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FAKULTAS USHULUDDIN DAN PEMIKIRAN ISLAM, UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA
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SPATIAL CONFLICT, LOCAL POLITICS, AND THE PRESENCE OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS; GNPF ULAMA IN MEDAN

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Abstrak
Abstract

Recently, cities in Indonesia are filled with the phenomenon of political movements from Islamic circles. They often carry out mobilization actions and street protests to negotiate the interests they carry which are considered as an attempt to color urban life. This article aims to discuss the presence of the Islamic social movement GNPF Ulama North Sumatra (hereinafter referred to as GNPF), to investigate the factors and key actors in the emergence of the movement, and the implications of the movement they played. This article is part of a field research conducted by observing and interviewing several movement activists. Then, the analysis in this article uses social movement theory. In this study, social movement theory is used in this case the political process and the structure of political opportunity. The findings in this article are that social movements are a reaction to the tightness of the socio-economic and political space. The emergence of Islamic social movements in contemporary Indonesian urban space is not only driven by old factors such as the influence of colonialism, moreover its emergence is driven by the process of modernization and urbanization of the city which results in spatial conflicts between business and religion. In addition, electoral political events at the local level also encourage the emergence of movements along with the existence of movement actors who also act as political actors. Here I argue that all the factors that have been mentioned have given rise to a broader aspect of studying how a movement arises

Keywords: spatial conflict, local politics, Islamic social movement, GNPF Ulama North Sumatra

INTRODUCTION

This article discusses the presence of Islamic social movements in urban spaces in Contemporary Indonesia, in this case the National Movement to Guard Fatwa Ulama (GNPF Ulama) in Medan. The focal point explores how they emerged, in what situations and spaces led to their emergence, how they shape the formation of the movement, and influence the public sphere in Indonesia. The presence of Islamic social movements such as the GNPF Ulama in urban spaces cannot be separated from the city’s modernization process. Capitalistic secular city development has been understood as a threat to the existence of Islam in Medan. The GNPF ulama introduced to the Islamic public about the resistance to political and business forces that threatened the rights of Muslims to live in the city. Public Islam must also be made aware to rise and unite in the momentum of electoral politics, supporting Muslim leaders who care about Islam. They believe that by supporting Muslim leaders the city’s policies will lead to the defense of Muslim interests.

The urgency of living space makes many people, especially millennial youth, urban based, who do not have a strong religious tradition, support these actions. The urgency is in the form of the dominance of the Chinese group, who are indeed superior in business and have the ability to access strategic locations in the city’s core, the need for the development of modern shopping and hospitality spaces has resulted in the eviction of several mosques in the city since the 2010s. In addition, several cases of blasphemy in North Sumatra, the wave of protests was bigger at the national level, especially when they challenged Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s speech in the Kepulauan Seribu Jakarta around
mid-October 2016 regarding Surah Al-Maidah verse 51 (T. Panggabean, t.t.), which was considered to have insulted and insulted the Alquran. Interestingly, after the case passed in mid-2017, the North Sumatran GNPF Ulama still continued their movement by being heavily involved in the electoral political process such as the 2018 North Sumatra governor election, 2019 legislative election, and 2020 Medan mayor-deputy mayoral election.

The entry of the Islamist movement into the democratic space in Indonesia has prompted scholars to examine this phenomenon and debate it. Several studies on this populist Islamic political movement are correlated with the tendency of globalization and economic capitalism. Indeed, the Islamist struggle here is to reject democracy and enforce sharia and the caliphate. However, the development of contemporary Islamists explains the fact that they are adapting to modern democracy as Islamic populism works (Hadiz 2018). Vedi R. Hadiz’s argument regarding the new Islamic populism refers to the strategy taken by considering the contradictory atmosphere of globalization and waiting for the momentum to allow the enforcement of Islamic teachings. This opinion of Vedi was criticized by Rangga Kusumo, that the phenomenon of the Islamic Defending Action movement which was driven by the GNPF MUI at that time was not new Islamic populism but Islamic pseudo populism. Vague Islamic populism, which calls for short-term pragmatic political goals by attribution and framing of Islam (Kusumo dan Hurriyah 2018). This movement is also referred to as a tendency to increase religious conservatism or in Martin Van Bruinessen’s terms as a conservative turn, (Van Bruinessen 2013) when the government no longer promotes liberal Islam as in the Suharto era, conservative Islamic groups strengthen. This phenomenon also explains the fragmentation among religious authorities, where there is a void of authoritative figures in mainstream Islam which gives rise to alternative authorities among Muslims (Burhani 2016). The emergence of this alternative authority was immediately welcomed by the ummah who tended to be in a new atmosphere of religion and popular piety in urban spaces in Indonesia (Wildan 2016).

It is important to consider that the phenomenon of the emergence of religion in the public sphere is a demand for a socio-political and cultural reorganization that they imagine is capable of realizing justice and achieving real development. Disobedience in urban public spaces appears related to the increasing Islamization, social mobility, economic growth, and democratization that have occurred among the people (Hasan 2011). Here we can see the parallels between Islamization, modernization, globalization and democratization, where key concepts associated with these trends are adapted to those rooted in local traditions and culture, to inform the entire dynamics of provincial cities in Indonesia today. The key players in this urban activism are the new middle class, who seek Islamic inspiration both to claim distinction and social status and to legitimize their consumptive lifestyle (Hasan 2011). They, the urban middle class Muslims, negotiate actively between global and local circumstances and cosmopolitan and interior centers (Hasan 2011). On the other hand, significantly, they play a role as actors who liberalize religion from traditionally submissive, passive, and submissive attitudes by turning it into a source of legitimacy and moral distinction to represent modern life forms.

By seeing the close relationship with locality, tradition, modernity, and globalization, Islam is increasingly considered important for local politics. Political elites have used Islamic symbols for instrumental purposes of expanding their political legitimacy and mobilizing constituent support, in a political environment of open competition and increased public participation in decision-making (Hasan 2009). In this process, religious symbols have undeniably moved away from their religious
moorings and narrow Islamist understandings, in favor of pragmatic political ends (Hasan 2011). For example, the phenomenon of remembrance and recitation events in urban spaces (Hasan 2012). In addition, religious activism has increased in the realms of fashion, cosmetics, finance, and other lifestyles. Here, these urbanites echo the messages of Islamic revival, influencing various social and political fields. The network, in turn, provides a descriptor path for upward mobility as well as a market for commercial products. The movement is also an Islamic solidarity that can be maintained with post-movement activities (Latief 2016).

As each movement has a unique concept, strategy, and role in each space and time, in the context of the urban Islamist movement in Medan, it is important to explore findings that subtly distinguish (nuance) the social setting that provides opportunities for the emergence and development of the movement. Then, how do they carry out the work of mobilizing resources, setting strategies and formulating goals in the struggle for political positions and economic resources; and how they formulate and identify the developing culture to be used as material for framing the propaganda movement, which is useful for increasing support, preserving and extending the resistance of the movement so as to achieve the movement’s goals.

Here, it can be said that these movements are natural participants in the urbanization process. Henri Lefebvre, Marxist philosopher and socio-spatial process theorist, argues that urbanization, as a phenomenon of globalization and the role of capitalism in the typical urban process of capital accumulation, causes specific urban crises that cannot easily be summed up as a crisis of industrial capitalism (Lefebvre 1991a). As a result, the political protest movement in urban areas emerged as a “right for the city” movement, which is understood as the right of urbanites to radically change the processes that govern the production and use of urban space (Kuymulu 2013). The city is a large and promising space for the mobilization movement because of the characteristics of urban social relations that are unique and different from the village, and the problem of complex social space (Miller dan Nicholls 2013).

Based on field research, I use a historical and political science approach to analyze the key factors that led to the emergence of the movement. Political opportunity theory is used to explain the emergence, development, and influence of social movements (McAdam, McCarthy, dan Mayer N. Zald 1996). In this context, the discussion adopts a broader understanding of protest and the political process and that theory development requires a more careful and more explicit conceptualization and specification of the variables and models of political opportunity, the dependent variables concerned, and the underlying assumptions about the mechanisms by which opportunity exists. turned into action. While observing the GNPF, I also investigated the history and development of Islamic social movements, urbanization, and the democratization process in Medan. In addition, I conducted interviews with some of the movement’s key figures. Therefore, this article focuses on how the political processes and structures that developed that led to the presence of Islamic social movements? what is the purpose of the movement?

**SPATIAL CONFLICT AND ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENT**

This section is a description of how urbanization and its complexity have resulted in mutual claims for space in Medan between groups that have led to collective actions from Islamic social movements. Within a certain time, these mutual claims escalated into conflict.
Henri Lefebvre, Marxist philosopher and socio-spatial process theorist, argues that urbanization, as a phenomenon of globalization and the role of capitalism in the typical urban process of capital accumulation, causes specific urban crises that cannot easily be summed up as a crisis of industrial capitalism (Lefebvre 1991a). This has prompted a political protest movement in urban areas to emerge as the “right for the city” movement, which is understood as the right of urbanites to radically change the processes that govern the production and use of urban space. B. Miller and W. Nichols say that the city is a large and promising space for mobilization movements (Miller dan Nicholls 2013). Urban spaces are contested with political economy motivation. In the context, the emergence of social movements can be understood as a struggle for the right to live in urban areas. In addition, Islamic social movements can be understood as an action to offset the secular monopoly in spatial politics in urban areas in Indonesia.

Medan is the capital of the province of North Sumatra. The history of Medan as a modern city can begin with Medan as a new city formed by European trading corporations in this case pioneered by Deli Maschapajit at the end of the 19th century. Previously, Medan was known as a small village like other small villages around East Sumatra. Ichwan Azhari explained that understanding Medan as the forerunner of the modern city can be traced from the four historical episodes that surround it. First, the era of the Chinese City in the 11-16th century which was influenced by Indian Hindu civilization. Second, the era of river civilization marked by the emergence of the kingdom of Aru. Third, the era of Labuhan Deli civilization which was controlled by the Deli sultanate there. And fourth, the period of Dutch plantation colonialism. In this recent historical phase that the city of Medan can be called as a city.

Expansion of plantations around the city that sustains the development of areas outside it which leads to the formation of a business administration area in the city. The formation of this city was purely to meet the needs of Europeans living in East Sumatra to do business and develop plantations. Here, it can be understood that Medan is intended for an elite class of international businessmen, not colonial soldiers, let alone workers. Besides that, Medan as a city is not designed for the religious life that most people imagine, but as a promising big business arena. With such an understanding, it is only natural that Medan becomes the target of urbanization. This experience confirms that the people who come and work here are highly motivated in the struggle for a more decent and well-established living space than their hometown. So, apart from being a business economic arena, it is also a battleground for political interests. Diverse social groups from their home regions move according to their vision and orientation, compete, and conflict in urban spaces. In addition, social units carry their ideologies and experiences of religious life, color city life, and add to their quality of life in a more pious manner (Habermas 2008). Urbanization in Medan is mostly carried out by various ethnic groups, especially Minang, Mandailing, and a number of Javanese people who dynamize business life as well as the spread of Islam that cannot be ignored. In terms of occupation, urbanization in Medan is not only filled by migrant workers but also by students, scholars and professionals. They moved to Medan for reasons of education, work or safety to escape the dangers caused by the war of Independence, the bloody social revolution of 1946, and the national army pursuing illegal encroachers on plantations in the 1950s (Pelzer 1982).

Colonialism policies that indulged foreign eastern classes such as the Chinese and discredited Islam as a lower class in politics had given rise to the Islamic Movement in Medan in the early 20th century. Here has appeared Syarikat Islam, Muhammadiyah, Al Washliyah, Alittihadiyyah.
Meanwhile, NU only entered the city in the middle of the twentieth century. The three organizations mentioned are from the promotion of Javanese people, while Al Washliyah is an organization that was born from Medan and Al Ittihadiyah in Tanjungpura about 60 KM from the city of Medan.

In Indonesia, the concept of urban spatial planning can be traced in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 26 of 2007 Article 1 paragraph 2 which states that space is the existence of spatial structures and spatial patterns. While the notion of ‘city’, is a geographical condition that describes the network system of human life, characterized by a high population density and colored by heterogeneous socioeconomic strata and materialistic patterns (Bintarto 1989). In Article 1 sub 10 of Law Number 26 of 2007 concerning Spatial Planning, it is stated that urban areas are areas that have non-agricultural main activities with the arrangement of regional functions as urban settlements, centralization and distribution of government services, social services, and economic activities.

The politics of physical spatial planning in the city of Medan often results in a clash between secular space and religious space. Secular space can be understood as a representation of government office buildings, open fields, city parks, highways, people’s markets, and modern shopping centers (Kong dan Woods 2016). The religious space is a physical house of worship that can be seen from the shape of the mosque building as a place of worship for Muslims, churches for Protestant Christians and Catholics, temples for Buddhists, temples for Hindus, and temples for Confucianism. This section explains how Islamic social movements emerged as a response to the process of land gentrification in the post-Suharto era. The conflict that occurs is the struggle for religious space with business space. The intensity of this conflict then shifted to a bad perception of other social groups in this case the Chinese Ethnic as their competitors in the struggle for political resources in the city.

In Medan, referring to data from the Central Statistics Agency in 2018 figures, there are plural religious communities consisting of 1,641,401 Muslims, 495,141 Protestants, 309,483 Catholics, 9296 Hindus, 215,315 Buddhists, 11,194 Confucians and 99 other religions ((Medan 2019). Based on these data, it can be ascertained that there is a physical distribution of religious space in Medan to carry out worship for adherents of that religion. For houses of worship, there are 1,110 mosques and 649 prayer rooms, 594 churches, 18 temples, and 185 monasteries ((Medan 2019) In addition, there are many Islamic educational institutions in the city, there are 257 Koranic Kindergartens with 1308 teachers, 438 Diniyah Takmiliyah Awaliyah Madrasas with 2794 teachers and 64 Madrasah Tsanawiyah.

Table 1. Physical Religious Space in Medan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House of worship</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>1033 Mesjid, 700 Musholla, 341 Langgar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristen Protestan</td>
<td>124 Gereja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khatolik</td>
<td>10 Gereja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>35 Pura dan Kuil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budhha</td>
<td>190 vihara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konghucu</td>
<td>78 Kelenteng</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: processed from the Religious Monograph of North Sumatra
Table 2. Data on the Number of Islamic Education Ministry of Religion 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Strata</th>
<th>amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kindergarten</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>primary school</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Senior High school</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Website of Kementerian Agama Kota Medan

Unfortunately, from the website of the Ministry of Religion of the city of Medan there is no data available regarding religious schools from other than Islam, so an explanation of the religious space in the city of Medan will suffice here. However, regarding data on physical space control of religions other than Islam, little information was obtained from religious monographs of North Sumatra, such as 17 Buddhist Educational Institutions and 13 Buddhist organizations. Then, there are about 62 church organizations. Here, through the data depicted in the table that has been compiled above, it is clear that the control of religious physical space is dominated by Islam.

Except for the religious physical space described above, Medan city space is dominated by capitalistic secular space. For example, the Mall, where there are approximately 18 modern shopping centers such as Brastagi Supermarket, Buana Plaza, Cambridge City Square, Carrefour Citra Garden, Cathay City Hall Town Square, Crystal Square, Deli Grand City (DGC Supermall), Gelora Plaza, Grand Palladium Mall, Hermes Place Polonia, Hongkong Plaza, Imperial Trade Center, Istana Plaza Medan, Makro Cash & Carry Medan, Medan Mall, Medan Mega Trade Center (MMTC), Medan Plaza, Olympia Plaza, Plaza Medan Baru, Plaza Medan Fair, Plaza Millennium, Ramayana Super Center, Sun Plaza, Suzuya Superstore, Thamrin Plaza, Trend Trade Center, Yang Lim Plaza, Yuki Simpang Raya Mall, Yuki Sukaramai, Center point, and the newest in the downtown area is Deli Podomoro Supermall. In addition, property expansion in the Medan area is very massive. New houses, schools and new shopping complexes emerged to support the needs of human activities. Research on urban land use by Michel Sipayung and his colleagues explains that land use change in Medan City in 2007 and 2012 was 1,665.07 hectares and land use change in Medan City in 2012 and 2018 was 1,115.62 hectares (Sipayung, Sudarsono, dan Awaluddin 2020). Furthermore, Sipayung explained that there are three sub-districts in Medan City that are experiencing development, namely Medan Belawan District, Medan Labuhan District and Medan Marelan District. Here it can be seen that the direction of physical development of the Medan City area in 2007 to 2012 and 2012 to 2018 is towards the south of Medan City. Sipayung also found that there was a discrepancy between the method he used and the facts in the field, where the validation results showed that there were eight sample points that did not match the digitization results with the conditions in the field. The eight points are the classification of Trade in Services with two land uses, Industrial Estates with one land use, Settlements with four land uses and Other Uses with one land use (Sipayung, Sudarsono, dan Awaluddin 2020). Nazaria Susanti in her research found that the phenomenon of the increasing number of urban residents can affect the pressure on green open spaces so that there is a change in green open space into built space (Susanty 2015)

In Medan, the demand for business land often shifts places of worship, conspicuously the expansion of business land and modern shopping centers in the city, which in addition to showing the splendor and brilliance of the city, also creates conflicts with the Muslim community. Since
2012, there have been dozens of mosque locations that have been demolished and/or replaced with modern business centers. This case made the Islamic movement, in this case, driven by the Islamic Community Forum (FUI) and APMAS (the Alliance for Mosque Care) fight both through legal channels, through the courts, and in a number of demonstrations. Here it can be understood that the presence of the mosque defender movement in Medan was not designed with a well-established strategic program except for a reaction of anger and disappointment to those from outside them. This is in line with Manuel Castell’s argument that movement arises and is formed from emotions that accumulate and turn into action (Castells 2015). Social movements, at the personal level, do not emerge and start their actions from a political program and strategy. Movement only begins with anger, disappointment, and other emotional states.

They consider that the demolition of the mosque building and its conversion into a modern shopping center is a blasphemy against religion. This case of course had become hot news that seized the public’s attention for months. Until now, even in some locations conflicts between developers and mosque managers still occur. Some of the mosques that were evicted and torn down or converted include; a) Masjid Al-Hidayah in the complex of PJKA; b) Masjid Jendral Sudirman in Padang Bulan; c) Masjid At Thoyyibah in Multatuli; d) Masjid Ar-Ridho in Polonia; e) Masjid Raudhatul Islam in Medan Barat; f) Masjid Al-Ikhlas in Medan Timur.

Various modes occur up to the eviction of the mosque. Starting from the cooperation of the developer with the Medan City Government, the eviction of the community by buying their houses at low prices. If they do not want to sell their house, they are intimidated until someone is arrested and detained, influencing the mosque’s nadzir to make a request for a new mosque to be built, arguing that the old mosque is no longer suitable, or the congregation no longer exists because they have moved after their house was sold. Interested parties to carry out evictions also manipulate and manipulate the results of the deliberation so that it seems as if the community (the congregation) agrees with the relocation of the mosque, getting a fatwa/recommendation from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). In the case of the destruction of the At Thoyyibah Mosque, because the MUI of Medan Maimun Sub-district did not agree with the destruction of the At Thoyyibah Mosque, the developer immediately requested, and received a fatwa from the Medan City MUI, using unscrupulous security forces and thugs from the start, in the process of buying residents’ houses, and in carrying out the demolition of the At-Thoyyibah Mosque.

For example, the case of the at-Thayyibah mosque which began with the plan to build a shophouse by PT Multatuli Indah Lestari in the area where the mosque was built. Meanwhile, the local community rejected the development plan and rejected the mosque’s execution, based on the fact that the At-Taibah Mosque had been standing on waqf land since 1956. However, the execution was still carried out in 2006 by PT Multatuli Indah Lestari. The developer’s pretext is that they have obtained approval from the Medan MUI, Medan City Government and the police and are willing to compensate. The Ummah’s resistance to their Ulama in the case of moving the mosque is polarized into two forms, namely closed and open. They carried out open resistance through demonstrations, mass mobilization, and even lawsuits. Indra Suheri as one of the FUI figures, stated that the demolition occurred related to the fatwa issued by the Medan MUI Fatwa Commission regarding the At Tayyibah Mosque. Medan.

The longest conflict over religious space is the friendship charity mosque in the Medan Area. This conflict has occurred since early 2017 until now. The beginning of this dispute was the desire
of Perumnas as a state-owned company to modernize the buildings and facilities of the flats they
developed. One of the efforts to modernize the facility is to change the design of the building and
increase its capacity. This work has to demolish the existing mosque building around the construction
site of the flats (Fauzi). The point of debate that causes conflict in this case is the issue of the land
status of the mosque itself. For the alliance of mosque defenders, the status of the mosque is waqf
and according to sharia, what they understand is that waqf cannot be contested, it is not easy to
displace waqf land. On the opposite side, for Perumnas the mosque and its land are in the company’s
ownership certificate, so there is no problem for the company to convert any building for the
company’s purposes (Fauzi, t.t.).

The status of waqf as a legal basis is actually understood by various scholars themselves. Amar
Adli, an Egyptian and Moroccan alumnus, Lecturer in the Sharia Faculty of UIN North Sumatra,
member of the Fatwa commission at the MUI in Medan, understands that even though a fatwa is not
included in the legal structure of the Indonesian state, it must be the basis, especially if it is directly
related to the interests of Muslims. Therefore, the fatwa regarding waqf must be understood strictly
and carefully that waqf cannot be converted or transferred except for issues of public benefit (Adli,
t.t.). It cannot be haphazardly and only for business purposes, waqf lands such as mosques are evicted
or moved (Adli, t.t.). On the other hand, Azhari Akmal Tarigan, a member of the MUI Strategic
Review commission for the city of Medan, argues that the fatwa in the Indonesian legal system is
not in a convincing and strong position, regarding the transfer of function or mosque istibdal, taking
into account the context of contemporary society and the needs of a modern city (Tarigan, t.t.).
However, the basis for the holding of the mosque defender group to maintain the Amal Silaturrahim
mosque is a fatwa that is strictly adhered to so that it cannot be arbitrarily converted by outsiders.

In addition to legal status, the Amal Silaturrahim mosque conflict can also be read sociologically.
For example, the location of the mosque is surrounded by a shopping complex which coincidentally is
dominated by Chinese businessmen, relatively few Muslims live around the mosque. In this context,
readings emerged from the alliance of mosque defenders that the effort to evict mosques was not
a matter of modernizing the housing complex, but providing facilities for certain ethnic groups, in
this case the Chinese. From here they continue reading that the government is more pro to business
groups not to Islamic groups. The interests of political and business policies sacrifice the interests
of Muslims and eliminate Islamic symbols in cities such as mosques. A number of banners and
posters containing the rejection of the planned eviction of the mosque were seen around the Amal
Silaturrahim Mosque, in Timah Putih, Sukaramai Flats, Sukaramai II Village, Medan Area District.
The banners, posters and flags of a number of Islamic organizations were installed a few days after
there was an issue that there would be a shift in the Amal Silaturrahim Mosque which would be carried
out by National housing company (Perumnas). The chairman of the Mosque Prosperity Agency
(BKM) for the Amal Silaturrahim Mosque, Indra Syafi’i, said that his party and all congregations and
Islamic organizations still maintain the existence of the Amal Silaturrahim Mosque while rejecting
the eviction. Perumnas’ action to evict the mosque violates the Waqf Law, especially since the shift is
for business purposes and not in the public interest.

The conflict of religious space in Medan is an important point in understanding the emergence
of the contemporary urban Islamic movement. The city government’s policies, domination of
space, evictions, in turn become materials for mobilization and cultural framing for the movement
to gain support and increase the resilience of the movement. In the context of Medan, as Bruner’s
research (Bruner 1961), Hasselgren (Hasselgren 2000), Usman Pelly (Pelly 1994) they explain that ethnicity plays a role in competitive urban spaces. Political opportunities to intervene and change in the political system can arise when the system experiences vulnerability and a crisis of legitimacy of support from the community (McAdam, McCarthy, dan Mayer N. Zald 1996).

The formation of these urban discourses comes under the stress of various power groups and corporations (Lefebvre 1991b). Control will significantly determine the possibility of control of an area, space, or city itself by existing groups or corporations. In the discussion of urban construction it is a social cinematic, where symbols and representations explain the relationship of various socio-cultural interactions. Here it is understood that space is not something that is neutral but that it is socially constructed, in these spaces there are various kinds of social practices. Space is not only physical but socio-cultural. The constellations and relations of various groups, various interests and power relations make the city a complex space. The city is a semiotic landscape in which various kinds of discourse exist (Papen 2015).

In the context of the GNPF, they consider the city to be a place to consolidate the movement. The city and the dynamics of its development have been disproportionately and impartially to Muslims, so it is important to revive the spirit of Islam that can color the development of the city (Rafdinal, t.t.). The image of Islam in the city, Islam as the majority of the city’s population has been reduced by global, national, and local political dynamics (Rafdinal, t.t.). Therefore, they try to take advantage of the political process as they see it to move to mobilize Islam as an effort to carry out the desired social change.

**SCHEMATIC OF THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

This scheme is based on a simplification of the description of what elements of the political opportunity structure allow a movement to emerge. The size of the circle in this scheme can be an illustration of how strong the influence of these elements is in the emergence of movement.
LOCAL POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE MOVEMENT

Manuel Castells said that initially the social movement was only present in the form of anger and disappointment, then, as the political process progressed, movement leaders emerged carrying personal and ideological political agendas that were not always the same as the original motivations of the movement members (Castells 2012).

In the context of the Islamic social movement in Medan, apart from being present to respond to the city structure which is deemed not to provide justice and sufficient proportions for Muslims, the movement is also present in the momentum of electoral politics at the local level. The key factor in the presence of the Islamic movement in this electoral political event is closely related to the actors of the movement itself. So, the key actors of the Islamic movement on behalf of the ummah are also political actors.

The mobilization of the GNPF movement is closely related to the momentum of electoral politics. The context of the emergence of the GNPF MUI in Jakarta with its multi-volume actions to defend Islam can be used to strengthen this argument that this movement is related to the 2017 Jakarta Pilkada. Therefore, this movement is not just a religious movement but a practical political movement related to leadership succession in Jakarta. Here, the movement as a practical political movement cannot be simply dismissed with a number of arguments. First, the background of a number of key actors in the movement from political parties. In the North Sumatran Ulama GNPF movement there are a number of activists who did participate in the legislative election contestation. Ustadz Aidan Nazwir Panggabean, who serves as chairman of the North Sumatran Ulama GNPF according to the Central GNPFU Decree as of January 2021, is a cadre of the Crescent Star Party for the North Sumatra region. Ustadz Aidan has served as a legislative candidate from the United Nations for the provincial council level in 2014 and 2019 (N. A. Panggabean, t.t.). Ustadz Aidan clarified that his participation in the legislative election as a candidate for the Crescent Star Party was based on an integral understanding in Islam that Islam and politics cannot be separated. So, in addition to non-parliamentary politics, Ustadz Aidan believes that the political struggle of Islam through democracy and sitting in the legislature can be more effective and influential (N. A. Panggabean, t.t.).

In addition, Tumpal Panggabean, one of the vice chairmen of the GNPF, for example, was involved in the legislative election process as a legislative candidate from the Democratic party in the 2014 election. Same with Rafdinal who participated as a candidate from various parties. Rafdinal claimed to be a 1998 reform activist, one of the founders of the PAN party in Medan at the beginning of the reform (Rafdinal, t.t.). Then, in the 2004-2009 elections, Rafdinal was a legislative candidate from the United Nations, in 2014 as a senator candidate (DPD RI), and in the 2019 election as a legislative candidate from PAN for a council seat in the city of Medan (Rafdinal, t.t.). Rabualam Syahputra, is an activist with the popular movement at the United People’s Forum (FRB) and has twice run as a candidate for regent of Deli Serdang in 2008 and 2013 through independent channels. Dedi Iskandar Batubara, an Al Washliyah activist and now the chairman of Al Washliyah North Sumatra, was a senator for the two DPD RI members for the 2014-2019 and 2019-2024 periods. Raden Syafii, who was also a former movement in the early period, was an activist for the people who had a party in Gerindra, had also been in PPP and PBR. Ustadz Heriyanisah, who was asked to be the coordinator of the GNPF presidium. In the early days, he also tried twice for the post-conflict local election in Langkat district for the 2008 period and the 2019 post-conflict local election. Involvement in the post-conflict local election process cannot be underestimated but must be intensified. Support
regional heads as in the 2018 gubernatorial election conducted by the GNPF Ulama North Sumatra.

The activists I interviewed said that this practical political move was actually part of a political movement that was in line with their main goal of fighting politically for Muslims, and that this step was also part of Islamic teachings to be actively involved politically. Tumpal explained that GNPF Ulama SU encouraged their activists to actively spread and be involved in the nomination process with the aim of making politics for the people. When we come into contact with the political space, the choice is to choose someone who can be trusted (T. Panggabean, t.t.). In the context of the legislative elections, the 212 activists merged into various parties, those involved in participating in the 2019 Pileg used the attributes of defending Islam such as Caleg 212 or Mujahid 212, in order to attract support from people who were sympathetic to the 212 movement at that time, they used it in order to attract support from movements or people who sympathize with 212. Seizing the legislative seats is done with the excuse of making a clear contribution rather than shouting from the side of the road, this step is also intended to guard the interests of Muslims as an official state institution (T. Panggabean, t.t.). They also think that practical political measures can also be considered more effective to fight than shouting in the streets. Then, efforts to control politics in the official parliament can be expected at the same time to reduce corrupt practices and policies that are not in favor of Islam (T. Panggabean, t.t.).

Here, it can be understood that the involvement of several movement actors in the practical politics of electoral politics in Indonesia is a strategy that allows mobilization movements to be carried out. In addition, the electoral political process allows them the opportunity to conduct political negotiations, lobbying a number of political elites. They believe this process as an effective way to pin the political interests of Muslims to Muslim regional head candidates so that they can be committed to regional development that pays attention to Muslims.

In the context of electoral politics, massive mobilization of movements, which often invites sympathetic support from the crowd, involving large masses of people, is an opportunity to negotiate support for the political elite. Movement actors see that there are gaps in the political parties as supporting machines for regional head candidates and as vote-gathering machines. The stagnation of the political party mobilization engine is supported by the liberalization of the political game in the election process. Candidates for regional heads must look for strategic groups that are able to work effectively and efficiently in gathering votes. It is in this context that the mobilization of Islamic social movements is transformed into the mobilization of vote support in regional head elections.

After the Ahok case subsided in Jakarta, the GNPF continued to mobilize their movement in the 2018 North Sumatra gubernatorial election (2018 Pilgubsu). They are active in deliberation at the movement level to come up with who needs to be encouraged to contest this gubernatorial election. The series of political maneuvers they carried out in a awake time. First, they nominate their own candidates from the individual path as did Wednesday Alam Sahputra.

The declaration was made at a four-star hotel in the middle of Medan, namely the Madani hotel, which is across the road from the Al Mahsun Grand Mosque in Medan and adjacent to the Maimon Palace. This step is a strategy to measure the market response to support for the movement and an attempt to consolidate the weak movement after the Ahok case. In strengthening this, they also carried out political fragmentation by bringing up another candidate from among themselves, namely Ustadz Nazwir. Another strategy they use is to delegitimize figures who are considered not pro-Islamic. For example, when the figure of Edi Rahmayadi was declared by Gerindra and PKS as
a candidate for governor of North Sumatra, they rejected it. They considered the decision of the two parties to be not aspirational because they had not communicated with them. Ahead of the determination of the candidate pairs for the 2018 gubernatorial election by the General Election Commissions (KPU), the PDIP as a major party in Medan issued a decision to carry and designate Jarot Saiful Hidayat and Sihar Sitorus (JOSS Pair) as their champions in the 2018 Gubernatorial Election. Rajekshah (ERAMAS) supported by Golkar, Gerindra, Nasdem, PKS, Democrats. Political polarization was soon formed from the two pairs participating in the 2018 Gubernatorial Election. For example, the Narrative of Djarot Saiful Hidayat as a supporter of Ahok. Jarot Saiful Hidayat was indeed the Deputy Governor of DKI Jakarta in 2016 when the Anti Ahok demonstrations were intense. As a result, this figure is identified as a sticky figure with Ahok. Furthermore, the figure of Sihar Sitorus, who is a Christian, was questioned by this movement as a threat to the existence of Muslims in North Sumatra. In this context, the GNPF MUI then chose to support the ERAMAS pair against Jarot Saiful Hidayat and Sihar Sitorus.

In an effort to support the ERAMAS pair, the North Sumatran Ulama GNPF movement considers this pair a candidate for regional head who has a commitment to Islam and the advancement of Islam in North Sumatra. Therefore, a social contract has been made between the North Sumatran Ulama GNPF movement and the ERAMAS partner.
Aidan Nazwir Panggabean emphasized that the support for the ERAMAS pair was in accordance with the movement’s commitment from the beginning which included; first, committed to defending the interests of Islam, the Umma, and the Ulama; second, is committed to maintaining the existence and certifying mosques in North Sumatra in stages; third; committed to building an Islamic economy by realizing Islamic banking; fourth, committed to building an Islamic Center; fifth, is committed to making GNPF, Islamic Organizations, Ulama and Umma as strategic partners in managing North Sumatra’s problems.

The mobilization of Islam in the electoral politics of the 2018 gubernatorial election is gaining momentum due to two things. First, the figure of Djarot Saiful Hidayat who is a PDIP cadre, apart from not being a native of North Sumatra, but also a figure who was involved in supporting Ahok in Jakarta. Second, the figure of Sihar Sitorus as his partner is a Christian figure. Thus, PDIP is considered not pro-Islamic struggle because it carries this figure. It is the narrative of this non-pro-Islamic couple that prolongs the movement’s breath and easily gets framing for the needs of political mobilization. Of course, the movement is not alone in mobilizing this and it is clear that this work is part of political cooperation between movement actors and political actors in political momentum as well.

This movement plays identity politics in this case religion in their support of winning the ERAMAS pair. After the gubernatorial election series arrived at the voting later, the result was that the North Sumatra KPU announced that the ERAMAS pair won over the JOSS pair. In a copy of the North Sumatra Province General Election Decision Number 160/PL.037-Kpt/12/Prov/VII/2018 obtained by Bisnis, the Chairman of the North Sumatra KPU, Mulia Banurea, stated that the pair received 3,291,137 votes or 57.58% of the total valid votes. in the gubernatorial election which was held on 27 June 2018, and the pair Djarot Saiful Hidayat-Sihar sitorus received 2,424,960 votes or around 42.42%. The ERAMAS couple received real support from the majority of the Muslim population around the East coast and the tip of the West coast, North Sumatra.
Political mobilization for electoral needs continues to be rolled out by movement activists in the simultaneous general elections between the 2019 legislative and presidential elections. The reason is, first, movement activists participate as election participants as legislative candidates. Second, the re-participation (rematch) of Jokowi vs. Prabowo Subianto in the 2019 presidential election.

A number of GNPF activists participated in the process of selecting candidates for the 2019 Legislature, including; Rafdinal as candidate no 4 of the PAN constituency IV Medan city, Nazwir Aidan Panggabean, Dedi Iskandar Batubara Candidate for DPD RI, Raden Muhammad Syafii candidate for DPR RI from the Gerindra party, Sugiat Santosos candidate for DPRRI from Gerindra. The stages of the Islamic defense action held by GNPF have added to the confidence of movement actors to become political actors, they are trying out legislative seats and regional senate representatives. Unfortunately, the attribution of the 212 legislative candidates and GNPF activists did not bring Rafdinal, Aidan Nazwir, and Sugiat Santosos to legislative seats. However, for Dedi Iskandar Batubara and Raden Muhammad Syafii managed to occupy the seats of senator and DPRRI.

Islamic mobilization is hotter in the realm of the 2019 presidential election than in the legislative election. Participation in the legislature is attended by many people and parties with diverse and complex interest backgrounds. Meanwhile, the 2019 presidential election is a rematch between Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. The figure of Joko Widodo since the 2014 election period has been propagated to the public as not pro-Islam, pro-China, pro-communist, and capitalist. Thus, the support of the Islamist movement groups is more towards Prabowo. Prabowo’s closeness to the Islamist movement or Islamic populism is actually a bit strange because in figure Prabowo has a liberal secular military background, his mother and several members of her family are Christians. However, since 2014 Prabowo has not hesitated to use Islamic issues to form coalitions with Islamic organizations in an effort to defeat Jokowi, and especially Prabowo’s support for Anis Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, he has the full support of all Islamic groups. In 2019, Prabowo again took advantage of religious issues that divided and garnered support from Islamic groups, and on a larger scale than 2014.

In considering this populist Islamic support map, Joko Widodo chose his running mate, Kyai Haji Ma’ruf Amin. This choice should be read as an attempt to counter the alarming tide of identity politics and political entrepreneurship of some of the main Islamic populist actors during the 2016-2019 period. Kyai Ma’ruf is a charismatic NU cleric and chairman of the MUI who allows Jokowi to fend off attacks against him as an anti-Islam, anti-ulama figure. As a result, the 2019 Presidential Election was won by the Joko Widodo-Ma’ruf Amin pair with 85,607,362 votes or 55.50 percent of the total national valid votes. Meanwhile, Prabowo-Sandiaga Uno won approximately 68,650,239 or 44.50 percent of the total national valid votes.

Political mobilization on behalf of the ummah and Islamic interests is always carried out by GNPF during the 2020 post-conflict local election. They carry out various political maneuvers in the public sphere, to strategic political groups to influence political policies throughout the event.

First, GNPF Ulama mapped out the candidates. This step was made among the lobbies of political parties in the selection of candidates. The GNPF Ulama movement conducts candidate selection similar to what political parties do. In this election, they have prepared two options to carry the candidates they have selected, namely through independent channels (individuals) and political parties (Sumutpos 2020). January 2020, GNPF Ulama held a closed meeting which was attended by the syuro board and tanfidz board, including Ustad Heriansyah SAg, Ustad Aidan Nazwir P, H
Tumpal Panggabean MA, Ustad Rahmad Gustin, and other administrators at the North Sumatra GNPF Ulama Secretariat Office, Jalan Bunga Kenanga Medan. The meeting scheduled a discussion and selection of the names of candidates for mayor of Medan in the 2020 Medan elections. As a result, 12 names of Islamic figures and national and regional class figures were netted who were proposed to be balloons for the Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Medan, both through political parties and through other channels. The independents are Tifatul Sembiring, MS Kaban, Raden M Safii, Prof Dr Muhammad Hatta, Sakhyan Asmara, Dedy Iskandar Batubara, Syafii Efendi, Ihwan Ritonga, Salman Al Farisi, Irfan Hamidi, Muhammad Safii, and Affan Lubis. The names were selected based on their track record of figures and their defense of the Islamic ummah and will be fought for by GNPF Ulama to be introduced to political parties in the regions and also at the center (T. Panggabean, t.t.).

Next, friendship and political lobbying. The North Sumatran GNPF Ulama met with political parties in the city of Medan with the target of the parties considering deciding to nominate the two figures they proposed to become candidates for mayor and deputy mayor of Medan who will compete in September 2020. While communicating with the political parties, they also calculated sequentially. politics to consider advancing through an independent path.

The North Sumatran Ulama’s GNPF political move ran aground when political parties differed from their votes. Political parties nominate their respective candidates. In the later political process, PDIP-Gerindra carried the pair Bobby Nasution-Aulia Rahman. Supported by Golkar, Nasdem, PAN, PPP, PSI, and Hanura. Meanwhile, Democrats and PKS carry the pair Akhyar Nasution-Salman Alfarisi.

Furthermore, around September 2020, three months before the 2020 regional elections, the North Sumatran Ulamas’ National Movement to Guard Fatwa (GNPF) raised a petition for community support demanding that the Medan regional election be postponed amid the Covid-19 pandemic. They are worried that the Medan Regional Head Election will become a new cluster of Corona virus transmission. The maneuver for postponing the election was only in Medan, not in other areas. The reason is that the transmission of the Corona virus is very high compared to other areas in North Sumatra. In this mobilization, the people, who agreed to postpone the pilkada, were asked to put their signatures on a white cloth. In addition to street mobilization, they also filed a Class Action lawsuit to the Medan District Court, with the agenda of the lawsuit asking the Medan KPU and Bawaslu to postpone the Medan City Election which will be held on December 9, 2020.

Apart from that, the Medan Pilkada will continue until election day. The North Sumatran GNPF Ulama concentrate their support on the Akhyar-Salman pair who are supported by the Democrat-PKS. Furthermore, based on the recapitulation of the Medan KPU, Bobby-Aulia received 393,327 votes or 53.45 percent of the valid votes. Bobby Nasution - Aulia Rachman won in 15 sub-districts, including Medan Kota, Sunggal, Helvetia, Denai, West Medan sub-district, Medan Deli, Tuntungan, Belawan, Medan Labuhan, Medan Polonia, Medan Baru, Medan Perjuangan, Petisah, East Medan and other sub-districts. Flying Field. Meanwhile, their rival, the incumbent mayoral candidate Akhyar Nasution, who was paired with Salman Alfarisi, won 342,580 votes or 46.55 percent. Akhyar Nasution - Salman Alfarisi won in 6 sub-districts, including Medan Amplas District, Medan Area, Medan Johor, Marelan, Medan Tembung, and Medan Maimun District.
CONCLUSION

Based on the description above, it can be concluded that the presence of an Islamic social movement in this case the North Sumatran Ulama GNPF is a reaction to the urgency of their living space in the city space. Gentrification occurs as a consequence of urbanization and the orientation of urban development which emphasizes the expansion of economic growth through the expansion of business and economic areas, but forgets the availability of proportional religious space.

Second, the emergence of the movement is due to political opportunities as seen from the liberalization of the democratic process, the absence of political parties as engines of mobilizing supporters’ votes. Opportunities to play identity politicization are considered as cheap and effective strategic work by not taking into account the values of public civility in urban space. As a result, tolerance and mutual respect for fellow citizens are neglected and a comfortable living space in the city is threatened.

As an article, of course, this study has limitations in exploring various aspects that require scientific answers. Thus, this situation also provides an opportunity for other scholars to understand the causes of the emergence of Islamic social movements.

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