

JURNAL SOSIOLOGI AGAMA

Jurnal Ilmiah Sosiologi Agama dan Perubahan Sosial



**RETORIKA IMAJI FILANTROPI ISLAM MODERN
DALAM PRANGKO AMAL MUHAMMADIYAH**

Adib Sofia

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PERSPEKTIF SOSIOLOGI PENGETAHUAN**

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Dede Syarif

PEREMPUAN DAN PERAN REGENERASI DALAM LINGKARAN EKSTREMISME KEKERASAN:

Narasi dari Indonesia Timur

Muhammad Najib Azca & Rani Dwi Putri

**PROGRAM STUDI SOSIOLOGI AGAMA
FAKULTAS USHULUDDIN DAN PEMIKIRAN ISLAM, UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA**

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Daftar Isi

RETORIKA IMAJI FILANTROPI ISLAM MODERN DALAM PRANGKO AMAL MUHAMMADIYAH	
Adib Sofia	149
GAGASAN STUDI AGAMA TERAPAN DALAM BINGKAI KAMPUS MERDEKA: PERSPEKTIF SOSIOLOGI PENGETAHUAN	
Ahmad Muttaqin dan Ustadhi Hamsah	171
BUILDING THE FOUNDATION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND COUNTERING RADICALISM IDEOLOGY IN INDONESIA	
Alfian Qodri Azizi, Muhammad Faiq, dan Thiyas Tono Taufiq	191
TEOLOGI LINGKUNGAN; Studi Fenomenologi Gerakan Environmentalisme Komunitas Air Kita Mojoagung	
Amilatul Khasanah dan Naibin	207
MENGATASI INTOLERANSI BERAGAMA: Sebuah Tawaran Moderasi Beragama Perspektif Syiah	
Dede Syarif	227
SOCIAL RELIGIOUS CHANGES OF EAST JAVA PEOPLE IN THE INDEX OF TOLERANCE ANALYSIS	
Muhammad Lukman Hakim, Indah Dwi Qurbani dan Abdul Wahid	243
MOBILISASI SUMBER DAYA DAN PARTISIPASI PUBLIK DALAM GERAKAN FILANTROPI ISLAM: Studi pada LAZIS Muhammadiyah di Kecamatan Kalasan, Sleman	
Sitti Harnia dan M. Falikul Isbah	261
PEREMPUAN DAN PERAN REGENERASI DALAM LINGKARAN EKSTREMISME KEKERASAN: Narasi dari Indonesia Timur	
Muhammad Najib Azca dan Rani Dwi Putri	281

BUILDING THE FOUNDATION OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND COUNTERING RADICALISM IDEOLOGY IN INDONESIA

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Abstrak

Penegakan Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM), terutama pada aspek kebebasan beragama di Indonesia masih tampak suram. Peristiwa-peristiwa kekerasan yang melibatkan konflik antar penganut agama masih sering terjadi. Hal itu menjadi bukti bahwa ruang kebebasan beragama masih menjadi persoalan serius di negeri ini. Indonesia merupakan negeri yang multi kultur, namun pemahaman yang sempit atas klaim kebenaran sepihak (*truth claim*) menjadikan pluralitas, khususnya agama, menjadi akar kebencian dan amarah. Memang, keragaman bisa memberikan sumbangsih yang signifikan dalam pembangunan nasional, namun di sisi yang lain, ia sangat potensial memicu konflik horizontal. Artikel ini akan mengurai persoalan yang menyebabkan intoleransi beragama dan bagaimana cara mengatasi paham radikalisme yang marak terjadi. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan *library research*. Perilaku kekerasan yang terjadi atas dasar agama akan dianalisa dari sudut pandang penegakan Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM), teologi Islam, dan sosio-yuridis sehingga solusi-solusi alternatif atas tindakan-tindakan kekerasan yang terjadi di masyarakat, khususnya pada kalangan Islam itu sendiri, bisa teratasi. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa toleransi mempunyai landasannya baik dari agama maupun hukum formal di Indonesia. Oleh sebab itu, bentuk intoleransi apapun tidak punya dasar dan hanya akan memperburuk citra Islam serta membuat orang tidak simpati terhadap agama.

Kata kunci: toleransi, kebebasan beragama, radikalisme, klaim kebenaran

Abstract

Human rights enforcement, especially in the aspect of religious freedom in Indonesia, is still unsolved. Violence involving conflicts among religious followers still occurs. It shows that the space for religious freedom is still a critical problem in this country. Indonesia is a multi-cultural country, but a narrow understanding makes plurality the root of hatred and anger. Indeed, diversity will contribute to national development, but on the other hand, it can also trigger horizontal conflicts. This article will unravel the problems that cause religious intolerance and how to overcome the mushrooming of radicalism. This article is qualitative-based research. The data were collected from the library study. The acts of violence caused by wrong religious understanding were analyzed from the Human Rights enforcement, Islamic theology, and socio-juridical viewpoints so that alternative solutions for acts of violence occurring in society, especially among Muslims, can be settled. This study finds that tolerance has its foundations in both religion and positive law in Indonesia. Therefore, any intolerance has no basis, and it will only worsen the image of Islam and make people unsympathetic to religion.

Keywords: tolerance, religious freedom, radicalism, truth claims



INTRODUCTION

Indonesia consists of various groups, ethnicities, races, cultures, languages, and religions. These differences can often trigger friction and conflict amid a pluralistic society. Whereas in a pluralistic society, safe and peaceful life is needed (Anam, Royanulloh, and Taufiq 2021). If we look closely, acts of radicalism and terror caused by religious fanaticism have not subsided in the last decade. The Setara Institute released data on the condition of religious freedom. West Java Province still ranks first for the last five years, with the highest violations by 162 cases, and then followed by DKI Jakarta with 113 cases, East Java was in the third position with 98 cases, Central Java with 66 cases, Aceh with 65 cases, South Sulawesi with 27 cases, North Sumatra with 28 cases, West Sumatra with 23 cases, and Banten with 36 cases (Novianto 2019).

It is still hot in the mass media about the church bombing in Makassar by a newly married couple and the attack on the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta by a girl last March 2021. The perpetrators of these two incidents are the millennial generation. This fact shows that the seeds of radicalism due to exclusive and intolerant religious understanding slowly but surely can create terrorism cells. Ironically, radicalism today is more often targeting the youths with empty of religious knowledge and dry spirituality. They are usually not among the pesantren circle, so they just access religious information through the internet.

Terrorists target young people to be influenced by the wrong religious understanding, that is, by justifying acts of violence, terror, and suicide. This idea is then spread through the internet network widely and easily accessible. Those who are still young and ignorant of religious knowledge eventually become victims of the terrorists' misguided thinking. Misunderstanding in the concept of *jihad*, which tends to be offensive, hatred towards the government that is considered incomplete in

overcoming the problem of this nation's crisis, and temptation of a *shortcut to heaven* by committing suicide have prompted the youths to fall into the radical groups such as JAD (Jamaah Ansharut Daulah), which is affiliated with the ISIS, *Islamic State of Iraq Syria* (Wijaya 2021). These radical groups are common enemies as their ideology is against the constitution and Pancasila.

The tragedy of church bombings had occurred before in Surabaya, last May 2018, that killed 13 people, including six perpetrators from the same family (CNN Indonesia 2018). The perpetrators were influenced by the idea of radicalism, *self-radicalized lone wolves*, which becomes part of terrorist cells without being organized and systemized (Haryani 2020, 146). Besides, the cases of "violence" and "vandalism" that often arise due to religious intolerance, such as the attacks on the Shia sect, Ahmadiyah group, the cessation of Hindu worship in Yogyakarta, add to the list of dark records of Human Rights enforcement concerning religious freedom in Indonesia (Novianto 2019). The acts that were born from the sentiments of religious dogmas is counter-productive to the goals of human rights enforcement, which legally supports the freedom of everyone to follow their religion, as stated in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United Nations declared on 10 December 1948 (UN General Assembly, n.d.).

Religious diversity is a necessity in a multi-cultural-religious country like Indonesia. Religion has a crucial role in contributing to national development. However, a wrong understanding turns religious plurality into "hate and anger." Religious understanding that deviates from the corridor would become a boomerang because it can trigger conflicts in society (Tim Keputusan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 2011). Religion is a guardian of peace and against harm, "becoming a blessing for the whole world" (Rasyid 2016). Regarding tolerance, Islam becomes the center of attention because there is a paradox between its teaching and reality, considering many conflicts within internal and external Muslims. Although this nation has a collective awareness that the foundation of this country is not based on religion, but a common force, according to Benny Susetyo, "views about my religion and my beliefs" is often the reason for violent behavior (Susetyo 2014).

Although the discourse on religious tolerance and pluralism is often echoed in the public sphere, its realization is not easy. It even seems "stagnate," only limited to lip service. There are many inhibiting factors of the realization of solidarity, solidity, and religious tolerance in the broader community. Therefore, the issue of religious freedom in this country still becomes our big homework together. Several related studies have been conducted so far. Saeed (1999) in his study investigated how tolerance can be established through reform of Islamic higher education institutions in Indonesia. Again, Crouch (2011) studied how Ahmadiyah was under a threat by radical Islamic groups and there was pressure on the government to implement legal restrictions on Ahmadis. While, in this study, the writers will outline several reviews of violence based on religion, examined from human rights enforcement perspective by using Islamic theological and socio-juridical approaches. This study is a library research. The information obtained was studied with deep analysis. It aims to obtain alternative solutions to solve the problem of violence that occurs, especially within Islam.

The Root of Violence

Violence is behavior inherent in social communities. Violence can take the form of physical or symbolic violence, which can cause suffering. Violence can be from small-scale conflicts, such as families, groups, and communities. Therefore, to carry out the anatomy of violence, several things need to be explored deeply about the emergence of conflict in society. Conflict can start from friction

between individuals, groups, or communities who have different interests, goals, and objectives (Taufiq 2021). Violence can also be interpreted as the action of a person or several people, in a strong position against someone who is in a weak position, by using means of force, both physical and non-physical, to intentionally cause suffering to those who are the object of violence (Wigjosoebroto 2002, 133).

The emergence of forms of violence has existed since the country's establishment, as stated by Max Weber because the state is synonymous with reconstruction, reproduction, and even social transformation of the long history of violence that has occurred to humankind. The wars and class conflicts over the exploitation of humans into labor by the owners of capital or the rich are evidence of social studies that realize the establishment of an independent state cannot be separated from violence (Wigjosoebroto 2002). Regarding the relationship between religion and violence, we can quickly answer apologetically that the values contained in the fundamental religious teachings are non-violent. What often happens in daily lives, personally or communally, is humans that have distorted the essence of religious teachings. The roots of religious intolerance can be traced back to the erroneous understanding of religious dogma. That is why religion is very easy to be driven by anyone who wants to profit by legalizing acts of violence for certain groups, politics, or capitalism, with the pretext of religion or the name of God.

Religion in the context of social relations has a high risk as a latent danger of overflowing violence. The first latent danger that can lead to acts of radicalism is due to the principle of *sacrifice* for a religion that is believed to be true. Rene Girad's theory reveals that sacrifice is an essential element of religion. Some religions ask their adherents to dare sacrifice something valuable for what they have or even further sacrifice someone to free the soul from sin. Sacrificial rites are considered legitimate to maintain the continuity of the cosmos, and sacrifice is considered a sacred offering. The logical consequence is that the person who sacrifices himself becomes a victim of violence considered sacred by a particular religion or sect. Violence in the name of religion is deemed to be legitimate by a certain group because, in their minds, violence, attacks, bombings have a valid legal basis. Even if they have to lose their lives, property, and family, anyone who wants to do it believes will get a reward and go to heaven (Wim Beuken 2003, 142–45).

Then, religion tends to violence when its identity and existence are threatened. Therefore, religious agitators will suffer the threat of exclusion and repression. In Islamic history, people accused of blasphemy will end up on the gallows; for example, the case of al-Hallaj, who was accused of embracing pantheism, was sentenced to death in 922 for committing heresy. The great theologian Ibn Rush also experienced the same thing. He was forbidden to go to the East because his writings were considered to show religious enmity. He was sentenced to death at the door of the mosque in Cordoba in 1195 because he was considered a heretic.

There was also a *mihnah* (inquisition) when Islam under the Abbasid caliphate rejected the views of Ahl al-Hadith by making the Mu'tazilite a state's school. The victim was the well-known cleric Ahmad ibn Hambal who was imprisoned (Armstrong 2004, 75). All these tragedies result from cynical fanaticism from the intolerant politicization of power and a hypocritical attitude by always feeling right before God. The violence was built on the ideology of divine order.

Islam and Theology of Religious Freedom

One of the aims of Islamic teachings is to provide peace of soul for their followers and guarantee freedom for religious communities to carry out worship with feelings of security and comfort. The urgency of the meaning of pluralism is to create an atmosphere that fosters the faith of each religious community, maintains the unity of the nation, and prevents division and hostility among human beings. Pluralism is necessary as Indonesia has a multi-culture society. Each religious individual can live side by side to learn and take positive experiences of the differences from adherents of other religions.

Religion is the driving social factor in realizing common goals, building a great nation and diverse cultures. We can learn why God created us of various ethnic groups, religions, and customs from the differences. The reason is to get to know each other. Then, we can take a lesson from their perspectives, life principles, and local wisdom values. If we can understand each other, a sense of brotherhood will be established, by which we can encourage a strong work ethic with one another. So, we can jointly look for ways to solve social problems, move the economy, regulate fair laws, maintain local wisdom in a community, region, and so on. Pluralism is a necessity in a pluralistic society, so the idea of pluralism must be continuously nurtured and developed. The goal is to create a productive and quality community in building the nation's civilization and culture. However, it is undeniable that plurality may also create disunity. Because of the risk of conflict that may arise, it is necessary to have an attitude of equality, openness, and tolerance, which are the core ideas of pluralism (Lestari 2020).

At least, there are four main topics in the Qur'an dealing with pluralism. *First*, embracing religion must not base on fear of coercion or even threats, as stated in Q.S Al-Baqarah: 256. This verse clearly explains that freedom in choosing religion lies in each human being. If embracing a religion is forced by an outside party, then religious teachings will lose their authenticity and sense of sincerity. *Secondly*, the teachings of Islam in the Qur'an admit the existence of adherents of other religions, as stated in Q.S Al-Baqarah: 62. This verse emphasizes the people to carry out actual activities, promoting pious behavior. It means every religion is challenged to compete with each other to manifest goodness in real life (*fastabiq-ül-khayrât*). *Thirdly*, the integration of the concept of prophethood. This concept is contained in Q.S. as-Syûrâ: 13, which explains that one of the core beliefs of Islam is to believe in all the Prophets and Apostles. This verse implies the principle of pluralism in Islam, with the teachings of various Prophets and Messengers of Allah.

Fourthly, the integrated divine message. This concept is found in Q.S An-Nisa: 131, which states that the holy book given by Allah to His Apostles contains teachings that aim to guide us to believe and obey Allah's commands. From this message, we believe in the concept of the oneness of God. Then, that single concept gave birth to religious pluralism brought by each of His prophets, both in terms of diversity in religious rituals as well as religious orders. The understanding of the pluralism teachings of Islam should not cease only on the sheets of normative texts. However, it needs to be a methodological framework for interpreting the texts and transforming these moral values in actual social life. Things that can trigger sharp debates among religious adherents that lead to hatred or feelings of antipathy must be avoided or thrown away. Theological polemics about eschatological issues of the truest religion (*truth claims*) and the question of followers' belief who will surely get salvation in the hereafter should be put aside as the most important thing is respect between fellow human beings. (Rachman 2010, II).

The history of the Islamic caliphate shows that the caliphs have practiced Islamic teachings that are not allowed to impose their will on others, to leave their religion, and convert to Islam. At the time of Umar ibn Khatab, after he conquered Jerusalem (Aelia, al-Bayt al-Maqdis), he then agreed to provide guarantees in the form of security for religion, self, and the church to the local people. The churches were preserved and not destroyed. No one was forced to convert to Islam (Purwanto 2012, 212, 235). This is actually counterproductive to what Indonesia is currently experiencing, where hatred under the pretense of religion legitimizes one's reasoning to harm or bomb houses of worship. The Abbasid caliphs had also opened a public dialogue between religious communities to overcome society's problems in the past. The dialogue was attended by many scholars consisting of various religions, sects, and groups. Therefore, hundreds of Islamic schools of thought were born and flourished during the Abbasid era, ranging from conservative to liberal or rationalist.

Juridical Guarantee of Religious Freedom

Freedom of religion in Indonesia has been guaranteed by the state constitution, as stated in Article 29 of the 1945 Constitution.¹ The norms contained in the constitution are explained in PP No.1/PNPS/1965 concerning the Prevention of Abuse and/or Blasphemy of Religion, and the rules for blasphemy offenses in the Criminal Code (article 156a), which states that anyone who insults religion is threatened with imprisonment for five (5) years. In addition, the international covenant on civil and political rights (ICCPR) has been ratified by the government through Law no. 12 of 2005. Legally, the covenant binds the state parties that have ratified it to include it in the articles of national legislation. The guarantee of freedom of religion or belief stated in article 18 of the ICCPR provides official instructions on adopting the right to freedom of religion, faith, and thought, which must be understood comprehensively and balanced.

Since the reformation era in 1998, the strategic agenda of Indonesia's constitutional politics leads to law supremacy, i.e., strengthening human rights principles and other big agendas. The three main aspects of the law supremacy are 1) The law acts as the commander in chief, so that its implementation may not be selective. The law must not be blunt when dealing with the haves and sharply down oppressing the poor; 2) The law functions as the center of the action, namely legal acts by government authorities or individuals must not deviate from the applicable legal provisions; 3) All parties are treated equally before the law (Setiadi 2012). Indonesia took a strategic step by reforming the 1945 Constitution (constitutional reform) to implement law supremacy. Freedom of religion gets its special portion in Article 29, Article 28 E, Article 28 I of the 1945 Constitution.

Human Rights (HAM) naturally must be fulfilled to maintain the dignity and existence of the continuity of human life in general. Al-Ghazali and other experts in jurisprudence state that human rights belong to five universal and fundamental rights (Al-Maqashid Al-Khamsah/Al-Kulliyat), namely protecting and preserving religion, life, property, intellect, and lineage (Yasid 2004, 76). The function and position of the government apparatus as *Ulul Amri*, God's representative, to protect and preserve human rights is very important. The state is the last resort, so this obligation cannot be shifted to other parties. The barometer of the success of a country can be viewed from the aspect of fulfilling and protecting the rights of its citizens because the main reason (*raison de etre*) for the formation of a state is to protect human rights (HAM). On the other hand, the state is said to have failed if it cannot fulfill and protect its citizens' rights.

¹ Article 29 (1), The state is based on the One Supreme God, (2) The state guarantees the independence of each resident to embrace their own religion and to worship according to their religion and beliefs.

Since the beginning of independence, with the formulation of Pancasila as the basis of state philosophy (*Philosophische Grondslag*), the Indonesian people have welcomed the role of religion in the public sphere (Abdullah 2017). Although Indonesia is not a country with an Islamic system, Pancasila as a *ground norm* contains Islamic values and principles that believe in God Almighty, as stated in the first principle of Pancasila. The teaching of monotheism, which is the core of Islam, as stated in the first principle, highly upholds the principle of *tasamuh* (tolerance), opportunity, and freedom for adherents of other religions to practice the teachings of their respective religions freely (Nur 1993, 55). Jimly Assiddiqie views that the Indonesian constitution has embodied the value of God Almighty into the principle of hierarchy and the elaboration of norms (Assiddiqie 2008). The value of God Almighty comes from religious teachings in Indonesia such as the Islamic Shari'a system, Hinduism, Christianity, Confucianism, Buddhism, and adherents of other beliefs. These great values are adopted and then transformed into articles to become legal norms that are valid and binding for all citizens. According to the One God principle, the shari'ah norms do not need to be displayed again because the name has changed to a generally accepted state law. Automatically the laws that live and develop in the laws and regulations in Indonesia must not contradict the religious norms believed by Indonesian citizens (Decision of the Minister of Law and Human Rights, 2011).

In history, the correlation between religion and the state in Indonesia shows continuous efforts to find common ground to bridge various ideological interests. Finally, Pancasila was accepted as a middle way of compromising the secular-nationalist group with the religious-nationalist group. Indonesia is not a religious state because it is not based on one particular religion as the basis of its state. Nor is it a secular state because it does not distinguish between state and religious affairs. So, in every spirit of Indonesian legislation, it is full of values, norms, and morals of religious teachings (Budiyono 2014).

As explained above, the Indonesian state still upholds the noble value of God Almighty so that no one can replace God's power in this world. From here, then, the doctrine of egalitarianism and equality of humanity in the life of the nation and society was established. Therefore, an understanding that declares Indonesia as an infidel/*taghut* state and is not following Islamic teachings is misled. The people should be given education by the government, educational institutions, and socio-religious institutions to counter intolerant ideas. Such mischievous understanding can become radical, which can be troubling and bring suffering to all of us. We have long lived side by side with all kinds of inherent differences but unite us as a nation. Therefore, love for religion must be accompanied by love for the homeland.

The Threat of Radical Jihadists

Furthermore, in the social sphere, it is important to pay special attention to the acute danger of authoritarian Islamic mass organizations, which are slowly mushrooming and emerge with the banner of "God's flag." Instead of fighting disobedience, it creates an unstoppable horizontal conflict. One of the big agendas of this group is to overthrow the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Because they think that Pancasila is not following Islamic principles, it is a product of infidel that needs to be eliminated from the earth. Anyone who is believing in this ideology is considered an infidel whose blood is lawful (Wahid 2009, 60). The emergence of this mass organization can be categorized as "quasi-intellectual." They infiltrate amid society, wanting to set up a leader but are unqualified. Because their quality shows the opposite value, relies on physical and imposes the will,

and ignores the rules that have been set (Rahardjo 2006, 25).

This group is known as puritan Islam or often labeled as hard-line Islam (Radical Islam), which usually offers textual references (jihad) to support the theological goals of anti-tolerance and exclusive behavior. Some examples of Islamic groups adopting radicalism include Laskar Jihad, led by Ja'far Umar Thalib from FKAWJ (Ahlussunah wal Jama'ah Communication Forum), which participated in the Maluku conflict. Then, Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI) whose members have spread the Bali bombing terror, KUIB (Bekasi), Asybal Tauhid Indonesia, Pulpit of Tauhid wal Jihad, Forum Supporting Daulah, Forum for Islamic Shari'a Activists, East Indonesia Mujahidin, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, and many others are affiliated to ISIS (Terorisme 2016).

If a group or individual has claimed to be the most authoritative party in interpreting religious doctrine, they are more likely to fall into authoritarian behavior. People who act authoritarian in various ways will demonstrate their personality and the group's ideas that must be adhered to and obeyed. They understand the verses of the Qur'an textually and historically so that consequently, the hypothesis that is taken leads to a narrow understanding as well. Their attitude will be to divide rigidly between non-Muslims and Muslims, then trace which territories can be considered as "Dar al-Harb" (enemy territory) as a place of jihad (Darajat 2016).

The radical groups believe that the Indonesian government is a *taghut* that does not want to enforce Islamic law, *shari'ah* (Nurani and Nurdin 2019, 90). The government also becomes a western stooge such as the United States (US) and its allies who colonized several Muslim countries. As long as Indonesia is still under a foreign hegemony even though its leader is a Muslim, Indonesia is included in the *Dar al harb*, which deserves to be the object of *jihad*. The Indonesian government is considered a *kafir mahaly*, that is, a leader who declares himself Muslim but is not willing to apply and implement Islamic law (Solahudin 2011, 210, 221).

Imam Samudra's statement about his involvement in conflicts in Ambon, Maluku, Poso, and so on was not due to socioeconomic inequality but was created as a continuation of the global crusade, as a response to conflicts ignited by the west in Muslim countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, the Philippines, Burma, and others. Those who took part in this conflict are named *mujahidin fi sabilillah*. Imam Samudra argues that the west always takes the initiative to attack and Islam always keeps defending, so he takes the jargon of defense and attack (*defoffensif*) in the same time based on the rule "the best defense is to attack" (*khairud difai'i alhuju*) as stated by Umar ibn Khatab (Samudera 2004, 189-90).

The acts of intolerance, radicalization, and terrorism are a serious threat to Indonesia's unity and nation. These actions can have a negative impact which ultimately results in extremism (Faiq and Syakur, 2021), for example, fundamentalist or Islamic puritan movements, which want to uphold "pure" Islam (*kaffah*) by spreading physical jihad actions and threats of terror. Such a movement gives a negative stereotype to Islam as a religion that likes to intimidate and create violence. Islam is a religion of peace. Therefore, *jihad* in the concept of nationality in Indonesia should be interpreted not as a form of fighting, killing on the battlefield (*jihad asghar*), but should be understood as a *jihad* against lust (*jihad akbar*) in the form of spiritual, moral, and ethical struggle (Ridho 2019, 4).

The Prophet Muhammad himself gave an example that bloodshed must be avoided during *jihad*. The command for *jihad* can be carried out depending on the social conditions. In the early days of Islam in Mecca, which was still structurally, socially, and politically weak, the prophet practiced the

jihad as taught in Q.S. Al-Ankabut: 6, by patiently restraining oneself in the face of pressure, insults, and attacks by the infidels. At that time, Muslims engaged in *jihad* by bringing themselves closer to Allah SWT so that it was not in the form of physical contact, attack, or engagement on the battlefield.

Only after Muslims gained strength both politically and socially, *jihad* in physical warfare was carried out. It was taking place during the Medina period, such as in the Battle of Badr, two years after the hijrah. It was because the Quraish never stopped carrying out hostile, intimidating, and preventing Islamic da'wah. The *jihad* applied by the prophet was not an offensive but a defensive effort under the pretext of defending the dignity and protecting the rights of Muslims. The prophet has a thorough understanding of *jihad's* verses, so he remained in the ethical corridor to behave when dealing with the enemy. Some of the teachings about *jihad* are stated in Q.S. Al-Hajj: 39 and Q.S. Al-Baqarah: 190 that is not disturbing women, the elderly, small children, civilians, priests, prohibiting damage to places of worship, prohibiting taking any enemy's goods, except with compensation for paying them, prohibiting the slaughtering of enemy's pets except to eat because of hunger (Enizar 2002, 138).

A defensive *jihad* has been practiced by the Islamic organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in Indonesia. However, NU has a different understanding of the concept of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb from that of the extremist groups. For example, NU views that *jihad* (*qital*) should only be carried out when the enemy has occupied the Muslim territory. Every Muslim citizen must protect their homeland from the enemy's cruelty. NU disagrees that Indonesia is categorized as *Dar al-Harb* in a safe and peaceful situation just because the governments do not apply Islamic law, so they are sentenced to *taghut*. On the contrary, those who attempt war in Islamic territory fall into the category of *irhab* (terror). During the colonial period, which at that time was ruled by the Dutch, not Muslims, NU still considered Indonesia to be a *Dar al-Islam* not a *Dar al-Harb* because the Muslim community at that time was given the freedom to carry out worship activities properly (Darajat 2016).

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah condemned a group of extremists who do *jihad* by carrying out a series of acts of terror in Indonesia against Christians, ruined houses of worship, and was hostile to a civil society with the argument that Indonesia was oriented towards the West. Therefore, it was included in the *Dar al-Harb* category. Indeed, the Indonesian state is still trapped in foreign hegemony. It can be seen from several laws and regulations that are still in favor of foreign interests rather than prioritizing people's welfare. Therefore, *jihad* in filling independence must be embodied in constitutional *jihad*, striving to change laws far from a sense of justice and unfairness to the weak (Darajat 2016).

The ulama declare that *jihad* against lust (*jihad nafs*) is included in the category of the greater *jihad*, because it is more severe than physical *jihad* on the battlefield (*jihad asghar*). The war against the enemy is visible; its time and where the war takes place can be clearly known. But, in terms of *jihad nafs*, the opponent is invisible and must be carried out anytime and anywhere all the time. Some examples of greater *jihad* are eradicating poverty, fighting laziness, ignorance, corruption, collusion, nepotism, injustice, greed, miserliness, and other bad actions. So, the concept of *Dar al-Islam* or *Dar al-Harb* is viewed from "the extent to which there is a guarantee for the Muslims in terms of implementing the teachings of Islam or not," not whether "the ruling government is non-Muslim or Muslim." Although the views of the two largest Islamic organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah, view *jihad nafs* as more relevant and important, it does not deny that war *jihad* can be carried out when

the enemy aggressively attacks the stability of the homeland. As history records, the *jihad* revolution of NU on October 22, 1945, had a significant impact in expelling the allied troops on November 10, 1945. The same thing also happened to the Muhammadiyah when supporting the Sabilillah Masyumi army against the allies that wanted to re-colonize Indonesia (Darajat 2016).

Youth and Terrorist Traps

Recently, the youths are often involved in acts of terrorism. Indeed, they are not intellectual actors, but they are active actors. Their presence in terrorist networks does not incite suspicion at first glance, so they are straightforward to enter into the terrorist net and carry out acts of terror without being suspected (Mutrofin and Kharis 2020). We need to be aware of this because terrorist groups attract young people through the internet, with propaganda for shortcuts to heaven, as long as they want to do *jihad* and even commit suicide bombings. The government should be more intense in supervising the recruitment of new members by ex-terrorists through social media networks. Social media and messaging applications that have content with nuances of radicalism and terrorism must be monitored. In addition, the government needs to build synergy with stakeholders such as the National Cyber and Crypto Agency (BSSN), State Intelligence Agency (BIN), Police of the Republic of Indonesia (POLRI), Indonesian National Army (TNI), Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (KEMKOMINFO) and other relevant state institutions. All these institutions must plan to stem the spread of radicalism and intolerance in cyberspace as a priority scale.

The identity crisis experienced by the youths makes them more vulnerable to intolerance, radicalism, and extremism. Psychologically, this condition occurs in the transition phase of children to adults or teenagers. They are no longer considered as children, but psychologically they are not mature yet in sorting wisely, which are positive and negative. Usually, they start looking for their identity, trying to mobilize resources to grow. During an identity crisis, a person would quickly experience “cognitive opening,” a crisis phase in which a person experiences uncertainty regarding self-identity, thus experiencing a micro-sociological process or reasoning to accept the possibility of new ideas and views of life (Azca 2013).

Another factor that triggers an aggressive response for someone to engage in radical *jihad* is the “moral shock,” that is, the occurrence of attacks and murders against Muslims in a place or country. In response, someone’s emotions will arise naturally based on a sense of solidarity with others and a feeling of the same religion, faith, and brotherhood. As a result of seeking random information, a person is motivated to engage in social or political action, even though previously he did not recognize the movement. For example, jihadist activists who went to Poso and Maluku were willing to leave their families because they saw a video of hundreds of Muslims in Tobelo being killed in a mosque (Qodir 2013). They then quoted the hadith of the prophet, “*fellow Muslims are like one body; if one part gets injured, the other part also feels pain.*” It is the argument of the jihadist movements. Instead of helping fellow Muslims, they worsened the conflict situation. This problem should be resolved with a conflict resolution approach, involving religious leaders, the community, and the government to touch the root of the problem to achieve peace after the conflict.

Radicalism acts by the youths can also be referred to as “identity actions,” in which a person will gain meaning after making corrections to social problems that occur. A group of teenagers will get a meaning of life with the slogan “I am radical; therefore, I exist.” The *jihad* movement that triggers

horizontal conflicts between religions occurs due to the “identity seeking” action of the *schismogenesis* response, i.e., the social changes during the transition to democracy in Indonesia. This period gave rise to various social groups, thus gradually triggering political and ideological contestation. A dramatic reflection of *schismogenesis* is the outbreak of religious community conflicts in Poso, Maluku, and Sulawesi. This series of conflicts created a *moral shock* for most Muslim youths, thus triggering them to want to engage in radical *jihad*. By participating in the *jihad* action, they will feel that their identity crisis ends either personally or in a *societal* context (Sukabdi 2013).

The psychological problems experienced by the younger generation are utilized by terrorist groups. It is because the youths tend to be more vulnerable, irritable, frustrated, and dissatisfied with government or social conditions. Terrorist groups present justifications, strategies, and solutions for achieving change. In addition, facilities, environment, and equipment are provided for courageous teenagers and want to carry out radical actions. Therefore, fortifying young people from the influence of radicalism is a joint obligation. Three social institutions that function and have an essential role in protecting the younger generation include: 1) Educational institutions. Through the nationalism curriculum, teaching tolerance and religious moderation, teachers can instill values to filter the entry of radicalism into a person; 2) Family. The role of parents is very urgent in cultivating a sense of love and affection for the younger generation. The family is a place to share and discuss when children face individual and social problems not to run away to find the wrong social environment, which can drive them into acts of violence; 3) Community. The role of local community leaders is expected to be able to create a conducive atmosphere, namely the creation of a peaceful and inclusive culture (Terorisme 2016).

Deradicalization of Former Terrorist Convicts

For perpetrators who create an atmosphere of terror employing violence or threats of violence are subject to criminal sanctions in the form of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 20 years, life imprisonment, or the death penalty as stipulated in Law RI No. 5 of 2018. However, considering that there are still many terrorist convicts who are not deterred after being imprisoned, the deradicalization program by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) needs to be addressed. Some former convicts returned to their groups or exodus to Mindanao and Syria. Some became individual terrorists, then carried out suicide bombings at several police stations. Another suspect recruited a new member who is still a teenager. The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) released data for the period from 2002 to 2020, ex-terrorist convicts returned to being involved in terrorist movements as many as 11.4% of the 825 terrorist prisoners, or more than 90 people, of which 38 people had high militancy (Wijaya 2021).

Alif Satria, a researcher on terrorism studies at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies), said the deradicalization program failed because terrorist prisoners were not obligated to participate (Firmansyah 2019). Besides, the barometer of the success of the deradicalization program does not have a success matrix to evaluate the weaknesses and progress of the deradicalization program. To be right on target, organizations that have been assisting terrorist convicts should be involved. All terrorist prisoners must be required to participate in a deradicalization program according to their level of extremism, high or low. Those who voluntarily participate in the deradicalization program are classified as low extremism, while those who do not wish to participate in the deradicalization process are classified as high extremism.

Furthermore, an important part of the deradicalization process is making ex-terrorist convicts re-accepted by the community in the environment where they live socially after completing their imprisonment. Some rejections against ex-terrorist convicts often occur because people are still afraid that they will commit terror again. The deradicalization program should not stop at changing the perspective and ideology of terrorists but also at the stage of resocialization and reintegration (Khamdan 2015). They not only fight the bad stigma in society but also have to survive to find work.

BNPT should have a solution to empower ex-terrorist convicts, create a positive climate to reunite them with society, and restore conflict. The ways that can be taken include building social partnerships, such as providing skills training so that ex-terrorists can start living independently and their welfare is fulfilled, providing protection for the rights of ex-terrorists as normal people in general, and building a moral movement against acts of terrorism and radicalism without making former terrorists feel alienated so that they can behave like the people around them. A relevant example of the deradicalization process of former terrorists was the establishment of an ideological school in Purwakarta by Regent Dedi Mulyadi. This school empowers former terrorists to become speakers teaching material on "Pancasila as an Indonesian Ideology, education on the dangers of radical ideas, how to respond to sensitive information and news related to religion and politics, emphasizing tabayyun (verifying information). The goal is that people are not easily provoked. This model is quite effective in helping the government in monitoring the reintegration activities of ex-terrorists after serving their sentences (Indrawan and Prakoso 2019).

CONCLUSION

Human Rights (HAM) enforcement in the dimension of religious freedom is like cleaning dusky water, considering that violent acts are still rampant. The Reformation agenda to uphold the law supremacy has not succeeded in solving human rights violations. Every citizen living in Indonesia should be aware that the earth he is living in is a nation-state that adheres to a democratic system, a unitary state, not a royal state, or a federal or religious (theocratic) state. This fundamental principle must often be voiced so that all citizens understand the existence of their country correctly. The uniqueness of Indonesia is seen in the choice of the founding fathers who made Pancasila the foundation of the state, not choosing Islam as an ideology even though the majority of people embraced Islam as their religion. They formulated Pancasila, whose five precepts contain substantial and global values from all religions and beliefs that exist in Indonesia.

In the past, the problem was that Pancasila became the dominant exclusive ideology used by the ruling elite to achieve one-sided goals to obtain practical benefits instead of being applied for the public interest. Therefore, we now have to reinterpret the existence of Pancasila so that it becomes guidance for the development of the country, people's welfare, and the establishment of democracy. Various efforts need to be implemented. *First*, review the meaning of Pancasila on contemporary issues, such as human rights, democracy, civil society, gender equality and good governance. *Secondly*, organize the basic logic with a comprehensive, deep, and integrated research on the ideas of Indonesia's political will based on Pancasila. *Thirdly*, preserving a culture of dialogue, which is reciprocally interactive among various elements of the nation, so that all of us can jointly construct a vision of Indonesia in the future to be more harmonious and prosperous.

Violence in religion cannot be justified, either from human reason or from any religious teachings. Violence in the name of religion will not glorify religion itself. But on the contrary, it gives

a negative image and makes people afraid, apathetic, and unsympathetic to the religion. For this reason, efforts are needed to change the paradigm of exclusive religious education towards a tolerant and inclusive religious education paradigm because the former will destroy the harmonization of religions and eliminate the attitude of mutual respect for the truth of other religions.



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