

# JURNAL SOSIOLOGI AGAMA

Jurnal Ilmiah Sosiologi Agama dan Perubahan Sosial



**MUSLIM STUDENTS, PHILANTHROPIC MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL PRACTICE:  
Narrative Study of The Ikatan Pelajar Al-Washliyah (IPA) in Serdang Bedagai, North Sumatra**  
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Wardatul Adawiah, Arya Hadi Dharmawan, Satyawan Sunito

PROGRAM STUDI SOSIOLOGI AGAMA  
FAKULTAS USHULUDDIN DAN PEMIKIRAN ISLAM, UIN SUNAN KALIJAGA

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## TRIANGLE OF POLITICAL POWER OF THE MATARAMAN COMMUNITY IN KEDIRI

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### Abstrak

Gejolak politik pada masa awal reformasi berdampak pada pembentukan partai yang tidak lagi dimonopoli oleh elit politik pada masa Orde Baru. Hal ini dibuktikan dengan prinsip demokrasi transparansi dalam pemilihan pejabat pemerintah. Perkembangan budaya politik di tingkat daerah berbeda dengan situasi di tingkat nasional. Perkembangan budaya politik di tingkat daerah lebih didominasi oleh pemikiran dan perilaku politik yang dilandasi oleh budaya politik yang matang. Penguatan penetrasi budaya politik lokal semakin tak terbendung pasca diberlakukannya era desentralisasi atau otonomi daerah. Masyarakat Mataraman Kediri memiliki karakteristik sosial budaya yang turut mempengaruhi tradisi politik mereka. Dalam konteks pemilihan umum, masyarakat Mataraman memiliki ciri khusus dalam pilihan politiknya yang tercermin dari pilihan dan dukungan terhadap partai politik tertentu, bahwa cara masyarakat memilih tergantung pada pola sejarah masa lalunya. Penelitian ini termasuk dalam kajian sosiologi politik karena fokus kajian sosiologi politik meliputi hubungan antara isu politik dengan masyarakat, antara struktur sosial dengan struktur politik, dan antara perilaku sosial dengan perilaku politik. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa masyarakat Mataraman Kediri memiliki corak politik sinergis yang dikenal dengan piramida kekuasaan politik. Hubungan antara elit agama, pengusaha, dan pemerintah memiliki sinergi politik yang mampu mempengaruhi pola dan peta politik di wilayah Mataraman Kediri.

*Kata Kunci : tiga kekuatan politik, elit agama, pengusaha, elit politik*

### Abstract

The political upheaval in the early days of reform had an impact on the formation of parties which were no longer monopolized by the political elites during the New Order era. This was evidenced by the democratic principle of transparency in the election of government officials. The development of the political culture at the regional level is different from the situation at the national level. The development of political culture at the regional level is more dominated by political thoughts and behavior based on a

mature political culture. The Mataraman Kediri community has social and cultural characteristics that also influence their political traditions. In the context of general elections, the Mataraman community has a special characteristic in their political choices which is reflected in the choice and support for certain political parties, that the way the people elect depends on their past historical patterns. The results of this study indicate that the people of Mataraman Kediri have a synergistic political pattern known as the architecture of power politics. The relationship between the religious elite, entrepreneurs, and the government has a political synergy that is able to influence political patterns and maps in the Mataraman region of Kediri.

*Keywords: political power triangle, religious elite, entrepreneur, political elite*



## INTRODUCTION

Political upheaval in the early days of reform had a significant impact on political institutions in Indonesia, one of which was political freedom marked by the birth of a number of parties (Mietzner, 2013, hal. 28-50) This panorama was absent during the New Order era. The fall of the New Order regime was marked by the transparency of democratic space in loading party laws which gave various elements the opportunity to occupy government positions. Interestingly, if the party system in the New Order era tended to be hegemonic, then in the reform era, it tended to be plural with various party ideologies and manifestos (Bodden, 2010). From the procedural aspect, the change towards a more democratic political system has indeed taken place.

Changes from the electoral law, particularly to promote a competitive party system, can also be seen from the ongoing changes in party laws. After the New Order, leading up to the 1999 general election, Law number 2 of 1999 on Political Parties was formed. Furthermore, before the 2004 general election, a revision of Law number 2 of 1999 was amended to Law number 31 of 2002 (B.Sarnawa, 2017, hal. 28-40). Prior to the 2009 general election, Law number 2 of 2008 on Political Parties was reissued, which in essence also created an effective party system to promote a quality democracy. Notwithstanding of the interests of the political parties involved in the revision of the law, Law number 2 of 2008 was revised again to become Law number 2 of 2011 to face the 2014 election (Agustina).

By understanding the above process, it is clear that the interaction among political powers in the reform era was very intensive. The formation of civil society followed by the development of a political and economic society encourages the acceleration of the democratic process (J.Heynes, 2013). In some conditions, the presence of political powers from the arenas of democratization provides opportunities for the community to control political and government agenda. In addition, the existence of a democratization arena also raises public awareness to participate as well as raises an inclusive attitude towards the political process being carried out.

From the descriptive representation point of view, the effort to bring about changes from the representational system is quite meaningful. The political system hegemonized by certain powers was formally uncovered. In the 1999 general election, Golkar, which on average won more than 60

percent of the elections in six consecutive elections, was only able to get 22.4% of the votes (King, 2003). When compared with the general election participants reaching 48 parties, seats in both the House of Representatives (DPR) and the provincial and district/city House of Representatives (DPRD) were concentrated in a number of parties (The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), Golkar, The United Development Party (PPP), The National Awakening Party (PKB), and The National Mandate Party (PAN)) (Haris, 2014). However, the existing power building is relatively diffuse. Similarly happened in the 2004 general election, the distribution of power was even more widespread with the inclusion of The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and The Democratic Party (PD) as parties that gained significant seats. Apart from these parties, a number of small parties also won seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) and the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) (Sherlock, 2004)

Meanwhile, when viewed from the substantive representation point of view, namely the existence of representatives who work in accordance with the aspirations of the people, this effort has not brought significant changes (M.F.Aminuddin, 2012). The often raised criticism is that the people's representatives are more concerned with themselves or the party they represent. This means that the multiparty system and free and fair general elections, in fact, still leave disconnected electoral problems (Marijan, 2015, hal. 121). Political development in a country is influenced by cultural developments that exist in the society of that country. Likewise, what happens in a regional government, the role of the political culture of the local community will further determine how the political dynamics takes place in it.

The civic culture does not constitute a political culture whose definition is often obtained from books on citizenship, describing the ways in which citizens should act in a democracy (A.Almond & Verba, 1990). As for, what is meant by political culture in this research is a culture of loyal participants. Individuals are not only oriented to political culture combined with parochial and subject political orientations (A.Almond & Verba, 1990), in other words, how the distribution of specific orientation patterns towards political goals among the peoples of the nation is. They further stated that citizens always identify themselves with symbols and state institutions based on their orientation. With this orientation, they also assess and obtain their places and roles in the political system.

Political participation is an activity of private citizens that aims to influence decision making by the government. Several aspects of this definition include activities that do not involve attitudes in it (E.Amna, 2012). In addition, the activities referred to here are activities carried out by individuals as civilian citizens who are different from professionals in the political field. Meanwhile, these activities are aimed at influencing government decision making (Huntington & Nelson, 1994, hal. 6-7). The Indonesia's political culture as a nation is dominated by two groups, namely the Javanese aristocracy and the Islamic entrepreneurs (Hati.R, 2013). Meanwhile, Clifford Geertz stated Indonesian society is divided into 3 political sub-cultural groups. The three groups include farmers in the interior of Java and Bali, coastal communities, and mountain communities (Alfian, 1991).

The political culture development at the regional level differs from the situation at the national level. At the regional level, it is more dominated by political thoughts and behavior based on a mature political culture. The strengthening of the penetration of the local political culture is

increasingly unstoppable after the enactment of the era of decentralization or regional autonomy. The influence of local political culture on the dynamics and political processes in the regions is getting stronger, despite the national political structure that has been implemented. The phenomenon of the strengthening of local political culture is related to the process of forming a national culture, according to Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, giving several notes that must be considered; first, the emergence of a culture of origin originating from a person or group in a society that develops according to their environmental background. What is meant by environmental background here is a bond that grows due to primordial fidelity. Second, the emergence of various local political cultures originating from outside the environment where the original culture is located. The large degree of trust and hostility between these political sub-cultures is shown by one political sub-culture to another in the interaction, resulting in the expectation to leave a certain impression on each political sub-culture. The third is the national political culture (A.Almond & Verba, 1990). In this case, the role of national culture depends on the stages that have been taken in the process of its formation.

Furthermore, the development of local political culture is influenced by two dominant factors that exist in the life of Indonesian society. These two dominant factors are the cultural system (customs) and the belief system or religion. Therefore, the development of the political sub-culture in the regions has been matured by the mutually supportive relationship between customs and religion (Romano, 2013). This process has been going on for hundreds of years, so this process further strengthens the political orientation of the ethnic groups in Indonesia. The roles of customs and religion have played an important role in the process of absorbing and shaping people's views on the power or symbols that surround it. In the non-institutional field, customs and religion have also influenced and/or given shape to the attitudes or views of individual members of society regarding the roles they may play in the political system (Alfian, 1991).

In relation to the political culture in the regions, researcher is interested in conducting a study on the development of the political culture of the Mataraman community in East Java. This is based on the fact that sociologically, the people of East Java, which are divided into 38 districts and cities, already have different cultural bases, so it will affect the political culture in it. In Javanese culture, power is not understood as it is or as which is used in the West. In this case, what is meant includes Central Java, Special Region of Yogyakarta, and parts of East Java. The Javanese culture in question originates from the *keraton* (Mataram Sultanate) during the pre-colonial period. This Javanese culture was widespread in society not only at that time but also lives and continues up to these days, although it is no longer fully understood because it has experienced interactions with other cultures. Javanese culture has a similar term, but not the same as Western rule, namely *Kasekten*. To expound the Javanese power, Ben Anderson contrasted it with the concept of Western power based on several criteria, namely: whether it is abstract or not, the sources of power, the amount of power, and the morality of power (Surbakti, 2010).

On the other hand, religious leaders and tribal leaders are obeyed by members of their community not because of the weapons or wealth they have, but because of the religious truths represented and disseminated by these religious leaders (Crone, 2004). Meanwhile, the customs and traditions maintained and upheld by the tribal leaders are also a source of power adhered to by members of the community. In addition, people obey government authorities not because they are

afraid of physical pain or because they are afraid of losing their jobs, but because of legal awareness for the sake of public order and the achievement of the goals of society or the state. The three things that have just been put forward are sources of normative power. The influence of these actors arises from the admiration of their fans or followers. According to Geertz, social relations between the groups are established through the role of *priyayi* in bridging the *abangan/wong cilik* who want to become *priyayi*. *Ngenger* culture, for example, opens up opportunities for all people to become *priyayi* (Jati, 2019). In other words, therefore, people from lower classes can relate to the *priyayi* (Suseno, 1985).

The Mataraman community has social and cultural characteristics that also influence their political traditions. In the context of general election, the Mataraman community has a special characteristic in their political choices which is reflected in the choice and support for certain political parties. People in the Mataraman region from 1955 to 2004 were always “loyal” to nationalist parties (Haris, 2014). Meanwhile, in the religious field, Islam, which is the majority religion adhered to by the Mataraman community, is an Islam that has a distinctive and distinct style from the Islam that develops in Indonesia, especially in East Java. Islam Mataraman was formed from a long dialectical process between Javanese culture, the Mataram kingdom and Islam, all of which complement and reinforce each other. Because of its distinctive and different forms, the Islamic tradition has a different place in the community (Chalik, 2017). The features and characteristics inherent in the traditions of community life also have implications for their political culture.

People in the Mataraman Kediri do not fancy the formalistic model of diversity because it is considered not nationalist. Thereby, the parties labeled nationalist get more support in the Mataraman Javanese community. This is different from the majority of people in the Madura and Pandalungan regions that show their loyalty to their support for the mass-based Islamic party Nahdlatul Ulama, such as the National Awakening Party, where *ulama* and *kiai* are still the role models in Madura and Pandalungan. Their influence also extends to the domain of the citizens’ political choices. When viewed from the categorization of flow politics using the Clifford Geertz categorization, the community in Kediri City consists of three different political cultural groups, namely the *santri* political cultural group, the *abangan* political cultural group, and the *priyayi* political cultural group.

Therefore, the parties that emerge and get support from the basis of their respective political cultural groups are still relatively consistent at every election in Kediri City until 2009, namely PKB which gets support from traditional Islamic or *santri* groups, PDIP which represents the *abangan* and non-Muslim groups, and Golkar which represents the *priyayi* group. This is what is interesting to conduct a research at, namely the pyramid of political power in Mataraman which has become the identity of the community, about why this happened, and how to maintain a political triangle, so it is timeless up to now.

This research belongs to the study of political sociology because the focus of the study of political sociology includes the relationship between political problems and society, between social structures and political structures, and between social behavior and political behavior (Althoff, 2011). On the other hand, in the study and research of political sociology, it is known to use two approaches, namely the institutional approach and the behavioral approach. In the view of political sociology, political orientation and attitudes of a person or group depend on the socialization of values and norms that



are internalized and understood from within the family, institutions, and the environment in which the individuals live their lives (Alfian N. S., 1991). Meanwhile, the approach in this research was a case study. Five characteristics of a case study include: (1) highlighting an event, (2) in-depth study, (3) focusing on the relationship between aspects of the case and process, (4) natural setting, and (5) using multiple sources and methods (Widjaja, 1982).

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### 1. Mataraman Community's Culture before the Reform

To describe the socio-cultural side of the people of Kediri City in this study, the researcher deliberately linked it with one of the cultural sub-cultures that exists and develops in East Java, namely the Mataraman culture. In this case, it implies that the dynamics of society that takes place -both in terms of socio-culture and politics- cannot be separated from the influence of this sub-culture. In several aspects, there are similarities regarding the views, insights, and behavior of the people in Kediri. This is the influence and formation of the dialectic of values and norms that apply in the Mataraman community, namely Javanese cultural values in East Java (chalik, 2017)

The division of sub-cultures in East Java differs from one expert to another. However, from the opinion of all experts, there is a similarity or agreement that the inhabitants of the western part of East Java have a Mataram culture. Therefore, this area is called the Mataraman area (Sutarto, 2004). If compared to the distribution of each sub-culture in East Java, the Mataram sub-culture is the largest and inhabits most of the parts of province in which Surabaya is the capital city. This conforms with a survey conducted by Litbang Kompas, with the latest data in 2017, that the total population in the Mataraman area is 40 percent of the total population of East Java. This is one of the main attractions for politicians when the regional elections and general elections are held to gain influence and support from the community, who are mostly Javanese.

The term and the name Mataraman have long been used by the community and socio-cultural observers. This is because the cultural patterns used by the community in their daily lives are the influence of the power of the ancient Mataram and Islamic Mataram kingdom. These two great kingdoms have had a very significant influence in the life of the Mataraman people, starting from the religious system, language, social organization, and cultural arts.

The Mataraman community, based on the latest data from the monograph of the Kediri City Government, shows that the number of people who are Javanese is almost 90%, while the rest comes from other tribes that exist in every district and city in the Mataraman area. One of the most obvious indicators is the sustainable and strong influence of Javanese tradition and culture. This can be seen from the use of language used by everyday people in interacting with one another. In addition to language as the measure, another indicator is the number of traditions enforced in people's lives, particularly concerning the life cycle: birth, marriage, and death as well as education (Segal, 2010).

Character education for the Javanese is mainly carried out through training in the use of language taught since childhood in the family (Idrus, 2012). The biggest role in this case is both parents. The position of parents and child is first explained as parties with different positions even though they are

in the same family. Therefore, every child is required to respect their parents. One way is to use the Javanese language according to certain predetermined and regulated levels (Soetjningsih, 2018).

The principle of harmony aims to create a community in a state of harmony, compatibility, and balance, so the community will create a calm, peaceful situation and avoid disputes or conflicts (Oxford, 2013). Likewise, all members of society are willing to help each other both in their individual interests, those involving public or collective interests in particular. The principle of harmony is seen in the atmosphere of working together, in exchange of ideas, either in the family environment, in relationships with neighbors, or in social life (Hochschild, 2003). This principle is well guarded by the community. However, anything that may disrupt harmony is handled immediately by all members of the community, so conflicts are avoided. Another thing that appears to stand out from the implementation of the principle of harmony is the ability to control emotions, so they remain controlled and do not interfere with community harmony.

The principle of respect governs the relationship between members of Javanese society in a hierarchical manner (Burger, 2004). Every Javanese person will immediately know where they should be at that time and situation, what kind of Javanese to use, what attitude should be taken in dealing with the interlocutor, and so on related to this principle (Mulder, 2001). Those are the two major principles that become the moral source of the Mataraman community which can be seen in all their orders, habits, actions, and behavior in their daily life. It is still upheld and maintained for its survival until now. This principle was inherent in the Mataraman community before the reformation, but, when the political atmosphere changed, the subculture which became the philosophy of life for the Mataraman Kediri community changed due to several factors, including politics.

To explain the social structure and orientation of the Mataraman people in Kediri, the researcher uses Clifford Geertz's perspective, which took place at that time as a political polarization between Islamic groups and nationalist groups. The heart of Geertz's view was ideological similarities that were transformed into a linear pattern of social integration with political choices. The *abangan* group defined as a less obedient Islamic group tended to choose a nationalist parties, while the *santri* group tended to choose an Islamic party. Traditional Islamic groups channeled their aspirations to the NU party, while modernist groups such as Muhammadiyah channeled their choices to Masyumi. Although Geertz's theory has received a lot of criticism even until now, social and cultural political experts are still his main analysis tool (Suryadinta, 2002).

In a broader context, however, the division of social classes in Indonesia is influenced by the political orientation of society due to religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and geographical factors. As for Indonesia, there is no social stratification based on socio-economy. Javanese society is only known for two individual differentiators in society, namely *wong cilik* and *wong gedhe* (Maliki, 2015). *Wong cilik* are ordinary people, while *wong gedhe* are those who work in the bureaucratic sector or what are commonly called *priyayi*. Therefore, in Indonesia, especially Javanese society, there is no known term of left or liberal. Since the first election in Indonesia in 1955, scientists consider that political flow has remained the dominant factor in influencing people's attitudes and behavior, with the results of the research of Dwight King and Baswedan revealed that there is a significant correlation in cities and districts in Indonesia that the Islamic parties get the support of the majority of the Muslim

population. Likewise with the support of nationalist parties, in this case the PDIP, for example, which has received significant support from the majority of non-Muslim community.

Apart from being sociocultural, Islam in Kediri has an important role in the social and governmental system. In the social structure, the *kiai's* position as the leader of the Islamic religion in Kediri City has a significant role. *Kiai*, apart from being an informal leader in the community, also has Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*) and educational institutions, in which the *kiai* is in charge of teaching religious knowledge to students as their main activity (Lubis, 2018). The number of students entrusted to *pesantren* by parents is an indicator that the *kiai* a figure who is believed to have a high religious knowledge above the average compared to general public (Widiyanto, 2016). The majority of the population of Kediri City is basically Muslim. Their Islam is divided into two groups: (1) nominal Islamic groups and (2) devout Muslims, or to borrow Geertz's (1960) terms as Islam *abangan* and Islam *santri*. Even though these two groups are both Muslim followers, their political affiliation is not similar because their religious culture is not similar either. Islam *santri* group tended to choose Islamic parties, while Islam *abangan* group tended to choose nationalist parties. In other words, the actualization of the political aspirations of Muslims in Kediri at the empirical level shows a phenomenon of cultural diversity which has implications for the choice of linear political parties.

Sociologically, Greater Kediri is divided into 2 groups: *santri* and *abangan*. These two groups are ideologically still standing strong today. Each group has an equally strong historical claim. In fact, due to the strength of each of these groups, in the 1965s when human tragedies caused many conflicts to erupt resulted in bloody violence (Pribadi, 2015). This picture became clearer after Clifford Geertz conducted research in the Pare area, Kediri, which produced a trilogy of antagonistic religious communities, and at that time, it could become a social explosion. The aforesaid issue can be observed after the tragedy in 1965, where the *abangan* group was getting squeezed. The spaces for their actualization and cultural expression were limited or even closed. Their existence in society became marginalized. The government, either directly or indirectly, considered them to be communists. Their movements were questioned and always linked to his past relations with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), a party that had been disbanded and banned by the government..

The *abangan* group in Kediri City, if examined more deeply, is divided into two groups. The first group is those who are theologically minimalist Muslims. They do not perform religious rituals properly like the *santri* group. However, when they deal with the public, they firmly say that they are Muslims. The second group is those who enter into *Aliran Kebatinnan* or Followers to a Belief. The distinctive feature of the second *abangan* community is loyalty in practicing the teachings of ancestral traditions such as *slametan* and various traditional traditions that have been valid in the community from generation to generation (Geertz, 2013). In subsequent development, the *santri* and *abangan* groups in Kediri have experienced changes. If in the 1960s, the *santri* group was always synonymous with market traders and the *abangan* group was always dominated by *priyayi* or government officials, in the present era, both groups have experienced fundamental changes. Each of them has mixed in both the type of work and social class. This means that both *abangan* and *santri* groups are equally plural, in which consisting of various professions such as farmers, traders, employees, street vendors, and so on. Thereby, the classification of *santri* and *abangan* based on social class and type of work is

no longer relevant.


## 2. The Triangle of Political Power in Mataram Community

Upon the fall of the New Order regime, political forces in Indonesia came in a different format, which also affected the geopolitics of the Mataraman in Kediri. This difference is related to changes in the roles and functions of several major political forces in determining the state policy-making process. The political forces in question are political parties, government bureaucracy, the military, and the society itself, namely individuals or groups of individuals who institutionalize their civil rights and political rights into institutions of political power (Mietzner, 2013). This phenomenon is represented by the emergence of various interest groups in various forms and characteristics, both professional organizations, religious organizations, and other hobby communities. These interest groups consciously want to be involved in the political process and seek to influence public policy (Asrinaldi, 2014). The new face of Indonesian politics gave birth to new patterns, such as the political triangle in Mataraman Kediri.

The triangle of power in Kediri City has occurred gradually; the reformation era at first and followed by the implementation of regional autonomy in managing regional government which cannot be denied as the main factor that encourages political and government elites to dare to take participatory steps by involving religious and community leaders, political parties, and various other social elements (Salim, 2010). Second, there is a strong desire among the community to replace the existing top-down leadership pattern with a more communicative leadership pattern, so people can convey their aspirations easily and freely. The emergence of a new awareness began when the Mayor of Kediri, Ahmad Maschut was elected in 1998 in the plenary session of the Kediri City Regional House of Representatives.

Commencing on 5 March 1998, Ahmad Maschut was elected as a member of the Regional House of Representatives (DPRD) to become the Mayor of Kediri, in replacement of the former Mayor, Wiyoto. Maschut was assisted by Bambang Edianto as Deputy Mayor, who previously served as the Regional Secretary. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor were immediately confronted with a difficult situation due to the current monetary and political crisis. In the first year of Maschut's government, he mostly carried out potential mapping and socializing with the community and religious leaders, politicians, and businessmen in Kediri. Meeting after meeting with community groups was held to listen to their aspirations and complaints, from economic, social, environmental, security, education, health to arts and sports. In running the government, Mayor Ahmad Maschut set a plan for a five-year working program in Kediri City which was named Tri Bina Kota. Through this program, Maschut wanted to make Kediri a center of education, a center for trade and industry, and a center for tourism. Besides, Kediri has a political characteristic called the "power triangle", where the geopolitical politics of Kediri is determined by three social classes.

Figure 1. The Triangle of Political Power



First, the political triangle is occupied by religious elites. Historically, the characteristic of Kediri City is the existence and role of religious leaders; *kiai*, pastors, and clerics in local constellation and dynamics, so their role greatly influences the pattern and results to be achieved (Lubis, *Sosiologi Agama: Memahami Perkembangan Agama dalam Interaksi Islam*, 2015). The reality in society shows that every society is ruled by a group of people who have certain qualities. In their sociological perspective, they are often called elites. This conception of the elite basically gives birth to a new social situation that reflects the dynamics of society, because in the structure of society, there are those who rule and those who are ruled. On the other hand, the relationship between the *kiai* and the community has long been institutionalized in the form of patron-client norms (Maliki, 2015). This relationship pattern has a special relationship and role between the two. The *kiai* is the patron, while the community is the client. The patron will get a special position in society. Even the patronage pattern between the *kiai* and the community is not limited by certain territories, but can be cross-territorial, namely regions between districts or even provinces (chalik, 2017).

The influence of the leadership and the wider *kiai* network ease them to establish communication with external parties, either government or private. The existence and position of *kiai* ease them to act as an agent for delivering government messages on the development (Qomar, 2005). Culturally, moreover, in the view of the Javanese people, the *kiai* have a quite special position, namely being respected and their orders is obeyed. The Kediri city government realizes that the *kiai* are in such a determining position in influencing community actions and in guiding them to accept certain steps, or certain policies from the government. This is the beginning of the *kiai's* interrelation with Kediri City government officials.

The relationship between the *kiai* and Kediri Government officials has been established in such a way, even though they have different roles, functions, and capacities, but they have the same goals, namely to serve the wider community. Initially, the relationship process usually begins with building friendly visits and continued with coordination by developing programs aimed at the general public. Of course, these programs are related to providing opportunities for *kiai* or religious leaders to convey messages planned for government activities. Usually, these messages are made in a Koran recitation event facilitated by the government. In addition, there is a special time when the celebration of religious holidays has also been scheduled in advance in planning government activities in the form of religious lectures.

In fact, by looking deeply, the process of the relationship between the *kiai* and the city government has benefits for both parties. On the one hand, *kiai* as part of the community elites can access several government programs, which are usually in the socio-religious field. Likewise, the

government also benefits because the government can make *kiai* a part of the socialization process of the development program that is being launched. This is very helpful because *kiai* as a role model can make the community easily receive directions regarding the roles and benefits received by the community. The messages conveyed by *kiai* will certainly be more digestible and accepted by the community because those who convey these messages are the role models themselves.

Therefore, the relationship between *kiai* and city government officials is mutually beneficial or symbiotic mutualism. This relationship is certainly felt to be very strategic in creating a conducive climate for development in Kediri city. This conduciveness is indeed important, that the author feels himself for more than 20 years living and interacting directly with the community. Almost all areas of government and social affairs can be resolved properly, without causing upheaval or protest from the community. In fact, this condition is widely valued and appreciated from other regions, so Kediri city often gets an award as the safest area from the East Java provincial government. In addition, the Kediri City government also received many visits or comparative studies from other local governments to learn about the stable condition to be applied in their respective regions.

The role of *kiai* in Kota Kediri, particularly *kiai* in the NU management structure, mostly functions as a supporter of government policies. This role is manifested as an agent of socialization and delivery of programs to the community at the grassroots. This support is not only a matter of religion but also in the field of health, maintaining unity and harmony as well as disseminating national insight (Moesa, 2007). Apart from being the agent of socialization for government programs, another role of *kiai* is as a conflict mediator. This is shown when there was a turmoil by the Gudang Garam factory workers demanding a wage increase by demonstrating to the management. At the request of the management of Gudang Garam to a *kiai* to become a mediator, the turmoil of the demonstration was suppressed and the management was also able to meet the demands of the employees. The success of mediating the conflict shows that under certain conditions, *kiai* still have a significant influence in society.

In general, the position of the *kiai* in Kediri city is still considered by the majority of the community as person qualified or superior in religious and social knowledge. Regarding the momentum of the general elections and regional elections, *kiai* and religious leaders are role models considered capable of providing enlightenment to the community, so people do not get trapped in momentary interests, or even serving a hostile to each other to split society (Amstrong, 2007). *Kiai* and other religious figures always call on their congregation to maintain harmony and unity, while still making the implementation of general elections or regional elections a success according to their original objectives. The main clerical role of the *kiai*, as expounded above, is *kiai* who are scattered in every ward in Kediri City, popularly known as *kiai kampung*.

Furthermore, in every moment of general election and regional election, *kiai* or *ulama* are often the target of political friendship. This is because *kiai* are considered having strong influence and charisma within society. This phenomenon has attracted the attention of politicians, in particular, when the regional elections or general elections are approaching the momentum. The reason is that by getting closer to the *kiai*, the politicians are getting closer to attracting public votes. Politicians flocked to get closer for blessings and prayers from the *kiai*, so they could be elected by the community. The

blessing given by a *kiai* to a candidate does not directly get the *kiai* involved in the political sphere. However, the blessing given will not have much impact when the *kiai* do not change their mind about the position of past romance. The motivation of the *kiai* involved in the general election and regional election processes varies.

Furthermore, in relation to the third political power, namely the corporation, in this case is the existence and role of PT Gudang Garam. In the concept of the industrial world, the relationship between the government, corporate management, and employees is called industrial relations. In this industrial relationship, the Kediri city government and PT Gudang Garam and employees are referred to as a tripartite relationship pattern. PT Gudang Garam is one of the largest cigarette industry manufacturers, which is the best *kretek*-producing industry in Indonesia, founded in 1958. This cigarette business originally only came from a home industry by a Chinese descendant named Suryo Wijoyo. At these days, Gudang Garam has transformed into a giant multinational company. Its contribution to customs and excise tax revenues in Kediri city and for the state makes Gudang Garam one of the most respected private companies. When viewed politically, the relationship between the government of Kediri city and PT Gudang Garam is a reciprocal relationship or with a mutual symbiotic relationship.

One indicator of this symbiotic mutualism relationship is that when there is a conflict or demands from employees for an increase in wages from the company management, it always ends peacefully. This can happen due to the mediation between the Kediri city government and the management of PT Gudang Garam. On the one hand, the city government feels helped because the presence of Gudang Garam is factually very influential on the economy of the people of Kediri. At least 30,000 employees, some of whom from the Kediri community, depend on their income by working in the largest cigarette company in Indonesia. Based on these facts, the government of Kediri city always acts carefully, so when there are problems involving employee demands, they settle in avoidance of damaging the good relations that have existed for decades.

The cooperation between the local government and PT Gudang Garam is also carried out in order to support government programs both in the city and district of Kediri. This kind of cooperation is routinely carried out every year, namely through the CSR program. In practice, the city government through related agencies submits activity proposals, and Gudang Garam will provide financial or goods assistance according to the needs of the activity in question. For example, the Department of Environment has plans for city park development activities, Gudang Garam provides assistance in the form of seats, trash cans, and trash carts. In 2016, Gudang Garam was the main sponsor of Persik, the mainstay of football club for the people of Kediri. This step was taken when there was a prohibition for local governments to pay for the football from the Regional State (APBD) funds. Therefore, Persik football club was once vacuum at that time because no one was funding the team.

In addition, as a corporation with a national and even international scale, the relationships built are not only at the local and provincial levels, but are even stronger at the national level. Due to its national position, this company has not always kept a distance from the local political dynamics in the city and district of Kediri since its establishment. For the corporation, the roles taken so far as previously described are sufficient to provide a very strong bargaining position both to the local

government and to religious/community leaders in Kediri and its surroundings. However, despite not taking practical political steps, all policies in the management of Gudang Garam actually had a significant impact on the dynamics and direction of the development of the city and district of Kediri.

Table 2: Roles and Functions of the Triangle of Powers

No	Elements	Roles And Functions
1	City Government and Regional Leadership Communication Forum (FORKOMPINDA)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Mayor and Deputy Mayor as executors and controllers of policies in the field of government together with other institutions including: Regionla House of Representatives (DPRD), District Prosecutor, Military District Command (Kodim) 0809, Kediri City Police, District Court. They joined in a forum called the Regional Leadership Communication Forum (FORKOMPINDA)</li> <li>2. Utilizing the Association of Inter-Religious People and Believers (PAUB-PK) activities, namely regular meetings between religious leaders every Friday Kliwon as a venue for joint activities with entrepreneurs and Regional Leadership Communication Forum (FORKOMPINDA)</li> </ol>
2	Kiai and religious leaders	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. As a role model in everyday people's life. They are also figures who are very competent in the religious field. They are pesantren kiai, ustadz, pastors, pastors, leaders of religious organizations (NU, Muhammadiyah, LDII, BAMAG and MUI). In addition, they also form a joint forum called the Association of Inter-Religious People and Believers (PAUB-PK).</li> <li>2. As a mediator between the community and the city government when problems arise in society. Likewise, as a mediator in industrial relations between employees and company leaders.</li> <li>3. Conveyors to messages and development programs from the government to the community/ummah.</li> <li>4. Conveyors to aspirations and criticisms from the public to the city government.</li> </ol>
3	Entrepreneurs or Corporation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Serving as a provider of employment for the community and a partner for the city government in supporting development policies and programs, especially in the regional economic sector.</li> <li>2. Often playing a role in helping religious activities and providing facilities and infrastructure related to places of worship, pondok pesantren, and private educational institutions managed by religious leaders.</li> </ol>

## CONCLUSION

From the results of the analysis above, it can be concluded that the Mataraman political pyramid in Kediri has been historically influenced by changes in the political direction of post-independence until the end of the New Order. The new face of politics, which used to be a royal system, has changed to democratic politics, which can be seen from the method used in the regional head elections in Kediri. However, far from before, Kediri has a social status that is divided into three categories, namely: *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi*. These three categories also color the face of politics in Mataraman Kediri because these three categories have different currents in their politics. This history has become a new path from the pyramid of political power to become a political identity in terms of building a flow of



political power pyramid, which can be seen in the roles of the religious elites, which culturally Kediri is the development rate of *pondok pesantren*, so the figure of *kiai* becomes central in the life of the people, and indirectly, what is said is that the religious elite will be heard more by the public.

The second axis is no less important, **Entrepreneurs/Businessmen**, in this case PT Gudang Garam, who have an economic impact on the growth and development of the Kediri community. The rulers walk in harmony with the religious elites in their political power as evidenced by funding for religious activities. Religious and business elites will run in harmony when they have permission from the **Government**, due to the changing political patterns of Indonesia, demanding compliance with the rules set by the local government, one of which is self-government with FORKOMPINDA. The three pyramids of political power symbolize that geopolitically, Kediri is in a position where there is a synergy between religious communities represented historically by *santri*, as well as *abangan* and *priyayi* belonging to the category of businessmen and government officials who play a role in maintaining the political tradition in Mataraman Kediri.



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