

From Theological Loyalty to Humanistic Integrity: A *Maqāṣidī* Reconstruction of the Qur'anic Verses on *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*

Dari Loyalitas Teologis menuju Integritas Humanistik: Rekonstruksi Maqāṣidī atas Ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an tentang Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'

Fathurrosyid* ^(a), Achmad Lutfi* ^(b), Mustofa As'ady* ^(c), Mahmudi^(d)

* Corresponding Author: fathurrosyid@ua.ac.id; achmadlutfi@uinssc.ac.id; asadi@uin-malang.ac.id

(a) Program Studi Ilmu al-Qur'an dan Tafsir, Fakultas Ushuluddin, Universitas Annuqayah, Jl. Bukit Lancaran, Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah, Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep, Jawa Timur 69463, Indonesia

(b) Universitas Islam Negeri Siber Syekh Nurjati Cirebon, Jl. Perjuangan By Pass Sunyaragi, Kota Cirebon, Jawa Barat, Indonesia

(c) Universitas Islam Negeri Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, Jl. Gajayana No. 50, Dinoyo, Lowokwaru, Kota Malang

(d) Universitas Annuqayah, Jl. Bukit Lancaran, Pondok Pesantren Annuqayah, Guluk-Guluk, Sumenep, Jawa Timur 69463, Indonesia

Abstract

This article reconstructs the theological concept of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through a *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach within the context of Indonesia's plural and multicultural society. The study stems from an epistemological problem regarding literal readings of Qur'anic verses on loyalty, which tend to foster identity-based exclusivism and the delegitimization of non-Muslim groups. Unlike previous studies that predominantly examine *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* within the frameworks of Salafi-jihadi ideology and identity politics, this article offers a *maqāṣidī* reinterpretation by integrating textual analysis, socio-historical context, and the universal objectives of Islamic law (*maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*). Employing a qualitative library-based method focusing on Q. 5:57, Q. 9:23, and Q. 60:1, the study demonstrates that the prohibition of loyalty in these verses is not inherently based on non-Muslim identity, but rather on acts of religious mockery, active hostility, political betrayal, and security threats to the Muslim community. Consequently, the effective cause (*'illah*) of the prohibition is ethical and contextual rather than theological-discriminatory. The study further argues that *Al-Walā'* should be reinterpreted as a commitment to justice, communal protection, and public welfare, while *Al-Barā'* signifies the rejection of destructive actions that threaten social peace. Through this approach, the paradigm shifts from identity-based theological loyalty toward humanistic integrity and civic loyalty compatible with religious pluralism, democracy, and Indonesia's constitutional principles. This study contributes to the development of contemporary *maqāṣidī* exegesis, particularly in reinterpreting Qur'anic verses on religious loyalty within multicultural societies.

Keywords: *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*; *maqāṣidī* exegesis; civic loyalty; humanistic integrity; religious moderation.

Abstrak

Artikel ini merekonstruksi konsep teologis *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* melalui pendekatan penafsiran *maqāṣidī* dalam konteks masyarakat Indonesia yang plural dan multikultural. Kajian ini berangkat dari problem epistemologis terkait pembacaan literal terhadap ayat-ayat Al-Qur'an tentang loyalitas,



yang cenderung memicu eksklusivisme berbasis identitas dan pendelegitimasi kelompok non-Muslim. Berbeda dengan studi-studi sebelumnya yang dominan mengkaji *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* dalam kerangka ideologi Salafi-jihadi dan politik identitas, artikel ini menawarkan reinterpretasi *maqāsidī* dengan mengintegrasikan analisis tekstual, konteks sosio-historis, serta tujuan universal syariat Islam (*maqāsid al-sharī'ah*). Menggunakan metode kualitatif berbasis studi kepustakaan dengan fokus pada QS. 5:57, QS. 9:23, dan QS. 60:1, penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa larangan loyalitas dalam ayat-ayat tersebut pada dasarnya tidak didasarkan atas identitas non-Muslim, melainkan pada tindakan penistaan agama, permusuhan aktif, pengkhianatan politik, dan ancaman keamanan terhadap komunitas Muslim. Akibatnya, sebab hukum ('illah) dari larangan tersebut bersifat etis dan kontekstual, bukan teologis-diskriminatif. Penelitian ini lebih lanjut berargumen bahwa *Al-Walā'* harus dipahami sebagai komitmen terhadap keadilan, perlindungan komunitas, dan kemaslahatan publik, sedangkan *Al-Barā'* bermakna penolakan terhadap tindakan destruktif yang mengancam perdamaian sosial. Melalui pendekatan tafsir *maqāsidī*, artikel ini merekonstruksi paradigma *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* dari loyalitas teologis berbasis identitas menuju integritas humanistik dan loyalitas kewarganegaraan yang selaras dengan pluralisme agama, demokrasi, serta prinsip-prinsip konstitusional Indonesia. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada pengembangan tafsir *maqāsidī* kontemporer, khususnya dalam mereinterpretasi ayat-ayat *Al-Qur'an* tentang loyalitas keagamaan di tengah masyarakat multikultural.

Kata Kunci: *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*; tafsir *maqāsidī*; loyalitas kewargaan; integritas humanistik; moderasi beragama.

Introduction

Indonesia continues to face serious challenges related to religious intolerance, which remain empirically documented. A report by the Wahid Foundation (2021) revealed the persistence of religious intolerance rooted in the misuse of religious authority, while the Religious Harmony Index published by the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia (2025) recorded a national score of 67.46, categorized as “moderately harmonious,” although identity-based tensions continue to persist in various regions.¹ Setara Institute (2020) also documented 180 incidents of violations of religious freedom within a single year.² These data indicate that religious exclusivism is not merely a discursive issue, but a concrete social phenomenon requiring more critical and methodologically grounded academic analysis.

One of the concepts frequently associated with this issue is *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*. The concept is generally understood as loyalty toward the Muslim community (*Al-Walā'*) and dissociation from parties perceived as opposing the faith (*Al-Barā'*).³ Historically, this concept developed within the tradition of classical Islamic theology

1 Sarah Shafira Sandy, “Indeks Kerukunan Umat Beragama Naik, Tertinggi Dalam 11 Tahun,” kemenag.go.id, 2025, <https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/indeks-kerukunan-umat-beragama-naik-tertinggi-dalam-11-tahun-3l3lw>.

2 Tatang Guritno and Kristian Erdianto, “Riset Setara Institute: Intoleransi Atas Kebebasan Beragama-Berkeyakinan Paling Banyak Terjadi Pada 2020,” nasional.kompas.com, 2021, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/04/06/18065451/riset-setara-institute-intoleransi-atas-kebebasan-beragama-berkeyakinan>.

3 Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, Mira Menzfeld, and Yasmina Hedider, “Interpretations of *Al-Walā' Wa Al-Barā'* in Everyday Lives of Salafis in Germany,” *Religions* 10, no. 2 (2019): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020124>.

and later gained a more systematic formulation in modern Salafi-Wahhabi discourse, particularly through the intellectual trajectories of Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.⁴ Nevertheless, radicalism cannot be reduced solely to theological factors, since it is also shaped by political, economic, and socio-structural conditions.⁵ In many studies, theological narratives function primarily as ideological legitimization for socio-political conflicts grounded in religious identity.⁶

This article departs from a central problem, namely an epistemological tendency to interpret Qur'anic verses on loyalty in a literal manner without adequately considering their historical context and the ethical objectives of the Qur'an.⁷ Within this approach, the term *awliyā'* is frequently understood in an essentialist sense as referring to all non-Muslims, thereby constructing a rigid dichotomy between the "community of believers" and the "other." Consequently, verses revealed within particular situational contexts during the formative period of Islam are reduced to universal and absolute norms governing socio-religious relations.⁸

In addition to the epistemological problem, this article is also grounded in a methodological concern, namely the dominance of partial and non-integrative interpretations that tend to overlook the *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* dimensions of justice, protection of life, social cohesion, and public welfare.⁹ The combination of ahistorical textual readings and fragmented analyses of the Qur'an's overarching message ultimately contributes to the strengthening of identity-based exclusivism and the weakening of civic principles within plural societies.¹⁰ Therefore, a *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach is required, one capable of integrating text, context, and the ethical objectives of the Qur'an in a more comprehensive, contextual, and humanistic manner.

4 Joas Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of The Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala Wa Al-Bara," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 1 (2012): 93–110, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743811001267>.

5 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367>.

6 Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–239, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004>.

7 Abdullah Saeed, *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a Contemporary Approach* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 115–128, <https://archive.org/details/interpretingqura0000saeed>.

8 Joas Wagemakers, "The Concept of Al-Wala' Wa Al-Bara' in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi," *Religion Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 820–835, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00096>.

9 Abdul Mustaqim, "Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsir Maqashidi Sebagai Basis Moderasi Islam," *UIN Sunan Kalijaga* 9 (2019): 45–49.

10 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7szvv>.

Studies on *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* can be divided into two major approaches: viewing it as an exclusive doctrinal framework or as a contextualized religious concept. Quintan Wiktorowicz explains that Salafi-jihadi movements construct their identity through exclusive loyalty and rejection of outside groups. Joas Wagemakers argues that this concept constitutes a central foundation of Salafi-jihadi ideology, particularly in the thought of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who closely links it to takfir and jihād. Meanwhile, Olivier Roy demonstrates that modern Islamic radicalism has evolved through literalist interpretations of religion detached from local cultural contexts. Consequently, *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is frequently understood as a rigid boundary separating the “community of believers” from the “other.”¹¹¹²¹³

On the other hand, a number of contemporary studies demonstrate that *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is not always understood in an exclusive manner. Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf explains that the concept also functions as a strategy for constructing the social identity of Muslim minorities within plural societies.¹⁴ Robert W. Hefner further argues that Muslim religiosity can be compatible with democracy and social pluralism.¹⁵ In the context of reinterpretation, Yasser Ellethy explains that the Qur'anic verses concerning loyalty are closely related to the context of conflict and political allegiance during the early Islamic period, and therefore should be understood historically and contextually.¹⁶ This perspective resonates with the contextual hermeneutics of Abdullah Saeed¹⁷ and the thought of Khaled Abou El Fadl,¹⁸ both of whom emphasize the importance of interpreting Qur'anic verses in light of their historical context and ethical objectives. Accordingly, *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* can be reoriented toward the values of justice, human dignity, and harmonious social coexistence.

11 Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–239, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004>.

12 Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139049399>.

13 Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University, 2006).

14 Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, Mira Menzfeld, and Yasmina Hedider, “Interpretations of *Al-Walā' Wa Al-Barā'* in Everyday Lives of Salafis in Germany,” *Religions* 10, no. 2 (2019): 1–18, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020124>.

15 Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*.

16 Yaser Ellethy, “*Al-Walā' Wa Al-Barā'* (Loyalty and Disavowal): Reconstructing a ‘Creed’ in the Muslim Hermeneutics of ‘Otherness,’” in *Religiously Exclusive, Socially Inclusive: A Religious Response*, ed. Bernhard Reitsma and Erika Nes-Visscher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023), 163–82, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048556434-012>.

17 Abdullah Saeed, *Reading the Qur'an in the Twenty-First Century: A Contextualist Approach* (London: Routledge, 2014).

18 Khaled Abou El Fadl, *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists* (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005).

Nevertheless, studies on *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* have largely focused on the ideological dimensions of Salafism, exclusive identity formation, and their relationship with religious radicalism. These studies generally remain confined to historical, political, or doctrinal critiques of Salafi-jihadi thought without reconstructing the concept through a *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach. Furthermore, research that connects this concept to the citizenship context of Indonesia's pluralistic and democratic society remains limited.

Unlike previous studies, this article not only critiques the exclusivist orientation of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*, but also reconstructs its epistemological foundation through *maqāṣidī* interpretation by integrating textual analysis, socio-historical context, and the concept of citizenship within the modern nation-state. Based on this scholarly gap, the article offers a *maqāṣidī* reinterpretation of the verses concerning *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* in order to develop a paradigm of loyalty that is more humanistic, contextual, and compatible with modern civic life.

Based on this background, the study seeks to reconstruct the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through three principal questions. *First*, how has the concept of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* been understood within classical to modern-contemporary exegetical traditions? *Second*, how does *maqāṣidī* interpretation reinterpret the Qur'anic verses on loyalty? *Third*, how can the results of this reinterpretation be applied within the context of citizenship in Indonesia's plural society? This study is expected to enrich contemporary Qur'anic interpretation studies while also contributing theoretically to the strengthening of religious moderation and social integration in Indonesia.

This research employs a qualitative method based on library research using a *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach. Primary sources include Qur'anic verses related to *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*, particularly Q. 5:57, Q. 9:23, and Q. 60:1, as well as classical to modern-contemporary *tafsīr* works. Secondary sources consist of literature on Salafism, radicalism, religious moderation, *maqāṣidī* interpretation, and *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*. The analysis is conducted descriptively and analytically by emphasizing the relationship between textual meaning, historical context, and the ethical objectives of the Qur'an based on the *maqāṣidī* interpretation theory of Abdul Mustaqim.¹⁹ This approach is employed to produce a more contextual and humanistic understanding of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* within contemporary Indonesian society.

19 The *maqāṣidī* exegesis of Abdul Mustaqim is operationalized through several stages: comprehensive interpretation, linguistic analysis, consideration of macro and micro contexts, distinguishing between *uṣūl-furū'*, *wasīlah-ghāyah*, and *al-tsawābit-al-mutaghayyirāt*, understanding the three domains of Qur'anic *maqāṣid*, integrating social sciences, humanities, and scientific approaches, and remaining open to criticism; Abdul Mustaqim, *Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsir Maqāṣidī Sebagai Basis Moderasi Islam* (Yogyakarta: UIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 2019), <https://archive.org/details/abdul-mustaqim-argumentasi-keniscayaan-tafsir-maqashidi-sebagai-basis-moderasi-i>.

The Theological Construction of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*

Etymologically, *Al-Walā'* derives from the root *waliya*, which denotes closeness, and later developed into the meanings of loyalty, protection, and allegiance.²⁰ Terminologically, *Al-Walā'* refers to a Muslim's loyalty to Allah, the Prophet, and fellow believers through mutual support and affection.²¹ Conversely, *Al-Barā'* derives from the root *bara'a*, meaning dissociation or disavowal, and is conceptually understood as distancing oneself from disbelief and all things that contradict faith.²² In the Qur'an, derivations of *Al-Walā'* appear approximately 238 times, while *Al-Barā'* appears around 27 times,²³ indicating that loyalty, affiliation, and the boundaries of religious identity constitute significant themes within the Qur'anic social ethic.

The development of the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* can be divided into several phases. During the classical period (2nd–10th century AH), the concept was mainly discussed within Islamic jurisprudence concerning loyalty among Muslims, the protection of *dhimmi* communities, and the prohibition against assisting enemies, and the concept had not yet emerged as an independent theological doctrine. Narrations attributed to Ahmad ibn Hanbal even regarded practices of loyalty and dissociation toward particular individuals as *bid'ah*.²⁴ In the pre-modern phase, Ibn Taymiyyah rejected *tashabbuh* in ritual and religious identity, while still permitting social relations with non-Muslims.²⁵ In the modern phase, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab incorporated *al-barā' min al-mushrikīn* into the doctrine of *tawhīd*, thereby transforming it into an independent theological doctrine.²⁶ In the contemporary period, the concept was further systematized within Salafi-jihadi discourse through

20 Ibn Manzhur, *Lisan Al-'Arab* (Kairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1119), 465–467; Al-Rāghib Al-Aṣṣahānī, *Mufradāt Alfāz Al-Qur'ān* (Damaskus: Dār al-Qalam, 1412), 885–886.

21 Muḥammad Al-'Uṣaymīn, *Al-Qawāl Al-Mufīd 'alā Kitāb Al-Tawhīd* (Kairo: Maktabat al-'Ilm, 1994), 234–235.

22 Halimatus Sa'diyah and Amrulloh, "Al-Walā' Wal Barā': Loyalty, Identity, and the Prophet's Message through the Lens of Hadith Criticism," *Journal of Qur'an and Hadith* 14, no. 2 (2025): 271–87, <https://doi.org/10.15408/quhas.v14i2.46550>.

23 Muḥammad Fuād Abdurrahmān Al-Bāqī, *Al-Mu'jam Al-Mufahras Li Alfāz Al-Qur'ān Al-Karīm* (Kairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, n.d.), 758–762 and 120–121.

24 Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abī Ya'la, *Ṭabaqāt Al-Ḥanābilah*, (Kairo: Maṭba'at al-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyah, 1952), 2:82.

25 Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Taymiyyah, *Iqtīdā' Al-Ṣirāt Al-Mustaḳīm Li-Mukhālafat Aṣḥāb Al-Jahīm* (Riyadh: Dār 'Ālam al-Kutub, 1999), 1:207–240, Mohd Sulaiman Nuba et al., "Ibn Taimiyyah's View of Al-Tasyabbuh: An Analysis of His Iqtida' Al-Sirat Al-Mustaḳīm Li Mukhalafah Ashab Al - Jahim," *RIS: Online Journal Research in Islamic Studies* 3, no. 1 (2016): 43–55, <https://doi.org/10.15364/ris16-0301-02>.

26 Muḥammad ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhāb, *Al-Durar Al-Saniyyah Fi Al-Ajwibah Al-Najdiyyah* (Riyadh: Dār al-Iftā', 1996), 2:88–95.

the notion of modern *jāhiliyyah* developed by Sayyid Qutb²⁷ and through the work of Muhammad Sa'id al-Qahtani, *al-Walā' wa al-Barā' fī al-Islām*.

The resurgence of the doctrine of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* has been shaped by several factors: the trauma of colonialism and the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924, which triggered a political and identity crisis within the Muslim world;²⁸ conflicts in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Gulf War, which generated narratives of a “war against Islam”;²⁹ the post-1973 oil boom expansion of Wahhabism through mosques, madrasas, scholarships, and religious literature;³⁰ scripturalist readings that neglect historical context, *nāsikh-mansūkh*, and *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*; and the socio-political marginalization experienced by certain Muslim communities, which transformed the doctrine into a means of strengthening collective identity and solidarity.³¹

From an epistemological perspective, the doctrine of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is constructed upon several fundamental assumptions;³² *first*, the world is perceived dichotomously as divided between *Dār Al-Islām* and *Dār Al-Kufr*. *Second*, love for Allah is believed to necessitate hatred toward His enemies, such that hostility toward unbelievers is regarded as part of faith itself. *Third*, Muslim identity is understood in an exclusivist manner through the rejection of those outside Islam. *Fourth*, loyalty to creed is placed above national, ethnic, and humanitarian loyalties. *Fifth*, non-Muslims are perceived as threats to faith, particularly when they occupy dominant positions over Muslims.

Based on the foregoing discussion, *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* encompasses three dynamically interconnected elements: faith, identity, and politics. Faith is recognized through identity, and in the name of identity, loyalty is constructed in order to attain political power oriented toward the establishment of a puritanical and exclusive

27 Sayyid Qutb, *Ma'ālim Fī Al-Tariq* (Kairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1964), 19-21; John L. Esposito, *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 51-63.

28 Mohamed Bin Ali, “Al-Wala' Wal Bara' in Wahhabism: From A Tool to Fight Shirk to Takfir of Muslim Leaders,” *Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2019): 28-43, <https://doi.org/10.15640/jisc.v7n1a3>.

29 Andrew Glazzard et al., “Islamist Violent Extremism: A New Form of Conflict or Business as Usual?,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 6, no. 1 (2017): 1-19, <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.503>.

30 Abdul-Karim Khan, “Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement,” *Nova Religio* 17, no. 2 (2013): 106-8, <https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2013.17.2.106>.

31 Abdul Majid et al., “Salafi, Hadith, and Islamic Law: Identity Politics and Wahabi Movement in East Kalimantan,” *Abkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 23, no. 1 (2023): 147-70, <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v23i1.32139>.

32 Yusuf Hanafiah, Zalik Nuryana, and Yazida Ichsan, “Unveiling The True Concept of Al-Wala' Wal Baro': A Refreshing Perspective on Aqidah Nir Radicalism in Islamic Education,” *IJISH (International Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities)* 6, no. 1 (2023): 33-44, <https://doi.org/10.26555/ijish.v6i1.7953>; Melisa Diah Maharani, “Salafism in Indonesia: Ideology, Identity, and Politics,” *Islamic Thought Review* 3, no. 1 (2025): 1-13, <https://doi.org/10.30983/itr.v3i1.9352>.

understanding of religion. Accordingly, this article examines the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through a *maqāṣidī* interpretive framework by reconstructing three central Qur'anic verses: Q. 5:57, Q. 9:23, and Q. 60:1.

Maqāṣidī Reconstruction of the Qur'anic Verses on Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'

The following three verses constitute the principal foundation of the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*, which has frequently been employed to justify exclusivist attitudes and, in some cases, misinterpreted as legitimizing intolerance, radicalism, and terrorism. The analysis is conducted through three stages: first, reconstructing classical, medieval, and modern-contemporary interpretations; second, examining both the macro socio-historical context and the micro context of the occasions of revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*); and third, reinterpreting the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* in order to produce a more contextual, inclusive, and relevant understanding for contemporary civic realities.

Q. 5:57: Religious Mockery as the Effective Cause ('Illah), Not Religious Identity

"O you who believe, do not take as allies those who ridicule and mock your religion from among those who were given the Scripture before you and the disbelievers. And fear Allah, if indeed you are believers." (Q. 5:57)

At a general level, Al-Ṭabarī explains that Q. 5:57 prohibits believers from taking the People of the Book and polytheists as *aʿwliyā'* because they mock religion, prayer, and the call to prayer (*adhān*).³³ Al-Qurṭubī interprets this prohibition as a form of protection for the loyalty of faith and the cohesion of the Muslim community,³⁴ which, within the framework of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*, relates to *ḥifẓ al-dīn*. However, modern exegetes such as Abduh understand the verse within a socio-political context, arguing that the prohibition concerns hostility and contempt toward Islam rather than mere religious difference.³⁵ Ibn 'Āsyūr situates the verse within the framework of preserving the social cohesion of the Muslim community,³⁶ while Al-Zuhailī emphasizes that the prohibition applies specifically to forms of

33 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy Al-Qur'an* (Kairo: Dār Hajr, 2001), 10:540-542.

34 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Ahkām Al-Qur'an* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1964), 6: 217-220.

35 Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr Al-Manār* (Kairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣriyyah al-Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1990), 6:195-200.

36 Muḥammad Ṭāhir Ibn 'Āshūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr* (Tunis: Dār Sahnūn, 1997), 6:249-250.

loyalty that are harmful to Islam and the Muslim community.³⁷

The macro context of Q. 5:57 pertains to the socio-political situation in Medina, where the Muslim community was striving to establish political and social stability amid threats from the Quraysh, hypocritical groups (*munāfiqūn*), and certain members of the People of the Book who allied themselves with the enemies of Islam. In such circumstances, political loyalty and religious identity became crucial for safeguarding the resilience of the Muslim community.³⁸ On the micro level, Al-Qurṭubī narrates that the verse was revealed concerning certain Jews and polytheists who mocked Muslims during prayer, as well as hypocrites who maintained manipulative relations with the Muslim community.³⁹ Therefore, the prohibition in this verse is not directed toward all non-Muslims, but specifically toward those who actively ridicule and show hostility toward religion.

From the perspective of *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 5:57 emphasizes the importance of preserving religious loyalty and the honor of religion in order to protect faith and maintain the stability of the Muslim community. Al-Ṭabarī understands the prohibition against taking those who ridicule religion as *awliya'* because such relations could undermine the integrity of the Muslim community.⁴⁰ However, Ibn 'Ashur emphasizes that the prohibition concerns active hostility rather than mere religious difference.⁴¹ Accordingly, social relations, political cooperation, diplomacy, and even administrative leadership remain permissible as long as they do not threaten religion or the public welfare of the Muslim community. The primary objective (*ghāyah*) of the verse is to preserve the dignity of religion and social solidarity, while the prohibition against taking those who mock religion as *awliya'* functions merely as a means (*wasīlah*) toward that objective. Al-Qurṭubī associates this with the protection of religion as one of the principal objectives of the Shari'ah,⁴² whereas Abduh stresses that the central concern of the verse is hostility, not differences in belief.⁴³

The tsawābit (permanent aspect) of this verse lies in the prohibition against showing loyalty to those who insult and wage hostility against religion, whereas its mutaghayyirāt (changeable aspect) can be seen in the forms of socio-political relations

37 Wahbah Al-Zuhaili, *Al-Tafsīr Al-Munir Fī Al-'Aqidah Wa Al-Syari'ah Wa Al-Manhaj* (Damaskus: Dār al-Fikr, 2005), 6:249-250.

38 Sayyid Quṭb, *Fī Zilāl Al-Qur'an*, (Kairo: Dār al-Syurūq, 2003), 2:882-885.

39 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Ahkām Al-Qur'an*, 6:221-224.

40 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy Al-Qur'an*, 10: 426-428.

41 Muhammad Ṭāhir Ibn 'Āshūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr* (Tunis: Dār Sahnūn, 1997), 6: 233-235.

42 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Ahkām Al-Qur'an*, 6:217-219.

43 Riḍā, *Tafsīr Al-Manār*, 6:441-443.

with non-Muslims within plural societies. Al-Zuhaili explains that the prohibition applies only when such relationships endanger Islam and the Muslim community. Consequently, civic cooperation, interreligious dialogue, and the protection of civil rights may still be established on the basis of *maṣlaḥah*. Accordingly, the *maqāṣid* of Q. 5:57 encompass individual reform (*iṣlāḥ al-fard*), social stability (*iṣlāḥ al-mujtama'*), and global harmony (*iṣlāḥ al-'ālam*). From this perspective emerge the principles of *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, *ḥifẓ al-'aql*, *ḥifẓ al-nasl*, *ḥifẓ al-māl*, *ḥifẓ al-daulah*, and *ḥifẓ al-bī'ah* as comprehensive safeguards for religion, humanity, society, and the social environment.⁴⁴

Q. 9:23: Freedom of Religion as a Maqāṣid

“O you who believe, do not take your fathers and your brothers as allies or protectors if they prefer disbelief over faith. Whoever among you takes them as allies, then they are indeed the wrongdoers.” (Q. 9:23)

At a general level, Al-Qurṭubī explains that this verse concerns *al-walāyah*, which should not be granted to unbelievers even when they are close family members.⁴⁵ Al-Ṭabarī understands it as a warning that loyalty to Allah and His Messenger must take precedence over familial loyalty.⁴⁶ Al-Rāzī further emphasizes that loving one's family does not mean making them the primary reference in matters of creed and politics.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, Al-Zamakhsharī highlights the rhetorical dimension (*balāghah*) of the phrase *ābā'akum wa ikhwanakum* as an affirmation that loyalty to faith must be prioritized above kinship ties.⁴⁸ In a similar vein, Al-Ālūsī interprets the verse within the framework of *fiqh al-awlawiyyāt*, namely prioritizing faith whenever it conflicts with family interests.⁴⁹ Al-Biqā'i views the verse as part of the formation of a collective Muslim identity aimed at protecting the community from the influence of parties hostile to Islam.⁵⁰ As for Al-Zuhailī, he stresses that the prohibition of *muwālāh* toward unbelievers who are hostile to Islam does not negate good and humane relations in general, because what is prohibited is *al-muwālāh al-siyāsiyyah*,

44 Al-Zuhailī, *Al-Taḥqīq al-Munīr Fī Al-'Aqīdah Wa Al-Syarī'ah Wa Al-Manhaj*, 6:240-242.

45 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Ahkām Al-Qur'an*, 6:95-97.

46 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy Al-Qur'an*, 14:485-487.

47 Fakhrud-dīn Al-Rāzī, *Maḥāṭib Al-Ghaib* (Beirut: Muassasah Al-Tarikhi al-'Arabi, 1999), 16:11-13.

48 Abū al-Qāsim Mahmūd bin Umar Al-Zamakhsharī, *Al-Kasasyāf 'an Haqāiq Wa Ghawāmid Al-Tanzil Wa 'Uyūn Al-Aqāwīl Fī Wujūh Al-Ta'wīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 2009), 2:259.

49 Shihāb al-Dīn Al-Ālūsī, *Rūḥ Al-Ma'ānī* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1994), 10:131-132.

50 Burhān al-Dīn Al-Biqā'i, *Naẓm Al-Durar Fī Tanāsul Al-Āyāt Wa Al-Suwar* (Cairo: al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.), 8:318-320.

not *al-mu'āmalah al-insāniyyah*.⁵¹

In its macro context, Q. 9:23 was revealed during the final phase of the formation of the Islamic community in Medina, particularly after the repeated betrayals of the polytheists and during the preparation for the Tabuk expedition. The sūrah largely addresses the political consolidation of the Muslim community and the affirmation of a collective Muslim identity.⁵² On the micro level, the verse relates to certain Companions who still maintained strong emotional attachments to their polytheist relatives. Al-Wāḥidī narrates that this verse was revealed concerning Muslims who found it difficult to detach their loyalty from family members who remained aligned with the polytheist camp.⁵³

From the perspective of *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 9:23 emphasizes that loyalty to faith must take precedence over loyalty to family or social groups. Al-Ṭabarī explains that the prohibition against taking fathers and brothers as *awliyā'* is directed specifically toward those who prefer disbelief over faith. Thus, the essence of the verse is not the severance of family ties, but rather the protection of faith and creed.⁵⁴

Within the domain of *furū'*, Al-Zuhailī distinguishes between prohibited political allegiance and permissible humanitarian relations. Accordingly, social interaction with non-Muslims remains permissible as long as it does not threaten religion.⁵⁵ The *ghāyah* of the verse is to preserve the purity of faith and the stability of the Muslim community, while the prohibition itself functions as a means (*wasilah*) for *ḥifẓ al-dīn*. Al-Rāzī further stresses that what is prohibited is not loving one's family, but rather treating them as the ultimate authority in matters of creed and political allegiance.⁵⁶

The *tsawābit* of Q. 9:23 lies in the principle that loyalty to Allah and faith must not be subordinated to familial primordialism, whereas its *mutaghayyirāt* can be seen in the forms of social relations with non-Muslim family members within plural societies. Ibn 'Ashur explains that the prohibition applies in situations of hostility toward Islam rather than mere differences in belief.⁵⁷ Therefore, family relations, social cooperation, and civic coexistence remain permissible as long as they do not interfere with the freedom of faith. Accordingly, the *maqāṣid* of this verse encompass

51 Al-Zuhailī, *Al-Taḥqīq al-Munīr Fī Al-'Aqīdah Wa Al-Syari'ah Wa Al-Manhaj*, 10:168–170.

52 'Ashūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr*, 10:160–165.

53 Al-Wāḥidī, *Asbāb Al-Nuzūl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, 1991), 250.

54 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy Al-Qur'an*, 14:333–335.

55 Al-Zuhailī, *Al-Taḥqīq al-Munīr Fī Al-'Aqīdah Wa Al-Syari'ah Wa Al-Manhaj*, 10:180–182.

56 Al-Rāzī, *Maḥāṭib Al-Ghaib*, 16:62–64.

57 'Ashūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr*, 10:167–169.

iṣlāḥ al-fard, *iṣlāḥ al-mujtama'*, and *iṣlāḥ al-ālam*, which give rise to the principles of *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-naḥs*, *ḥifẓ al-aql*, *ḥifẓ al-nasl*, *ḥifẓ al-māl*, *ḥifẓ al-daulah*, and *ḥifẓ al-bi'ah* as comprehensive safeguards for religion, humanity, and social harmony.

Q. 60:1: State Sovereignty as a Universal Framework

"O you who believe, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies, extending affection to them while they have rejected the truth that has come to you. They have expelled the Messenger and yourselves merely because you believe in Allah, your Lord..." (Q. 60:1)

At a general level, Q. 60:1 prohibits believers from taking as *awliyā'* those who are hostile toward Islam and the Muslim community, particularly in the form of ideological loyalty, strategic support, or the disclosure of information that could endanger the community. Al-Ṭabarī explains that this prohibition is not directed toward all non-Muslims, but specifically toward those who act with hostility and betrayal against the Muslim community.⁵⁸ Ibn Kathīr further clarifies that the actions of Ḥaṭīb, within the micro context of this verse, were motivated by fear for the safety of his family rather than hypocrisy.⁵⁹ Meanwhile, Al-Rāzī interprets the verse as a prohibition against granting political and security loyalty to parties that threaten the existence of the Muslim community.⁶⁰ Ibn 'Āshūr subsequently emphasizes that the verse aims to preserve socio-political stability and the integrity of the Muslim community without prohibiting fair and just social relations with non-Muslims.⁶¹

The macro socio-historical context of Q. 60:1 is related to the preparation for the *Fath Makkah* after the Quraysh violated the Treaty of *Ḥudaybiyah*. In such circumstances, the leakage of military information to the Quraysh was regarded as a serious threat to the security of the Muslim community in Medina.⁶² The micro context of the verse concerns the incident involving Ḥaṭīb ibn Abī Balṭa'ah, who had family members in Mecca without tribal protection. Out of concern for their safety, he secretly sent a letter to the Quraysh containing information about the planned conquest of Mecca.⁶³ After the letter was discovered, Muhammad accepted Ḥaṭīb's explanation and forgave him, recognizing that his actions were motivated by fear

58 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wīl Āy Al-Qur'an*, 18:60–64.

59 Abū Al-Fidā' Ismā'il Ibn Katsīr, *Tafsīr Al-Qur'ān Al-Adzīm* (Riyadh: Dār Ṭayyibah, 1999), 8:89–92.

60 Al-Rāzī, *Mafātih Al-Ghaib*, 29:295–297.

61 'Āshūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr*, 28:145–148.

62 'Āshūr, *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr*, 28:145–148.

63 Al-Wāḥidī, *Asbāb Al-Nuzūl*, 434–435.

for his family rather than hypocrisy, especially considering that he was among the veterans of the Battle of Badr.⁶⁴

From the perspective of *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 60:1 emphasizes the importance of preserving religious loyalty, communal security, and political integrity against parties hostile to Islam. Al-Ṭabarī explains that the prohibition against taking enemies as *awliyā'* signifies the prohibition of providing support to parties engaged in hostility against the Muslim community. Accordingly, the verse is closely related to *ḥifẓ al-dīn* and the security of the Muslim community. Nevertheless, this prohibition does not imply severing relations with non-Muslims, since Q. 60:8 explicitly permits fair and benevolent relations with those who do not show hostility toward Islam. Therefore, social interaction, economic cooperation, diplomacy, and citizenship belong to the contextual domain of *furū'*. Ibn 'Ashur further emphasizes that the verse prohibits political betrayal and threats to security, rather than humanitarian relations. Thus, the *ghāyah* of this verse is to preserve socio-political stability and prevent the harm caused by betrayal, which in the modern context may be applied to the protection of state data, diplomatic ethics, and information security.⁶⁵⁶⁶

The *tsawābit* of this verse lies in the principles of maintaining loyalty to truth, protecting the community, and rejecting betrayal, whereas its *mutaghayyirāt* can be seen in the forms of interreligious relations, diplomacy, and citizenship that continue to evolve according to historical and social contexts. Therefore, the meaning of *awliyā'* should not be understood as a prohibition against befriending all non-Muslims, but rather as a prohibition against forms of cooperation that threaten security and social justice. From the perspective of *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 60:1 encompasses *maqāṣid fardiyyah*, *ijtimā'īyyah*, and *siyāsiyyah*, which give rise to the principles of *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-naḥs*, *ḥifẓ al-mujtama'*, and *ḥifẓ al-da'wlah* as safeguards for religion, humanity, social stability, and national security. Thus, the prohibition contained in this verse is preventive in nature and oriented toward the realization of *maṣlaḥah*, rather than discrimination against non-Muslims.

64 Katsir, *Tafsir Al-Qur'an Al-Adzim*, 8:89–92.

65 Al-Ṭabarī, *Jāmi' Al-Bayān 'an Ta'wil Āy Al-Qur'ān*, 22:548–551.

66 'Ashūr, *Al-Tahrir Wa Al-Tanwīr*, 28:145–148.

Reinterpretation of the Theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through *Maqāṣidī* Interpretation: Reconstructing Civic Loyalty in Contemporary Indonesia

Q. 5:57: Identifying Active Hostility as the 'Illah of the Prohibition of Loyalty

The theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* in Indonesia needs to be reexamined through a *maqāṣidī* interpretive framework so that it is not understood in an exclusivist manner. Salafi-jihadi groups generally interpret this concept as absolute loyalty to Muslims and rejection of non-Muslims.⁶⁷ However, Uriya Shavit demonstrates that moderate Muslim scholars understand the prohibition of loyalty as applying only to parties actively hostile toward Muslims, rather than to all non-Muslims.⁶⁸ Ibn 'Ashur likewise emphasizes that the *'illah* (effective cause) behind the prohibition in Q. 5:57 is ridicule and hostility toward Islam, not religious difference in itself. Therefore, *al-walā'* should be understood as the protection of communal welfare (*maṣlahah*), rather than social separation based on religious identity. This approach is consistent with contemporary *maqāṣid* thought, which places justice, tolerance, and public welfare at the center of the objectives of the Shari'ah.⁶⁹ Jasser Auda further argues that *maqāṣid* must serve as the foundation of Islamic law in order to maintain its relevance within modern life.

In the Indonesian context, the *maqāṣidī* reinterpretation of *al-walā'* gives rise to a concept of loyalty that integrates faith and nationalism. This interpretation accords with the "Trilogy of Ukhuwah" formulated by KH Ahmad Shiddiq, which consists of *ukhuwah Islāmiyyah*, *waṭaniyyah*, and *bashariyyah*. Research by Nur Ali demonstrates that interreligious literacy is effective in preventing radicalism because it affirms that Islam and Indonesian national identity can coexist harmoniously. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, through the concept of *fiqh al-muwāṭanah*, likewise emphasizes the importance of equal citizenship for both Muslims and non-Muslims. Accordingly, *Al-Barā'* in Q. 5:57 should be understood as the rejection of hostility that threatens the Muslim community, rather than the severance of social relations with all non-Muslims. Al-Zuhailī further emphasizes that social cooperation, interreligious dialogue, and national loyalty do not fall within the prohibition of the verse as long

67 M. Sultan Latif Rahmatulloh and Durotul Ngazizah, "Tafsir Salafi Online Di Indonesia; Al-Walā' Wa Al-Barā' Sebagai Landasan Pergerakan Salafi Jihadis," *Journal of Islamic Civilization* 3, no. 2 (March 30, 2022): 160–73, <https://doi.org/10.33086/jic.v3i2.2650>.

68 Uri Shavit, "Can Muslims Befriend Non-Muslims? Debating Al-Walā' Wa-Al-Barā' in Theory and Practice," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 1 (2014): 67–88, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2013.851329>.

69 Tawfiek A.S. Mohammed, "A Scientometric Study of Maqasid Al-Shariah Research: Trending Issues, Hotspot Research, and Co-Citation Analysis," *Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics* 9, no. 2 (2024): 87–90, <https://doi.org/10.3389/frma.2024.1439407>.

as they do not harm the Muslim community.⁷⁰⁷¹⁷²

Through *maqāṣidī* interpretation, loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI) and Pancasila may be understood as part of *ḥifẓ al-daulah*, namely the protection of the state for the realization of collective welfare (*maṣlaḥah*). This is because safeguarding religion also means presenting Islam as a faith that supports peace and social harmony. Consequently, Indonesian Muslims who preserve national unity and foster interreligious cooperation are, in essence, practicing *Al-Walā' al-maqāṣidī*. Furthermore, the concept of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is more appropriately applied in situations of war and active conflict rather than within peaceful societies such as Indonesia. Therefore, the *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach becomes essential for strengthening religious moderation, tolerance, and the inclusive character of Islam Nusantara, all of which are oriented toward the public welfare of the nation.

Q. 9:23: The Supremacy of Religious Loyalty and the Reconstruction of Civic Loyalty

Within the framework of reinterpreting the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 9:23 cannot be understood as legitimizing permanent hostility toward non-Muslims. Rather, it functions as an ethical mechanism for safeguarding the independence of faith and the security of the Muslim community within the context of conflict in Medina. The prohibition against taking polytheist family members as *awliyā'* should therefore be understood as a prohibition against political loyalty to parties threatening the Muslim community, not as an absolute prohibition of social relations. Andrew F. March explains that religious loyalty and civic loyalty can coexist as long as the state guarantees justice and civil freedom.⁷³ Accordingly, the reinterpretation of this verse gives rise to a paradigm of civic loyalty that is compatible with modern nation-states such as Indonesia.

The reinterpretation of the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through *maqāṣidī* interpretation also shifts the orientation of loyalty from theological exclusivism

70 Slamet, "Trilogi Ukhuwah: Fondasi Pembangunan Indonesia," www.nu.or.id, 2017, <https://www.nu.or.id/opini/trilogi-ukhuwah-fondasi-pembangunan-indonesia-42oXD>.

71 Nur Ali et al., "Interreligious Literacy Learning as a Counter-Radicalization Method: A New Trend among Institutions of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 32, no. 4 (2021): 383–405, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2021.1996978>.

72 David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, "One Nation Under God? Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's Changing Fiqh of Citizenship in The Light of The Islamic Legal Tradition," *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2014): 217–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0277-4>.

73 Andrew F. March, "Political Islam: Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, no. February (2015): 103–23, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-082112-141250>.

toward civic ethics (civic loyalty). Q. 9:23 only prohibits forms of loyalty that result in the subordination of faith, political betrayal, or support for parties hostile to the Muslim community. Therefore, social cooperation, national solidarity, and democratic participation do not fall under the category of prohibited *muwālāh*. Tariq Ramadan emphasizes that the *maqāṣidī* approach aims to restore the Shari'ah to its ethical-humanistic orientation, namely the protection of human dignity, freedom, and social peace. This interpretation is further supported by Al-Zuhailī, who distinguishes between *al-muwālāh al-siyāsiyyah* and *al-mu'āmalah al-insāniyyah*.⁷⁴

Through a *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach, Q. 9:23 can also be understood as a basis for protecting freedom of conscience and the spiritual independence of the individual Muslim. The verse affirms that a person should not submit to primordial family pressure when it threatens their faith. In a modern context, this principle is relevant to the protection of religious freedom within Indonesia's civic framework. Mohammad Hashim Kamali, as cited by Wildan, explains that the objectives of *maqāṣid al-shari'ah* include safeguarding human freedom, social justice, and public welfare.⁷⁵ Accordingly, *maqāṣidī* interpretation should be directed toward *maṣlaḥah 'āmmah* and human peace, so that the reinterpretation of this verse contributes to strengthening social cohesion and interreligious harmony.

Q. 60:1: From Communal Loyalty to Civic Loyalty

Within the framework of reinterpreting the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* through *maqāṣidī* interpretation, Q. 60:1 does not prohibit relations with non-Muslims in an absolute sense. Rather, it prohibits strategic loyalty to parties that threaten the security of the Muslim community.⁷⁶ Al-Qurṭubī explains that the prohibition of taking enemies as *awliyā'* relates specifically to political support and protection for those who wage war against Islam. Similarly, Fakhr al-Din Al-Rāzī emphasizes that the essence of the verse is not general social interaction, but the protection of the community's existence from political and security threats.⁷⁷ This perspective is further reinforced by David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, who show that contemporary Islamic citizenship thought is increasingly moving toward an inclusive form of national loyalty that is compatible with modern civic

74 Abimanyu Iqbal Soesanto, "Radical Reform: Studi Analitis Konsep Ijtihad Tariq Ramadan," *AL-MANHAJ: Jurnal Hukum Dan Pranata Sosial Islam* 4, no. 1 (2022): 51–60, <https://doi.org/10.37680/almanhaj.v4i1.1545>.

75 Wildani Hefni, Imam Mustofa, and Rizqa Ahmadi, "Looking for Moderate Fiqh: The Thought of Mohammad Hashim Kamali on the Reformation of Rigidity and Inflexibility in Islamic Law," *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 10, no. 1 (2025): 30–57, <https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v10i1.10694>.

76 Al-Qurṭubī, *Al-Jāmi' Li Ahkām Al-Qur'ān*, 8:50–54.

77 Al-Rāzī, *Mafātih Al-Ghaib*, 28:287–291.

frameworks.⁷⁸

Through the *maqāṣidī* approach, *Al-Walā'* in Q. 60:1 is reconstructed into civic loyalty oriented toward the protection of the state, public security, and social welfare. In the Indonesian context, safeguarding the NKRI, the constitution, and national unity is understood as part of *ḥifẓ al-dawlah*, which is in harmony with the objectives of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*. Al-Shāṭibī emphasizes that the purpose of the Sharia is to preserve social order and prevent socio-political corruption. In line with this, Felicitas Opwis explains that *maqāṣid* functions as an ethical instrument of Islamic law aimed at ensuring stability and public welfare. Therefore, *al-barā'* is understood as a rejection of actions that threaten national security and sovereignty, rather than a rejection of religious identity itself.^{79,80}

In modern plural societies such as Indonesia, Q. 60:1 demonstrates that Islam continues to provide space for interreligious relations and cooperation, as long as there is no betrayal or hostility involved. Al-Marāghī explains that good relations with non-Muslims are permissible as long as they do not harm the Muslim community or undermine the religion.⁸¹ Accordingly, social, educational, and civic cooperation can be understood as a form of *al-walā' al-maqāṣidī*, oriented toward the realization of shared *maṣlaḥah*. Robert W. Hefner shows that Indonesian Islam has developed within a democratic and pluralistic tradition that integrates Islamic values with modern citizenship.⁸² This approach is consistent with the framework of *Islam Nusantara*, which emphasizes moderation, tolerance, and social cohesion as the foundation of national life.

Typology of the Prohibitions of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* in a *Maqāṣidī* Perspective

Understanding the Qur'anic verses related to *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* must be approached proportionally by considering not only normative-theological aspects but also the social and political contexts as well as the ethical objectives of the Qur'an. From the perspective of *maqāṣidī* interpretation, the prohibition of taking certain

78 David H. Warren and Christine Gilmore, "One Nation Under God? Yusuf Al-Qaradawi's Changing Fiqh of Citizenship in The Light of The Islamic Legal Tradition," *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2014): 217–37, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0277-4>.

79 al-Syatibi, *Al-Muwāfaqat Fi Usul Al-Ahkam*, Vol. II (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n.d.), 8–15.

80 Felicitas Opwis, "Maslaha in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory," *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 2 (2005): 182–223, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3399225>.

81 Aḥmad Muṣṭafā Al-Marāghī, *Tafsīr Al-Marāghī*, (Kairo: Maktabah Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1946), 28:66–68.

82 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 12–30, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7szvv>.

parties as *awliyā'* is not absolute toward all non-Muslims, but is instead related to specific causes and consequences that threaten communal welfare, such as the ridicule of religion, pressures of familial loyalty, and political betrayal. Therefore, each verse contains its own *'illah* (effective legal cause) and *maqāṣidī* orientation according to its revelatory context.

Within the *maqāṣidī* framework, the prohibitions of *Al-Walā'* in the Qur'an vary according to the social context and the type of threat faced by the Muslim community. The issue of religious mockery in Q. 5:57 is directed toward the protection of religion and the strengthening of ethical tolerance. The tension between familial loyalty and religious commitment in Q. 9:23 highlights the importance of faith integrity and civic loyalty in national life. Meanwhile, Q. 60:1 relates to political betrayal that threatens communal security, and therefore is oriented toward the protection of the state and constitutional loyalty. Through this approach, the verses of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* can be understood in a more contextual, moderate, and relevant manner for contemporary multicultural societies, as illustrated in the following table:

Table 1. Typology of Prohibitions of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* in *Maqāṣidī* Interpretation

No.	Verse	Effective Cause (' <i>Illah</i>)	Primary Maqāṣid	Contemporary Relevance
1	Q. 5:57	Religious mockery	<i>ḥifẓ al-dīn, ḥifẓ al-mujtama'</i>	Ethics of tolerance
2	Q. 9:23	Familial loyalty pressure	Freedom of faith	Civic loyalty
3	Q. 60:1	Political betrayal	<i>ḥifẓ al-daulah</i>	Constitutional loyalty

A Reconstruction Model of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*: From Theological Exclusivism to Humanistic Integrity

In the classical paradigm, *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is understood as absolute loyalty to fellow Muslims and rejection of non-Muslims. *Al-Walā'* is defined as faith-based loyalty, while *Al-Barā'* is understood as social and political separation from those outside the Muslim community. This paradigm developed within the Salafi-Wahhabi tradition, which tends to view religious relations in dichotomous terms between the community of faith and the community of disbelief. As a result, interreligious relations are often interpreted in an exclusivist and confrontational manner.

The epistemological problem of this paradigm lies in the textual reading of verses on loyalty without adequate consideration of historical context, *asbāb al-nuzūl*, and the universal objectives of the Qur'an. Contextual verses are treated as absolute and universal rules governing all forms of social relations. This approach neglects the values of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* such as justice, peace, and public welfare, thereby producing rigid identity-based loyalty that may contribute to intolerance.

Through the *maqāṣidī* interpretive approach, the verses on *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* are understood based on the objectives of the *Sharī'ah* rather than identity alone. The prohibition of taking certain groups as *awliyā'* is related to hostility, betrayal, and threats to security, not to religious difference itself. Thus, the focus of the verses is directed toward the protection of religion, life, social stability, and collective welfare.

Based on this reinterpretation, *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* is reconstructed toward a humanistic-civic paradigm. *Al-Walā'* is understood as commitment to justice, public welfare, and national loyalty, while *al-Barā'* is understood as rejection of violence, extremism, and actions that damage social peace. In the Indonesian context, loyalty to the NKRI, Pancasila, and plural social life is seen as compatible with *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* and the principles of a multicultural society.

Table 2. Epistemological Reconstruction Model of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'*

No.	Stage	Description
1	Classical Paradigm	<i>Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'</i> is understood as absolute loyalty to fellow Muslims and rejection of non-Muslims. This paradigm views religious relations in dichotomous terms, leading to exclusivist interpretations of interfaith relations.
2	Epistemological Problem	The interpretation of verses is conducted textually without adequate attention to historical context, <i>asbāb al-nuzūl</i> , and <i>maqāṣid al-sharī'ah</i> . As a result, religious loyalty is understood rigidly and may contribute to intolerance.
3	<i>Maqāṣidī</i> Deconstruction	<i>Maqāṣidī</i> interpretation understands the prohibition of taking certain groups as <i>awliyā'</i> not based on religious identity, but on hostility, betrayal, and threats to security and collective welfare.
4	Humanistic-Civic Paradigm	<i>Al-Walā'</i> is defined as commitment to justice, public welfare, and national loyalty, while <i>Al-Barā'</i> is understood as rejection of violence, extremism, and actions that undermine social peace.

Conclusion

This article demonstrates that the theology of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* cannot be understood merely as a doctrine of social separation based on religious identity. Instead, it must be read within the framework of the ethical objectives and universal welfare (*maṣlahah*) of the Qur'an. Through a *maqāṣidī* interpretation of Q. 5:57, Q. 9:23, and Q. 60:1, this study finds that the prohibition of loyalty is not based on non-Muslim identity, but rather on active hostility, religious mockery, political betrayal, and threats to communal security. Therefore, the *'illah* of the prohibition is contextual and ethical in nature, not theological-discriminatory.

This study also affirms that *Al-Walā'* represents a commitment to justice, communal protection, and moral integrity, while *Al-Barā'* signifies the rejection of destructive actions that threaten humanity and social order. Accordingly, the paradigm of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* shifts from a theological-identity-based loyalty toward a humanistic integrity grounded in *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*, particularly *ḥifẓ al-dīn*, *ḥifẓ al-nafs*, *ḥifẓ al-dawlah*, and *ḥifẓ al-nizām al-ijtimā'ī*.

In the Indonesian context, the *maqāṣidī* reinterpretation of *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* gives rise to the concept of civic loyalty that is compatible with religious pluralism, democracy, and constitutional principles of the state. Loyalty to the *NKRI*, *Pancasila*, and social cohesion does not contradict faith; rather, it forms part of the protection of public welfare and societal stability. Therefore, social relations, interreligious cooperation, humanitarian dialogue, and civic participation do not fall under prohibited *muwālāh*, as long as they do not involve hostility toward religion and the Muslim community.

This study ultimately affirms that the Qur'anic verses on *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* aim to preserve the dignity of religion while simultaneously establishing a peaceful, just, and dignified social order. This reinterpretation also contributes to strengthening religious moderation, social harmony, and national integration in Indonesia's multicultural society.

Data Availability Statement

All data supporting the findings of this study are contained within the article.

Acknowledgments

The authors gratefully acknowledge the colleagues who provided constructive feedback during the research and writing of this article.

Authors' Contributions

All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Fathurrosyid, Achmad Lutfi, Mustofa As'ady, Mahmudi performed material preparation, data collection, and analysis. The first draft of the manuscript was written by Fathurrosyid, and all authors commented on previous versions. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest related to the publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

References

- ‘Āshūr, Muhammad Ṭāhir Ibn. *Al-Tabrīr Wa Al-Tanwīr*. Tunis: Dār Sahnūn, 1997.
- Al-‘Uṣaymīn, Muḥammad. *Al-Qaṣṣ al-Mufīd ‘alā Kitāb Al-Tawḥīd*. Kairo: Maktabat al-‘Ilm, 1994.
- Al-Ālūsī, Shihāb al-Dīn. *Rūḥ Al-Ma‘ānī*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1994.
- Al-Aṣḥānī, Al-Rāghib. *Mufradāt Alfāz Al-Qur’ān*. Damaskus: Dār al-Qalam, n.d.
- Al-Bāqī, Muḥammad Fu’ād ‘Abd al-Bāqī. *Al-Mu‘jam al-Mufahras li-Alfāz al-Qur’ān al-Karīm*. Beirut: Dār al-Ma‘rifah, 2010.
- Al-Biqā’i, Burhān al-Dīn. *Naẓm Al-Durar Fī Tanāsib Al-Āyāt Wa-Al-Surwar*. Cairo: al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.
- Al-Marāghī, Aḥmad Muṣṭafā. *Tafsīr Al-Marāghī*. Kairo: Maktabah Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1946.
- Al-Qurṭubī. *Al-Jāmi‘ li-Aḥkām al-Qur’ān*. Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyyah, 1964.
- Al-Rāzī, Fakhruddīn. *Mafātih Al-Ghaib*. Beirut: Muassasah Al-Tarikhi al-‘Arabi, 1999.
- al-Syatibi. *Al-Muawafaqat Fī Usul Al-Aḥkam*. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, n.d.
- Al-Ṭabarī. *Jāmi‘ Al-Bayān ‘an Ta’wīl Āy Al-Qur’ān*. Kairo: Dār Hajr, 2001.
- Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad. *Al-Durar al-Saniyyah fī al-Ajwibah al-Najdiyyah*. Riyadh: Dār al-Iftā’, 1996.
- Al-Wāḥidī. *Asbāb Al-Nuzūl*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1991.

- Al-Zamakhsharī, Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar. *Al-Kashshāf ‘an Ḥaqā’iq wa-Ghawāmiḍ al-Tanzīl wa-‘Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fī Wujūh al-Ta’wīl*. Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2009.
- Al-Zuhailī, Wahbah. *Al-Tafsīr al-Munīr fī al-‘Aqīdah wa-al-Sharī‘ah wa-al-Manhaj*. Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2005.
- Ali, Mohamed Bin. “Al-Wala’ Wal Bara’ in Wahhabism: From A Tool to Fight Shirk to Takfir of Muslim Leaders.” *Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture* 7, no. 1 (2019): 28–43. <https://doi.org/10.15640/jisc.v7n1a3>.
- Ali, Nur, Benny Afwadzi, Irwan Abdullah, and Muhammad Islahul Mukmin. “Interreligious Literacy Learning as a Counter-Radicalization Method: A New Trend among Institutions of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia.” *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 32, no. 4 (2021): 383–405. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2021.1996978>.
- Azni, Azni, Muhammad Hafis, Asril Amirul Zakariah, Adi Harmanto, Miftahuddin Miftahuddin, and M. Ihsan. “Pseudo-Maṣlaḥah and Epistemological Failure in Marriage Dispensation at Indonesian Religious Courts.” *Jurnal Ilmiah Peuradeun* 13, no. 2 (May 2025): 1399–420. <https://doi.org/10.26811/peuradeun.v13i2.2047>.
- Damir-Geilsdorf, Sabine, Mira Menzfeld, and Yasmina Hedider. “Interpretations of Al-Wala’ Wa Al-Bara’ in Everyday Lives of Salafis in Germany.” *Religions* 10, no. 2 (2019): 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10020124>.
- Ellethy, Yaser. “Al-Walā’ wa Al-Barā’ (Loyalty and Disavowal): Reconstructing a ‘Creed’ in the Muslim Hermeneutics of ‘Otherness.’” In *Religiously Exclusive, Socially Inclusive: A Religious Response*, edited by Bernhard Reitsma and Erika Nes-Visscher, 163–82. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9789048556434-012>.
- Esposito, John L. *Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Fadl, Khaled Abou El. *The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists*. New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005.
- Glazzard, Andrew, Sasha Jespersen, Thomas Maguire, and Emily Winterbotham. “Islamist Violent Extremism: A New Form of Conflict or Business as Usual?” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 6, no. 1 (2017): 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.503>.
- Guritno, Tatang, and Kristian Erdianto. “Riset Setara Institute: Intoleransi Atas Kebebasan Beragama-Berkeyakinan Paling Banyak Terjadi Pada 2020.” *nasional.kompas.com*, 2021. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/04/06/18065451/riset-setara-institute-intoleransi-atas-kebebasan-beragama-berkeyakinan>.
- Hakim, Rakhmat Nur. “Survei Wahid Foundation: Indonesia Masih Rawan Intoleransi Dan Radikalisme.” *nasional.kompas.com*, 2021. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2016/08/01/13363111/survei.wahid.foundation.i?page=all>.

- Hanafiah, Yusuf, Zalik Nuryana, and Yazida Ichsan. "Unveiling The True Concept of Al-Wala' Wal Baro': A Refreshing Perspective on Aqidah Nir Radicalism in Islamic Education." *IJISH (International Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities)* 6, no. 1 (2023): 33–44. <https://doi.org/10.26555/ijish.v6i1.7953>.
- Hefner, Robert W. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7szvv>.
- Hefni, Wildani, Imam Mustofa, and Rizqa Ahmadi. "Looking for Moderate Fiqh: The Thought of Mohammad Hashim Kamali on the Reformation of Rigidity and Inflexibility in Islamic Law." *Al-Istinbath: Jurnal Hukum Islam* 10, no. 1 (2025): 30–57. <https://doi.org/10.29240/jhi.v10i1.10694>.
- Ibn Kathīr, Abū al-Fidā' Ismā'īl. *Tafsīr al-Qur'ān al-'Azīm*. Riyadh: Dār Ṭayyibah, 1999.
- Khan, Abdul-Karim. "Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement." *Nova Religio* 17, no. 2 (2013): 106–8. <https://doi.org/10.1525/nr.2013.17.2.106>.
- Maharani, Melisa Diah. "Salafism in Indonesia: Ideology, Identity, and Politics." *Islamic Thought Review* 3, no. 1 (2025): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.30983/itr.v3i1.9352>.
- Majid, Abdul, Mahdalena Nasrun, Novizal Wendry, Ruslan Sangaji, and Abdul Hakim. "Salafi, Hadith, and Islamic Law: Identity Politics and Wahabi Movement in East Kalimantan." *Ahkam: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 23, no. 1 (2023): 147–70. <https://doi.org/10.15408/ajis.v23i1.32139>.
- Ibn Manẓūr. *Lisān al-'Arab*. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, n.d.
- March, Andrew F. "Political Islam: Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science* 18, no. February (2015): 103–23. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-082112-141250>.
- McCauley, Clark, and Sophia Moskalenko. "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 20, no. 3 (2008): 415–33. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550802073367>.
- Mohammed, Tawffeeq A.S. "A Scientometric Study of Maqasid Al-Shariah Research: Trending Issues, Hotspot Research, and Co-Citation Analysis." *Frontiers in Research Metrics and Analytics* 9, no. 2 (2024): 87–90. <https://doi.org/10.3389/frma.2024.1439407>.
- Mustaqim, Abdul. "Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsir Maqashidi Sebagai Basis Moderasi Islam." *UIN Sunan Kalijaga* 9 (2019): 45–49.
- . *Argumentasi Keniscayaan Tafsir Maqāshidi Sebagai Basis Moderasi Islam*. Yogyakarta: UIN Sunan Kalijaga Press, 2019. <https://archive.org/details/abdul-mustaqim-argumentasi-keniscayaan-tafsir-maqashidi-sebagai-basis-moderasi-i>.
- Nuba, Mohd Sulaiman, Mohd Anuar Ramli, Mohd Farhan, and Md Ariffin. "Ibn

- Taimiyyah's View of Al-Tasyabbuh : An Analysis of His Iqtida' Al-Sirat Al-Mustaqim Li Mukhalafah Ashab Al - Jahim." *RIS: Online Journal Research in Islamic Studies* 3, no. 1 (2016): 43–55. <https://doi.org/10.15364/ris16-0301-02>.
- Opwis, Felicitas. "Maslaha in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory." *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 2 (2005): 182–223. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3399225>.
- Qutb, Sayyid. *Ma'ālim Fī Al-Ṭarīq*. Kairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1964. <https://archive.org/details/m3alem>.
- Qutb, Sayyid. *Fī Zilāl Al-Qur'ān*. Kairo: Dār al-Syurūq, 2003.
- Rahmatulloh, M. Sultan Latif, and Durotul Ngazizah. "Tafsir Salafi Online Di Indonesia; *Al-Walā' wa Al-Barā'* Sebagai Landasan Pergerakan Salafi Jihadis." *Journal of Islamic Civilization* 3, no. 2 (March 30, 2022): 160–73. <https://doi.org/10.33086/jic.v3i2.2650>.
- Riḍā, Muḥammad Rashīd. *Tafsīr Al-Manār*. Kairo: al-Hay'ah al-Miṣriyyah al-Āmmah li al-Kitāb, 1990.
- Roy, Olivier. *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*. New York: Columbia University, 2006.
- Sa'diyah, Halimatus, and Amrulloh. "Al-Wala' Wal Bara': Loyalty, Identity, and the Prophet's Message through the Lens of Hadith Criticism." *Journal of Qur'an and Hadith* 14, no. 2 (2025): 271–87. <https://doi.org/10.15408/quhas.v14i2.46550>.
- Saeed, Abdullah. *Interpreting the Qur'an: Towards a Contemporary Approach*. New York: Routledge, 2006. <https://archive.org/details/interpretingqura0000saeed>.
- . *Reading the Qur'an in the Twenty-First Century: A Contextualist Approach*. London: Routledge, 2014.
- Said, Muhtar, Moh Fadli, Aan Eko Widiarto, and Dhia Al-Uyun. "Between Revelation and Constitution: The Sovereignty Fiqh of Muhammad Yamin's Sociopolitical Ijtihād." *Journal of Islamic Law* 6, no. 2 (July 2025): 236–64. <https://doi.org/10.24260/jil.v6i2.4220>.
- Sandy, Sarah Shafira. "Indeks Kerukunan Umat Beragama Naik, Tertinggi Dalam 11 Tahun." kemenag.go.id, 2025. <https://kemenag.go.id/nasional/indeks-kerukunan-umat-beragama-naik-tertinggi-dalam-11-tahun-3l3Iw>.
- Shavit, Uri. "Can Muslims Befriend Non-Muslims? Debating Al-Walā' Wa-Al-Barā' in Theory and Practice." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 25, no. 1 (2014): 67–88. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09596410.2013.851329>.
- Slamet. "Trilogi Ukhuwah: Fondasi Pembangunan Indonesia." www.nu.or.id, 2017. <https://www.nu.or.id/opini/trilogi-ukhuwah-fondasi-pembangunan-indonesia-42oXD>.
- Soesanto, Abimanyu Iqbal. "Radical Reform: Studi Analitis Konsep Ijtihad Tariq Ramadan." *AL-MANHAJ: Jurnal Hukum Dan Pranata Sosial Islam* 4, no. 1 (2022): 51–60. <https://doi.org/10.37680/almanhaj.v4i1.1545>.
- Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad. *Iqtida' al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm li-Mukhālafat*

- Aṣḥāb al-Jahīm. Beirut: Dār ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1999.
- Wagemakers, Joas. *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139049399>.
- . “The Concept of *Al-Walā’ wa Al-Barā’* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi.” *Religion Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 820–835. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00096>.
- . “The Enduring Legacy of The Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of Al-Wala Wa Al-Bara.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 44, no. 1 (2012): 93–110. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743811001267>.
- Warren, David H., and Christine Gilmore. “One Nation Under God? Yusuf Al-Qaradawi’s Changing Fiqh of Citizenship in The Light of The Islamic Legal Tradition.” *Contemporary Islam* 8, no. 3 (2014): 217–37. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11562-013-0277-4>.
- Wiktorowicz, Quintan. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29, no. 3 (2006): 207–239. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100500497004>.
- Ya‘lā, Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Ibn Abī. *Ṭabaqāt Al-Ḥanābilah*. Kairo: Maṭba‘at al-Sunnah al-Muḥammadiyah, 1952. https://books.google.co.id/books/about/Ṭabaqāt_al_Ḥanābilah.html?id=pUHYAAAAMAAJ&redir_esc=y.

