

# The Role of the State in the Formation of Moderate Islam in Indonesia<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This paper examines the role of state in shaping the notion of moderate Islam in Indonesia within the context of responding to the rise of terrorism. The aftermath of Suharto's authoritarian regime, Indonesia faces the threat of terrorist attacks from within and outside the country span from 9/11 bombing in the US to Bali bombings. Those aforementioned events have shaped the state behaviors toward Islam in Indonesia. In this regard, the notion of moderate Islam is more than just a theological or political preference. It is a notion that emerges from the context of eradicating terrorist threat. This paper argues that the massive events of terrorist attacks in home and abroad have created condition where the state has come up with the notion of moderate Islam not only as a means of inclusions for Muslim groups but also to acquire "legitimacy" for the project of counter-terrorism run by the state. Current studies on Islam and the state have undermined the role of the state in appropriating the notion of moderate Islam. Additionally, studies on Islam in Indonesia whether it is seen as theological or political preferences is captured from below meaning that Muslim society is conceived as such (radical, moderate, conservative and so forth). This study investigates the state's programs such as Inter-religious dialogue, Seminars, establishing Muslim groups of anti-terrorism, and issuing *fatwa* on terrorism by MUI.

**Keywords:** *Moderate Islam, State, Indonesian Islam, Terrorism, Radicalism*

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## A. Introduction: The Discourse on Terrorism and The Rise of Moderate Islam

Three years after Suharto stepped down the world trade center in the US was crushed by the hijacked plane, which later has been changing the global politics. The notions of "Islamic terrorism", "Islamic fundamentalism", "extremism", "radical Islamist groups" and so forth become journalistic jargons we consume through TVs, newspapers, online news portal and even in the scholarly publication. In addition, following the WTC tragedy, in Indonesia several bombings such as Bali I and II, JW Marriot, Cirebon happened. The attacks have been accentuated with the notion of "Jihad", an Islamic holy war. The actor of bombing using white turban by calling "*Allahuakbar*" has added a point of accentuation which say that here the evil is Islam.

In the wake of global violence, started from 9/11 then followed US unilateral action to Iraq and Afghanistan, Indonesia faced domestic challenges of political shift from authoritarian regime to democratic consolidation. Muslims response toward the growing and intense global violence has been very much related with the Muslims political polarizations in home which also can be traced back to the wider picture of Muslims political orientations and their relations with the state before democratic transition takes place (Hefner, 2002). According to Hefner, the discourse of global violence and the US unilateral action was the site of contestation of more localized Muslim political spectrums that was between "Muslim proponents of democracy" and "the neofundamentalist conservatives". In this regard, Muslims responses toward terrorist attack that followed in Indonesia, to name Bali I and II, Jakarta and Cirebon, can be seen in this light. Moreover, which later would be explained, the state which engages with those Muslims proponents of democracy at the same time has led to the notion of "moderate Islam" in the light of "Indonesian Islam". This is in line with what Hefner argues about the above case:

The reactions and the rivalry were related to three other crises simultaneously shaking Indonesia: the attempted transition from the authoritarianism of the Suharto dictatorship, the struggle to redefine the terms of Indonesian nationhood after the discrediting of Suharto's conservative nationalism, and arguments over the position of Islam in the practice of governance and the idea of Indonesia (2002: 754).

Therefore, the extent to which moderate Islam is directed is very much on its relations to the above mentioned events. Scholars and public figures in Indonesia have undermined the term moderate Islam

as cultural preference. Some of them often exemplify the very moderate with how Islam came to Nusantara and the ability to “assimilate” with local traditions. On the other side, the acceptance toward democracy is used by some as a point of departure.

Most obviously, scholars assume “Moderate Islam” as inherently attached to Indonesian Islam (e.g. Eliraz 2004, Ramakrishna 2009, Azra 2006, Ali 2007, and Hefner 2002). It sees that historical trajectories of Indonesian Islam was brought by moderate way of interpreting the religious text so that if the other faces of Islam which is far from moderate is identified as not moderate. Non-moderate way of interpreting the text could lead to the other justifications such as fundamentalist, radicals or even extremist. Here, culture is very much attached as to fold Muslim religious behaviors and so their political preference. Muslims political orientations depend on how far they assimilate with local culture. It implies from, for example, Azra’s insistence on how Clifford Geertz notion of religion of Java signifies the aforementioned (Azra, 2004: 2). For Azra, the term religion of Java implies the ability of Muslim to absorb the Javanese culture without necessarily become less Islamic.

Specifically speaking, identifying radical groups in Indonesia is very much underpinning the very term moderate Muslims. Muslim groups such as FPI (Front Pembela Islam), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), JI (Jamaah Islamiyah) and Laskar Jihad are to be labelled as radical Muslim groups (Ali, 2007: 198). Thus, who do not share political and even cultural orientations with those groups will be labeled as moderate Muslims. For Ali, this category includes prominent Muslim organization leaders such as Muhammadiyah and NU and Muslim figures such as Syafi’i Ma’arif, Azyumardi Azra, Hasyim Muzadi and Abdullah Gymnastiar (2007: 198). In terms of its categorization in Indonesia Ali states that:

The ideas of native Islam, progressive Islam, tolerant Islam and pluralistic Islam that emerged in the 1970s are categorized as moderate. The same category can be given to ideas to re-actualize Islam, nationalize Islam, de-sacralizing, cultural Islam, contextual *ijtihad*, and other alike. The Islamist group or *Salafi* that neither uses nor allows violence can be categorized as moderate *Salafi* (*Salafiyah Wasathiyah*) (Ibid, 199).

In making this categorization, Ali employs a broad spectrum of moderate Islam. He includes the *Salafi*, who share cultural proximity with those extremist and radical (See, Woodward, 2011), into moderate Islam category as long as they avoid using violence, although they have strict interpretation of the Quran. Through the inclusion of its categorization, moderate Islam in Indonesia comprises the mainstream comparing to the radical.

According to Azra, in terms of its characteristics, radical groups in Indonesia are commonly differentiated into two groups. The first is local model such as Laskar Jihad and FPI and the second is transnational model such as *Hizbut Tahrir* and *Jemaah Ikhwan al-Muslimin Indonesia*/JAMI. Azra noted that all these radical groups have sense of ideological connection with Middle Eastern radical ideology such as wahabism (Azra, 2002, 51). As a matter of fact, these groups are not part of terrorism as mentioned by the state, although some of them have inclined with violence and share the similar ideology of establishing *daulah islamiyah* or Islamic state and the like.

In Indonesia, there are two major organizations that are considered inherently moderate, Muhammadiyah and NU (Azra, 2005, Anwar, 2004, Eliraz, 2004). These two are simply identified as the mainstream branch of civil society group with huge members. Giora Eliraz (2004, 87) sees the Islamic revival in Indonesia is closely related with this two which is peace, tolerant and democratic comparing to the Islamic revival in the Middle East countries. She traced back to the Suharto period in which the two have the prominent role in defining the "moderate Islam", especially in the time they accepted Pancasila as the single ideology.

In the other side however, liberal Islam is very much in association with intellectual tradition as it is also used in the West, even from the era of classic Muslim western thinkers. Nevertheless, when it comes to their support of secular model of the state, this is likely to be a political stance (Assyaukanie, 2009: 140-168). Thus, unlike liberal Islam that departs from an intellectual enterprise, the moderate is hardly defined as having intellectual root, though for some, the notion spans from wider range of Muslims' political and religious orientations and class division (Esposito, 2007: 26-27). However, in Indonesia, the term looks very much straight forward, especially when it comes to responding terrorism and the urgent of reclaiming the state's ideology.

It is true when it comes to appropriating Muslim religious and political orientation with state's ideology in the time of Suharto authoritarian regime. According to Ichwan, the use of Pancasila and Constitution as the source of Islamic law, and not Quran and Hadist, has moderated Muslims in Indonesia (2006: 124). Indeed, it was the consequence of enforcing Pancasila from the beginning. In the other side, Muslim civil society groups were forced to acknowledge Pancasila as their sole ideology. Some of them tried to negotiate their political stance by involving in corporatist institutions established by the regime such as ICMI. The next chapter explores the role of the state in Suharto era in moderating Muslim religious and political orientations.

In his inauguration speech for his second election, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono stated that the key point of Indonesian success is the national identity, Indonesianess (Keindonesiaan) which is reflected from diversity, fairness, tolerance, moderateness, openness and sense of humanity. According to him, that uniqueness is the characteristics that differentiate Indonesia with other nations in the world (*Kompas*, 20/10/09). SBY statement reflects the state's image especially when it comes into being through programs and activities specifically designed by the state's apparatus to construct what Islam fit in to the state's ideology.

In addition to the president's remark, the (former) Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Wirajuda stated in his remark, such as one at the Opening Ceremony of the 2009 Indonesian Arts and Culture Scholarship, used the term to refer to certain groups that the government engages in to support its effort of combating terrorists. In addition, he emphasized the government initiatives to make the moderate voices heard to the world as representing the face of Indonesia. In relation to the government effort of eradicating terrorism, providing space for moderates to give a voice, mutually supports the former (Kemenlu, 30/07/09). Both the President and the Ministry's remarks reflect the resonance of matters that the state faces that is "the crises simultaneously shaking Indonesia".

Currently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA), National Counter-Terrorism Body/ Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) and MUI are the most active in dealing with counter-terrorism activities in Indonesia by promoting moderate Islam. In this regard, this paper focuses on programs and activities held by those aforementioned institutions. This paper uses a qualitative research. Data comes primarily from two types. The first is written materials. It comprises from official websites, news portal, official document, books, booklets and research reports. The second is interview. Subjects of interview come from staff of Fatwa Commission of MUI, director of desk of Social and Culture at Directorate of Public Diplomacy of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, director of Directorate of Research and Development at Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the head of Terrorism Eradication Team (Pokja Penanggulangan Terorisme) at Yogyakarta. Interview is conducted in order to confirm and add values of what the government currently conceives as moderate Islam and what has been doing in response to terrorism and radicalism, especially from the perspective of the given institutions.

## B. Theoretical Framework

Some studies on the state and Islam and Indonesia give attention to the role of the state as an actor incorporating certain official rules intended for managing Muslims religious life. Those studies are including the effort of incorporating Muslim figures to support the state's interest and agendas through existing institutions. Those studies have given rise to concepts like "state Islam" (e.g. van Bruinessen 1996, Nur Ichwan 2006) and "regimist Islam" (e.g. Hefner 2000). Those studies mostly investigate the role of the New Order regime in shaping Muslim political orientations toward the state's agendas. They mostly scrutinize the existing government institutions in this case is the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) in supporting state's agenda while others focus on the establishment of Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, ICMI) as part of state's client (e.g. Nieuwenhuijze 1958, Boland 1982, Ramage 1995, Porter, 2002, Ichwan, 2007 and John Olle 2009).

The above mentioned scholars, except Olle, see the state as a strict agent as it is obviously the case of the New Order regime. Although Ichwan has been providing the example of post Suharto Indonesian state, however, he puts exclusively to MORA as a case study in which the findings are mostly consistent with the image of "state Islam". Giving much closer attention to MUI officers, Olle employs an ethnographic approach toward the state by interviewing MUI officers. However, Olle does not take a case of the term of moderate Islam being employed by MUI and how the term is used in the backdrop of responding terrorism and religious extremism.

On the other side, scholars investigating Islam in Indonesia use the term moderate Islam as mere a label to indicate Muslims religious and or political orientation (e.g. Eliraz 2004, Ramakrishna 2009, Azra 2005, Ali 2007, Hefner 2002). They certainly take it for granted or with little definition and mostly put the phenomena of the growth of radicalism or extremism bringing religious sentiment as the backdrop. None of them investigate the term as evoked by the Indonesian state and how it relates to its practices. In this regard, this study will fill the gap that left by the aforementioned scholars.

## State's Programs of Counter-radicalism and Connecting Moderate Muslim Groups

### 1. Designing Operative Institutions

In response to terrorism and radicalism, there are several operative institutions that have been established by the state through its agencies. The first is the establishment of Directorate of public diplomacy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which the activities of Interfaith Dialogue take place. The second is the establishment of BNPT (National Counter-Terrorism Body), especially in its functions to engage with civil society groups and the establishment of regional terrorism eradication teams. The third is the establishment of anti-terrorism unit by MUI which uses their network of Islamic preachers across the nation.

#### a. Directorate of Public Diplomacy

The ministry of Foreign Affairs through Directorate of Public Diplomacy has played important roles in initiating interfaith forums. In March 2002 the directorate of public diplomacy was established (Rachmawati, 2009: 21). The ministry of foreign affairs through the so called total diplomacy tries to redefine its approach in dealing with many issues especially those related to the global politics, including religion. According Elvis Napitupulu, a head of desk of Social and Culture of Directorate of Public Diplomacy at the MOFA, until the end of cold war period, as a matter of fact, the states have enjoyed the privilege as the dominant actors engaging with issues and problems that trans-national in matter. This has given consequence that whatever problems appear dealing with international relations, they are dominantly responded through political lenses and not less with military approach. However, according to Napitupulu, "since there are many issues in the post cold war era that should be seriously tackled with comprehensive understanding and approach such as global warming, terrorism and the like which demand wider actors to involve, the state alone is insufficient" (interview with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012).

In this regard, the establishment of directorate of public diplomacy is the way to incorporate non-state actors in dealing with problems that affected by global and local events that have effects on global and also local constraint. Terrorism

and religious extremism are the main reasons that the MOFA seeks to define its approach of cooperating with Muslim civil society groups. Incorporating the Muslim figures and institutions is more appealing in approaching the problems of radicalism rather than the state alone, as it will be responded by the Muslims in Indonesia as targeting the Muslims as the enemy like those western countries especially US have done (interview with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012).

According to Napitupulu, for the purpose of gaining support from the moderate Muslims, the MOFA cooperates with NU and Muhammadiyah in every activities and programs of interfaith dialogues. In addition, scholars from Islamic Universities also take part in the programs. Hence, the point is that as stated by MOFA is “to rebrand Islam amidst the asymmetric global order with excessive terror attacks in the name of Islam” (interview with Napitupulu, 02/07/2012).

b. ***Tim Penanggulangan Terrorisme (Terrorism Eradication Team) of MUI***

Based on a series of Islamic jurisprudence discussion (*halaqah*) in 2002, MUI issued the fatwa against terrorism. It condemns terrorism as *haram*. For the purpose of responding terrorism, MUI established special team called *Tim Penanggulangan Terorisme*, TPT (Terrorism Eradication Team) which is aimed at guiding Muslims into the right path of Islam and discouraging them from violent orientations. TPT held *taushiyah* (religious advice), publishing books and issuing *fatwa* as part of their programs. MUI claimed that the fatwa being issued was a response of MUI toward the growing tension of terrorist attack. TPT has published a booklet that distribute in a series of *halaqah* held in several provinces and MUI branches. The booklet titled “Halaqah Penanggulangan Terorisme: Peran Ulama Dalam Mewujudkan Pemahaman Keagamaan Yang Benar” contain fatwa and its explanation, including a fatwa concerning the problems of nationalism (MUI and FKPMN, no year).

For MUI the act of terror without any legitimate reason such as not in the time of war, cannot be justified. The issuing of fatwa based on the *halaqah* held by MUI in 2002 and followed by other meeting in 2003 (Interview with Irfan Helmy 12/07/2012). In the mean time, the fatwa is processed



to be informed to public. The difference between terrorism and jihad according to the fatwa are the former is destructive which goal is aimed at destroying other people with no rules in order. Whereas jihad is constructive even with waging war which goal is upholding the God's teaching or defending one's right with certain rules based on *shariah*. In addition, the fatwa is inserted with the fatwa on how to live a life within pluralistic Indonesian society. This fatwa is based on Ulama's decision called *Masail Asasiyah wathaniyah* (the strategic matters of nationhood). It contains four points (MUI and FKPMN, no year).

The first is the principles of Islamic teaching regarding relations among religious believers within the frame of Indonesian unitary state. This highlights the legitimacy of Indonesian Constitution and Ideology, Pancasila. Muslims right is equal with those other religious believer in the frame of Indonesian nation-state. Hence, Muslims do not necessary to acknowledge other religious believers' faith. In addition, it emphasizes the role of the state in guarding religious lives and keeping them pure by upholding penalty toward religious blasphemy.

The second is the role of religion in managing peoples' attitudes. This explains that Indonesian citizens are religious believers so that the national ethics should be based on religious teachings. The government should integrate the moral values of religions with every single dimension of the state. This point recommends "national movement of managing people attitudes" (*Gerakan nasional pembinaan akhlak bangsa*) (MUI and FKPMN, no year).

The third is implementation of Islam as *rahmatan lil alamin* (blessing for the entire universe) in the frame of societal, national and state's lives. Islam is a religion that covers every single problem concerning the societal and national lives. Pancasila is acknowledged as an open ideology that could be considered as a commitment and source of law, inspirations and thought of all citizens within living pluralistically. Because of its all-encompassing religion in every time and space (*shalihun likulli zamanin wa makanin*), Islam should be a source of managing national lives. The fourth is the right to vote and choosing the political leaders. Islam acknowledges election as a commitment to choose the right leaders in order to uphold *imamah* (religious leadership) and *imarah* (political

leadership). Therefore, Muslims should choose a leader that can accommodate Islam as it is based on faith and submission to God (*taqwa*) and those having moral commitment such as honesty and having integrity. Those points have been inserted with Islamic texts from Al-Quran and Hadist and so the opinions of ancient Ulamas such as Imama Al-Ghazali and Al-Mawardi as did the fatwa on terrorism (MUI and FKPMN, no year).

According to Irfan Helmy, a member of Fatwa Commission of MUI and a member of organizing committee of TPT, in response to terrorism and to support the state to counter terrorism, MUI, except issuing *fatwa* and establishing TPT, also cooperates with BNPT. MUI send its members to sit in BNPT organization (Interview with Irfan Helmy 12/07/2012). Additionally, MUI's support to the state has been confirmed by the use of the state's definition on terrorism as stated in its booklet containing *fatwa* on the matters of terrorism and nationalism.

### c. National Counter-Terrorism Body (BNPT)

The establishment of BNPT is referred to the Presidential Act Number 46 year 2010 about BNPT. But it was not until July 2011 BNPT was officially established as a centralized body of counter-terrorism agency (Putri, 2011: 48). It is equally positioned as the ministerial body. In the first *consideration* of the act, the state defines terrorism as "criminal act against humanity characterized as trans-national, well organized and having sophisticated network so that threatens national and international security". According to chapter 23 of Presidential Act stated above, in doing its jobs BNPT creates *Satuan Tugas* (Divisions of Order) which can also cooperate with civil society groups and figures. It is worth noting that the establishment of BNPT, after eight years since the Bali attack in 2002, as a counter terrorism agency has marked significant shift within state's approach toward terrorism. It is also to replace the previous Coordination Desk of Preventing Terrorism under the Indonesian Ministry of Coordinator of Politics and Security.

Recently, the BNPT has established some representatives in some provinces. In Yogyakarta it is called *Pokja Penanggulangan Terrorisme* headed by K.H Muhaimin, a headmaster of

pesantren Nurul Ummahat in Kota Gede, Yogyakarta who is also a leading figure of NU in the province. For Muhaimin, the building of *Pokja* is meant to socialize the danger of terrorism through cultural approach. He admitted that, the security approach that dominates state's policies dealing with eradicating terrorism has made more people especially Muslims perceive the state as too repressive. Moreover, it does not only cover the issue of terrorism as such but more identifying radical tendencies within society, although not explicitly waging violence in their actions (interview with K.H Abdul Muhaimin, 27/07/2012).

In Kendari Southeastern Sulawesi province, BNPT established Forum Koodinasi Pencegahan Terrorisme/FKPT (Coordination Forum of Preventing Terrorism). BNPT cooperated with Wahid Institute in holding two days workshop on July 24-25, 2012 in Kendari concerning the initiation of FKPT. According Professor Irfan Idris, head of Deradicalization Desk of the BNPT, FKPT is "expected to bear the wisdom of local radical actions through for example community leaders approach" (Kendari News, 23/07/12).

## **2. Building Networks of Moderate Muslims**

In this section, there are efforts the state has played in terms of building moderate Muslims networks that is worth noting. It can be seen from first is the holding of Inter-faith dialogues forums in which the state provides space for moderate Muslims to voice and second is building Muslim circles of anti-terrorism. The former focuses on the interfaith dialogue forums held by desk of Directorate of Public diplomacy at MOFA and the latter on establishing specific groups in response to terrorism and activities and programs held by BNPT, MUI and MORA. All of them are seen in the light of responding terrorism and radicalism.

### **a. Incorporating Muslims through Interfaith Dialogue**

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) involves in managing interfaith dialogues cooperated with NU and Muhammadiyah. The MOFA has facilitated the holding of International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), in which the former chairman of NU Hasyim Muzadi acted as a director and Regional Interfaith Dialogue (RID) in which Muhammadiyah

co-host. The factors behind holding the forums come from international and domestic factors (Banawiratama et.al. 2010: 112). International factors can be summed up into three: first is the rise of terrorism. Second, many attacks and atrocities acted in the name of Islam which leads to the image making: Islamic terrorism. Third is US unilateral action through global war on terror. Whereas the domestic factors include: first is lack of institutional ability in hindering terrorism. Second is the misconception of Islam versus west rivalry. Third is the need to strengthen security action with democratization and human right. And the forth is the need to show Indonesian Islam to the world as a positive portrait.

The first ICIS was held in 2004 in Jakarta under the theme *Upholding Islam as Rahmatan Lilalamin (a blessing for the entire universe)*. As noted by Muzadi the spirit of Islamic teachings in Indonesia has been rooted historically known as *tawassuth* (middle way). The acceptance of this middle way was signified by agreement of ICIS delegations coming from all over the world with different streams under *the Jakarta Declaration*. For him, moderation is not only projected by Indonesian Muslims but Muslims all over the world (Muzadi 2008: 206). Here, Muzadi appropriated a theological meaning of moderation which is sourced from Islamic percept.

The Second ICIS was held in June 2006 in Jakarta and coming with a grand theme, *Program of Action to Uphold Islam as Rahmatan lil Alamin toward Global Justice and Peace*. The conference was attended by more than 300 scholars from 54 countries, not only from countries whose majority population Muslims, but also from countries where Muslims are minority. Whereas the third ICIS was held in July 2009 in Jakarta under the theme *Islam as Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin: Peace Building and Conflict Prevention in the Muslim World* (Banawiratama et.al, 2010, 99-101).

Moreover, together with Muhammadiyah, the Ministry shares a common regional forum called Regional Interfaith Dialogue (RID). RID was first initiated by the Indonesia (former) minister of foreign affairs Hasan Wirajuda and Foreign Ministers of Australia Alexander Downer collaborated with Muhammadiyah. It was held in Yogyakarta in 2004 under the theme *Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation: Community Building and Harmony*. This meeting resulted in the initiation of International Center for Religious and Cultural Cooperation

as a permanent shared institution aimed at a mean to enhance cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation among religious believers and strengthening moderate networks and institutional capacity (Banawiratma et.al, 2010, 103-104).

In this initial event, the participant articulated their agreement under the *Yogyakarta Statement of Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation*. The participants expressed their recommendations in several points which can be summed up as: promoting interfaith dialogues and actions in order to gain peace and harmony among religious believers. One of the derived action plan of RID is the youth interfaith exchange in which young people from other country stay for a couple of time in a host family in different country with the different faith (Tabloid Diplomasi, 2008).

#### b. Building the Muslims Circle of Anti-Terrorism

BNPT as a national counter-terrorism body has also played the role of building moderate Muslims. In the early of its establishment, BNPT immediately cooperates with MUI. In addition, MUI has issued *fatwa haram* on terrorism long before BNPT established. With its various branches and links in the regions across Indonesia, MUI is the potential counterpart for BNPT in dealing with counter terrorism and radicalism. In early November 2010, MUI with FKPMN (Forum Komunikasi Praktisi Media Nasional) held *halaqah* on counter-terrorism in MUI central branch in Jakarta. In that early meeting, Many Muslim figures and *Ulama* representing various organizations attended that *halaqah*. In the mean time, Ansyaad Mbai, head of BNPT, acted as the keynote speaker and panelist in *halaqah*. He stated clearly that since terrorism is an extra-ordinary crime trough which the actors aim at upholding *Syariah* and *Daulah Islamiyah*, there should be, in Mbai's word, "an extra-ordinary preventive action" (MUI, 20/11/10).

In the frame of "extra ordinary preventive action", BNPT feels more confident in cooperating with *Ulama*, in this sense is MUI. In addition, Mbai described there are five modus operandi of terrorism. The first is, exemplifying government weakness; the second is flaming conflicts and making use of it; the third is by doing so, the actors got the government to respond repressively; the forth is the effort of attaining public sympathy; and the fifth is disseminating propaganda and

terrorist ideology. In this sense, for Mbai, BNPT will engage with Muslim clerics in “empowering moderate Muslims” such as those promoted by Muhammadiyah and NU (MUI, 20/11/10).

In attaining its goals BNPT has run several programs including signing MoU with several notable Muslim organizations, especially NU and Muhammadiyah and their under-bows. Initial cooperation with MUI has marked as an “open-door” for BNPT to engage with other Muslim organizations. MUI is seen as the free pass, since this one represent Muslims and having influence toward Muslims religious lives. This is to say also the modernist and traditionalist Muslim streams as represented by Muhammadiyah and NU and other similar organizations could be seen in MUI’s formation. In addition, the State Islamic Universities have also been the BNPT counterparts from which BNPT recruit its director to say one is Professor Irfan from Alaudiddin State Islamic University acted as director of deradicalization desk. According to Djoko Suyanto, BNPT will go hand in hand with society dealing with its missions. This is to say that BNPT will very much engage with non-state actors especially with religious leaders.

BNPT has signed MoU on preventing radicalism with NU and Muslimat, a NU wing organization for women. The latter has held workshop on counter-radicalism in five cities. Siti Aniroh, a representative of Muslimat saw the importance of Muslimat to engage in the program because “terrorism has threatened NKRI (Indonesian unitary state) and brought about religious and social conflicts”. Moreover, the act of terror has given rise to trauma within societal life. As part of NU, Muslimat has huge resources of members and institutions around archipelago such as *majlis taklim* (religious circle), schools and pesantrens (NU Online, 17/02/12).

In the other side, MORA takes apart in responding terrorism. Although with limited budget allocated to the programs and there is no specific team for counter-terrorism, it is responsible for designing Islamic teaching curriculum (see, Ichwan, 2006). Indeed, officially, Islamic curriculum for schools from elementary to junior high and college are supplied by the MORA. The MORA designed workshops on the role of *Pesantren Leaders in Developing Peace Culture*. As stated by the MORA, the goals of the workshops are: first, building

networks among Pesantren in preventing religious radicalism; second, conceptualizing pesantren's view on religious radicalism; third, seeking the best way to tackle radicalism. The workshops were held in six provinces: Lampung (Bandar Lampung), Central Java (Semarang), Jawa Timur (Jombang), Banten (Serang), East Kalimantan (Samarinda), West Nusa Tenggara (Mataram), Gorontalo (Gorontalo) dan Central Sulawesi (Palu) (Balitbang Kemenag, 10/04/12).

In response to terrorism and radicalism, it has engaged with BNPT and Lazuardi Biru, an NGO concerns on radicalism, in holding the workshops on deradicalization. In 30 of November 2010, for example, the workshop titled "*Peran Masyarakat dalam Penguatan Nilai-nilai Islam Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin untuk menangkal radikalisme dan Terorisme* (the role of society in strengthening Islamic values as *rahmatan lil-alamin* in tackling radicalism and terrorism)" held in Jakarta attended by Nasaruddin Umar, (Directorate of Muslims counseling, the MORA), Komaruddin Hidayat (Rector of UIN Jakarta), Hasyim Muzadi (Former Chairman of PBNU), and Amirsyah Tambunan (representative of MUI). Acted as speakers, they were coming with almost similar frame on preventing the country from radicalism. According to Umar from MORA, the Ministry has designed three model of deradicalization: prevention, rehabilitation, and re-socialization/reintegration/reengagement (Bimas Islam Kemenag, 01/12/10).

### C. Imposing Moderate Islam

When the president issued the Presidential Act number 46 on Counter Terrorism Body, the state has conceptualized a kind of more than just a definition of terrorism and how to respond it. Terrorism is defined as a crime against humanity with trans-national in character. This definition is also used by MUI in its fatwa on terrorism. Officially speaking, there is no such term radicalism attached to the text both the act and the fatwa.<sup>2</sup> However, as noted in the previous chapter, radicalism is common to use among political and religious elites to point out groups and individuals having inclinations toward using violence. On the other hand, the term radicalism and its characteristic have broadened beyond what is informed by the term terrorism as it is obviously used interchangeably. The

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2 See *Peraturan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 46 Tahun 2010*.

latter is informed as a threat toward the existence of nation-state the former is a threat to Islam itself. Thus, it is common to hear that not a clash of civilization we witness but a contestation between Muslims who prefer democracy, human right and pluralism and those against it and prefer force in their effort of articulating their interests (e.g. Hefner, 2002 and Esposito and Mogahed, 2007).

As it has been exemplified by those institutions, one cannot but to note that moderate Islam is Indonesian Islam. Following the models of Muslim polity based on Assyaoukani's explanation, the proponents of democratic religious state are at play within those institutions. As stated by most political and religious elites previously, Indonesia is not an Islamic state, but accommodates all religions. So that to say, state's incorporations of Muslim groups such as Muhammadiyah and NU, is the other message that both groups has committed to the Indonesian unitary model with Pancasila at hand. Terrorism in the eyes of the state is a real threat toward Indonesian nation-state. The prolonged debate of how Islam supposed to be placed within the state in Indonesia can be seen in this message.

Moreover, the issue of fatwa on terrorism which inserted with the fatwa of the problem concerning nationhood by MUI is portrayed as penetration of how religion is justified the very notion of becoming moderate and Indonesian Muslim. MUI's engagement with BNPT, NU, Muhammadiyah, pesantrens and the associations of Ulama in countering radicalism has signified the very "building moderate Muslims networks". This effort is inserted with the sense of becoming Indonesia, in SBY's term *keindonesiaan*. Therefore, proving that one is a Muslim is not enough. Therefore, a Muslim should remain loyal to the state's ideology.

The message becomes real when we notice MOFA. Through its incorporation and engagement with NU and Muhammadiyah, it signifies the image of the state. The state through ministry of foreign affairs has clearly defined the moderate Islam. This notion comes up through its engagement with the non-state actors. In addition, there is a new division within the ministry of foreign affairs which concern on building relations with non-state actors called the directorate of public diplomacy. Through cooperation and institutional mediation, what the so called moderate Islam or Muslims not only appear



as such but at the same time and the most important is echoing the state's interest. It is important to say that state has bolded the notion of moderate Islam through its jargon and activities.

#### **D. Conclusion**

Examining the state's notion of moderate Islam and its role in constructing the notion, through its activities and programs has shown that the state imposes the notion by engaging with Muslim leaders in response to terrorism and radicalism. Having faced with crisis of legitimacy after the fall of New Order, the events of terrorist attacks happened within and without the country has meet the political expectation of the recent government to reclaim its ideology by imposing such notion of moderate Islam. Moderate Islam is seen as constructed image of the state in order to mobilize Muslims in response to terrorism and radicalism.

In this regard, terrorism and radicalism is not merely a threat for the state as it is seen as a crime toward humanity as such. Nevertheless, the act of terrorism and the growing trend of radicalism have been perceived as threatening the very notion of Indonesian-long-established ideology, Indonesian unitary state and Pancasila. Indeed, this is "a blessing in disguise" to finish the "postponed homework" of providing Muslims with democratic political channel along with appropriating them with the idea of Indonesian unitary state. It was that for long ago Muslim polity suffered under authoritarian regime and has been left with no choice except to accept or to rebel with the risk is being sentenced as subversive.

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