoz, F. A. La paz imperfecta. Granada: Universidad de Granada. (2001): 2.

The notion of "Imperfect" in this challenging work of conceptualizing peace refers to the complexity that defenders of peace and any institution promoting peace must address. The idea of im (not) perfect seeks to raise awareness of the "unfinished" or "processual" nature of peace itself. With imperfect peace, new pathways open toward understanding peace beyond the violence-peace dichotomy, where the absence of one reality gives rise to its opposite. At this point, imperfect peace opens the debate on our very conception of the etymology of peace. Similarly, "One of the greatest advantages we have is that peace can be felt, perceived, and thought about from multiple points, spaces, and spheres".[13] Under the designation of imperfect peace, all those experiences and conflictual actions that have provided peaceful satisfaction to the needs of the involved individuals or groups can be grouped. Thus, imperfect peace includes actions typical of both positive and negative peace [even neutral peace] that have been previously manifested.

The theory of imperfect peace is of particular interest to this article, as the similarity between our precepts and those of imperfect peace lies in its study of "all the possible relationships and, where applicable, determinations that can exist in those actions in which conflicts are peacefully regulated"[14]According to the author we would include in this conceptualization the causal interrelations between different instances, regardless of their quantity, quality, direction, or intensity, such as: peace (those situations in which needs are satisfied); scales of peaceful regulations (individual/group: socialization, charity, kindness, sweetness, solidarity, cooperation, or mutual aid; regional/state: agreements, negotiation, exchanges; international/global: vertical relationships – between elements of different scales – and horizontal relationships – between elements of the same scale)[15].

The theory of imperfect peace paves the way for recognizing peace in various sociocultural and linguistic contexts. For example, peace is reproduced in different forms according to the social practices of communities. Consequently, the semantics used in the different "categories" of peace shed light on what society understands about peace and pacification. The use of peace as a descriptive category of social realities or behaviors helps in the task of understanding peaceful regulations, which, according to Muñoz and Rueda (2004), helps define a very broad experiential and experimental field of human relationships that we must recognize as baggage and heritage for the recognition, reconstruction, growth, and development of peace. In short, for the proponent of imperfect peace as an analytical category, Francisco Muñoz[16] states:

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[13]   Muñoz and Rueda, B. M. Una Cultura de Paz… t.,t., 46.

[14]   Muñoz and Rueda, B. M. Una Cultura de Paz… t.,t.,. 48.

[15]   Muñoz. Pax Orbis, complejidad…, t.,t., 42.

[16]   Muñoz. Pax Orbis, complejidad…, t.,t., 48.

"Ultimately, we choose to call imperfect peace the 'analytical category' that defines the above contents. Firstly, to break with previous conceptions in which peace is seen as something perfect, infallible, utopian, finished, distant, and unattainable in the immediate. Attainable in the next world, in glory, the heavens, with the mediation of gods, far from worldly matters, beyond the reach of humans by themselves. Secondly, as we have been stating, an imperfect peace that helps recognize peaceful practices wherever they occur, revealing these milestones as supports for a greater, broader peace. And thirdly, an imperfect peace that helps us plan for conflictual and always incomplete futures".

Imperfect peace serves to qualify peace according to its scope and durability, as it is an unfinished process, as previously stated, and is closely related to the evolution of humanity itself. The praxis of peace requires a dynamic continuum that transforms in accordance with the transformation of conflicts and their complexity across time, society, culture, groups, issues, etc. In a predominantly Islamic context, it is true that its members belong to different social groups, creating and propagating values that are learned and reproduced. However, it is also true that, depending on the degree of their freedoms, these individuals internalize values that may be foreign to their immediate social group (family, friends, school, etc.). In the "Critique of the Hypothesis of the Incompatibility of Islam with the Values of Civil Society," Zghal (2001) questions the "incompatibility" of Islamic values with those of civil society, largely defending the harmony, from the Islamic perspective, that can be reached between these two social forms.

Similarly, as Habermas[17] asserts, it would be a giant leap to understand peace as something close to democracy. We would be defending the "shift in the center of gravity in relation to the three resources represented by money, administrative power, and solidarity, with which modern societies meet their integration and regulation needs"[18] (243). In this context, the researcher is interested in recognizing and reconstructing the grid of weak and strong powers within which social relations, conflict management, and imperfect peace options are embedded. "For this, it is necessary to focus on the possibilities for action of individuals and groups within the systems in which they are embedded and, where appropriate, on their potential for transformation"[19]

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[17] Habermas, Jurgen. "Derechos humanos y soberanía popular: las concepciones liberal y republicana." (1994).

[18] Habermas, Jurgen. "Derechos humanos…, t.,t., 243.

[19] Muñoz Muñoz, Francisco A., and Cándida Martínez López. Los habitus de la paz imperfecta. Universidad de Granada, (2011): 58.

APPROACH TO THE ZAWIA

According to the Royal Spanish Academy (RAE), a *Zagüía* is described as: "In Morocco, a type of hermitage that houses the tomb of a saint" (DRAE). However, this definition is too brief to adequately describe one of the most deeply rooted religious institutions in North Africa, particularly within the Berber community of northern Morocco. The term zawia can also refer to a hermitage, hospice, confraternity, brotherhood, *ribāt*, sanctuary, mausoleum, mystical silo, and *jalua*, among others. While there are linguistic nuances in its meaning, the best way to approach it is by investigating its social role, considering the most representative stages of its modern history, from its peak to the independence of the Maghreb country.

The most significant period for the zawia was during the Merinid Sultanate [1244–1465], which is considered the embryonic period of the great Sufi currents and their respective zawia. The Wattasid period [1471–1549] is similar to the previous one, with no structural changes in the zawia. The Sultanate of the Banu Saad [1549–1659] was essentially the period of the zawia as a political institution, greatly influencing the decisions of the ruling regime. The current Alaouite monarchy [since 1665] marks the period of stabilization for the zawia, both in their internal structures and functions. Across the four major dynasties, a common feature is the traditional mediation and arbitration in conflict regulation carried out by the zawia. Additionally, many leaders of the confraternities based in the zawia were recognized as having judicial authority, parallel to that of the then reigning Cherifian power. Depending on the scale and nature of the conflict, the intervention of one or more chiefs from the zawia affected by the conflict was often necessary (see Berrahhab, 1989). In the Eastern Rif, the mediation role of the zawia chiefs was "shared" with the leaders of the tribal factions, commonly known as *amghar*.

When the scope of a conflict exceeds the capacity of a particular *cabila* (commonly referred to as a tribe), the machinery of containment, resolution, and suppression of the *Protection League* [20] is activated with the approval of the allied zawia. Thus, during the pre-colonial period, these institutions were recognized, respected, and/or imposed within the society of Eastern Morocco.

With the advent of colonialism, which divided the eastern Rif into two zones—[1] the region administered by Spain to the west [Nador] (see Villanova, 2005) and [2] the area administered by France to the east [Berkane]—the two areas were separated by the Moulouya River. A common denominator between the two zones was the introduction

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[20] Hart, David. "Conflicting models of a berber tribal structure in the Moroccan Rif: the segmentary and alliance system of the Aith Varyaghar." Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditeranée 7.1 (1970): 93-99.

of new institutions administratively unknown to the local population, commonly referred to as the intervention offices. The new policies, crystallized in the form of written laws and framed by Moroccan *Dahires*, endorsed by the colonial powers, reduced the influence of the zawia, especially those that saw their goals threatened by foreign intervention. Modern institutionalization gained ground over local religious entities, which saw their influence, social capital, and economic power diminish. However, this was not a universal experience for all members of the zawia, as prominent leaders were benefited by the protective laws of the foreign powers, granting them the status of "protected" individuals and rendering them immune to the Cherifian laws.

In the province of Nador, under Spanish presence, many of the *Zawia* remained on the sidelines of radical changes and direct confrontation with the colonial powers, maintaining a low profile. For those in favor of the Spanish presence in the region, such as Ibn Azzuz Hakim (1955) in his article *"Beneficence and Social Action in Morocco"* from mid-1955, the work of Spain was praised. He stated that to to demonstrate to the skeptics how Spain fulfills its tutelary duties in Morocco, not in accordance with the obligations it has undertaken under the international treaties that regulate its Protectorate—as some claim, in their ignorance of the humanitarian work that has been developed and is ongoing—but following directives in whose conception the Spanish nation is a master, aimed at improving the moral and material situation of the Moroccans in all areas, especially in the welfare sector. [21]

However, regional geopolitical changes created a rift in the traditional management system of the zawia, as well as in key aspects such as: [1] the economy, with the management of *habus* (religious endowments); [2] social aid, with the collection of alms and charitable assistance; [3] education, particularly Quranic education, as this no longer guaranteed the same access to professions as it had before foreign intervention; [4] justice, where the zawia gradually lost ground in this area to the new administration; [5] religion, as we will see later, its neutral stance in many aspects of the struggle for independence earned it numerous enemies within the National Liberation Group. In short, the traditional zawia of Eastern Rif was buried under the new administration of the Spanish overseers and French supervisors (see El Imlahi, 2020), losing its sociocultural, economic, educational, and political hegemony.

The loss of influence continued to be evident with the advent of the country's independence in 1956. The sociocultural transition from 1956 onwards refers to the social and cultural changes that occurred within a specific historical context, in this case, concerning the shift from the Franco-Spanish colonial administrative structure to an independent one. This point of reference is closely tied to changes in norms, structures,

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[21] Ibn Azzuz. 1986: 39-40.

and gender roles, leading to a lasting paradigm shift both over time and in a broader social space. This transition took place in various domains and at different levels of sociocultural life in the area under study, further emphasizing the need to highlight the transformations experienced in the eastern region.

In short, the transformations within the structure of the *Zaouia* entity (such as hereditary transmission of leadership to descendants, loss of interest, etc.) and the sociocultural changes surrounding the zawia in this historical framework, especially the waves of migration—particularly to France and the Netherlands following independence—left some of these institutions with little governance, destabilizing their structure. This period, from 1956 to 1966, was one of the most unstable for the zawia.

THE *ZAOUIA* OF EASTERN RIF IN INDEPENDENT MOROCCO

The positions of the zawia in the Eastern Rif during the post-independence period vary widely, generally falling into three categories: favorable, neutral, and openly aligned with the new form of independent administration. The *jerifian* power, represented by Sultan Mohammed V in the final years of the Protectorate, specifically in 1946, called for the suppression of the esoteric manifestations of the zawia in the central and western regions of the country. This translated into a closer alignment between the Sultan and the conservative wing of the National Liberation Front. As will be discussed later, with the reign of his son, King Hassan II, starting in 1961, the support for the zawia was discreetly revived to weaken the influence of conservative Salafists. Taking the example of Allal El Fasi, this was done with some moderation on the part of the nationalist. This situation regarding the zawia highlights the significant role these institutions played in the public sphere, as the conflict was of such magnitude that it required a reevaluation of the entire Islamic institution in Morocco. Al-Fasi's main objective was to eliminate the zawia, replacing them with a "purified" Islam, thus removing the "degraded tendencies" of popular Islam seen in the early zawia.

Perhaps one of the main proponents of the confrontation against the zawia for al-Fasi was Bel-Araby al-Alawi, who, although a supporter of the Tijaniyya *Zaouia*, saw the zawia as the failure of Islam in Morocco, which allowed the colonizers to enter (Gellab, 1996). Bel-Araby's theoretical premises involved allowing zawia but with a more orthodox, puritanical, and Salafist Islam. The author's views describe the hostile positions of Moroccan sultans toward these entities. The national figure of Mohammad ben Abd al-Lah had fought against these institutions, with violent resolutions continued by Mulay Sulaiman. The new political ideas sought to resurrect *dahires* from the late Middle Ages to reflect the nullity of the relationship between the sultans and the zawia, with the most notable example being the prohibition issued by the previous Sultan

on the zawia and their festivities. In the same vein of confrontation, the revival of the Tijaniyya *Zaouia* was publicly called for (Souda, 1965).

The conflict between the *Zaouia* and the *jerifian* power was justified by Al-Fasi (1958) based on the principles of national unity. That is, [1] an unacceptable trend of esoteric rituals in the zawia was considered an affront to Islam itself, as seen in the recent example of King Mohammad V, who prohibited the acts of the Hamduchiyya and *'isawiyya* brotherhoods, which were considered "dens of perdition" for public morality; [2] the dangerous proximity to power was interpreted as an imminent rebellion, making these *Zawia* rivals to the current political parties; and, thirdly, [3] the decentralization of the branches of the zawia was seen as a cause of disunity at a time when unity for independence was the moral and national necessity for the entire community, as understood from the reasoning of liberation.

Initially, the responses of the Zawia to the changes are differentiated primarily by the interests of these entities, accentuated by their geographical location, particularly between those located in the plains and near cities, and those in mountainous, hard-to-access areas. Specifically, during this period, we have the following:

First. The zawia al-Bekawiyya-Zianiyya: This zawia belongs to the Sufi path known as *Zianiyya*. The name *Bekawiyya* refers to the founder of this path in the Eastern Rif region, Sidi Ali ben Mohamed al-Wakili, in the commune of Beni Mangush, southeast of the city of Berkane. Local sources (see http://www.beniznassen.com) indicate that the *Zaouia* ceased to operate in the mid-20th century due to migration, coupled with the conversion of the leaders of the path to the practices of the local *Qadiri* order.

Second. The zawia al-Habriyya: Founded by Haj Mohamed al-Habri al-Azawi, originally belonging to the Karkariyya path from the central Rif, specifically from the commune of Tamsaman. In 1960, sources report that the zawia settled near the Algerian-Moroccan border in the village of Ahfir, east of the city of Berkane. Local sources (see http://www.beniznassen.com) state that they use drums in their esoteric rituals, which is somewhat unusual for the Sufis in the Eastern Rif region, who do not generally practice this. Another characteristic is the use of the space near the zawia for initiation rituals conducted by the scholars of the path, where trees, shrubs, and rock formations become places of special interest for rituals. The zawia Zegzel or *Hamdawiyya*: Located in the Beni Issnasen mountains, near the Camel Cave, this *Zaouia* was founded in the early 19th century by Muley Ahmed ben al-Iyyachi. It is a mountainous zawia, difficult to access. After a few generations, the zawia branched out into the following: [1] The main zawia in Zegzel remained under the direction of Muley Ben Said, in the northern part of the city of Berkane. [2] Sidi Mohamed ben al-Hashimi Ain al-Hrara chose the commune of Beni Ourimesh, in the western area, bordering the Moluya River to

the west. [3] Muley Ahmed Ben Teyyeb settled in the Malu area of Beni Atiq, at the southern tip of the Berkane province. [4] Sidi Mohamed Ben Muley al-Saddiq moved to Beni Waklan, east of Berkane. Although the branches led to a relative expansion of the zawia, they soon became independent of each other. Ultimately, the four mentioned branches remained largely symbolic. It is important to note that all of these movements took place in predominantly Amazigh areas (see Benitez 2012), which may explain this phenomenon by the population's acceptance of the teachings of these *Zawia*. However, this point remains open for future contributions.

Fourth. The zawia Boutchichia: Founded in the mid-18th century by Sidi Ali Ben Mohamed al-Boutkhili. The zawia had several *jerifes* (spiritual leaders) throughout its history, and by the time of this research, it was under the leadership of *Jerife* Abbas Ben al-Mujtar, who led the order from 1936 until his death in 1972. The physical headquarters of the *Zaouia* are located in the village of Madagh, north of the city of Berkane. In general terms, the main internal modification in the path was the succession process established by Abbas in his written will of April 13, 1968, where the progeny was named as the primary candidate for succession. This mode of succession led to conflicts within the order, as some close to the leadership believed the zawia should follow the founder's teachings and pass the leadership to the most knowledgeable scholar, not the biological heir of the *jerife*.

The Boutchichia and Habriyya *Zawia* were located in the French zone, where they enjoyed a certain degree of freedom to continue their activities, with less pressure in terms of charity work than their counterparts in the mountainous areas to the south of the city of Berkane, which were more economically and socially distressed. In the theological context, the Boutchichia zawia places significant emphasis on religious practices in their temporal dimension, prioritizing the companionship or *suhba* with the superior leader. The main representatives of the *Zaouia* during this period include *Jerife* al-Abbas Ibn al-Mukhtar Ibn Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-Mukhtar, who took leadership in 1960. During his early years of leadership, the head of the zawia leaned toward the orthodox wing of Islam, even hosting Sheikh Yassine, who would later become the leader of the Islamist group al-Adl wa al-Ihsan. What is notable in this initial stance is its scholarly, non-hereditary character, as later appointments would become hereditary. Specifically, this *jerife* passed leadership to his son, *Jerife* Hamza, who became the main figure of zawia starting in 1972.

Hamza's role required him to make a critical decision: to return to the Sufi path and distance himself from the orthodox Islamic tradition or the pious ancestors (*salaf*). The most notable conflict during this period was the letter from Sheikh Yassine to the then King of Morocco, Hassan II, titled *"Islam or the Deluge"*, published in 1974. In this letter, the zawia had to decide to distance itself from the aspirations of Sheikh Yassine,

as he addressed the monarch on equal terms, something that was unthinkable at the time. On the other hand, *Jerife* al-Mustafa, son of *Jerife* Sidi al-Makki, founded a new zawia in the nearby town of Ahfir in 1944, following several disagreements with the mother zawia near the city of Berkane. According to Talhaoui (1995), several researchers claim that the teachings imparted in this new zawia represent the true teachings of the Boutchichia Qadiri Sufi path. As for the *Zawia* Bekawiyya and Zegzel, it can be noted that they branched into numerous lineages in the Berber-majority areas, but despite the establishment of many filial locations under the mother zawia, they did not maintain continuity. Local sources (see http://www.beniznassen.com) suggest that many of these branches faded into obscurity. The most significant contribution to the area was the social and spiritual assistance provided to families in the mountainous regions south of Berkane.

As a background, Arko[22] notes that some zawia were under scrutiny by the authorities, due to their activities which were seen as an interference in public spheres outside their charitable duties. This was especially true after some zawia aligned themselves with the orthodox wing of the Moroccan Muslim Brotherhood. Following these events, the state pursued a policy that dictated and forced the zawia to restrict themselves to their religious duties and be self-sufficient in them (56). While this was not directly the case for all the zawia mentioned, it is undeniable that the politicization of the zawia affected the trajectory of those in Eastern Rif. Between 1956 and 1978, the zawia of Eastern Rif, particularly in the mountainous regions, found themselves in a critical situation, as the new governmental elites were changing the political landscape. The protective laws that had benefitted some *jerifes* and followers of the zawia in these regions were coming to an end. In addition, there was a greater investment of socioeconomic power in urban areas, to the detriment of rural regions, compounded by waves of rural exodus and migration to Europe.

In summary, the conflict was open on several fronts, and, in addition, violence became a central element of the discourse against the zawia from various factions. At this point, responses to the zawia can be classified into: [1] categorical rejection, [2] nuanced rejection, and [3] conditional acceptance.

Regarding the first response, the ideological attacks from the Islamic orthodox wing [Salafism] against the zawia institution were constant, considering them morally degraded and spiritually inclined to deception. In this context, al-Zamzami[23] wrote a book to unmask what he considered the degenerate activities occurring within the

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22 al-Arko, R. (2019). Moroccan Zawiyas in the modern Moroccan context and their relationship with the state: Botchichya Zawya as a case study. Universidad Mohamed Primero de Oujda. https://jilrc. com/

23 al-Zamzami. al-Zaouia wa ma fiha min vida' wa a'mal al munkar. Casablanca (1999).

Zawia. In his book, *al-Zaouia wa ma fiha min vida' wa a'mal al munkar* [The zawia and What Lies Within It: Heresies and Reprehensible Acts], he defends the position of Islamic law scholars, referring to most zawia as reprehensible places of all acts contrary to Islam. Along the same lines, the Salafist discourse supported violent rhetoric and a categorical rejection of these entities, labeling them archaic, vulgar, and outdated institutions within the framework of Islamic reformism[24]. The rejection of the zawia was so intense that nationalist supporters engaged in acts of sabotage against their rituals, especially during the first period of the Moroccan *Nahda* [Renaissance]. In Allal al-Fassi's early memoirs and speeches, there is a clear rejection of the zawia referring to the acts of nationalist sympathizers as patriotic acts, which "attracted a group of young people who distributed books printed by the Salafists in Egypt, and traveled with them to cut down the *baraca* trees and destroy the stones they believed were [miraculous]" (al-Fassi, 1958, p. 132). However, these practices were not widespread, with distinctions made between different zawia.

The second group of responses to the zawia was characterized by ambivalence, sometimes rejecting and at other times accepting it. This group included those zawia that enjoyed a certain degree of maneuvering room within the *majzén* apparatus. Thanks to their services in support of the central power, they were allowed to operate with few obstacles, particularly those in the French-controlled zone. For these zawia, operating under these circumstances was not problematic, as their low profile and presence on the outskirts of power centers allowed them to function without significant issues. Finally, the response in favor of the zawia came from the mobilizations of the zawia themselves. These entities were able to take advantage of moments of calm in a period of intense political mobilization to dominate the sociocultural framework of the local spectrum. However, some of those mentioned have experienced a significant decline in their activities, largely due to the loss of local power after the exodus to the city and Europe.

THE *ZAWIA* AS A PEACEFUL SPACE IN CONFLICT

After the year of independence, voices calling for concord arose regarding all the institutions of the Maghreb country, including both newly established official institutions, as well as traditional ones and those in the process of formation. However, these voices were not sufficient to put an end to the direct, structural, and symbolic violences that plagued the state. Among the intellectuals mentioned earlier, voices advocating moderation toward the zawia institution emerged, considering it as a force for national unity, essential to meeting the new demands of the historical moment. In general terms, the contributions of the zawia in Eastern Rif to the local needs of their people led to a

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[24] al-Zamzami. al-Zaouia…, t.,t.,: 65.

reevaluation of their necessary inclusion in the new era. More specifically, the benefits and recognition of the work done by zawia such as Boutchichia and Habriyya. The resolution of sociocultural conflicts in the Rif was primarily carried out through peaceful means. Within the educated circles, there were calls for concord to confront the reactionary waves against the zawia.

Mujtar al-Susi (1966) was one of the intellectuals within the nationalist bloc who called for moderation in the confrontational stance. According to al-Susi's ideology, such confrontations led to greater division in the spiritual strength of the country. It is true that most of his interventions occurred before independence, but his ideology lived on in the nationalist youth. In Eastern Rif, they did not see direct confrontation with the zawia as necessary, and indeed, a significant portion of the youth forces belonged to one of these religious entities in the region. Al-Susi's moderate stance is, to some extent, a reflection of his inner circle, as it is well known that his father was the administrator of the zawia al-Darqawiyya in Marrakech, along with its branches in the Rif. During his esoteric training within the *Zawia* Darqawiyya, he moved early on to various cities in the country to continue his studies in Islamic jurisprudence. At the same time, he pursued his political goals within the nationalist youth movement, in a circle marked by strong religious conservatism. During this period, our subject also taught Islamic studies at the zawia al-Nasiriyya in Fez and the southern Rif (al-Zahi, 1998, p. 73).

Conservative voices tended to moderate the zawia element in al-Susi's figure. According to Gallab (1996):

"His role in the madrasa [zawia] is similar to that of the manager of the *rabita*, as known in Arab-Islamic civilization, specifically in North Africa, from Alexandria to the southern parts of Morocco. The *rabita* hosted students of various levels, with the teacher instructing the older ones, who in turn taught the younger ones. The *rabita* had a library, discussion tables, and offered education. In the past, the *rabita* also conducted jihad. However, during the time of al-Mujtar al-Susi, this work [jihad] was not carried out; instead, he focused on national awareness and guidance" (Gallab, 1996: 263).

This approach of redirecting the *Zawia* toward revitalization resonated in the post-French zone of Eastern Rif. In the Berkane region, records refer to a position aligned with the ideology of al-Susi, as these *Zawia* contributed their experience in social work to alleviate the suffering of the disadvantaged in the area. The common denominator between al-Susi's figure and the *jerifes* of the Eastern Rif region is that, just as al-Mujtar was exiled in his early years, several *jerifes* from *Zawia* [Karkariya, Nasiriyya, etc.] were

exiled to the French zone of Algeria due to similar activities as those of al-Mujtar, only to return later to their places of origin to continue their social work.

The second figure to stand out in this section is al-Thami al-Wazzani (al-Wazzani, 1947), particularly his manuscript titled *al-Zawiya* [The *Zawia*]. He was educated within one of the most important Sufi traditions in the country, specifically in the *Darqawiyya*, among other reasons, due to his membership in the family of the *jerifes* of the Wazzaniyya *Zawia*. His stance toward his family's institution was one of certain sympathy, ambivalent between the ascetic life of the Sufis and the political climate of the time. He managed to reconcile these two seemingly distant categories, or at least that was the intention of the conservative forces. His politico-religious figure became prominent after the founding of the Nationalist Movement in northern Morocco. In 1936, he also founded the newspaper *Rif*. Perhaps his importance lies in being one of the defenders of the *Zawia* while also promoting free [regulated] schools to fulfill the foundational objectives of the nationalist movement. He was, for his time, a somewhat ambiguous personality; his contemporaries describe his actions as follows:

> "He moves from the *Zawia* to the club and the center of the party, from the circle of *dhikr* (remembrance of God) to the political council, from the presence of the *sheikhs* who praise to the transgressive, joyous youth [who live their lives], from the presence of the spiritual sheikh to the scientific council and administrative entity [...] He can be considered one of those Sufis detached from this world, or one can regard him as a nationalist, a fighter in the political field, or count him among the ranks of the youth who live their time without worries" (al-Zahri, 1998: 79; Gallab, 1996: 276).

However, in the Eastern Rif, there are variables within Islam itself that relegate these institutions to the background, including the *salafist* discourse from 1956, which is supported by modernity and even by politically active Islamist forces emerging from the Mashreq [the East], particularly the political philosophy of Sayyid Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, there was the increasing rejection from conservative Islamic forces, which advocated for religious puritanism in the line that Gellner (1981) described as the stance of the doctors of Islamic law. The *salafiyya* of Allal al-Fassi (see Bennadi, 1993) in the country would reject much of the Sufi doctrine and its institutions, openly condemning them. According to al-Fassi, in the *Zawia* exists "the absolute submission of followers to their master and belief in the miracles [*kârâmat*] of the sheikh and his *baraka* [blessing], which are contrary to the principle of divine unity [...]" (Bennadi, 1993, p. 27), similar to the "idolatrous worship of tradition" coined by Garaudy (1990). However, the *Zawia* is much more than submission and beliefs; it is above all a sociocultural institution that reflects the local life of its neighbors.

The dynamism of the *Zawia* in the Eastern Rif is increasingly fluid, with one of the main new strategies being the use of religious diplomacy. This new, yet historically rooted, practice of expansion within the *Zawia* became more solidified after the Sand War of September 1963. In this context, the expansion shifted from a horizontal east-west orientation to a vertical one, from north to south. During the first phase of independence, the diplomacy in question was almost entirely focused on the African continent, particularly in the western Sahelian countries, specifically Senegal, Mali, among others. One sign of this governmental partiality was reflected in 1963, when the former King Hassan II founded a mosque in Dakar, signaling clear support for the *Tijaniyya tariqa*.

Following the Sand War of 1963, several *Zawia* sought new ways to compensate for the human and economic resources coming from the Algerian side. In this regard, the main "neutral" contribution of the *Zawia* during this period was their silence during the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. There are no known manifestos either for or against the violence that ensued, making the *Zawia* an example of neutrality amidst the polarization of the time. During the same period, Islamic studies concerning the *Zawia* pointed to an irreparable decline, following a similar line of thought as Debont and Coppolani (1897) had half a century earlier, in reference to their survival within the social fabric of the mid-20th century. The theories of decline pointed to the capitalist entities of modernity, drawing on Weberian hypotheses about the displacement of religion in favor of modern rationalism, which would inevitably consign archaic institutions to oblivion. However, these theories could not be applied to Islamic institutions, as is the case here, due to the particularities of popular religiosity in the Rif region. Other theories, which were somewhat more accurate, pointed to the internal hierarchy of the institution itself. In this context of recession, Spencer (1971) argues that this decline is not so much due to abandonment, but because the youth have not joined them. The *tariqas* ('brotherhoods') disappear when their sheikhs die, because there is no one to succeed them: their children, due to their mindset and primary interests, no longer belong to the world of their parents.[25]

It is true that in the Eastern Rif, this case is evident in the *zawia* of Zegzel, where the abandonment by the faithful is recorded in the *zawia*'s documentation, but this is less about the internal structure of the *zawia* after the death of the *cherif*, and more about the hostile environment in which the institution is located. Similarly, in the plain area of Berkane province, the *Habriyya* and *Bourchichia* paths have experienced a strong

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[25] Spencer, J. (1971). *The Sufi Orders in Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (1971): 250; Herrera Torres, C. (2011). ¿Un enfermo terminal? Resurgimiento sufí, modernidad e islamismo en Marruecos. In E. Gómez Pellón & A. González Vázquez (Eds.), Religión y Patrimonio Cultural en Marruecos. (2011):. 37-66.

resurgence. These have transformed from simple Quranic schools or *madrasas* into genuine institutions with social responsibilities, which can be considered as a significant contribution to social peace, with a focus on social assistance, support for the needy, literacy schools, social awareness, and political participation in the background, as well as a presence in mountainous areas, among other actions. Indeed, this transformation, according to Pascon (1983), is due to their ability to capture mediating functions in their geographical setting, and thus, they have maintained their moral authority among the Moroccan population. In short, they have been able to adapt to the needs of the moment to advocate for social peace through imperfect actions of peace, understood as unfinished micro-processes of local pacification. In this regard, Baldick[26] not only asserts that the *zawia* have endured, but in certain geographical areas, they have been revitalized. In addition to internal promotion changes, these institutions are also experiencing a rural exodus to the cities. Torres (2011) argues that this spatial variation is largely dependent on changes in attitude within certain social groups. This change in attitude is none other than the moderation and search for interpretation by educated collectives regarding the new national Islam, in contrast to the interpretations of Islamic orthodoxy represented by the Salafists. According to this author, the point of convergence for debate is thus centered on the new discourse of neo-Sufism, subjecting Sufi tradition to a process of self-criticism based on religious orthodoxy[27]. Similarly, Haenni and Voix[28] view the resurgence of the *zawia* as the result of the diversification of their followers, who would gradually swell the ranks of cosmopolitan middle classes. It is important to note, in the observations of these authors, the external factor, where the presence in European and North American countries provided them with substantial publicity and resources.

At this point, the imperfect peace found within the *zawia* is manifested in the form of small contributions to the local community, more or less continuously over time. In the plain areas (*trifa*)[29], the functions of these entities include facilitating the distribution of certain types of grain to farmers, literacy programs for women, social assistance, among other activities. Similarly, in the mountainous areas, hermitages provide both spiritual and physical support to a region that has been heavily affected, often becoming small public centers for occasional gatherings and local celebrations. Any contribution to peace from these entities can be understood through the concept of imperfect peace, as its author asserts: "One of the greatest advantages we have is that peace can be felt,

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[26] Baldick, J. Mystical Islam: An Introduction to Sufism. London: Macmillan. (1989).

[27] Baldick, J. Mystical Islam: An Introduction…, t.,t.,: 56.

[28] Haenni, P., & Voix, R. God by all means… Eclectic faith and Sufi resurgence among the Moroccan bourgeoisie. In M. Bruinessen & J. Howell (Eds.), Sufism and the "modern" in Islam (151-170). London: I.B. Tauris. (2007).

[29] Ouragh, A. O. Campo de desplazados durante los años del hambre en el Rif Oriental: Una historia casi olvidada. Dirassat in Humanities & Social Sciences, 5(1). (2022).

perceived, and thought about from multiple perspectives, spaces, and realms"[30]. The concept of imperfect peace encompasses all those conflict-related experiences and actions that have peacefully addressed the needs of the individuals or groups involved. Thus, imperfect peace incorporates actions associated with both positive and negative peace (and even neutral peace) as previously discussed.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

- *The Role of the zawia in the Rif Region*

    The *zawia* has played a significant and evolving role in the social, spiritual, and political landscape of the Rif region. Despite challenges, including political and social pressures, the *zawia* have remained a vital part of the local communities, particularly in rural and mountainous areas, where they serve as centers of social assistance, spiritual guidance, and community cohesion.

- *Responses to zawia*

    The *zawia* has faced varied responses throughout history, including outright rejection by conservative Islamic factions, ambivalent acceptance, and active support. The conservative critique, especially from the Salafi movement, has often focused on the perceived moral and spiritual dangers of the *zawia*, seeing them as outdated and counter to the principles of Islamic orthodoxy. However, the *zawia* have also found moderate support, particularly from intellectuals and local populations who see them as necessary institutions for social harmony and national unity.

- *Internal Transformation and Social Relevance*

    The transformation of *zawia* from religious centers into institutions with broader social functions, such as literacy programs, social welfare, and political engagement, has been essential to their continued relevance. These entities have adapted to local needs, making them crucial players in fostering peace and stability, especially in the face of external challenges and political conflict.

- *Imperfect Peace*

    The concept of "imperfect peace" is particularly useful in understanding the role of the *zawia* in the Rif. Their contributions to peace, while not always formal or complete, reflect the small, continuous efforts made by these institutions to address local needs and conflicts. These actions, while modest, play a role

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[30] Muñoz. Pax Orbis, complejidad…, t.,t., 54

in maintaining social harmony in a region with a complex history of conflict and political upheaval.

- *Cultural and Political Influence*

  Despite criticism and opposition, *zawia* have managed to maintain a cultural and political presence in the Rif, adapting to changing political climates, particularly after Moroccan independence. They have used their position to mediate social issues and strengthen community ties. Their ability to navigate these transitions while contributing to national and local peace efforts is a testament to their enduring importance.

- *Future of the zawia*

  The future of the *zawia* in the Rif region will likely depend on their ability to adapt further to modern challenges, including rural-to-urban migration, the rise of new religious movements, and the evolving political landscape. Their continued role as mediators of peace, both social and spiritual, remains crucial, especially as they balance traditional practices with the demands of contemporary society.

CONCLUSIONS

The *zawia* in the Rif region has evolved over time, adapting to changing social, political, and religious dynamics while remaining a central institution within local communities. Despite facing criticism, particularly from conservative Islamic factions such as the Salafi movement, which viewed them as outdated and spiritually dangerous, the *zawia* have maintained a significant presence. Their role has been multifaceted, offering not only spiritual guidance but also social support through programs like literacy for women, food assistance, and social welfare. This adaptability has allowed them to navigate complex political environments, especially during times of national conflict and social upheaval, such as the aftermath of Morocco's independence and the 1963 Sand War.

Moreover, the *zawia* have played a crucial role in the development of "imperfect peace" within the Rif region, offering small but sustained contributions to local peace-building. This concept of imperfect peace, where the actions of the *zawia* may not always be formal or comprehensive but are continuously beneficial, aligns with the broader idea that peace can be experienced and perceived in varied, localized ways. Their contributions to social harmony, particularly in rural and mountainous areas, have been indispensable, providing stability in regions that faced external pressures and internal divisions.

The transformation of the *zawia* into institutions with social functions, such as community centers and political engagement, has enabled them to remain relevant in

modern Morocco. This shift reflects their ability to adapt to the needs of the time while remaining rooted in local traditions. Their ability to serve as mediators in social and political conflicts has reinforced their position as essential institutions for peace and unity. Additionally, their cultural and political influence, particularly in the post-independence era, highlights the continued importance of these institutions in shaping both local and national discourse. The future of the *zawia* depends largely on their ability to evolve in response to the shifting demographics, such as rural-to-urban migration and the rise of new religious ideologies. Yet, their long-standing role as mediators of peace and their deep connections with local communities suggest that they will continue to play a significant role in the region. By balancing traditional practices with modern challenges, *Zawia* are likely to remain key players in fostering social cohesion and maintaining a sense of identity and belonging in the Rif and beyond.

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